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This study examines the creation of a criminogenic policy, NAFTA, and its subsequent
social harms that primarily impacted poor rural farmers and indigenous people in Mexico.
Previous research into state-corporate crime has focused on crimes committed by one state and
one corporation, while little research has investigated the commission of crimes by more than
one state operating in collusion. Previous research on human rights violations has emphasized
genocide and physical integrity rights, while this study raises attention to “lesser” human rights
violations such as abusive working conditions, lack of political participation in policy formation,
and limited access to clean air and water. Criminogenic policies can contribute to these forms of
human rights violations, and offer one avenue for studying the relationship between states.
Using criminogenic policy as a guiding concept, this study asks and begins to answer at least
three questions: (1) Can policies (e.g., treaties, declarations, conventions, charters, etc.) legally
created cause social harm (crime/human rights violations)?; (2) Are some policies criminogenic
based on how they are formed?; and (3) Was NAFTA criminal and/or criminogenic?
Utilizing case study method, this study employs an analytical framework for studying
criminogenic policies to the case of NAFTA. This framework is informed by four primary
bodies of literature including state-corporate crime, world-systems analysis, social structure of
accumulation theory, and neo-Gramscian work on the transnational capitalist class. Numerous

sources including academic journals, newspapers, historical archives, meeting memos, recorded
phone conversations, NGO reports, and governmental documents are used to reconstruct the time
before, during, and after the NAFTA negotiations and their subsequent social harms.
The results from this study indicate that members of a transnational capitalist class
spanning North America including political leaders, business elites, prominent intellectuals,
media pundits, and members of international financial institutions heavily influenced the creation
of NAFTA. The TCC actively blocked public participation in NAFTA, and Mexico desperate
for foreign investment gave larger concessions than either the United States or Canada. In the
over twenty years since NAFTA, various social harms have affected primarily rural farmers and
indigenous people in Mexico. Of these effects, this study documents the poverty, inequality, unand underemployment, harsh working conditions, lax workers’ rights and protections,
displacement, product-dumping, improper removal of toxic wastes, deforestation, water
shortages, soil erosion, air and water pollution, exploitation of guest workers, and drug-, border-,
and immigration-related violence in Mexico as a result of NAFTA. This study charges that
NAFTA is criminal and/or criminogenic on three counts violating the UN International Bill of
Human Rights: (1) the NAFTA negotiation process was criminal and criminogenic for its
undemocratic structure, influence of the TCC, and oppression of opposition groups, (2) the
written text of NAFTA was criminal and criminogenic for its failure to include human rights
protections; and (3) NAFTA was criminogenic for the various listed social harms that occurred
as a partial result of NAFTA.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

After years of negotiation, on January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade
Agreement went into effect in Mexico. In response, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation
(EZLN aka the Zapatistas) declared war against the Mexican government in one of the most
intense and extreme responses to a free trade agreement. Given the magnitude of this level of
response to the implementation of NAFTA, there was a stark polarization among the population
over NAFTA. EZLN leadership sought to speak on the behalf of the entire country’s indigenous
people and subsistence farmers, despite being headquartered in Mexico’s most southern region
of Chiapas (Marcos 2004; EL Kilombo Intergalactico 2008). The conflict between Mexico’s
indigenous population and the ruling class dates back to conquest of the Spanish conquistadoras
led by Hernán Cortés around 500 years ago, yet this conflict intensified when the Zapatista
movement strongly opposed President Salinas’ reform of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution.
This 1992 reform put an end to land reform by allowing privatization of ejidos known as
community or public landholdings. Effectively, this reform privatized communal lands and
criminalized some ejidatarios as land-squatters. In other words, ejidatarios did not own the land
formerly, but did have the right to cultivate it prior to the 1992 reform. The EZLN was a major
critic of this reform and the overall movement towards a neoliberal globalized economy,
particularly NAFTA as a major policy intended to achieve this goal (Barry 1995; Suchlicki
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1996). The opposition of NAFTA was so strong that the Zapatistas formally declared war on the
Mexican government.
NAFTA has been the subject of widespread scrutiny including numerous scholarly
studies, NGO reports, and journalistic accounts that document a wide range of outcomes
attributable to NAFTA. These outcomes run the gamut from economic growth to destruction of
agriculture. Objective assessment of NAFTA and its implications is difficult because most
sources tend to be partisan – either for or against NAFTA. In this dissertation, I will make use of
the tremendous amount of literature on NAFTA to investigate its effects on Mexican citizens,
primarily its indigenous population and individuals in the agricultural sector. I focus on these
effects specifically, since this is where critiques of NAFTA have been most vocal in displaying
their disapproval. If social scientists are tasked with giving voice to the disadvantaged, then
critics of NAFTA, found in Mexico, must be heard and their arguments objectively evaluated
rather than dismissed or ignored without thorough investigation. Critics of NAFTA have
identified several social harms attributable, at least, in part to the implementation of NAFTA.
The list is quite long, but a few of these social harms include widespread poverty, particularly in
rural areas (World Bank 2005; Gonzalez 2011; Public Citizen 2014); increased unemployment
(Wise 1998; Trading Economics 2016); slumping real wages (Wise 1998; Trading Economics
2016); large scale displacement (Bacon 2014a); mass migration to the United States and violence
along the border (Bacon 2008; 2013); deteriorating labor conditions (Salas, Campbell, and Scott
2001); weakening of union membership and activity (Human Rights Watch 1996; 2001); civil
unrest by groups such as the Zapatistas that has been met with violence by the state (Knoll
2014); intense violence associated with the rise of the drug trade that employs many displaced
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Mexicans (Watt and Zepeda 2012); and escalated environmental pollution and destruction
(Gallagher 2004).
The central focus of this dissertation is on the social harms related to the agricultural
sector in Mexico, stemming from the implementation of NAFTA (Rivera, Whiteford, and
Chávez 2009). The NAFTA-induced changes in the agricultural sector include a series of other
social harms such as soaring food prices, particularly corn or corn based foods (Fox and Haight
2010); use of dangerous insecticides (Gonzalaez 2011); malnutrition resulting from exposure of
citizens to a neoliberal diet (Otero, Pechlaner, and Gurcan 2015); contamination of groundwater
from agricultural runoff (Gonzalez 2011); loss of Mexican food sovereignty (Otero 2011);
deleterious effects of U.S. food dumping (Wise 2009); and job loss and displacement of rural
farmers in Mexico (Public Citizen 2001). These social harms in the agricultural sector have
contributed to and compounded several of the other more general social harms stemming from
implementation of NAFTA. The destruction of the agricultural sector has contributed to illegal
immigration, individuals joining the ranks of the informal economy, especially the drug trade,
and other issues of displacement and mobility. In addition, Mexico’s loss of food sovereignty
and widespread poverty created dangerous conditions during the global food price hikes in 200708. Resistance movements have formed due to several of these conditions and created a
turbulent dynamic between disgruntled citizens and state agents. Both economic and political
stability are at stake in Mexico, and the United States has recently engaged in security-based
negotiations with Mexico with these two goals in mind.

4
NAFTA-induced Social Harms as Crime
Given that I intend this dissertation to make a contribution to the field of criminology, a
brief explanation of the classification of these NAFTA-induced social harms as crime and human
rights violations (HRVs) is crucial. Criminologists view crime as both harmful and blameworthy
(see Agnew 2011). However, the goal of this dissertation is not to simply document the
consequences of NAFTA as blameworthy harms and thus criminal. It goes further to reclassify
these crimes as HRVs. A criminological focus on HRVs is not necessarily novel, but
criminologists redefining crime in this way is new ground.1 Mainstream criminologists (see
Agnew 2011) have criticized Schwendinger and Schwendinger (2001) as subjectively redefining
particular crimes as HRVs. Nevertheless, the Schwendingers view HRVs as inextricably linked
with crime that undeniably fall in the realm of criminology. According to Schwendinger and
Schwendinger (2001: 85):
All persons must be guaranteed the fundamental prerequisites for well-being, including
food, shelter, clothing, medical services, challenging work, and recreational experiences,
as well as security from predatory individuals or imperialistic social elites. These
material requirements, basic services, and enjoyable relationships are not to be regarded
as rewards or privileges. They are rights!
Thus, consistent with this view, “in the process of redefining crime, criminologists will redefine
themselves, no longer to be defenders of order but rather guardians of human rights”
(Schwendinger and Schwendinger 2001: 89). It seems very clear to them that any definition of
crime should not be bounded by the legal code. However, the primary criticism with the HRV
approach is that human rights are not well defined (see Agnew 2011). Agnew suggests that
criminologists may disagree on the definition of human rights, and any research taking this
approach must provide a clear definition of HRVs. Agnew sees international law as providing

1

Several other criminologists have used similar human rights approaches (Barak 1994; Green and Ward 2004;
Hillyard, Pantazis, Tombs, and Gordon 2004; Passas and Goodwin 2004; Pemberton 2007).

5
this definition, although this approach can be criticized as bounded by law despite its
transcendence of domestic law. In addition, he criticizes the Schwnedingers for not providing a
list of HRVs. A complete list of violations considering the Schwedingers’ more expansive
definition of HRVs would be quite extensive, and they understandably did not attempt to make a
comprehensive list.

International Law and the Definition of Crime and Criminogenic
In an attempt to appease critics such as Agnew, I adopt the stance of Rothe, Mullins, and
Sandstrom (2009) on attributing HRVs to policies, particularly economic policies. Specifically,
The direct manipulation of a state’s economic processes and ownership structures
violates core human rights standards, especially as embodied by the 1974 Declaration on
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (UNGA 3201/s-vii), the
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Human Rights (2003), the Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Human Rights, the Maastricht Guidelines (1997), and the
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with regard to Human Rights Agreement (2003). In this light, the economic
manipulations promoted by the World Bank and IMF look far more like neocolonial
intervention strategies than philanthropic assistance to global neighbors in need. These
manipulations constitute a forceful and direct resubordination of postcolonial economies
to former colonial powers and markets. Though it could be argued that global economic
reorganization in the postcolonial environment has resulted in the reestablishment of
informal colonial relations, structural adjustment programs serve to formalize and
crystallize these relationships (Rothe et al. 2009: 82).2
Thus, Rothe et al. (2009) view many of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
policies as predatory agreements that coercively reconstruct developing nations’ economies.
Although these policies may differ from state bilateral and multilateral agreements, Rothe et al.’s
argument is crucial to this dissertation because they emphasize the imbalanced nature of these

22

See the several bodies of international law listed (Maastrict Guidelines 1997; UN 1966b; 1974; 2003) and the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ website at
http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx.
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agreements and, more importantly, they classify these types of agreements as either being or
contributing to HRVs.
Unfortunately, Rothe et al. (2009), as well as others (Green and Ward 2004; Hillyard,
Pantazis, Tombs, and Gordon 2004; Passas and Goodwin 2004; Pemberton 2007), tend not to
provide a comprehensive list of what is and is not a HRV. However, they list several bodies of
international law that are useful in providing the groundwork for a more concrete
operationalization of HRVs. Although a thoughtful discussion on the definition of human rights
can be fruitful, I will not attempt to create the desired comprehensive list of HRVs, but this
dissertation should help define HRVs. HRVs will be understood as blameworthy harms using
the several bodies of international law as guidelines for difficult judgement calls.3
The United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) should be
added to the previous list of international laws (UN 1948). The UDHR established a worldwide
definition of human rights that researchers began using to operationalize human rights (Claude
and Jabine 1986). Claude and Jabine (1986) identify three distinct categories of HRVs: security
and integrity rights (also known as physical integrity rights), civil and social rights, and
socioeconomic rights including wealth distribution, standard of living, and unemployment. Of
the three categories, most countries keep records on social indicators that are classified under
socioeconomic rights. For example, health indicators such as the infant mortality rate and life
expectancy are often recorded by countries around the world. On the other hand, states tend not
to keep records on indicators in the other two categories, especially when governed by repressive
regimes. Despite data on social indicators being recorded, they are often not viewed as

3

The United States often leaves international human rights bodies of law unratified (e.g. ICESCR), but this analysis
holds to the definition of crime as blameworthy harms. Thus, the United States does not have to ratify these bodies
of law to be labeled criminal.
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indicators of HRVs. Thus, a high infant mortality rate, although classifiable under a violation of
socioeconomic rights, typically is not discussed as a HRV. However, the current dissertation
expands beyond the traditional exploration of HRVs to include all three types of HRVs described
by Claude and Jabine (1986), thus filling a gap in the human rights literature.
Since the words crime, criminal, and criminogenic will be used throughout this
dissertation, it is important to clearly define them upfront. Most importantly, crime is defined
succinctly as blameworthy harm in line with many critical criminologists (Agnew 2011). More
specifically, crime is used in this dissertation as an extension of Iadicola and Shupe’s (2013)
definition of violence. Thus, crime can be defined as “any action, inaction, or structural
arrangement that results in physical or nonphysical harm to one or more persons” regardless of
legality (Iadicola and Shupe (2013:26). Furthermore, crime is willful, not necessarily
intentional, possibly justified by the actor(s), and perhaps unrecognized as violence by the
perpetrator or victim. Any use of the word criminal relates to this definition of crime. Thus, to
say something is criminal, simply means that it violated the standard of crime laid out here.
Finally, the definition of criminogenic also derives from this definition of crime. Something that
is criminogenic is so because it creates conditions that do or are likely to lead to criminal
outcomes. Like crime, something that is criminogenic is made criminogenic willfully,
potentially without intent, possibly justified by the actor(s), and perhaps unrecognized as crime
by either the perpetrator or victim. Therefore, a criminogenic policy is a policy that willfully
creates the conditions conducive for criminal outcomes. The following chapter takes this up
again and specifies the use of the term policy.

8
Theoretical Contribution to Criminology
This dissertation examines the construction of NAFTA and its effects. Instead of simply
asking the question, “Did NAFTA have negative effects on Mexican citizens?” I ask, “is/was
NAFTA a criminogenic policy?” In other words, did economic and political elites from both the
United States and Mexico formulate and come to an accord on NAFTA’s parameters with an
understanding of the high likelihood for social harms due to the structure of NAFTA? This
concept of a criminogenic policy is novel and contributes to the criminological literature,
specifically research on state-corporate crime, for a variety of reasons.
First, and most importantly, it fills a major gap in the literature that fails to investigate
state crimes where more than one state is criminally responsible. Virtually all of the statecorporate crime literature make some use of Kramer and Michalowski’s (2006) integrated
theoretical model of state-corporate crime, or Rothe and Mullins (2009) extension of this model.
Using these models as a framework for analysis, state-corporate crime research tends to focus on
either a government, corporation, or both in collusion in committing a crime. One state is
typically considered criminal. However, given the advent of neoliberal globalization and the
interweaving of political, economic, and cultural systems internationally, two (or more) states
could and have committed crimes collectively. Therefore, like traditional state-corporate crime
theory that explains the conditions under which a state and a corporation can collude to commit
crimes, this dissertation expands this tradition to allow for the investigation of multiple states
colluding to commit crime.
Second, the concept of criminogenic policy provides one avenue for studying multiple
participating criminal states. Policy becomes a useful unit of analysis for this type of research.
The crimes of globalization literature has studied the social harm impacts of policies
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implemented by the World Bank and IMF, as described earlier in Rothe et al.’s (2009) study.
Although the approach I use is not completely new, it expands beyond these international
institutions to look at bilateral (or multilateral) negotiations between states that create and
implement policy that produces social harm, in general, and HRVs, in particular. In other words,
policy provides a public source for tracing bilateral (or multilateral) relationships as it is a
byproduct of these relations. Unlike the crimes of globalization literature, then, this dissertation
focuses on the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States through the study of
NAFTA’s formation and implementation.
Third, the balance or imbalance of power between the two (or more) states whose
relationship is under investigation is paramount for studying criminogenic policy. In the case of
the United States and Mexico, there is an imbalance of political, economic, and cultural power
that must be considered when interested in the policy that is created based on these countries’
agreements. This dissertation incorporates Wallerstein’s (1974; 2004) world-systems analysis
into state-corporate crime research to uniquely assess policy formation and its consequences as
potentially harmful given the power imbalance between the United States and Mexico.
Lastly, this dissertation adds to criminologists’ attempts at expanding the definition of
crime to included HRVs (Barak 1994; Schwendinger and Schwendinger 2001; Green and Ward
2004). Most obviously, investigating policy as a HRV, or major factor causing HRVs, is unique.
Economic policy that restructures the marketplace can have profound effects on workers in the
country(ies) that the policy affects. Therefore, instead of looking at joblessness,
underemployment, and widespread hunger as unavoidable catastrophes, these can be classified as
HRVs arising from economic policy agreements. In other words, these criminogenic policies
occupy a new territory in criminology worthy of investigation. This study will test the

10
boundaries of what mainstream criminologists consider crime. Similarly, the definition of HRVs
is also expanded in this dissertation, and will be discussed in the next section.

Contributions to the Human Rights Literature
Scholars of human rights who study HRVs have drawn two conclusions that have been
particularly harmful to any further research on HRVs (Hafner-Burton 2014; Regilme 2014).
Both are discussed in more detail in the theoretical chapter and are referred to as logics of the
human rights literature. The first is the “failed state” logic that suggests that HRVs are primarily
the result of “failed states” or states that lack the ability to establish social, political, and cultural
equity, an unbiased criminal justice system, and state of security for its citizens. Thus, these
researchers often categorize weak states as failed when they do not have a strong military or
police force to maintain the rule of law. In this dissertation, I refute this logic because it often
classifies HRVs as non-systematic, accidental, or unfortunate events. Instead, I emphasize that
any weak state explanation is harmful since it releases the state from any culpability it may have
in the commission of HRVs. Furthermore, weak states must be understood as weak in relation to
stronger states. Policy formation between a strong and weak state may effectively make or keep
a state weak due to the power imbalance being embedded in their agreement. My focus on
NAFTA provides an opportunity to closely examine this possibility.
The other misleading conclusion of the human rights literature is the “few bad apples”
logic. According to this logic, human rights scholars focus on a few bad individuals as being
culpable for HRVs without recognizing that there may be criminogenic institutions,
organizations, and cultures. Thus, the removal of a “corrupt” state agent who has ordered the use
of torture on citizens often has little effect on reducing HRVs because that individual is quickly
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replaced and tends to commit similar abuses if the state organization is left unchanged. In other
words, individuals’ behaviors must be understood within the context of the societal structure,
institutional forms, and cultural milieu. These contextualizations should go a long way in
illuminating the intricacies of blame for HRVs.
This dissertation contributes to the human rights literature in a few other ways as well.
Most importantly, it investigates HRVs that are often times neglected in this literature because of
a narrow focus on particular HRVs such as genocide or physical integrity rights (i.e., torture,
disappearances, political imprisonment, and extrajudicial killings). Although civil rights and
liberties, workers’ rights, and women’s rights have gained some recent attention (Cingranelli and
Richards 2010), they are still underdeveloped, and rights such as those listed by the
Schwendingers (2001) including the right to food, shelter, and challenging work, have not been
examined. This dissertation provides a deeper look into how these “lesser” HRVs develop in a
country. Specifically, NAFTA provides a useful case of a potentially criminogenic policy that
established the conditions under which HRVs occurred. Referring to the extended list above of
HRVs resulting from NAFTA, at least in part, NAFTA can be viewed as an economic policy that
has led to harmful outcomes such as displacement, unemployment, and poverty. Using the
interpretation offered by Rothe et al. (2009), this policy ostensibly can be classified as a HRV, or
as contributing to HRVs.
Furthermore, this dissertation challenges another potentially dangerous conclusion of the
human rights literature perpetuated by human rights organizations. With the primary focus on
physical integrity rights, both human rights scholars and non-government organizations (NGOs)
tend to conclude that a country is doing well once its physical integrity rights decrease.
However, this may be a dangerous conclusion to draw if other, “lesser” HRVs still persist. For
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instance, although extrajudicial killings may decrease, widespread poverty may increase.
Therefore, to say that a country is to be praised for its human rights record in this example can be
counterproductive to making progress on its other forms of HRVs. Would domestic violence
scholars conclude that women who are no longer being raped, but are still being beaten, are
experiencing an improvement in their daily lives? Perhaps, but the point is there is still work to
be done in this area.
Lastly, if nothing else, the current dissertation contributes empirically to this body of
literature simply through its documentation of these less-studied HRVs. In addition,
investigating how policy can shape HRVs within a country is a useful contribution to the human
rights literature. Human rights scholars have alluded to this focus on policy, but no serious
studies have examined their impact in creating conditions for HRVs. Instead, most of the
research on policies has looked at countries signing international bodies of law and their effect
on reducing HRVs.

Significance of the Study
Given the global impact of economic restructuring, the implications of this study could
well go beyond those for NAFTA’s effects on Mexico. One of my primary goals is to
demonstrate how policies can legally cause various social harms and thus should be labeled
criminogenic. If policies are operating within a legal framework, any of their harms are
particularly dangerous because they may go unrecognized and/or unaddressed. In addition, the
perpetrators or benefactors of these policies may not face any major criticisms. If such policies
are understood as potentially harmful, then the significance of this study cannot be understated.
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By demonstrating that policies, often arrived at legally, can cause widespread social harm, this
dissertation speaks primarily to two groups
First, international law can incorporate the findings of this study to implement more
protections for ordinary citizens from the dangerous agreements made between powerful nations
and those less powerful in the name of profits. Although it has already been mentioned that
certain bodies of international law can be interpreted to encompass economic restructuring, such
as in NAFTA, as a violation of international law, international law could be expanded to make
the crimes I cover in this dissertation more explicitly illegal. Identifying “legal” harms should be
of particular importance to law makers.
In addition to informing international law makers, and perhaps more importantly, this
dissertation should contain implications for human rights organizations. Thus, human rights
organizations can reshape their institutions to include the HRVs studied here. With the inclusion
of these HRVs, human rights organizations can extend the boundaries of what mainstream
society deems a HRV. One of the goals of this dissertation is to critique these organizations as
not extending their definitions of HRVs far enough, as this can be harmful to victims of “lesser”
HRVs. Through changing human rights organizations, international law makers may follow suit
and sometime down the road implement concrete changes in human rights through major
declarations and treaties.

Research Design
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the effects of NAFTA by tracing its
formation during the negotiation process, focusing primarily on the relationship between the U.S.
and Mexican states, and then documenting the outcomes of NAFTA of its implementation using
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case study methods. To achieve this goal, the dissertation includes the following parts. Chapter
2 constructs an integrated analytical model to explore how criminogenic policy can contribute to
HRVs. This proposed model borrows from a diverse theoretical literature including statecorporate crime, social structure of accumulation theory, and world-systems analysis.
Additionally, I redefine HRVs as crimes to utilize criminological thought when explaining these
abuses. Chapter 3 reviews the empirical literature most relevant to this criminological approach
to studying HRVs. The crimes of globalization literature offers the most relevant research to this
dissertation since it focuses on policy effects on human rights conditions and crime. As stated,
much of the work done on HRVs has focused on physical integrity rights, and nine case studies
of Latin American countries offer a rich amount of detail on states committing these abuses
against their citizens. I briefly review each of these cases, and their findings are instrumental in
the design of this dissertation. Chapter 4 critically evaluates case study methods and their
suitability for the current dissertation. Then, I provide the research procedure in detail and
justify the decisions made throughout the project. Chapter 5 reconstructs the events leading up
to NAFTA negotiations. Mexico’s social, political, and economic background is detailed to give
context to the negotiation process. Chapter 6 focuses on the NAFTA negotiations and its
implementation process. A major goal of this chapter is to gain insight into the U.S.-Mexico
relationship in order to understand the impacts of NAFTA. Chapter 7 focuses on those impacts
with a comparison of Mexican workers’ conditions before and after NAFTA, specifically
narrowing in on the conditions of Mexican agriculture and indigenous populations. Chapter 8
summarizes the connections between NAFTA and its aftereffects while emphasizing the
importance of analyzing this policy as criminogenic. Finally, I conclude with theoretical and
empirical contributions, avenues for future research, and limitations of the study.
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CHAPTER 2
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING CRIMINOGENIC POLICIES

Chapter Overview
This chapter begins by critiquing the various logics that inform the human rights
literature4 in its study of human rights violations (HRVs). Based on my critique, I redefine
HRVs to include state or state-corporate crimes or blameworthy harms to make the argument that
HRVs are crime. Once this conception of HRVs as state or state-corporate crimes is established,
several theories are employed to create an integrated analytical framework for exploring how
international policy impacts HRVs and this policy formation and implementation can be viewed
as state or state-corporate crime. The proposed analytical framework is primarily informed by
state-corporate crime theory, world-systems analysis, social structure of accumulation theory, the
concept of the transnational capitalist class. Each of these diverse theoretical perspectives offers
something different in helping to explore HRVs and their relation to policy creation. The
foundation of the proposed analytical framework involves international state relationships and
the bilateral creation of policy. These policies are essential for study as they are products of
international relationships, and in turn potentially create conditions and circumstances under
which HRVs are committed. This chapter introduces each connected piece of the proposed

4

The human rights literature refers to a wide body of research encompassing empirical findings from the economic,
international relations, political science, and peace studies literatures. A majority of these studies are quantitative
investigations of PIRs while ignoring many other HR such as civil rights and liberties, workers’ rights, and women’s
rights. See Hafner-Burton (2014), Regilme (2014), and Giuliani and Macchi (2014) for extensive overviews of this
literature.
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analytical framework while drawing connections between them. Lastly, the chapter will
conclude by reiterating the entire framework and summarizing its parts and connections. Before
continuing it may be helpful to view this framework in its entirety. The proposed analytical
framework can be seen in Figure 2.1.

Human Rights Violations as State Crimes
Failed State Logic
An underlying logic found throughout much of the human rights literature is that of failed
states which are often blamed for HRVs (Skocpol 1985; Frynas 1998; Ruggie 2006; 2009; 2010;
Englehart 2009). In other words, a state’s inability to secure some level of social and political
equality, uphold the rule of law and impartiality, and protect its citizens against abuses,
especially HRVs, are the primary reasons for a state to be defined as a failed state. Failed states
are also viewed as governments that lose control of the population. Although the human rights
literature provides many mixed results, two pervasive conclusions continually surface: (1)
democracy provides a buffering effect against HRVs (Risse 1995; Russett 2005; Davenport
2007a; Callaway and Matthews 2010); and (2) conflict, whether it is internal or external,
increases the likelihood of HRVs (Rasler 1986; Davenport 2007b; Shor et al. 2014; HafnerBurton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014). Both of these findings are incorporated in failed state logic.
The inability to secure democracy or ongoing political instability can be viewed as failures of the
state that lead to HRVs (Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1996; Zanger 2000; Harff 2003).
Conflict can oftentimes be framed within a “breakdown of law” argument, as HRVs result from a
weak state capacity to resolve or contain conflicts (Rasler 1986). Yet, the reason for a state’s
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weak capacity should be questioned. When the state is in an unbalanced relationship with
another, the stronger state may be responsible for maintaining the weaker state’s capacity.
The pervasive logic of failed states argues that HRVs are caused by the failure of states
due to the inability of the state in some facet, but this logic works against a more profound and
nuanced understanding of HRVs and their causes. This logic sees HRVs as non-systematic,
accidental, or unfortunate events which leads to ignoring intentional commission of HRVs by
individuals, corporations, or states that in turn benefit from these abuses. With the propagation
of this logic in academia, perpetrators of HRVs may avoid culpability for otherwise blameworthy
harms by avoiding detection. In other words, when purposeful, systematic HRVs are defined as
accidental or unavoidable, the perpetrators and benefactors of those violations are freed from
criminal culpability and left to potentially recommit similar offenses. The failed state logic must
be replaced by a more accurate depiction of how and why these abuses are committed in order to
hold violators of human rights accountable.
The first step in moving beyond the failed state view of HRVs as accidental and
unfortunate events is to redefine HRVs as crimes. Interestingly, criminologists have not often
sought explanations for HRVs, but they have still studied HRVs, most notably genocides
(Hagan, Rymond-Richmond, and Parker 2005; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009; Winton
2011; Olusanya 2013; Pruitt 2014; 2015). Furthermore, these criminologists tend to use
international law as the basis for determining criminal activity that includes HRVs. It certainly is
not hard to make the argument that HRVs, especially physical integrity rights violations, are
crimes when considering treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR; UN 1966a) and the Convention against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (UN 1984) which both state that torture is a violation of international
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law. In addition, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948) has inspired several
human rights treaties and declarations that have established the importance of HRVs.
For this dissertation, the definition of crime can be expanded further to include acts that
may be legal—but cause serious injury—by defining crime as “blameworthy harms,” as is
typical in the state-corporate crime literature. Defining crime as blameworthy harm is essential
because law is constantly in flux, and the hope is that harmful acts where someone is culpable
will be made illegal. The ambiguity of blameworthy harm has been questioned (Agnew 2011).
The existence of harm is to a certain extent determined by the researcher, and HRVs are often
encouraged to be used as an indicator. Fagan (2005:1) offers another useful definition of a HRV
as anything that disrupts “the necessary conditions for leading a minimally good life.” Thus, in
this study, HRVs will be defined as crimes that violate international law or blameworthy social
harms.

Social Harm as Violence
Before progressing, it is useful to briefly expand on this dissertation’s use of the terms
crime, blameworthy social harm, and HRVs by using Iadicola and Shupe’s (2013: 26) definition
of violence described as “any action, inaction, or structural arrangement that results in physical
or nonphysical harm to one or more persons.” Violence (and by extension crime/HRVs) is
willful, not necessarily intentional, possibly justified by the actor, perhaps unrecognized as
violence by the perpetrator or victim, and universal. Such a definition allows an investigation
into the accidental and unfortunate (unintentional) to explore willful accidents where the accident
prone circumstances may have been created by willful intentions. When dealing with crimes of
the state that may be surreptitious or categorized as unintentional or unfortunate, such as the
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socially harmful effects of a policy, Iadicola and Shupe’s definition of violence is useful because
it goes beyond interpersonal violence and institutional violence to include structural violence that
occurs when the hierarchical ordering of individuals in a society is in the process of being
established, maintained, extended, or reduced. Policies may impact these structural
arrangements and thus contribute to social harms. Lastly, they discuss the triadic relationship of
violence, inequality, and human freedom. The three have dialectical relationships—violence and
inequality are positively correlated; violence and freedom are negatively correlated; and
inequality and freedom are negatively correlated. This triadic relationship allows for predictions
that increased inequality and decreased human freedom will likely increase HRVs.

“A Few Bad Apples” Logic
Many researchers studying HRVs have used principal-agent theory which contends that
principals and agents often have conflicting goals and both can pursue their own selfish interests
(Arrow 1985). Much attention is then focused on agents acting in their own self-interest leading
to the conclusion that there are some “bad agents” operating for a “good principal.” This
misdirection of culpability underlined in principal-agent theory highlights a second misleading
suggestion that individuals must be punished with no need to address criminogenic institutions,
organizations, or even the cultural zeitgeist. Corporate crime analysts have well debunked the
“few bad apples” logic by demonstrating that corporate crime can, in fact, best be viewed as the
result of cost-benefit analyses made by CEOs and other executives and managers (Paternoster
and Simpson 1996). Morality and legality tend not to be weighed heavily in this rational
calculus (Vaughan 1998). Corporate crime specialists have therefore argued that corporations
must be held accountable as organizations rather than removing the few “bad” individuals
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(Braithwaite and Fisse 1990). Otherwise, these individuals will be replaced with new individuals
who, immersed in the corporate culture, will act in similar ways as the supplanted “bad”
individuals (Friedrichs 2010). In the middle of the twentieth century, Sutherland (1949)
established that corporations were repeat offenders, finding that 97.1 percent of the 70 largest
corporations in his day were repeat offenders. With high rates of repeat offending, it should be
clear that something other than individual agents should be viewed as culpable for corporate
crime whether it be corporations, capitalism, or the culture of competition.
Organizational theory also helps to explain corporate and state-corporate crime by
identifying corporations or governments as organizations highly resistant to change and
primarily interested in self-preservation (March and Olsen, 1984; Avant, 1993). When the selfpreservation of organizational theory is applied to governments and corporations within a global
capitalist system designed around “profit or perish,” it is less surprising to discover the lengths
that these organizations are likely to go to survive. Morgan (1997) uses analogies such as
machines, organisms, brains, and cultures to describe organizations and how they are something
greater than, or at least different than, the sum of their individual parts. Therefore, removing a
small part of an organism, does not stop the organism, but rather that part is either replaced or its
role is taken over by another part. In other words, the removal of the “bad apples” will not
correct the systemic issues deeply embedded within the state, corporation, or other organization
that lead to corporate or state-corporate crime.
In an extension of the “few bad apples” perspective, Bohara et al. (2008) argue for
analytically approaching HRVs as policies that may be implemented by states to achieve selfish
goals and manage the population. Understanding HRVs through policy formation is crucial for
this dissertation, as one state’s influence over another can be discovered through treaties and
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agreements made between those countries, and these policies can then lead to HRVs. Bohara et
al. (2008) do not explicitly label HRVs as crimes, but do establish a framework for
understanding them as intentional and purposeful. They also described the “collusive principal”
that explains cases where states may employ particular agents to pursue the interests of the state,
but also allow the government to place blame on them if their actions draw negative attention. In
other words, states may minimize risk by hiding behind “bad individuals” directing attention
away from the state as criminal itself, while also maximizing benefit via these agents’ actions.

State-Corporate Crime
One professor of international law, Susan Marks (2011), wishes to advance the
theoretical explanation for HRVs by abandoning the “few bad apples” and “failed states”
perspectives while replacing them with what she calls “planned misery.” Using the planned
misery perspective, she sees the actions taken by states as both willful and anticipating
subsequent HRVs. Under such a paradigm, these actions can otherwise be categorized as
blameworthy harms or state/state-corporate crime. With HRVs more appropriately categorized
as crimes, criminological theories can be used to help explain HRVs. Specifically, the statecorporate crime literature is most apt to provide this explanation.
Criminologists focusing on state-corporate crime often directly study HRVs without
necessarily using that language and, as stated before, tend not to engage the body of literature
studying causes of HRVs. Nonetheless, these criminologists, such as Ronald Kramer (2010a)
and Martha Huggins (2010), use criminological theory to explain the bombing of civilians and
institutionalized torture respectively. Both of these are HRVs, specifically physical integrity
rights violations consisting of extrajudicial killing and torture, both of which are investigated in
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the human rights literature. Although much of the previous research on HRVs from the human
rights literature has focused on the state, corporations have recently received more attention (see
Giuliani and Macchi 2014). The state-corporate crime literature argues that states and
corporations must be studied together because the interaction between them often leads to social
harm and analogous social injury, or, in the words of Kramer and Michalowski (2006: 20):
State-corporate crimes are illegal or socially injurious actions that result from a mutually
reinforcing interaction between (1) policies and/or practices in pursuit of goals of one or
more institutions of political governance and (2) policies and/or practices in pursuit of the
goals of one or more institutions of economic production and distribution.
For example, Dawn Rothe (2006) demonstrates how this intersection creates a mutually
beneficial coalition between the corporation and the state using the example of the U.S. military
in Iraq and the Haliburton Corporation.
Kramer and Michalowski’s (2006) integrated theoretical model of state-corporate crime
is essential to the current study. More than any other model, their theoretical framework has
provided a comprehensive and expansive explanation of why states and/or corporations conduct
harmful behavior and oftentimes in cooperation. Their complete model appears in Table 2.1.
This model offers several levels of analysis including the macro (institutional environment),
meso (organizational), and micro (interactional) which allows for the study of relationships that
exist both horizontally between states and corporations, for instance, and vertically between the
levels of analysis examining how corporate culture may impact the interactions of employees.
There are also three catalysts for action in the model—motivations, opportunities, and controls—
that all influence the likelihood of a state-corporate crime being committed. Similarly, this can
be applied to HRVs as it has been established that these are state or state-corporate crimes, often
intentional, and thus perpetrators of HRVs, whether states, corporations, or both, likely have
motivations for committing these abuses, the opportunity available to do so, and a lack of

Table 2.1. Kramer and Michalowski’s Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime
Catalysts for Action
Levels of Analysis
Institutional
Environment

Motivations
Culture of Competition
Economic Pressure
Organizational Goals
Performance Emphasis

Opportunities
Availability of Legal Means
Obstacles and Constraints
Blocked Goals/Strains
Availability of Illegal Means
Access to Resources

Controls
International Reactions
Political Pressure
Legal Sanctions
Media Scrutiny
Public Opinion
Social Movements

Organizational

Corporate Culture
Operative Goals
Subunit Goals
Managerial Pressure

Instrumental Rationality
Internal Constraints
Defective SOPs
Creation of Illegal Means
Role Specialization
Task Segregation
Computer, Telecommunication, and
Networking technologies
Normalization of Deviance

Culture of Compliance
Subcultures of Resistance
Codes of Conduct
Reward Structure
Safety and Quality Control
Communication Process

Interactional

Socialization
Social Meaning
Individual Goals
Competitive Individualism
Material Success Emphasis

Definitions of Situations
Perceptions of Availability and
Attractiveness of Illegal Means

Personal Morality
Rationalizations and Techniques of
Neutralization
Diffusion of Responsibility
Separation from Consequences
Obedience to Authority
Groupthink
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controls preventing them from violating human rights. Moreover, HRVs will likely be
committed by actors who are motivated and have opportunities to violate human rights while
facing few or no controls that can prevent them from committing these abuses.
The three catalysts for action must be understood in relation to each other within each
level of analysis. Motivations are directly linked to the goals of a particular state or corporation.
The motivation to achieve goals “by any means necessary” leads to the possibility of highly
motivated organizations or individuals conducting harmful acts. The unrestrained pursuit of
goals can lead in turn to criminal activity at all three levels of analysis: (1) individuals (micro
level) may harm others in route to achieving their goals; (2) organizations (meso level) may
implement injurious policies or their actions might hurt others and they may influence their
employees or members through their emphasis on cultural goals to put their organization before
the safety of others; and (3) the institutional environment (macro level) can create an atmosphere
of individualism and greed that engenders callous and detrimental behavior by individuals and
organizations operating within it.
Opportunities are equally important in explaining state-corporate crime in the integrated
model. Opportunities are bifurcated into legitimate and illegitimate means. The access to these
means is important in relation to goal attainment. On the one hand, the model postulates that
crime is unlikely to occur when goals can be met with legitimate means and those means are
readily available to the organization. On the other hand, crime is more probable under two
scenarios: (1) goal attainment is blocked through the use of only legitimate means, illegitimate
means can meet these goals, and the organization has access to the illegitimate means; or (2)
legitimate means may meet the goals, but the organization lacks access to these means and
instead has access to illegitimate means capable of achieving the same goals. The access to
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legitimate or illegitimate means is important at all three levels of analysis as well. The
institutional environment may shape the level of cultural acceptance of organizational deviance,
the use of illegitimate means may become normalized within particular organizations, and
individuals may experience pressure to use illegitimate means and receive rewards for using
them.
Controls encompass both the presence and absence of public scrutiny and official legal
sanctions for deviant organizational behavior. Again, the institutional environment may be a
culture of regulation dedicated to keeping powerful organizations in check, or one of
deregulation allowing organizations to self-regulate. Each type of environment will likely
impact organizations operating in them where self-regulating organizations may be more
inclined to be more lenient on themselves when pursuing goals unless strong social movements
or public scrutiny pressures them away from deviance. Lastly, members of organizations
become aware the punishment attached to different behaviors and may bend the rules where it
has been routinely accepted and rewarded.
Since the inception of the Kramer and Michalowski (2006) model, several state-corporate
crime researchers have utilized it to analyze and explain crimes of the powerful, but others have
also attempted to expand the original model. Most notably, Rothe and Mullins (2009) expand
the original model by splitting the control catalyst for action into controls and constraints, and
adding a fourth level of analysis by separating the institutional environment into the international
level and the state/structural level (See Table 2.2). Rothe and Mullins note that their model,
although seen as an extension of Kramer and Michalowski’s framework, does not strive for
empirical prediction. Instead, they present it as a tool for in-depth case exploration. Their
conception of the catalysts for action slightly differs from the original state-corporate crime

Table 2.2 Rothe and Mullins Integrated Theory of International Criminal Law Violations
Catalysts for Action
Opportunities
Constraints
International Relations
International Reaction
Economic Supremacy
Political Pressure
Military Supremacy
Public Opinion
Complementary Legal
NGOs/Social
Systems
Movements
Oversight

Levels of Analysis
International Level

Motivations
Political Interests
Economic Interests
Resources
Ideological Interests

Controls
International Law
International Sanctions
Economic Institutions

Macro Level
(State/Structural)

Structural Formations
Economic Pressure
Political Goals
Ethnogenses
Anomie

Availability of Illegal
Means
Control of Information
Propaganda
Structure of
Government

Political Pressure
Media Scrutiny
Public Opinion
Social Movements
Rebellion

Legal Sanctions
Domestic Law

Meso Level
(Organizational)

Organizational Culture
and Goals
Authoritarian Pressures
Reward Structures

Communication
Structures
Means Availability
Role Specialization

Internal Oversight
Communication
Structures
Traditional Authority
Structures

Formal Codes of
Conduct

Micro Level
(Interactional)

Socialization and
Psychological Frame of
Agent
Individual Goals and
Ideologies
Normalization of
Deviance
Definition of the Situation

Groupthink
Diffusion of
Responsibility
Perceived Illegal Means

Socialization
Obedience to Authority

Legitimacy of Law
Perception of Reality of
Law Application
Personal Morality
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model. Motivations can fall into one of two categories, either internal desires (e.g., political or
economic interests) or external factors driving the actors towards a particular behavior (e.g.,
economic pressures, organizational culture). External factors can influence internal desires. For
instance, a corporation operating within a highly competitive capitalist marketplace may be
driven to accept and internalize the logic of “profit or perish” incorporating it into its business
practices and business culture. Or, it is also possible that internal desires of a particular
organization can be forced into the global environment creating an external impetus for other
actors’ behaviors. For example, the U.S. struggle for economic supremacy has led to a particular
form of capitalism shaping the global economic system which, in turn, creates economic
pressures on various states and corporations worldwide. Opportunities are conceptualized as in
the original model with a primary focus on legitimate and illegitimate means, but power
relationships are emphasized in the model. Controls are defined as complete blockages to a
criminal act when criminal sanctions or penalties are an inevitable result of crime (i.e., domestic
or international law, legal sanctions). Constraints are conceived as obstacles to successful
commission of a crime (e.g., public opinion, political pressure, international reactions). In other
words, controls have the potential to stop crime from happening, while constraints are more like
roadblocks that must be circumvented by a criminal actor that only slow or reduce, but do not
prevent, criminal behavior.

Multiple State Crime Commission?
Although Rothe and Mullins (2006; 2009) included the international level to create a
model more applicable for analyzing state crime in non-Western states where economic motives
are not the driving force of state crimes, it can still be useful when applying it to the U.S. state to
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understanding how the U.S. state with its vast resources, unlike most other states, can influence
the international level. This makes the expanded model more appropriate for this dissertation
since a primary focus is at the international level and specifically how powerful states (the
United States in this case) can influence weaker, less powerful states leading to HRVs. Such an
understanding of this influence is contrary to the “failed state” and “a few bad apples”
perspectives. Rothe and Mullins (2009) even critique the criminological literature addressing
HRVs for this shortcoming. Specifically, they criticize Harff’s (2005) theory of genocide for not
including international level variables such as “economic collapse or high rate of indebtedness to
foreign powers,” “postcolonial conditions,” and “global economics.” Where this dissertation
attempts to fill a void in this literature is by bringing in international level variables, generally
motivations and opportunities. Controls and constraints at the international level will also be
explored, but already have been a recent focus in the human rights literature (Lutz and Sikink
2000; Calvano 2008; Jetschke 2010; Simmons and Danner 2010; Hafner-Burton 2014).
In the original state-corporate crime model, Kramer and Michalowski (2006)
distinguished between two types of state-corporate crimes: (1) state-initiated corporate crime and
(2) state-facilitated corporate crime. The key distinction is the relationship between the state and
the corporation during the commission of a crime, social harm, or analogous social injury. When
corporations conduct culpable and injurious acts under government supervision, in collusion with
the state, or with simply tacit governmental approval, the crime is said to be state-initiated.
State-facilitated corporate crime arguably highlights the state as less criminally liable since
governments are not directly initiating criminal activity, but instead failing to provide effective
oversight of corporate criminality either intended or unintended, or overlapping goals have
inhibited the state from meaningful oversight and enforcement. One of the first case studies
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employing the state-corporate crime model investigated the explosion of the Challenger space
shuttle (Kramer 1992). Instead of concluding that it was an unfortunate accident which was the
consensus at the time, it can be classified as a state-initiated corporate crime in which the state
agency, NASA, awarded a government contract to a private corporation, Morton Thiokol, to
build the rocket boosters that ultimately caused the explosion. Morton Thiokol, in collaboration
with NASA made several budget cuts and expedited the launch date due to political pressure
leading to the catastrophic explosion resulting in the death of all seven crew members. This is a
case of state-initiated corporate crime because the state’s actions influenced the hasty behavior of
a corporation resulting in a blameworthy harm.
Another classical case study exemplifies a state-facilitated corporate crime. Aulette and
Michalowski (1993) documented a major industrial fire that took place in 1991 at a chicken
processing plant in Hamlet, North Carolina owned by Imperial Food Products Inc. A hydraulic
line exploded spraying flammable oil onto open gas flames under chicken frying equipment in
the factory causing a fast-spreading fire that resulted in the death of twenty-five workers and
another fifty-six injured. Although the immediate cause of the fire was the explosion of the
hydraulic line, the deaths and injuries were not directly due to the fire, but were in fact caused by
Imperial Food Products managers padlocking the majority of exits, including fire exits,
throughout the building as a company policy to prevent employee theft. Due to these actions,
many workers were trapped inside the structure unable to escape the fire. In addition, it was later
found that there were systematic oversight failures partially responsible for the deaths and
injuries of these workers. A common theme found in the United States was revealed in North
Carolina that little state funding was going to programs that would protect worker safety such as
the Occupational Safety and Health Program, and instead were flowing to businesses or policies
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that favored the interests of corporations over workers. Moreover, U.S. Department of
Agriculture inspectors failed to report the padlocked doors, despite being required to do so, and
the local government failed to require the plant to be brought up to code when the roof had been
replaced shortly before the fire happened. This case represents a state-facilitated corporate crime
because, rather than the state directly being involved in the blameworthy harm, all three levels of
government allowed for such a crime to be committed due to their gross negligence.
More recently, the state-corporate crime literature has shifted to studying international
state crimes. Chambliss, Michalowski, and Kramer’s (2010) edited volume, State Crime in the
Global Age, documents a wide variety of international state and state-corporate crimes. This
dissertation continues that trend while also introducing new forms of state-corporate crimes.
State-corporate crimes have been distinguished as being either state-facilitated or state-initiated.
However, if we raise state-corporate crime to the international level, as has already been done,
more than one state may be involved. Examination of the dynamic of two states involved in the
commission of crime necessitates new categories of state-corporate crime. Thus, international
state-corporate crime can be classified into four categories: (1) international state-facilitated
corporate crime, (2) international state-initiated corporate crime, (3) international state-facilitated
state crime, and (4) international state-initiated state crime.
The first two categories are simply the original distinctions at the international level.
Thus, a state in one nation either facilitates or initiates state-corporate crime in another country.
The original research in state-corporate crime looked at the relationship of states and
corporations within the same country such as the Imperial Food Products fire that investigated a
U.S.-based corporation, North Carolina state government, local government, and U.S. national
government (Aulette and Michalowski 1993) and the Challenger explosion that involved a
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federal government agency, NASA, and U.S. corporation, Morton Thiokol (Kramer 1992). An
international state-facilitated corporate crime includes both a state and corporation, however the
corporation is not headquartered in the state involved. Typically, a multinational corporation is
headquartered in one country, but operates in several others. Thus, a subsidiary company may
operate internationally adding another layer of complexity to the originally conceived definitions
of state-initiated or state-facilitated corporate crime. Shell Nigeria—an oil company operating
in the Niger Delta in Nigeria—provides an example of international state-facilitated corporate
crime (Zalik 2004). Shell Nigeria is a subsidiary of Shell Oil Company headquartered in
Houston, Texas, in turn, Shell Oil Company is a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell headquartered
in The Hague, Netherlands. Much of the oil and its profits were extracted from Nigeria,
distributing little to none of the profits to Nigerian citizens, while ecological destruction was
taking place. Social unrest arose due to these conditions, and violent security forces protected
the oil company’s property supported by the Nigerian military. The violence surrounding the oil
business was destructive, threatening the oil supply and creating scarcity that actually maximized
profits that, in turn, contradicted an incentive for proper oversight and control of the violence.
These overlapping goals of the Nigerian state and Shell inhibited proper oversight resulting in an
international state-facilitated corporate crime, in this case, the Nigerian state-facilitated crimes of
the multinational corporation Shell.
Similarly, an international state-initiated corporate crime may include a state and a
corporation from different countries. Both the state and corporation may be from the same
country but cooperate to commit a crime in another country. For example, there has been much
discussion since World War II on war-profiteering involving the military-industrial complex
where the U.S. state invades another country during war time. Rothe (2006) argues that
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Haliburton’s role in the Iraq War alongside the U.S. military constitutes both a state-facilitated
and state-initiated corporate crime. Thus, the U.S. invasion of Iraq provided Haliburton with the
opportunity for “over-costs, overcharges, failure to provide services charged for, and kickback
profits” and Dick Cheney was able to coordinate these systematic crimes via his established role
as Vice President and his former role with Haliburton (Rothe 2006: 236). Thus, the U.S. state
initiated and facilitated the crimes of Haliburton in Iraq.
The third and fourth categories are more unique because they describe crimes that have at
least two states as the central actors in commission of a crime that is international by definition.
The state-corporate crime literature has focused much attention on how the state and the
corporate sector collaborate in crime commission. However, with the rise in popularity of
studying international state-corporate crimes, it is essential to incorporate a second state in the
model as both states may play an integral role in either initiating and/or facilitating commission
of a crime. In particular, the relationship between two states is at the center of the proposed
analytical framework for understanding HRVs, primarily those suffered by citizens of
developing or third-world nations. For example, the relationship between the U.S. and the
Mexican states must be taken into account when explaining some HRVs occurring in Mexico.
Several Latin American case studies will be explored in the next chapter, but a couple will
briefly be mentioned here to demonstrate the dynamic of two states involved in HRVs. In
Uruguay, for example, both the Brazilian and the U.S. states were involved with the Uruguayan
state in committing HRVs (Heinz and Fruhling 1999). Violent oppression was used against
members of the labor movement and Communist Party in Uruguay. The U.S. state provided
military intelligence, armed warfare tactics, and the training of torture techniques used by the
Uruguayan state against its own citizens when they opposed the established government. U.S.
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direct involvement in the HRVs in Uruguay constitutes an international state-initiated state
crime, while U.S. failed to address the atrocities occurring since they served U.S. national
interests can be classified as an international state-facilitated state crime.
A clearer example of an international state-facilitated state crime is when one country has
the ability and opportunity to prevent the commission of a crime, or the harm it causes, and
stands idly by, likely benefiting from the crime committed. For instance, the case study of El
Salvador (Gómez 2003) documents the extreme governmental violence taking place that targeted
leftist political groups. This strategy benefited the United States through restructuring the
economy of El Salvador. At a time when the violence escalated, refugees were being killed and
tortured for attempting to leave El Salvador, and those lucky enough to reach the United States
were sent back to El Salvador by the U.S. government allowing, in all likelihood, for their deaths
and torture to continue resulting in an international state-facilitated state crime.

World-Systems Analysis
Although world-systems theory does not typically occupy a space in state-corporate
crime analysis, with the introduction of international state-facilitated and -initiated state and
state-corporate crime, using this theoretical approach provides contextual understanding of
international state relationships. World-systems analysis is not a theory, but rather a framework
to analyze global phenomena (Wallerstein 1974; 2004). World-systems theory shifts from a
focus on nation-states to a “world-system” as the primary unit of analysis used to understand
social influences and change. Although nation-states are viewed as less important than the
world-system, they are still largely involved in world-systems analysis. Wallerstein separates
countries into three groups—core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral countries. The focus is on
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how these countries interact and move from one category to another under the predominant
world-system. The overarching world-system, according to Wallerstein, is the global capitalist
economy which is delineated by the global division of labor distinctively categorizing the three
types of countries. Core nations have highly-skilled workers, advanced technology, and attract
lucrative capital investment, while the other nations are characterized by low-skill, laborious
production, and oftentimes are highly involved in the primary sector of extracting natural
resources. The relationship between non-core and core nations is structured in such a way to
allow for core nations to exploit peripheral nations for their cheap labor and natural resources,
while peripheral countries remain dependent on capital investment from core nations. Hegemons
are described as the (to some extent) rulers of the world, who make the rules under the current
world-system. Interestingly, nation-states are attributed to being hegemons with the United
States being the most recent and current hegemonic power.
World-systems analysis is essential for the current dissertation since the primary unit of
analysis transcends the nation-state. Somewhere between the world-system and the nation-state
are bilateral relationships of theoretical interest to world-systems theory. Of particular interest
are relationships between core nations and semi-peripheral or peripheral nations. World-systems
theory helps explain the economic relationship between these nations, but struggles to expand
beyond the economic, and certainly does not attempt to explain crime or social harms like HRVs.
The current dissertation uses this framework to explore how these unbalanced economic
relationships may lead to other social outcomes, such as shaping the type and intensity of HRVs
occurring in a nation. In other words, HRVs in a peripheral nation may be in large part shaped
by the disadvantageous economic association it holds with a (or multiple) core nation(s). Thus,
world-systems analysis complements international state-initiated and -facilitated state crimes,
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particularly when the commission of crime involves an economic motivation, which is quite
common.
As stated, the United States will be analyzed as the core nation in this dissertation.
However, according to Wallerstein himself, the United States occupied a unique position
differing from all other core nations. The United States is identified as a hegemon which refers
to a situation when “one state combines economic, political, and financial superiority over other
strong states, and therefore has both military and cultural leadership as well … hegemonic
powers define the rules of the game” (Wallerstein 2004: 94). Before proceeding, it is important
to sort out a few other definitions central to world-systems analysis. A world-system is “a
system that is a world” and “the unities of social reality within which we operate, whose rules
constrain us” (Wallerstein 2004: 98). Two types of world-systems are identified: world-empire
and world-economy. Both have multiple cultures and the primary difference between them is
that a world-economy has multiple political centers, while a world-empire has only one. Worldempire is typically used when studying historical pre-capitalist systems, thus it is not important
to the dissertation. Wallerstein states that there is no world-empire currently, only a worldeconomy represented by global capitalism. The world-economy is defined as the global capitalist
economy in which the United States is a hegemon. There may be multiple political centers, but
if the influence of one (or more) is such that other countries lose legitimacy, then these particular
countries are of key importance. Hegemonies may have a sphere of influence that transcends the
nation-state, encompassing a relatively large region of the world without covering the entire
globe. The U.S. hegemonic sphere of influence likely includes most of the Western Hemisphere
which will become clearer in the next chapter covering several Latin American countries. In the
end, like Wallerstein, this dissertation views the United States as occupying a more powerful
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position than the average core nation, and this is central to the understanding of any international
state-initiated or -facilitated state crime where there is an interaction between the United States
and another nation, particularly semi-peripheral and peripheral nations.

Policy
As stated earlier, the relationship of states is of central importance to the current study.
Although isolating bilateral state relationships is artificial in that these relationships take place
within the context of global multilateral relationships, focusing on bilateral relationships offers a
method of investigating the influence of one nation on another. The proposed analytical
framework centers around these bilateral relationships, in particular the relationship between
core and non-core nations as defined by world-systems analysis. Policy becomes essential to any
investigation of state relationships because policy is often the outcome, product, or manifestation
of such relationships. Arguably, the best way to study state relations is through policy formation,
whether they are bilateral or multilateral agreements in the form of treaties, declarations,
conventions, charters, etc. Such a strategy is akin to foreign policy analysis popular in political
science. The word policy will be used as an umbrella term to refer to this large body of
international agreements. Since policy is formalized, and often public documents are released
outlining them, more information on their formation is available. Contrarily, if one were to study
international state relationships without focusing on policy, they may rely on alternatives such as
memos, meeting notes, emails, and other evidence of communication between states which is
extremely difficult to obtain, thus often leaving much to speculation. Although policy is a
paramount unit of analysis when studying these bilateral state relationships, too much emphasis
must not be placed on policy to the point that the bilateral relationship is completely
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characterized by one policy agreement. Thus, it is essential to contextualize the policy by
documenting events before, during, and after such an agreement.
The present study proposes to focus on policies that have harmful consequences.
Industries are described as criminogenic when companies within them feel pressured to adopt
criminal business practices primarily to compete against other companies in the industry
(Bradshaw 2012). These business practices then lead companies to systematically violate
environmental laws and regulations. Similarly, states are subjected to intense economic
pressures and strains by the highly competitive global capitalist marketplace. Since the state is
primarily tasked with creating legislation that is conducive for the ease of capital accumulation
(more on this later), they tend to push for policies that benefit capital while causing harmful
effects to members of the working class. Due to the unbalanced nature of policy negotiation, the
most disadvantaged individuals within a non-core country tend to experience these deleterious
effects such as exposure to toxic waste, unsafe work environments, a lack of medical care,
removal from lands or displacement, and abject poverty among others, although this does not
mean that the average citizens of the core nation may not suffer social harms as well. Several
Latin American cases studies will demonstrate the direct repression, often overt, of people by
their own governments in the next chapter (Hey 1995; Heinz and Fruhling 1999; Gómez 2003).
In the human rights literature, HRVs are similarly studied for the most part as overt HRVs such
as physical integrity rights violations, but it is the stance of this dissertation that many HRVs
often are less visible and justified to the point of invisibility.5 For example, torture is a visible
HRV to the extent that the act of torture can be seen, while poverty brought by unjust policy
could be a HRV, but the social forces leading more people into poverty are not visible like the
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act of torture. Crimes by liberal democracies are often the most invisible (Green and Ward
2000). Moreover, liberal democracies may, more so than other forms of governments, have to
exert more influence over popular ideologies of resistance to preserve their positions of power,
all the while maintaining secrecy. Investigating crimes of liberal democracies, deHaven-Smith
(2006) noted that they are likely to be highly surreptitious crimes due to the sensitivity of state
officials to public perception, unlike leaders of autocratic governments. Furtive crimes of high
ranking elected officials have long been quickly dismissed with little investigation and labeled
conspiracy theories. These harder-to-detect forms of HRVs can be studied through the
investigation of criminogenic policies, in their formation and consequences. Much of the focus
of this dissertation is on criminogenic policies and their harmful effects.
Through the study of policy, one can observe if these bilateral or multilateral agreements
have led to any HRVs or created the circumstances under which they are likely to occur. Given
the unbalanced nature of the international relationships, the core nation bears more of the
responsibility for the agreement. State-corporate crime theorists would also describe these
relationships as unbalanced (Kramer and Michalowski 2006; Rothe and Mullins 2009). The
imbalance relates to the opportunities, controls, and constraints present within each country.
Core nations would be understood as having more opportunities to negotiate policy that will be
conducive to meeting their goals, and higher motivations for negotiating such a policy. Controls
such as international law (e.g., UN Security Council) and international financial institutions (e.g.,
World Bank) are heavily influenced by core nations, therefore these controls would have less
ability to inhibit core nations from enacting criminogenic policy. Moreover, core nations are less
affected by constraints such as public opinion or international reaction due to the abundance of
resources controlled by core nations capable of disseminating favorable information regarding
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their actions. On the other hand, non-core nations are defined by their lack of opportunity, and
are more responsive to controls and constraints. Thus, any policy between these two types of
nations likely reflects more of the core nation’s interests; and if any harmful externalities exist,
they are most likely felt by the least powerful populations within the non-core nation. Policies
may lead to HRVs unintentionally, but it has been discussed that violence (or crime) can be
unintentional (Iadicola and Shupe 2013). In fact, these criminogenic policies are not likely to be
intentionally harmful, but given the pressures placed on the core state to negotiate a policy that
strengthens its economic position within the global economic network, the core nation is more
likely to ignore, or not seriously consider, the potential harms of an economically-beneficial
policy. Thus, a policy will tend to be created when the primary goals are considered met, while
other tangential goals such as human rights are secondary and may be lost in the negotiation
process. The important characteristic of these policies is that they are willful, and as discussed,
the core nations (and even the non-core nations) may willfully pressure for the enactment of
criminogenic policies. These policies are often derived under particular historical circumstances
influenced by the current social structure of accumulation (also to be discussed in a later section).
The benefactors of these policies cannot be left to hide behind the logic that these policies may
have unintended consequences (such as HRVs) when there are systemic patterns of such policies
having similar outcomes.

Normalization of Deviance
Another important concept in the state-corporate crime literature is “normalization” of
deviance. Vaughan (1996) applied this concept to the Challenger explosion case describing
NASA’s organizational culture as uncritical of deviant behaviors occurring within the

41
organization. In other words, behaviors, actions, and beliefs that would otherwise be defined as
deviant became accepted as normal after repeated occurrences with no negative consequences,
thus leading to the “normalization” of said behaviors, actions, and/or beliefs. When deviant
behaviors have been normalized, actors no longer weigh the costs and benefits of such action
because it is now defined as normal operating procedure by members of the organization. To
give an example of how normalization has been applied to crimes of the powerful, the decision
and war strategy to bomb civilians has been explained by the process of normalization (Kramer
2010a; 2010b; Kramer and Kauzlarich 2011).
Kramer (2010a: 121-127) outlined three factors that can be attributed to the normalization
of the bombings of civilians: (1) “the social construction of the morality of war goals”; (2)
“weapons technology, military planning, and technological fanaticism”; and (3) “the laws of war:
the absence of enforcement and the legitimation of violence.” All three of these factors may be
used to explain the normalization of other crimes as well. The social construction of morality is
important, not just for war goals, but other goals that can be accomplished through the
commission of state-corporate crimes. Focusing primarily on World War II, Kramer describes
the U.S. military strategy to prioritize the lives of American troops by focusing attention on them
and directing it away from enemy troop or civilian deaths. With such a strategy, civilian life in
nations invaded by the United States has callously been neglected while an apotheosis of
American troops has overshadowed any concern for others. Brigadier General Jacob E. Smart
exemplifies the construction of morality of war goals in an interview with Conrad Crane (2000),
stating, “But of course there is morality in war. But it takes a lower priority than surviving. It
takes a lower priority than winning … The innocents suffer far more than the perpetrators.” In
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line with morality, sides of war are often times simplistically labeled “good” and “evil”
demarcating the allies of war from the enemies.
In addition to being applicable to bombing of civilian or other war crimes, the social
construction of morality is important to understanding HRVs as well. For instance, communism
was often times labeled “evil” in many Latin American countries throughout the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s (Hey 1995; Heinz and Fruhling 1999; Gómez 2003). Consider the word “rebel” as an
example. It, in and of itself, establishes a negative connotation to groups of people who disagree
with the government and act in such a way to change policy. Such strategic use of language and
social construction of morals led many individuals in these societies to join in on the
demonization of the so-called rebels’ behaviors to the point that the rebels were subjected to
extreme abuses, such as killing and torture that were normalized.
Development of new and sophisticated weaponry has also contributed to the
normalization of state crime, particularly aerial bombardment of civilians and other war crimes
(Kramer 2010a). There is no better example than the Korean War to demonstrate this point.
Korea is described by Crane (2000) as being the first real American air-war where predominant
battles were fought with aircraft, but more importantly, massive bombing campaigns were used
to win the war. The immense devastation from the numerous bombs dropped on Korea resulted
in complete obliteration of cities and the highest ratio of civilian-to-military personnel deaths of
any American war (Cummings 2010). Phrases such as “precision bombing” and “collateral
damage” have slipped into the military’s and civilian’s cultural vernacular to euphemize the
atrocities of the destruction carried out by this sophisticated weaponry. Drones appear to be one
of the most recent affixations of technological superpower to eliminate terrorism while
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downplaying the potential and actual harms caused by employing such destructive technology
(Johnston and Sarbahi 2015).
The applicability of use of technology to understand commission of HRVs should not be
difficult, as physical integrity rights violations such as extrajudicial killings are often done via
drone strike which has become a normalized method of fighting terrorism (Rothe and Collins
2014). More interestingly, HRVs, such as infringing on workers’ rights, can also be normalized
through a fascination with technological advance. The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant offers a
unique example of a corporation that committed violations against workers and the environment,
exposing them to radioactive material (Bruce and Becker 2007). The state also played an
integral role in providing lax oversight, while also directly investing in the corporation’s
activities. This plant was involved in enriching uranium for nuclear power and weapons of
warfare. The state relied on the plant for supplying uranium-rich weapons for military defense
purposes resulting in many instances of little-to-no regulation of worker safety. As precautions
were ignored and hazardous materials were mishandled by workers, several complications,
including death, arose as about one in ten employees were exposed to 20 times more
radioactivity than the, now known, limit of exposure considered safe. The exposure of workers
to this radioactive material can be understood as being normalized, influenced through a cultural
dependence on, and captivation with, technological progress in general, and not just specifically
geared towards military developments.
Lastly, the absence of law enforcement or weak punishments meted out by police or
regulatory agencies can result in normalization of deviant behavior. In other words, if deviant
behavior is never punished or officially labeled deviant, it becomes normalized. A cursory
glance of U.S. history exemplifies how U.S. military violence has become normalized by
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successfully escaping any punishment for transgressions, and for the most part, minimizing any
deviant label. Aerial bombardment has become normalized by the lack of enforcement of
international law, thus failing to hold American leaders accountable for their war crimes (Kramer
2010a). Kramer highlights the amorphous phrase, “military necessity,” which has provided an
exploitable loophole in international law. The United States has relied on this phrase to allow for
the bombing of foreign civilians as legal and acceptable when it is deemed necessary to ensure
the safety of the greatest number of civilians, typically Americans. As these crimes are
committed repeatedly without criminal sanctions, they become normalized since no regulating
institution is reacting to them as deviant. International law also encompasses crimes other than
war crimes and can be expanded to explain HRVs. The habitual violation of international law by
the U.S. government is well documented (see Boggs 2010) and plays a large role in normalizing
criminal behavior. Ultimately, any crime that is not labeled, treated, and punished as a crime
will ultimately become normalized over time.
Normalization plays an integral role in the legitimization of criminogenic policies.
Patterns of criminogenic policy formation become normalized after similar policies are passed
and the ideologies informing these policies become institutionalized. Over time, key players in
policy formation neglect the potential harmful effects of their policies because other countries
are creating or agreeing to similar policies. Furthermore, there is virtually no criticism coming
from powerful policymakers and also no criminal sanctions. The extensive social expenditure
cut requirements attached to loans by the World Bank provides an example of how the United
States, through its influence on an international financial institution, the World Bank, pressured a
series of countries to the point that the stipulation of slashing social expenditures was a
normalized process to qualify for receiving loans. All the while, the most disadvantaged
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individuals in these indebted countries suffered from HRVs, such as reduced or no access to
health services.
Political Economy of Human Rights Violations
Social Structure of Accumulation Theory
Since inequality is closely related to violence (Iadicola and Shupe 2013), any astute
investigation of HRVs must make inequality a central point of study. Most important are the
institutional and structural levels of violence both domestically and internationally since these
forms of violence are largest in scope and magnitude, and serve to maintain the unequal
hierarchical structural arrangements. Arguably the most influential social institution is the
economy, and thus an investigation on how the economy contributes to violence, both at the
institutional and structural levels, is paramount. Furthermore, a major focus must be on policy
and how it organizes the economic structure that in turn creates conditions for violence. The
neoliberal economic movement is an essential target of study since it has tremendously
influenced the ideologies that reinforce the hierarchical divisions of society, and has spurred a
large growth in inequality (Kotz 2015). Since social structure is a primary focus of any
sociological investigation, neoliberalism will be investigated using the theoretical lens of social
structure of accumulation (SSA) theory. Although SSA theory has not typically been used to
study crime or HRVs, given the interconnectedness of inequality and HRVs, it is important to the
proposed analytical framework.
According to SSA theory, an SSA is a set of economic institutions and principles
established to facilitate the ease of accumulating capital over time that creates conditions
favorable for amassing capital rapidly in a capitalist economy and/or the global capitalist
marketplace (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982; Kotz, McDonough, and Reich 1994;
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McDonough, Reich, and Kotz 2010). Economic institutions established within an emerging SSA
must provide opportunities for capital investment, economic stability, and, most essential,
increasing profits. Several elements of each SSA are of key importance to SSA theory, some of
which are capital-labor relations (and even capital-capital relations), the role of the state in the
economy, the corporate sector (and in particular, the financial sector), the shape of the global
economy, and any political coalitions.
The most recent SSA is neoliberalism noted as lasting from 1979-2008, arguably even
longer (Kotz 2015). The simple definition of neoliberalism includes three types of policies:
liberalization (deregulation), privatization, and stabilization. Yet, Kotz goes to great lengths to
define neoliberalism in much more detail. To summarize, Kotz outlines four fundamental
changes that categorize the neoliberal era: (1) the global economy previously influenced by the
Bretton Woods system crashed and was replaced by policies that emphasized free movement of
capital and goods and an integral role for central banks; (2) the role of the state in the economy
drastically shifted to deregulation, tax cuts, and privatization among other policies; (3) unions
suffered several defeats as the power shifted more and more disproportionately in the hands of
capital rather than labor; and (4) competition intensified in the corporate sector and financial
institutions increasingly became more involved in speculative endeavors that appeared more
lucrative. Many policies have been created during the neoliberal era and they likely reflect these
changes listed by Kotz. For example, policies during the neoliberal age would be more likely to
favor capital over unions compared to policies created during a different SSA. Thus, the current
SSA is important for understanding policy formation within that particular SSA. Furthermore,
world-systems analysis suggests that the world-system of importance is a global capitalist
economy with the United States constituting a hegemonic core-nation. Coupling this
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understanding with SSA theory, the world-system may better be understood within the context of
an SSA. During neoliberalism, the world-system can be said to be a neoliberal global capitalist
economy with the United States a center of focus due to its massive hegemonic influence on the
global economy. Any policy involving the United States is likely to reflect the goals of
neoliberalism (e.g., deregulation, social expenditure cuts, tax cuts for wealthy, and the
weakening of unions)6 during the timeframe of the neoliberal era.

Transnational Capitalist Class
There is a powerful, amorphous, sometimes faceless group of influential individuals
referred to by many names that influences policy formation between nations. Gill (1990) and
Sklair (1991) call them the transnational capitalist class (TCC). Cox (1987) investigates a
similar group named the transnational managerial class. Gill (1993) later referred to them as an
emerging neoliberal transnational bloc. More recently, Ozekin (2014: 94) described them as a
transnational historic bloc. The importance of this TCC, or whatever name used to describe
them, expands well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Only a small part of the TCC will be
referenced throughout this dissertation, primarily individuals connected to the United States and
Mexico, and a few Canadians.
The purpose of this section is to present the basic conceptualization of a TCC and how it
has come to shape global economic ideology. The concept of a TCC builds on Gramsci’s idea
of a historic bloc described as "an alliance of different class forces politically organized around a
set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction and coherence to its constituent elements"
(Gill 2003: 58). Although Gramsci typically thought of hegemony as confined to the capitalist
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state, Cox (1993: 52) expanded the boundaries of hegemony to include a larger, transnationally
influential social structure “expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay
down general rules of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that act across
national boundaries." Thus, with the advent of neoliberal globalization, a TCC, and the concept
of hegemony, transcend the nation-state. As production and capital accumulation have become
more transnational within the new economic structural forms, factions of a TCC have emerged
from the previous nationally-oriented classes (Robinson 2004). Consequently, global social
forces replace domestic social forces characterized by common motivations, identity, and a
powerful consensus on the global structure of capitalism unencumbered by national or
geographic boundaries. Ozekin (2014: 104) defines the TCC as:
The emerging transnational historic bloc primarily consists of productive social forces
and transnational capital itself, but it also includes various economic and political forces
whose interests and ideas are deeply committed to the progressive liberalization and
integration of global economic system. In this respect, the owners and key executives of
transnational corporations and private financial institutions and other capitalists around
the world can be viewed at the zenith of an emerging transnational historic bloc.
He continues on to specifically list members of the TCC:
Moreover, the executives of central banks, leading political figures, high officials and
civil servants in advanced capitalist countries and some in peripheral capitalist countries
can be also regarded as constitutive parts of transnational bloc. The emerging historic
bloc also comprises bureaucrats and technicians in the agencies of transnational state
structures; such as the IMF, the World Bank and other transnational forums, and a set of
charismatic public figures, political leaders and organic intellectuals (e.g., academics,
opinion leaders, intellectual elites) who ensure the formation and persistence of the bloc
by providing ideological legitimacy and technical solutions to the problems of neo-liberal
orthodoxy.
The actors listed by Ozekin are primarily those that state-corporate crime researchers investigate.
If the TCC is influential in shaping policy, then any state-corporate crime framework must
consider these connections.
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Cox (1983) describes the process by which a TCC is formulated. Once domestic
hegemony is established within a particular society, the forces perpetuating and reifying
hegemony tend to disperse outward internationally by coalescing with similar social forces found
in several nations. As differing ideologies may clash, some come to predominate among the
TCC as hegemony becomes global hegemony. Although certain nations may be the “centers” of
hegemony by proliferating more members of the TCC, they are not restricted to their domestic or
national identities.
To understand the current global hegemony and TCC, consider the competing ideologies
of Soviet communism or socialism and U.S. capitalism. Post-WWII, the United States served as
a center for the capitalist hegemonic world order, referred to as the Pax Americana (Bowles,
Gordon and Weisskopf 1990). The domestic capitalist class in the United States was expanding
to form the TCC. At that time, Fordist capital accumulation was built around mass production,
the division of labor based on efficiency, and mass consumption (Gill 1990). The economic
system also balanced both free trade and government protectionism complemented by a
Keynesian welfare state acting as a social safety net against uncontrollable market forces
(Ruggie 1982; Gill and Law 1989). The Bretton Woods system institutionalized these U.S.-born
economic cornerstones through organizations such as the IMF and World Bank, until in 1971,
when the United States ended the gold standard and the world economic system faced a crisis of
accumulation as Kotz (2015) would call it.

Summary of Analytical Framework
At this point, all pieces of the analytical framework have been introduced and described.
The entire framework can be found in Figure 2.1. To clarify this model, each piece and its role
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will be reviewed. First, the model centers around the international state relationship of a core
nation and a non-core (peripheral or semi-peripheral) nation. State-corporate crime theory, both
the Kramer and Michalowski (2006) and Rothe and Mullins (2009) models, is integrated to
explore and explain the behavior of states in these relationships. For instance, each state will
have its unique motivations, opportunities, controls, and constraints influencing how it interacts
with other states. As noted earlier, these core and non-core state relationships are unbalanced,
based on both the state-corporate crime literature and world-systems analysis. World-systems
analysis studies these state relationships in the context of the world-system, which is defined as
the global capitalist economy (Wallerstein 1974; 2004). Core nations are at the center of this
global economy offering them more opportunity and leverage in such negotiations, and they also
have an interest in maintaining the world-system. State-corporate crime theorists would also
label these relationships as hierarchical since core nations have a greater number of opportunities
to achieve their goals (motivations) while facing fewer controls and constraints capable of
inhibiting achievement of these goals. Policy, then, is the product of these international state
relationships which is enacted in the form of treaties, declarations, conventions, charters, etc.
Given the power possessed by the core nation within this unbalanced relationship, extant policy
is more likely to reflect the core state’s and TCC’s interests. In turn, the core state’s interests are
likely shaped by the current world-system, SSA, and TCC.
Another important component of this analytical model is the impact of the SSA that
shapes the economic environment in which these policies are created by influencing the
motivations, opportunities, controls, and constraints (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982; Kotz,
McDonough, and Reich 1994; McDonough, Reich, and Kotz 2010). For example, the neoliberal
era has given rise to deregulation and public ideologies in favor of deregulation that lessen
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controls and constraints. Also, neoliberalism has been characterized by shifting the balance of
power toward capital and away from labor. Thus, policy within the neoliberal era likely strives
for deregulation, shifting power to capital, privatization, and financialization. Neoliberal
ideology has become normalized among policymakers. Agents of the state are socialized within
the current SSA, and thus create policy that reflects the SSA. Furthermore, the process of
criminogenic policy formation becomes normalized among members of the TCC involved in
negotiations. Thus, the patterns of inequality and violence as a result of these policies becomes
neglected and overlooked when they are not brought to the direct attention of these key players
in policy formation. Policy, particularly economic policy, also becomes a way in which
members of the TCC can solidify conducive conditions for accumulating capital.
Policy is paramount to the theoretical model because, as suggested, policy can have
impacts on HRVs. In other words, policy has effects on violence, inequality, and human
freedom among citizens of the states enacting international policy. However, since the
relationship more likely reflects the interests of the core nation, citizens of the non-core nation
are more likely to experience the negative consequences of criminogenic policies, with the most
disadvantaged populations being disproportionately affected. For example, the neoliberal era has
witnessed several economic policies and agreements that have created vast inequality in both
core and non-core nations. Overall, criminogenic policies are created in bilateral or multilateral
international relationships characterized by extreme power imbalances that tend to have
deleterious effects on citizens of non-core nations. Policies are official agreements that are often
understood as being akin to law. Since criminogenic policies are easier for states to legitimize
than overt violent repression, they have been neglected by scholars and not recognized for the
harms they cause to citizens. This understanding necessitates the current analytical model.
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CHAPTER 3
REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERAUTRE ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Chapter Overview
Although research on human rights violations (HRVs) has been conducted in a multitude
of fields, this chapter focuses primarily on the criminological research on HRVs. First, the study
of HRVs will be connected with criminology given the redefinition of HRVs as crime in the
previous chapter. An assessment of the empirical literature on HRVs will follow. It begins with
a brief critical review of empirical literature on genocide. Although the current dissertation will
not cover genocide, research on genocide can still offer insights into the study of HRVs. Next,
the literature on crimes of globalization will be reviewed. The studies that comprise this
literature are most similar to the current study as they focus on how the actions and policies of
international financial institutions can lead to HRVs, most notably violations of civil, social,
political, and economic rights. Lastly, several extensive qualitative case studies will be
reviewed, albeit not conducted by criminologists. For these cases, physical integrity rights
violations are tracked within different Latin American countries. Despite the focus on physical
integrity rights, several other HRVs can be found in these case studies. However, the extensive
detail of these cases provides a comprehensive look into HRVs committed, predominantly by
states, in particular countries over extended periods of time. Overall, this chapter examines a
wide body of literature covering HRVs, from the most to the least severe forms, and emphasizes
criminological explorations.
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Criminological Research on Human Rights Violations
Criminologists, such as Day and Vandiver (2000), have argued that criminology has not
focused on studying or explaining genocide, or other HRVs, but instead have left the theorizing
of genocide to political scientists.7 Maier-Katkin, Mears, and Bernard (2009) attempted to
bridge the gap between the human rights literature and the criminological literature, but like most
theoretical explanations and empirical research on HRVs in the field of criminology, focus
exclusively on genocide.8 In addition to the focus on genocide, these studies tend to focus on the
research question, “Why do otherwise normal people commit atrocities?” akin to Milgram’s
(1974) classical experiment of obedience to authority.
Overall, the empirical research on genocide focuses exclusively on the interactional level
of the Kramer and Michalowski (2006) and Rothe and Mullins (2009) models. Citizens or state
agents may engage in genocidal behaviors due to motivations such as competitive individualism
paired with divisions of race, nationality, or religion, an access to illegal means to achieve their
goals, and a lack of controls or constraints (e.g., people may rationalize their behaviors based on
in-group/out-group dynamics, during genocide responsibility is diffused, and groupthink may
inhibit critical thought). When a group of individuals is subjected to HRVs, other citizens may
join in the perpetration while other citizens may facilitate HRVs by ignoring their occurrence and
allowing them to continue. The empirical literature on genocide can help explain why people
come to obey, accept, and replicate authority in the commission of HRVs. Most importantly,
this literature can help to understand the interactions between individuals in policy creation and
why agents of the state may create policy more likely to have negative effects on particular

7

However, Carrier and Park (2013) criticize these claims that criminology only recently has investigated genocide
or HRVs.
8
See Athens (1992; 1997; 2003), Hagan, Rymond-Richmond, and Parker (2005), Hagan and Rymond-Richmond
(2009), Winton (2011), Olusanya (2013), and Pruitt (2011; 2014; 2015).
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populations, especially when those populations are part of the “other” group. In other words, the
genocide literature can help inform research into the negotiation stages of policy creation to
assess if key players in the negotiation process acknowledge potential social harms, and if so,
how they address those perceived harms. The neoliberal ideologies have a strong justifying
force and tend to favor the groups of ownership and management rather than the working class.
Structural violence against natives and local farmers may be justified and viewed as necessary
for greater economic progress. Despite the usefulness of the literature on genocide, it is not
without its shortcomings. For example, Matsueda (2009) points out that the failure to explore
macro-level factors may contribute to genocide and other HRVs. Given the micro-level
orientation of genocide research, the crimes of globalization literature found within the statecorporate crime literature offers some of the best empirical explorations of HRVs due to its more
macro orientation.

Crimes of Globalization
“Crimes of globalization” research – a phrase coined by Friedrichs and Friedrichs (2002)
– is a relatively new body of literature in the broader state-corporate crime genre that focuses on
the growing interest in international crimes. Crimes of globalization are associated with
“demonstrable harm that results from the policies and practices of the international financial and
trade institutions, principally the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World
Trade Organization” (Friedrichs 2007: 10). Given the focus on policy by the crimes of
globalization literature, the few studies investigating socially harmful policy effects greatly
inform the current research. Since the focal point of this dissertation involves examining
criminogenic policies, it is essential to review the empirical findings of this body of literature.
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The view of globalization taken by the crimes of globalization literature also informs the
current dissertation. Friedrichs and Friedrichs (2002: 15) list four dimensions of globalization;
the first two are most pertinent to my study. The first dimension highlights “the growing global
dominance and reach of neoliberalism and free-market capitalist system that disproportionately
benefits wealthy and powerful organizations and individuals.” Secondly, “the increasing
vulnerability of indigenous people with a traditional way of life to the forces of globalized
capitalism” is another major focus. An ideology of free-market capitalism and free trade
dominates the globalization era; such neoliberal policies that demarcate this era tend to create
conditions that establish winners and losers. The benefactors most often are multinational
corporations and the sufferers are poor and disadvantaged populations with disproportionately
negative effects on indigenous populations in developing nations (Frank 2000). Thus, neoliberal
globalization contributes to burgeoning inequality, widespread unemployment, and vast
impoverishment (Carrasco 1996; McCorquodale and Fairbrother 1999; Shapiro and Brilmayer
1999). In turn, HRVs may be largely attributable to neoliberal globalization policies and
practices. Many studies on crimes of globalization have demonstrated that profits are generally
placed before human rights (Falk 1993). Poverty is thus not alleviated but rather reinforced and
exacerbated within the political economy of neoliberal globalization (Bracking 2009).
Rothe, Mullins, and Sandstrom’s (2009) study in the crimes of globalization literature
focuses on genocide from a starkly different approach than the mainstream genocide literature
briefly reviewed above. This study and others in this literature add depth and historical context to
genocide research. As noted, the mainstream criminological literature on genocide has focused
primarily on explaining why individuals take part in genocidal violence with less attention to the
social forces that create macro-level conditions conducive to genocide. Even Pruitt (2011) and
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Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009) struggled to explain why states commit genocide (even
though they study genocides where the state played a major role). Although Pruitt (2014; 2015)
discusses triggering catalysts (e.g., internal war, revolution, regime change, or other conflicts) as
playing a large role in establishing the conditions for genocide, his work encompasses very little
of the historical, social, and economic conditions within a country leading up to genocide. For
instance, in the case of Rwanda, Pruitt (2011) traces the roots of ethnic division between the
Hutus and Tutsis back to the Belgian colonization, but this colonial influence does not inform his
analysis. Contrary to the mainstream approach, the state-corporate crime literature has extended
research on genocide to include the social and economic conditions leading up to genocide.
Rothe et al. (2009) researched the Rwandan genocide in an attempt to uncover the
conditions spurring the civil war and subsequent genocide. In other words, they sought to
identify the triggering catalysts of this catastrophic event. They argue that economic policies of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank laid the groundwork for such atrocities
to happen. Both these institutions did not purposely seek to spur genocide, but their actions to
impose strict conditions on aid packages had devastating effects on the economic environment
and undermined Rwanda’s economic independence. These institutions placed investor returns
before the people of Rwanda by devaluing their currency, privatizing their local marketplace,
and slashing social expenditures. The currency devaluation led to soaring inflation and poverty
that primarily affected rural areas and farmers. Privatization compounded the issue of poverty
since the wealth shifted from the local citizens to U.S. and other Western institutions. Lastly,
reductions in social spending further crippled the most impoverished populations in need of
assistance. The exacerbated economic inequality gave rise to disgruntled militant groups who
began seeking individuals to blame. Overall, these policies created anomic conditions conducive
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to extreme genocidal violence. Crimes such as those committed by the IMF and World Bank in
Rwanda have been called crimes of globalization. Rothe et al. (2009), as well as other
criminologists within the crimes of globalization literature (Friedrichs and Friedrichs 2002;
Rothe, Mullins, and Muzzatti 2006; Ezeonu and Koku 2008), have emphasized the importance of
international intervention through the use of policies and practices and how this intervention can
create conditions conducive for HRVs, making it the most relevant body of literature for the
current dissertation.
Another case study, and the original study that gave rise to the study of crimes of
globalization, investigated a World Bank-financed dam built in Thailand (Friedrichs and
Friedrichs 2002). This study established crimes of globalization as a subfield of state-corporate
crime, albeit few criminologists have actually continued the research in this area since its
creation. Friedrichs and Friedrichs (2002) used a case study methodological approach while
supporting it with participant-observation and interviews. As part of the participant observation,
Jessica Friedrichs lived intermittently at a Pak Mun Dam protest village just outside of Ubon
Ratchatani, Thailand for four months. During her stay, she interviewed five villagers about their
experience relating to the Pak Mun Dam. Interviews were also conducted with local energy
officials, World Bank representatives, NGO members, and local academics investigating the
issue.
The central argument Friedrichs and Friedrichs (2002) make is that international financial
institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, IMF, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have
engaged in criminogenic practices and policies within the context of neoliberal globalization, and
the case of the Pak Mun Dam is used to buttress their argument. Hydropower development was
a large-scale goal of many development projects throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Continuing
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this trend, the World Bank approved a loan in 1991 to support the building of the Pak Mun
hydroelectric dam in Thailand to increase industrialization. However, they argue that several
consequences of the dam construction are criminal.
A large portion of forestland was flooded due to the dam’s presence which actually
violated the World Bank’s own policy of protecting cultural property. This flooding caused the
destruction of several edible plants, a variety of mushrooms, and bamboo species consumed by
the locals for survival. Stagnant water created by the dam was known to have adverse health
effects, but plans to address parasitic river fluke migration were not well implemented. As a
result, local residents of the riverfront who relied on the river for drinking, bathing, and other
basic necessities were plagued with skin rashes. Fish species declined rapidly after the dam was
erected which completely altered the lives of fishermen and the local fisheries that were reliant
on this aquatic life for their incomes and subsistence. Physical resettlement was necessary for
these individuals and others whose houses or farms flooded. In other areas, the rise in water
level has made transportation difficult, also resulting in relocation. The complications leading to
displacement have to some degree been addressed since their land has been appraised and
compensation has been paid, but it is largely debated as to whether this compensation has been
paid to all those who were affected (Friedrichs and Friedrichs 2002).
Many of the individuals who lost their income fled to the urban center of Bangkok, but
Bangkok’s economy was not able to support such a large number of workers flowing into the
city. With the dam causing grievances among the peasants and locals, protests ensued where the
Thai police were involved in forcibly removing protesters and arresting a large share (Friedrichs
and Friedrichs 2002).
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The Pak Mun dam demonstrates one case where the World Bank implemented a
developmental plan in Thailand that resulted in a series of HRVs. More generally, the
involvement of IFIs in practices and policies that contribute to HRVs can be observed across
much of the Third World. IFIs are multinational institutions that claim to represent global
interests, but as it can be seen in the Pak Mun dam case, they tend to reflect the interests of the
most powerful and wealthy nations, particularly multinational corporations headquartered there.
The Friedrichs’ (2002) study provides empirical evidence that supports the proposed model in
the previous chapter.
Ezeonu and Koku (2008) integrate three key foci of the current dissertation (state crime,
structural violence, and neoliberalism) in their study of the HIV pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa.
They argue that neoliberal policies contributed to a greater exposure of women to high-risk
lifestyle choices, which often resulted in higher probabilities of HIV infection. Unrestrained
capitalism is associated with exposing these individuals to greater harm rather than less. For
example, Ezeonu and Koku (2008) argue that the Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), created by the WTO, emphasizes the theft of intellectual property over
distribution of life-saving drugs, and this has reduced access of those in sub-Saharan African
nations to HIV drugs. TRIPS demonstrates the potential harms of a free marketplace. In
addition, most HIV prevention in African has attempted to reduce the transmission from mother
to child while few efforts have been made to treat the mother.
Beyond TRIPS and its effect on limiting access to HIV drugs, Ezeonu and Koku (2008)
mention several factors that have contributed to a rise in risky lifestyles among poor women in
sub-Saharan Africa that led to higher rates of HIV infection. First, structural violence in the
form of unequal distribution of resources and poverty lead to differing health outcomes. Poverty,
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paired with gender inequality, accentuate the incidence and prevalence of infectious diseases
among women in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, privatization of the economy – policies
advocated by the IFIs – often lead to economic devastation in a number of countries, displacing
many people from their previous places of employment (Cornia 2001; De Vogli and Birbeck
2005). This displacement, in turn, leads to newly created male migrant workers who travel
farther away from home to find work and to an increase in the number of casual sexual partners
resulting in more HIV infections (Anarfi 1993; Anarfi, Appiah, and Awusabo-Asare 1997;
Jochelson, Mothibeli, and Leger 1991). Ultimately, the wife back home then contracts the virus
as well when the men return. Third, currency devaluation, coupled with privatization, place
many women in dire economic conditions that lead them to seek out work in the commercial sex
trade to provide for their family. Furthermore, the dire economic conditions also exacerbate the
unbalanced gender relations between men and women, leaving women less equipped to engage
in safe sex practices. Fourth, health care cuts have dramatically reduced the number of people
covered and the quality of health care. Lastly, limitations have been made on U.S. aid packages
such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief which restricted funds going to
organizations dedicated to helping commercial sex workers or clean needle exchange programs
(Kamwi, Kenyon, and Newton 2006). When considering these factors, it comes as no surprise
that African women account for 70 percent of all women who contract HIV (UNAIDS 2004).
The IMF has used structural adjustment programs (SAPs) as conditional attachments to
loans given to struggling countries. Many of the factors studied by Ezeonu and Koku (2008)
were conditions attached as SAPs to loans given to sub-Saharan African countries. A common
condition of receiving loans is the removal of trade tariffs that ironically were and still are used
by the United States to protect its internal economy. The removal of theses trade tariffs can
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cripple some developing countries’ economies as they lack the economic power to compete with
developed countries in a global market. The World Bank also offers loans to states with the
expectation that they will open their markets. These nations often struggle with debt repayment,
which can result in the underfunding of important social programs. For example, Sierra Leone
spent almost seven times more money on debt repayment than on its primary schools in 2001
(Buston 2003).
Rothe, Mullins, and Muzzatti (2006) specifically explore the effects of IMF and World
Bank loans and their attached SAPs on the sinking of the Senegalese ferry, Le Joola, on
September 26, 2002. At first glance, this disaster appeared as a traditional state crime or
classifiable as resulting from a failed state. The government openly admitted fault and several
officials resigned from their positions. Yet, as alluded to earlier, other states, or in this case,
IFIs, may be responsible for a state’s failure. After thorough investigation, Rothe et al. (2006)
discovered that the SAPs placed on the Senegalese government led to spending cuts in various
areas, including the transportation budget that directly affected the ferry programs. Given the
geographic location of Senegal on the Atlantic coast, ferries were often times the only true
choice for travel. The spending cuts reduced the successful navigation and upkeep of the Le
Joola, and only one rather than two engines was functioning when the ship capsized resulting in
the death of 1,863 passengers. Although superficially it may be concluded that the Senegalese
state was negligent, Rothe and her colleagues demonstrated that the dominant ideology of
western capitalism guided the IFIs to act in the interest of capital, while neglecting to consider
the potential harmful effects of its actions on human lives. IFIs are guided by a logic of
development of free market capitalism that benefits states that control IFIs the most. In this case,
the IFIs were motivated to create a more conducive condition for capital in Senegal by slashing
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social expenditures. Thus, categorizing the sinking of the Le Joola as an unfortunate accident, or
attributing it to the failure of the Senegalese state are problematic for two reasons. First, these
understandings are not holistic and are historically inaccurate since they do not consider
significant influences external to the Senegalese state. Second, and possibly most important
from a criminological perspective, these explanations obscure the criminal liability of more
powerful states and IFIs in the sinking of the Le Joola. Consequently, the alternative
explanations benefit the criminally culpable actors by both allowing them to escape any scrutiny
or any real investigation into their role in the social harm, and displacing the blame onto the less
powerful states. Interestingly, through a crafty loophole, IFIs are not bound by international law
because they are not nations, albeit representing the interests of particular nations and controlled
disproportionately by those nations as well. IFIs appear to be a tool by which wealthy nations
can achieve economic restructuring in developing countries. Accordingly, they must be
understood within this context. In other words, IFIs should not be studied independently from
the states that control them as some of the crimes of globalization literature has seemingly done.
For the current dissertation, the U.S. and Mexican states are of central importance, but actions of
the IFIs will not be ignored given the influence the U.S. state has over these institutions.
Although the crimes of globalization literature has demonstrated IFIs create harmful
polices leading to deleterious outcomes, the overemphasis on the IFIs is problematic. Despite
the image of IFIs as international representing a multinational perspective, IFIs’ practices and
policies often reflect the interests of the most developed, rich nations. As previously mentioned,
a global capitalist economy fosters an environment in which two nations, differing greatly in
economic and political power, create policies that disproportionately affect the most
disadvantaged populations in peripheral nations. Similarly, as institutions of globalization, IFIs
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have acted in the interest of wealthy, developed nations rather than the global poor. The World
Bank and IMF were both creations of the developed world with little to no involvement from
developing or Third World countries. Agreements involving the Third World tend to only
benefit or serve the interests of local elites in those developing countries. Thus, the proposed
analytical model of this dissertation provides a distinct advantage over the approach found in the
crimes of globalization literature. States working together in criminogenic bilateral (or
multilateral) relations replaces IFIs as the central focus since IFIs are ultimately powered by
these inflectional states.
Similarly, Mackenzie (2006) emphasizes that the states responsible for, and in control of,
IFIs must be held accountable for IFI actions and policies. In other words, given the amount of
power a handful of nations have over these institutions, these states themselves must be the
subject of study when interested in the harms produced by IFIs’ practices and policies. The IMF
and World Bank should not be understood as international democratic institutions despite their
rhetoric. Upon investigation, countries hosting the wealthiest economies have secured a large
portion of voting rights in these institutions resulting in little need of developing nations to vote
along with them (IMF 2016; World Bank 2016). Thus, powerful states with large percentages of
voting power (core nations) should be the focus of criminal investigation. Particularly, the
United States holds an extremely dominant positon in these institutions.
Several reasons demonstrate how powerful states influence and control IFIs. First, both
the IMF and World Bank are headquartered in Washington, D.C. while the U.S. Treasury
Secretary nominates the World Bank president which happens to always be a U.S. citizen. The
IMF director is always a European citizen albeit supported by a serving deputy from the U.S.
(Monbiot 2003). Second, the United States has the largest voting portion in these institutions
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amounting to about 16 percent of the total vote (IMF 2016; World Bank 2016).9 For the majority
of IMF and World Bank decisions, a 50 percent majority must be met. Considering these
decisions are primarily economic, and the wealthiest nations have the majority of voting power,
it is not surprising that decisions are likely made with the interests of developed nations in mind.
For instance, nations comprising G7 constitute around 45 percent of the vote. Thus, these seven
nations need little support for policies in their interest. Third, for considerably important voting
decisions such as an amendment to the World Bank’s or IMF’s Articles of Agreement, an 85
percent majority is needed in both the IMF and World Bank to implement a policy. Such a high
threshold allows the United States to effectively hold a veto power with over 15 percent of the
vote in both institutions.
The WTO actually has a more democratic structure where each member holds a single
vote. However, researchers have criticized the democracy of the WTO, focusing primarily on
the occurrence of “green room” negotiations where superior economic countries meet in private
to reach agreements before officially deciding within the WTO (Mackenzie 2006). Furthermore,
green room negotiations allowed the economically superior countries to dominate the official
WTO negotiations as a bloc drowning out the voices of developed nations (Woods and Narlikar
2001). Regardless of the problems of the WTO, each country possessing a vote is quite an
improvement over the IMF and World Bank where 48 sub-Saharan African nations possess 5.35
percent of the World Bank vote only slightly more than Germany’s 4.39 percent (Ottenhoff
2011).

9

Voting power in the World Bank and IMF can be viewed at
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/VotingPowers and
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx respectively.
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The IFIs’ practices and policies address interest rates, inflation, trade barriers, and
deficits with arguably good intentions, but these procedures fail to consider their effects on
poverty, deprivation, illness, and death seriously (Stiglitz 2002; Monbiot 2003; Wallach and
Woodall 2004). The myopia of IFI is attributable to the lack of diversity in decision making with
nearly only developed nations with any voice in these institutions. For example, the creation of
TRIPS by the WTO has empowered drug companies from developed nations to go after the
manufacturers of cheap generics in the developing world (Stiglitz 2002). These drugs may even
be life-saving drugs, but the WTO emphasizes the theft of intellectual property over distribution
of life-saving drugs. Compulsory licensing was later developed to allow nations to circumvent
TRIPS in order to produce life-saving drugs when severe health emergencies were declared.
However, “TRIPS Plus” was introduced by the U.S. offering investment incentives to WTO
members to strongly protect intellectual property rights of U.S. corporations which potentially
undermined compulsory licensing (Mackenzie 2006).

Comprehensive Case Studies of Latin American Countries
Several qualitative cases studies crucial to the development of this dissertation have been
alluded to throughout this and the previous chapter. These studies cover nine Latin American
countries including Guatemala, Costa Rica, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Cuba, El
Salvador, and Nicaragua (Hey 1995; Heinz and Fruhling 1999; Gómez 2003). The goal of this
section is to describe how other large-scale case studies on HRVs have been conducted, outline
their major empirical findings, and offer criticisms that will be addressed in the current
dissertation. Each study will be detailed separately, in chronological order, as each one seems to
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improve on the one before it, concluding with general patterns and findings from all of them
collectively.

Guatemala and Costa Rica10
Hilde Hey (1995) conducted a study, in collaboration with the Netherlands Institute of
Human Rights, to search for the causes of HRVs, what she calls “gross HRVs” (a 1967 U.N.
classification) which are no different from physical integrity rights. She chose Guatemala and
Costa Rica because the former was a country with systematic HRVs, while the latter had
virtually no HRVs during the time period from 1979-1990. Her search for causes followed the
logic of Mill’s (1843) method of agreement and difference which sought to determine the main
causes of HRVs by comparing the two nations were in the same region, but differed greatly in
their human rights outcomes. Through case study comparison, the differences could be
attributed to causes of HRVs. First, Guatemala differed greatly from Costa Rica in that the
military dominated political and social life (e.g., influenced elections, declared law, and enforced
law), wealth distribution was very uneven despite having a medium level GDP, a majority of the
population lived in absolute poverty, and there was limited access to education for most of the
population. In contrast, Costa Rica had a social democracy with a substantial welfare system
similar to European countries, a much more equal wealth distribution, no far right-wing political
parties with any substantial following, and education and health care expenditures were greater
than the military budget. The colonial histories of the two countries were also disparate. The
Hey’s (1995) case study method utilizes two types of sources: documentation of the historical developments and
inventories of HRVs. Stohl, Carleton, Lopez, and Samuels (1986) and Stohl (1992) provide the inventory of HRVs
which accounts for the severity (type), frequency (number), and range (victim) of violations. Another source of
importance included reports by Amnesty International, a document containing testimonies on disappearances
entitled Asociación Centroamericana de Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos, other NGO reports, official
documents published by the United Nations, Organization of American States, and the United States, and some
interviews were also conducted with members of the Guatemalan armed forces.
10
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Spanish Empire heavily exploited Guatemala for its cheap labor by enslaving its large
indigenous population. Costa Rica did not experience this exploitation because of the smaller
population.
Hey’s (1995) study was informed by three bodies of literature including totalitarianism,
state repression, and genocide studies. Previously, theories of genocide focused on ideologies
that identify collectivities and often-times label out-groups. Race is a common divisive factor
that is applicable to Guatemala where there is a clear racial division between Indians and
Ladinos which is in direct contrast to Costa Rica. Furthermore, an ideology of national security
creates divisions in Guatemala, while an ideology of social democracy fosters collaboration and
unity in Costa Rica. Totalitarianism is considered to be more conducive to HRVs than a more
democratic state. Borrowing from Melson (1992), Hey (1995: 10) argues that a “state in crisis”
is more determinant of physical integrity rights violations than totalitarianism. A “state in crisis”
is defined by internal strife or violent conflict, where violence is often used to resolve the crisis.
Guatemala experienced violent conflict during the time of study, while Costa Rica did not.
Using theories of state repression (Sloan 1984; Gurr 1986), Hey argues that states are likely to
use violence when they lose or lack legitimacy. If states have control over the military, state
repression is a cheap way to regain power and legitimacy through a monopoly over use of
violence, whereas reform, co-optation, and other non-violent strategies are not realistic
techniques for addressing conflict when legitimacy is lost (Gurr 1986). Lastly, Heinz and
Fruhling’s (1999) research is incorporated into the study since their studies were being
conducted at the same time and funded by the same institution as Hey’s research. Taken
together, Hey constructs a theory of physical integrity rights violations suggesting HRVs are a
tool used by states for modifying the behavior of civilians. Thus, governments must recognize or
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perceive a threat to their power emanating from the actions of oppositional citizens in order for
the state to react with physical integrity rights violations.
Theoretically, Hey (1995) attempted to explain both circumstances (short-term causes)
and conditions (long-term causes) of HRVs. Both Guatemala and Costa Rica experienced large
labor protests, civil unrest, and overt criticisms of the ruling class, thus these circumstances were
not considered sufficient to cause HRVs since Cost Rica did not experience systematic HRVs
(only isolated cases of torture were documented). However, only Guatemala experienced violent
guerrilla opposition where these guerilla groups violently opposed military actions and policies.
Thus, Hey (1995) concluded violent guerilla oppositions are a cause of short-term spikes in
HRVs.
As for long-term causes (or conditions) of HRVs, Hey (1995) explained systematic
HRVs in Guatemala as due to its security forces establishing a dominant power position in
society and politics. The military owned several major businesses and allowed only political
candidates in favor of military to run for election (they also rigged or fixed elections). Military
training and recruitment started at a young age to indoctrinate Guatemalans with anti-Communist
sentiments, and systematic brutalization broke down their empathetic nature and human
compassion. The National Police, tasked with investigating crime, was controlled by the military
and thus did not pursue crimes of the military. Yet, crimes of those perceived as a threat to the
military were actively tracked and civil patrols prevented local oppositional movements from
forming. The police were severely underpaid and undereducated resulting in a high level of
corruption. Death squads were associated with the military (although difficult to establish these
ties) and the G-2, the Military Intelligence Agency, acted as the private army of the ruling
military (like the CIA in the United States).
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Lastly, Hey (1995) argues that two ideologies also served as long-term causes of HRVs
in Guatemala. First, the military propagated a strong nationalism sentiment forcing the
ladinization (assimilating indigenous groups such as the Mayans to the modern mainstream
culture) of indigenous Indians. Indians were also ladinized via a compulsory one-year sentence
of military duty. This policy failed as Indians felt isolated and resisted joining the military.
Civic action programs also sought to gain favor among the Indians and the populous by
implementing social welfare programs. However, such programs also failed to dissuade the
Indians from supporting guerrilla groups. The second ideology used by the military was national
security. Most of the military’s actions were justified in the name of national security. Thus,
their use of HRVs to engage in counter-insurgency against guerrillas and anyone who criticized
the military was viewed as a war for peace (war against guerrillas). A dwindling legitimacy
forced the military to switch ideological strategies. In response, the military established a faux
democracy, but this did not occur until the guerrillas were defeated. In Costa Rica, the military
did not play a dominant role in running the country and the Costa Rican government made
concessions to protesters and critics rather than committing HRVs against them. However,
government concessions enabled elites to pursue their interests without opposition. Costa Rica
also lacks a large ethnic minority to justify violence in the name of nationalism internally.
Although Hey (1995) briefly mentions relationships between the two countries in her
study with United States and their importance was emphasized, very little of her investigation
focused on these countries’ relationship with the United States. The next case studies bring the
United States into the analysis, as will this dissertation. Also, several questions are left
unanswered by Hey’s study: Why did the military dominant in Guatemala, but not Costa Rica?
How are HRVs and economic and social conditions related? Were Costa Ricans accepting the
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status quo while Guatemalans challenged it? How do the relationships with the United States
differ between Costa Rica and Guatemala? Maybe the most important question is what
conditions led to the violent guerilla opposition since Hey deemed this the most important factor
impacting HRVs committed by the state in Guatemala? It is possible that economic HRVs such
as widespread poverty, rampant unemployment, and the dismantling of unions could have played
a role in spurring a violent opposition to the state. This dissertation seeks to expand beyond
Hey’s focus solely on physical integrity right violations to include these other lesser HRVs that
may play a central role in creating the conditions for the gross HRVs studied by Hey.
Furthermore, in the era of neoliberal globalization, these economic HRVs may be due in large
part to policy formation, particularly free trade agreements such as NAFTA. This dissertation
also plans to expand Hey’s work beyond a domestic focus to including external factors
contributing to HRVs within countries.

Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina
Wolfgang Heinz and Hugo Fruhling (1999) published four cases studies as a part of the
same publishing series as Hilde Hey (1995), and also sought to explain causes of gross HRVs.
The time periods covered in these case studies are 1960 to 1990 in Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile,
and 1976 to 1983 in Argentina. Unlike Hey’s study, Heinz and Fruhling (1999) analyze each
country separately with little comparison between them. Heinz independently investigated
Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina while Fruhling covered Chile. Heinz presents a model for the
systematic study of these cases in the beginning of the book. The model consists of four goals:
(1) the repression system which includes all perpetrators of HRVs must be uncovered; (2)
economic and political policies and the crises of these systems that gave way to systematic
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HRVs must be described; (3) the global environment in which the country under investigation
exists including foreign influences on internal decision-making elites must be explained; and (4)
a composition of the victims of HRVs needs to be constructed. The second and third goals are
most useful to the current dissertation as they address the main criticism of Hey’s (1995) work.
Policies are understood as potentially impacting the conditions under which HRVs are
committed, and foreign influences are taken into account when considering HRVs within each of
these Latin American countries.
The influence of the United States was often documented throughout these case studies.
Although Heinz and Fruhling (1999) do not fully follow their own advice, they encourage an indepth analysis of the benefactors as well as the victims of HRVs as part of their framework, and
deem interconnections of perpetrators and benefactors most important when outlining the
repression system. Accordingly, they utilize a historical case study method that includes archival
research and personal interviews with military and government officials during the time of
repression to describe each case. The case studies focused primarily on description while
offering some post-hoc explanations. However, no social theory was discussed or used to guide
the project. The main sources of each case study will be listed followed by an overview of the
case.
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Brazil11
In Brazil, all evidence documented in Heinz’s (1999a) case study points to the fact that
the military dictatorship had a well-orchestrated plan to eliminate subversives early in their
development by collecting information via surveillance on political dissidents and legislated new
laws to legally apprehend them. Among the physical integrity rights violations, the military
committed political imprisonment and torture most commonly, and military officials were aware
of these HRVs. The military viewed these particular violations as effective tools for combatting
the guerrilla opposition. Extrajudicial killings and disappearances differed slightly in that they
were not part of orders coming down from high-ranking officials. However, they were viewed
as a necessary evil by the majority of military leadership and thus tolerated.
The leaders of the military dictatorship used three primary justifications to neutralize
HRVs and gain the acceptance of the public. First, they justified HRVs as part of an ideological
warfare in response to communist and terrorist action. Leaders argued that if these communist or
terrorists were to win, the political and economic system would be destroyed. Similarly, they
justified HRVs under the guise of traditional warfare against leftist guerrillas perceived as an
internal, violent, and deadly enemy that was dividing the country. The wave of communism
throughout the 1950s increased the perceived threat of communism in Latin American countries.
Thus, a primary goal became the elimination of the communist sentiment in these countries, and
the United States alike, in favor of established internal governments. The successful communist
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See Heinz (1999a) for full case study. The Brazil case study relied primarily on the “Never Again” project
organized by the Archdiocese of Sao Paolo supplemented by the World Council of Churches which consists of 700
military court proceedings from 1964 to 1979. Many political prisoners gave testimonies that were recorded in this
project. Several fact-finding reports also proved to be valuable sources. Declassified U.S. documents, first
published by Carrollton Press in England, were used to gain information on U.S. involvement in Brazil. Lastly,
Heinz (1999a: 4) conducted interviews with “witnesses from the political, academic, political party, human rights,
police and military sectors of society.”
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revolution in Cuba, led by Fidel Castro, increased the level of hysteria towards Communism and
spurred the direct use of counter-revolutionary tactics towards all leftist groups. Lastly, the
military dictatorship justified HRVs using a national security doctrine, and they described all
these acts of violence as a defense of national security. The National Security Doctrine,
developed by the Superior War College (ESG), established the first national security state in
Latin America. In turn, the military dictatorship to arise out of these circumstances was created
to implement a political and economic model based on security and development which was
strongly influenced by the United States. The U.S. role in shaping the economic and political
model in these countries is a key theme that emerges from these case studies that will inform the
current dissertation.
These ideological factors and justifications served to protect the economic policies that
were the main motivation for the HRVs. Three economic policies relate to the human rights
conditions in Brazil. First, the military dictatorship justified the repression of labor movements
under the guise of economic growth as they portrayed labor unions and worker strikes as
inhibiting economic growth that would benefit the nation. Second, businesses sought increased
profits and the military was able to offer a stable business environment once communist and
leftist movements were quashed. The business environment was stable in that workers would
not strike to improve their working conditions. A tranquil economic environment allowed
foreign direct investment to be protected from the threat of labor unrest. Third, since the
economic model clearly benefited the middle and upper classes, it was only a matter of time until
the lower classes revolted. HRVs became necessary to repress the lower classes, thus securing
the interests of the military, politicians, and business. With these findings, Heinz’s (1999a) work
improves on Hey’s (1995) by contextualizing why violent opposition to a state may arise. With
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this more nuanced understanding, one cannot simply say violent opposition to the state leads to
the state committing HRVs, which is one of the most frequent findings in the human rights
literature. Instead, it should be understood that this violent opposition is often rebellion against
poor economic and political conditions as detailed in this case study of Brazil.
Several of these ideological, political, and economic factors were influenced by Brazil’s
relationship with the United States. The United States trained military and police personnel in
Brazil to perform HRVs, specifically much evidence points to the teaching of torture techniques.
Furthermore, Brazil received large sums of money in foreign aid from the United States which
went to support the military dictatorship in repressing communist and worker movements. In
sum, the economic policies discussed greatly benefited U.S. multinational corporations and the
U.S. government. Therefore, these policies could be further explored using the proposed
analytical framework in this dissertation.

Uruguay12
Uruguay’s military dictatorship came to power quite differently than in Brazil, Chile, and
Argentina. In Brazil and Chile, a conservative military regime overthrew a liberal progressive
government and in Argentina and Brazil, and Chile to a lesser degree, military leadership arose
out of political and economic chaos. The military dictatorship came to power gradually in
Uruguay through consistent pressure on a weak democratically-elected president, Juan María
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See Heinz (1999b) for full case study. The primary sources for the Uruguay case study included major
publications investigating the political role of the armed forces. The joint commanders-in-chief of the armed forces
and the army high command attempted to justify their reasons for intervening politically and seizing governmental
power in three books. A fourth publication released later included the admission of some errors by the military high
command on the topic of HRVs. Reports by the inter-American Commission of Human Rights, the International
Commission of Jurists, and Amnesty International were also key to the study. As was the case with Brazil, the
researchers also included fact-finding reports, declassified U.S. documents published by Carrollton Press, and
interviews with witnesses from the various sectors of society.
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Bordaberry, who supported military leadership. Aware of his growing unpopularity, he sought
favor from a popular public institution, the military. Due to a host of conditions including a
rising violent guerilla movement, a faltering civilian president, a military battling parliament, and
a majority of the population in passivity, the military was able to take power in a totalitarian
form, unlike in its neighboring Latin American countries.
The political left was traditionally weak in Uruguay throughout the 1950s and1960s.
Even in 1971, the left received less than a fifth of the vote in presidential elections. Thus, the
actual threat of the political left taking control of the country was likely not to blame for the
military dictatorship’s repressive campaign. Instead, the stagnant economy was assumed to be
rectified by a new development model imposed by a new authoritarian political order bolstered
by a national security ideology, all spearheaded by the military establishment. In addition,
government repression was directed at labor unrest and its connection with armed guerilla
movements perceived as threatening to the stability of the country. Another important factor
contributing to the HRVs was the radicalization of the police who were targeting the Tupamaros,
a leftist guerilla group, and using torture to identify members. As actions on both sides
increased, the dispute intensified. When the military entered the conflict, it could only increase
the HRVs. Yet, only torture seemed to be systematically built into the strategy of repression.
Most disappearances were likely only cover-ups for accidental killings during torture. Uruguay
is a relatively small country with a peaceful history and a highly-educated population which
likely contributed to the HRVs being milder than in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. However,
even the military officers themselves were shocked by the large number of political prisoners.
The military in Uruguay wished to achieve two important goals: (1) a new political model
that included a military-selected presidential candidate and a role for the military in overseeing
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the political process, and (2) a new economic model that shifted away from a closed domestic
economy based on import substitution to an export economy interwoven with the global market.
Both goals were independent, thus repression continued even as the economy changed to meet
the second goal. Political corruption opened the opportunity for the military to take on an
increasingly involved political role to re-stabilize the nation. In addition, politicians’ inability to
deal with the Tupamaros, internal security, and economy continued to reinforce the need for
political change. With little political experience, the military’s victories against the Tupamaros
and other guerilla groups provided the support needed to take power. A censorship decree in
1973 provided the secrecy necessary for the military dictatorship to maintain power while
committing HRVs.
Training indoctrination likely did not cause military personnel to desire to create a
civilian-military regime. Instead, the most important causes of the military’s ideological shift
were combined elements of a failing, stagnant economy, the political failure to address
opposition to the development model without the use of military force, and the 1972 offensive of
the Tupamaros. Two weak presidents (Jorge Pacheco Areco and Bordaberry) who had little
interest in maintaining democracy also allowed for this shift. Therefore, the conditions leading
to HRVs in Uruguay were similar to those in Brazil. The military used both economic and
political stability as stated primary goals to justify the HRVs and create the conditions under
which violent conflict arose. One particular political group, the Tupamaros, began politically
opposing the poor economic and political conditions, but later turned to violence to achieve their
goals which played a large role in the violent military response using HRVs as both sides
intensified their violence. However, to understand this violence, one must place this violence
within its political and economic context. The current dissertation will strive to document the
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Mexican state’s relationship with groups like the Tupamaros, such as the Zapatistas, since these
groups often are considered the strains on the state leading to HRVs.
Brazil and the United States provided the desired models of economic growth and
political strategy to Uruguay. Both of these countries helped Uruguay battle against the
Communist ideology and labor movement by fostering a strong anti-Communist sentiment.
Training, education, and resources were provided to the military and police forces to establish
the new political order and subsequent development model while simultaneously repressing any
opposition violently. Specifically, the United States offered contributions of intelligence
monitoring and counter-insurgency tactics that involved training the Uruguayan military in the
use of torture techniques to gain information and facilitate the fight against the rebels. The
United States knew about the HRVs in Uruguay, but allowed them to continue until the primary
goals were met. Later, the United States disapproved of the HRVs to salvage its public image.
The political and economic agreements between the United States, Brazil, and Uruguay
benefitted the social elites in each country. Thus, these countries were able to work together in
eliminating threats to their shared political and economic goals. This understanding is central to
the proposed analytical model I use in this dissertation.
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Chile13
Since the Chilean case study was conducted by Fruhling rather than Heinz, it differs
slightly in approach. Fruhling (1999) was interested in how repressive policy fluctuates within
the national climate. His focus was on individuals and groups who create conditions conducive
for HRVs and ideological justifications for these conditions made by the state. He began with
Eduardo Frei’s presidency. Being a moderate, Frei polarized the nation during his presidency,
becoming unpopular on both the left and right. With the political poles gaining distance from
each other, Salvador Allende was elected. Given the political circumstances, his use of state
power to bring socialist change provoked a conglomeration of opposition among the right,
middle-class, Christian democrats, judiciary, and military. Political polarization along with the
Cuban revolution, socialist talk of armed revolution, and U.S. propaganda motivated support for
a military coup against Allende’s administration. A political crisis concerned the middle and
upper classes who felt that armed revolution could endanger their safety. Allende’s economic
policies created food shortages and hyperinflation, which compounded the political crisis and
instilled fear in the middle- and upper-classes that the left wished to establish a “popular
dictatorship.” Although after the coup, many original supporters questioned their decision to
overthrow a democratic president and feared authoritarian rule might prevail.
The military had a predisposition toward anti-communism even in the early 1900s and
the United States influenced these tendencies further by using propaganda to describe
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See Fruhling (1999) for full case study. The most important source for documenting the HRVs was the
newspaper La Tercera de la Hora since it was considered the most accurate. Information published by Vicariate of
Solidarity and the Chilean Commission on Human Rights was also included. One fact-finding truth commission
report including 2,279 cases of abuse, Informe de la Commisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, was essential
for listing the HRVs due to its substantial number of interviews conducted with victims’ families. Fruhling (1999)
also conducted original interviews with human rights lawyers, scholars of repression, retired military officers, and
other individuals involved in the repressive process.

79
communism as the biggest threat to Latin America. To ease these fears, the United States,
largely responsible for them, offered training and resources for counter-insurgency tactics and
forces. The military was reluctant to use force to oust a democratic president and were adamant
at providing external protection rather than internal security. However, three years into
Allende’s presidency, enough supporters were gathered in order to successfully execute the coup.
A growing distrust of politicians was a key factor in garnering support for the coup. Also,
Allende decreased funds to the military to pay for expanding social programs – this was viewed
as a threat to the military establishment despite the fact that Allende raised the salaries of the
armed forces. A potential conflict with neighboring Peru was also viewed as a probable reason
the military considered and ultimately carried out the coup. Lastly, fear of a civil war between
the military and leftist groups also provoked the coup, and this fear was driven by propaganda
floating in the military circle that exaggerated the strength of these guerrilla groups.
During the coup, the presidential palace was bombed and a declaration of war was made
by the military against leftist groups. Plan Z that suggested the Unidad Popular were preparing
to execute a coup to eliminate high-ranking military officers was disinformation that exacerbated
the anti-communist sentiment among the military. The total war strategy intimidated the leftist
opposition, silenced public criticism, and led to high rates of HRVs. In 1973, DINA14 – a
clandestine police force designed to eliminate any threat (most commonly through
disappearance) to the military dictatorship most principally Communist, Socialist, and MIR 15
Party members – was created. Disappearances allowed DINA and the Joint Task Force to
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DINA, the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional, or, in English, the National Intelligence Directorate, was
established in November of 1973 and functioned as a Chilean secret police similar to the U.S. CIA (Weiner 2007).
15
MIR, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, or, in English, the Revolutionary Left Movement, was a farleft political organization that actively opposed the Pinochet military dictatorship and was involved in guerrilla
activity.
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repress political opposition to the military while avoiding any responsibility or public criticism.
These disappearances were largely ordered by high-ranking officials in the military rather than
isolated events by low-level personnel. This first phase of repression is demarcated from 1973
(coup) to 1977 when DINA was dissolved due to major criticisms against its activities. The
Catholic Church was the most outspoken critic of the HRVs committed by DINA and the
military regime, while the United States also applied pressure to save face,16 since by 1977 most
neoliberal economic policies had already been implemented. The Catholic Church was able to
use publications by human rights advocates to educate the public while protecting leaders of the
opposition from abuses. The Catholic Church along with international criticisms from the
United Nations and other human rights organizations were the major players in stopping most
HRVs in Chile.
The second phase of repression lasted from 1977 to 1982 in which very few HRVs were
committed. The few victims during this phase belonged to armed resistance groups, the MIR
and the Manuel Rodriquez Popular Front which was a reaction to the economic crisis of the time
(e.g., falling wages, high unemployment). Then, from 1983 until 1989, HRVs increased
precipitously. Excessive force primarily was used against growing support for labor
demonstrations due to the economic situation. According to the evidence, there is no doubt that
the HRVs committed by the military regime were part of a repressive strategy to eliminate the
leftist opposition. From 1973 to 1982, the targets of repression were selected as a part of this
strategy, but from 1983 to 1989, victims of repression were likely not strategically targeted, but
instead victims typically died during public protests. Almost nothing was done by any of the

The U.S. reversal of support for the Chilean military regime is largely due to the Carter administration’s decision
to indict the military officers responsible for the planned assassination of Orland Letelier in Washington, D.C.
16
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police forces to address these deaths, even though they were likely not part of a planned
repressive strategy (normalization likely explains these killings).
The military regime was able to take over the media immediately upon seizing power
which allowed for mass dissemination of images that displayed communists and other leftists as
enemies of the state. The media helped to justify the human rights abuses committed by the
military. The first major justification was that war tactics were necessary to avoid a full-blown
civil war at a later date. The military suspected Allende and his supporters of planning to initiate
a civil war with the support of Cuba. The other justification was guided by the National Security
Doctrine which viewed Marxism as an internal threat. Thus, any action taken by the military
was deemed justified if it was aimed at eliminating internal threats and solidifying security.
Contributing to the dire conditions, the courts did not attempt to process any perpetrators of
HRVs likely because they were indoctrinated by the propaganda and understood these actions as
justified.
Economic conditions contributed to the HRVs since much of the repression was targeted
at unions and labor strikes, or demonstrations motivated by the deteriorating economic
conditions for workers. After coming to power, the military also passed several neoliberal
economic policies with the support of business. Augusto Pinochet used repression to contain
much of the voiced opposition to these new policies which were near opposites of the policies
put in place by the preceding Allende government. Chile, seeking to secure foreign investment,
offered beneficial policy incentives for foreign companies wishing to penetrate its domestic
market. In agreement with the foreign business community, the Chilean military regime
promised to keep the Marxist labor unions under control and establish an environment more
conducive to business and capital accumulation. Chile’s HRVs took place within an ideological
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war between differing economic factions. Both the social welfare policies of Allende and the
neoliberal policies of Pinochet stirred violent opposition. Although these policies are briefly
mentioned by Fruhling (1999) in his case study, more emphasis should be placed on
understanding how these policies were formulated, their impacts on the population, who
benefited from them, and if they violated human rights. Despite not addressing these concerns,
Fruhling (1999) does demonstrate that these policies played an integral role in creating the
conditions under which HRVs were committed.

Argentina17
From 1937 to 1983, the military in Argentina was politically involved in running the
country unlike most other Latin American countries. Several coups were executed with only one
democratically elected president serving his full term during this period, Juan Peron’s first term.
The military ousted and exiled Peron in 1955 while serving his second term. Both supporters
from the left and right became violent and battled in armed opposition. The assassination of
General Pedro Aramburu in 1970 (de facto president responsible for the coup ousting Peron in
1955) by the Montoneros, a leftist guerilla group, is said to be the starting point of an internal
war. However, once Peron was exiled, guerilla movements began to form supporting the return
of Peron from exile. Upon Peron’s return in 1973, both political sides felt their pleas would be
answered. From 1973-1976, major political crises occurred creating polarization between Peron
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See Heinz (1999c) for full case study. Human rights organizations proved to be invaluable in the Argentina case
study. Several human rights organizations published reports, some of the most important were done by Permanent
Assembly of Human Rights, the Center for Social and Legal Studies, and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights. The Diario del Judicio recorded trial testimonies from witnesses and members of the military and
police. Secret documents from the military junta that were released as well as declassified U.S. documents
published by Carrollton Press, and interviews with witnesses from the various sectors of society were also included.
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supporters. Peron was originally widely supported throughout the political spectrum, but with
the political polarization, these supporters became divided. Eventually, Peron turned his back on
the leftists and war was actually declared against them. The Montoneros then took it upon
themselves to create a socialist Argentina. Isabel Peron, Juan Peron’s wife, took over the
presidency after Juan Peron’s death in 1974. Repression by the military de facto government
against guerillas was mild at this time despite there being some deaths. Once the polarization of
the left and right grew to be irreconcilable, the Peronist right began eliminating the opposition in
large numbers while the guerillas targeted police, military, and some politicians. During this
“internal war,” most traditional peace-keeping attempts proved futile, suggesting the necessity of
a military intervention.
In 1976, the military launched a coup to seize power and eliminate the guerilla
opposition, with the support of most of the population. The counter-revolutionary nature of the
struggle led to the intelligence agencies’ rise to power. Military officials explain they were
simply following orders from the Peron government when they committed HRVs. The military
perceived an immediate and perilous communist threat, and they communicated this threat to the
public. The communist propaganda dehumanized communists who were portrayed as less than
human and irreconcilable (largely because many captured Montoneros had committed suicide).
Overall, the wide use of disappearances seems to be a deliberate and systematic approach taken
by the military to instill fear in the guerrillas and their allies while also concealing the level of
HRVs, unknown until much later.
The neoliberal economic policies that were introduced during military rule would not
have been possible under a democratically-elected president. The use of HRVs was necessary
for subduing an otherwise resistant population. The technocrats in alliance with the military
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sought to establish a new economic model. The United States seized the opportunity to open
Argentina’s markets and introduce it into global capitalism, which was also not thought possible
under democratic rule. Using the hostile political environment as a smoke screen, the military
violently repressed labor and trade unions to pave the way for neoliberalism. Heinz (1999c)
argues that most likely the new neoliberal policies led to unemployment and a shrinking working
class. The guerillas were “justifiably” eliminated due to their violent approach, while the labor
and trade unions were held in check with similar repression tactics. Fear swept the nation during
these crises allowing the military junta to exert its power over a mostly docile population after
crushing the guerrilla movements. Neoliberal economic policies are portrayed as having a
profound impact on the economic conditions under which HRVs were committed. As Heinz
(1999c) argues, these policies increased unemployment creating a large pool of aggrieved
stagnant workers. These workers attempted to express their discontent politically leading to a
polarized political environment. The heated political arena quickly turned hostile resulting in
HRVs. As Heinz (1999c) suggests, given the influence of neoliberal economic policies on the
conditions leading to HRVs, this dissertation considers these policies a central unit of analysis.
Therefore, rather than just analyzing the actions of the Argentinian state, the central focus of
Heinz’s (1999c) analysis is on economic and political policies. In the age of globalization, these
policies take the form of trade agreements. Thus, examining Argentina’s relationship (and
economic agreements) with countries that are part of Wallerstein’s (1974; 2004) economic core
is crucial.
Two primary ideological influences propelled the military repression of internal
opposition in Argentina. First, the National Security Doctrine that was influential in the other
Latin American countries studied also identified communists and terrorists as the central threat to
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political and economic stability in the country. More importantly, however, was the French
counter-insurgency strategy (developed originally against Algeria) in informing the military in
Argentina to control its population with propaganda and force using torture and killings when
necessary. Political goals of security are also important for this dissertation since it is apparent
in these case studies of Latin America that, time and again, political goals of stability and
security are used to justify HRVs. Oftentimes, people rebelling against perceived injustices
embedded in economic policies are criminalized to pave the way for implementation of these
economic policies.

Cuba, El Salvador, and Nicaragua
Sociologist, Maya Gómez (2003), used historical comparative analysis to investigate the
causes of HRVs, mostly physical integrity rights, in Cuba, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Of the
three major works presented in this section, Gómez’s study was the most comprehensive
exploration of causes of HRVs. Unlike the first two studies, she makes international
relationships, particularly those with the United States, an integral part of her study, with the
primary intention of moving beyond the dominant focus in on other HRV research on internal
factors and a rational choice paradigm of the state acting as a unified whole. Thus, for Gómez
(2003: 80), causes of HRVs transcend the nation-state where they occur, and the state should be
viewed as a “divided state,” contrasting the state theorized by realists. Therefore, internal and
external factors that contribute to HRVs are the central focus leading to Gómez (2003: 94)
asking the research question: “What kinds of changes in national politics or international
pressure seem to affect patterns in human rights abuse?” The current dissertation also examines
this concern through the study of criminogenic policies.
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Gómez (2003) uses historical-comparative methods for the following reasons: (1) to
increase the idiographic depth into specific cases; (2) to explore historical trajectories and social
processes; (3) to provide an encompassing investigation of both internal and external factors
affecting state behavior; (4) and to contextualize HRVs historically, politically, and socially.
Such a research method allows for considerable flexibility in studying a wide array of complex
variables that intersect in the social world such as the interactions between state and international
systems. Furthermore, patterns of HRVs can be documented and “critical turning points” such as
historical events can be pinpointed to explore their effects on subsequent abuses (Gómez 2003:
86). Her methodological approach centered on the “construction and analysis of case narratives”
(Gómez 2003: 85). This approach allows for the investigation of historical events in their
chronological order to explore their casual significance. These historical narratives order history
as it actually happened in “story” form, and provide an organization of complex social
phenomena within their proper historical context and temporal position. Gómez’ (2003) primary
focus is on the specific timing of events considered “critical turning points” that separate
important segments of history crucial for investigation. These turning points are defined by the
changes following them. If the overall pattern of HRVs are changed after some event, it is
considered a critical turning point, similar to Pruitt’s (2011; 2014; 2015) triggering catalyst.
Thus, answering the how, when, and why systematic changes in HRVs occur is arguably
answered by discerning these turning points. As part of her historical narratives, changes in
international policy and internal politics are important for portraying a country’s changing
human rights situation.
Gómez’ (2003) selects Cuba, El Salvador, and Nicaragua as cases for her study for
several reasons. First, all three countries are culturally and regionally similar and related
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suggesting similar internal dynamics. Second, they all have gained international attention and
even experienced some level of intervention on the basis of human rights. With such attention,
they all have received considerable focus for research providing a large amount of available data.
Third, each of these countries occupies a similar position in the international economy as
developing nations. Fourth, the three countries differ greatly on levels of HRVs experienced.
Fifth, while having similar positions internationally, there are many differences among their
political, economic, and class systems. Most important for this dissertation, the countries had
dissimilar relationships with the United States.
In her search for causes of HRVs, Gómez (2003) distinguished between what she called
pressures and threats, investigating them both internally and externally, expanding on Poe et al.
(1997) and Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999). Although pressures and threats were not conceptualized
well, pressures seem to cover any constraints that have the potential to influence behavior by the
state or other non-state actors, while threats are perceived or actual dangers to the established
power structure benefiting state or non-state actors. Furthermore, she takes a constructivist
approach to explore Poe et al.’s (1997) concepts of “willingness” (actors have perceived costs
and benefits which are essential for action) and “opportunity” (actors must have structural
supports or suitable circumstances favorable to executing their action) when considering the
motivations of state or non-state actors. Lastly, she uses the idea of decoupling to understand
state decision making as disjointed by the simultaneous pursuit of several, potentially conflicting,
goals such as international legitimacy, domestic authority, economic development, ect. (Meyer,
Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Christenson 1997).
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Cuba
Cuba had widespread HRVs prior to the 1959 communist revolution which probably was
a major impetus for the revolution itself beyond the economic and political goals. The
revolutionary government enhanced social and economic rights for citizens in the country after
seizing power. HRVs actually were the most severe just after the revolutionary government took
over that were prompted by external threats destabilizing the country, such as the Bay of Pigs
Invasion. Rates of political imprisonment were extremely high, but unlike the politically right
governments in the other Latin American countries, the Cuban leftist government held capitalist
and imperialist sympathizers – considered threats to the state at that time – indefinitely.
Furthermore, the United States created an even greater threat by urging many Latin American
countries to join the United States in embargoing imports and exports to and from Cuba. The
Soviet Union provided the needed support and relief for the Cuban economy to survive. With
this support, political, social, and economic conditions improved in Cuba during the 1970s.
Human rights conditions also improved, with most of Cuba’s political prisoners being released
by 1977. Even relations with the United States improved during this time. For the first time
since the revolution, Cuba lifted its “Illegal Exit Law” allowing dissatisfied citizens to leave the
country. Many sought to leave for the United States. Cuba likely lifted the law in order to avoid
any possible internal conflict. Cuba also took advantage of the U.S. open door policy, sending
criminals and the mentally challenged to Florida in the Mariel boatlift in 1980.
During the 1980s, Cuba maintained a good human rights record, due in part to the
economic stability provided by the Soviet Union. When Ronald Reagan was elected president,
his administration switched strategies towards Cuba to more hostile tactics. Despite this more
aggressive U.S. approach, Cuba was still able to protect human rights. However, after the
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collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cuban economy crashed. Forced to face this economic crisis,
Cuba realigned itself internationally and accepted U.S. investment to resuscitate the Cuban
economy. With the bleak economic conditions, HRVs resurfaced, although in different form. In
addition to the anti-government rioting during these times, the government attempted to organize
civilian groups to do the government’s “dirty work,” and political imprisonment was used albeit
with much more regularity and shorter sentences. Despite these new repressive strategies, the
Cuban government was able to maintain international legitimacy. In the wake of the “war on
terrorism,” Cuba has been under scrutiny again for incarcerating political prisoners.
In conclusion, Gómez argues that the United States, Soviet Union, United Nations, and
human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were all
responsible for external pressures and/or threats contributing to, or limiting, the HRVs occurring
in Cuba. Cuba represents an exemplar case of a nation where external actors have influenced its
domestic situation. Internal factors played a major role as well – many of which resulted from
external factors. The three most important internal factors affecting levels of abuse in Cuba
identified by Gómez (2003: 120) were “the level of economic stability,” “presence of established
domestic institutional structures,” and “level of internal pressure or civil unrest.” Three
important factors influencing types of abuse were strength of international human rights
organizations, level of international criticism, and reliance on international partnerships or
agreements. The Cuban case demonstrates the importance of including international factors in
understanding the domestic human rights situation. Economic stability was also crucial, similar
to the previous case studies reviewed. The United States seized the opportunity to invest in the
Cuban economy when Cuba lost the Soviet Union’s economic support. As the economic
situation changed due to this alteration in the U.S.-Cuba relationship, the economic conditions
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arguably became more conducive to HRVs. Gómez fell short in exploring this relationship in
more detail in order to understand its connections with the changing conditions in Cuba and to
explore their impacts on HRVs. Much of what Gómez has done suggests the importance of this
relationship, but does not go all the way in tracing the connections.

El Salvador
The El Salvador civil war, lasting from 1979 to 1992, resulted in the worst HRVs in
Central America in recent history, with an estimated one percent of the population being killed.
To understand the civil war, one must understand the history of El Salvador and the “la
Matanza” (the massacre) event particularly. In 1932, amidst global economic depression, El
Salvador’s workers suffered extreme pay cuts and loss of employment leading to a massive
uprising. The uprising was suspected of being inspired by Agustín Farabundo Martí, leader of
the Communist Party. The military captured and executed Martí, which incited a peasant revolt.
The peasant revolt was met by brute military strength by the government guided by a “scorched
earth” policy which claimed the lives of nearly three percent of the El Salvadoran population.
All labor unions were then banned until the late 1960s. With the events of “la Matanza” in the
minds of El Salvadorans, the perceived fraudulent election of U.S.-backed presidential candidate
Carlos Romero in 1977 was even more disturbing to the populous. Romero was also a general in
the military who had strong ties to the economic elite. Before Romero could even be
inaugurated, civil unrest broke out and was met by severe HRVs. The government declared a
state of emergency that revoked all constitutional rights. Faced with international criticism,
Romero introduced the Public Order Law attempting to formalize and legitimate state repression.
However, the Public Order Law only increased criticism, forcing Romero to repeal it. Again,

91
Gómez’ noting of Romero’s political and economic connections is applauded, but the research
should take the next step to explore Romero’s role in the U.S.-El Salvador relationship and how
that relationship may have impacted HRVs.
With the formation of guerrilla groups, the inability of Romero to quell the opposition,
and the successful Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua scaring the elite, the military executed a
coup d’état in 1979 that overthrew and exiled Romero to Guatemala. The new military
government was divided with both left- and right-wing sympathizers. Initially, they established
the Revolutionary Governing Junta (RGJ) inviting civilian politicians to join. The RGJ promised
a long list of social, economic, and political rights, but none of the promises were kept. Even
though violence was severe before Romero’s ouster, HRVs would actually intensify under the
RGJ. All civilian members of the RGJ resigned by 1980 due to the excessive violence and little
power they had in the government. A moderate, Jóse Duarte (Christian Democratic Party
leader), was brought in to the RGJ in an attempt to unify the people, but civil unrest continued.
At this time, the reformist and rightist factions of the military government were even more
pronounced. Colonel Adolfo Arnoldo Majano, a reformist, successfully averted two coup
attempts by extreme right military members. Yet, Majano was soon voted out of his position in
the RGJ resulting in the predominance of rightists in the RGJ.
Archbishop Oscar Romero encouraged soldiers to rise up against the military by refusing
to participate in HRVs. Enraged by the Archbishop’s subversive position, the military
assassinated the archbishop during a ceremonial prayer. Severe HRVs and protests ensued with
little policy change by the United States who continued to support the ruling regime. U.S. aid
never stopped coming into El Salvador as defeating the leftists appeared to take priority over
addressing HRVs. The United States certainly wanted to maintain a positive image
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internationally, but the goal of eliminating the leftists was more important. The military
government knew that it had immunity as long as it maintained U.S. support. In 1981, the
military declared martial law intensifying government violence. Refugees were killed while
attempting to flee the country and the United States denied all Salvadorian refugees – sending
them back when they attempted to enter the United States. Democratic elections were held
subsequently, with the conservatives winning a majority in 1982. To circumvent criticism, state
repression tactics were switched to more narrowly focus on oppositional members. The United
States continued to support the El Salvadoran government despite international criticism, and
even went so far as to praise the government’s human rights record.
In conclusion, the El Salvador case suggests that the political and economic elites
continued HRVs until they were deemed unnecessary for the primary goals which seemed to
focus on establishing a new economic system characterized by free market ideology and
eliminating the opposition which undermined the possibility of this achievement. Both the
conservatives in the military government and the United States continued to support or use
HRVs until these goals were met. Then, once these goals were met, they were able to hide
behind their support for democracy and human rights. Even though international criticism
existed, the U.S. support was able to undermine it. These criticisms were only effective in
shifting the type of HRVs from overt to covert, and from indiscriminate to more focused
targeting. Gómez argues that international organizations played a role in the peace process, but
fails to mention that this only came after the primary goals of the United States and military
government of El Salvador were met. Furthermore, the relationship between the United States
and El Salvador appears to be crucial to understanding the HRVs in El Salvador. However,
Gómez does not place this relationship at the center of her analysis, nor does she attempt to trace
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how this relationship may have contributed to and/or orchestrated the HRVs. Instead, Gómez
simply notes that El Salvador was the recipient of U.S. aid, and the United States turned a blind
eye.

Nicaragua
The Somoza family held a dictatorship over Nicaragua from 1936 to 1979 when they
were overthrown by the Sandinistas. During the Somozas’ reign, HRVs were numerous and
atrocious. One example of their atrocities is Operation Vampire which sold donated blood of
poor Nicaraguans for the family’s financial gain. They were also notorious for political
corruption. In one instance, they pocketed large sums of U.S. aid money for their personal
fortune. Under their reign, inequality was extreme, even by Latin American standards, with only
a few people owning most of the land. A majority of HRVs that occurred during the Somozas’
regime were committed by the National Guard (e.g. killings, torture, and disappearances of rural
peasants).
The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN, or Sandinistas), named after Augusto
Cesar Sandino,18 were the most prominent guerrilla group critical of the Somoza family. In an
act of dissidence, the Sandinistas invaded the home of José María Castillo, a high ranking
government official, during a house party. The Sandinistas took several hostages and held them
for ransom, requesting one million U.S. dollars and the release of fourteen political prisoners
pertinent to the Sandinista movement in exchange for the release of Castillo and his dinner

18

Augusto Cesar Sandino is a controversial national hero who was the first to oppose the Somoza regime when he
led a peasant army revolt against the U.S. Marines and National Guard military occupation of Nicaragua resulting in
a civil war from 1927 to 1933. The National Guard was U.S.-backed and led by Anastasio Somoza Garcia.
Sandino’s struggle against the U.S. National Guard and the Somoza family represented the struggle against
American imperialism to many of the peasants in Nicaragua. Although the Marines were driven from Nicaragua,
the National Guard assassinated Sandino under orders from President Anastasio Somoza Garcia creating Sandino as
a martyr. The FSLN later took the name Sandinistas in his honor.
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guests. Although the FSLN’s demands were met, the Anastasio Somoza Debayle government
more seriously viewed them as a threat, declaring martial law on December 28, 1974 shortly
after this incident. Extreme repression followed these events since all constitutional rights were
neutralized by this declaration. Dr. Pedro Chamorro Cardenal, head of a prominent independent
newspaper in Nicaragua was murdered by a government-supported death squad, sparking
widespread rioting and demonstrations by thousands of Nicaraguans requesting the resignation
of President Somoza. The National Guard responded by escalating the conflict, resorting to
bombarding civilian population centers to reclaim the city from the protesters. International
scrutiny increased and the United States even asked Somoza to voluntarily leave office, but he
refused. Eventually, the FSLN launched a final offensive that overthrew the Somoza regime on
July 17, 1979.
Under the new Sandinista government, HRVs did not disappear although they did
arguably improve. HRVs qualitatively shifted in form as political imprisonment was now the
most ubiquitous type of HRVs perpetrated by the government. The Sandinista government did
in fact ratify several human rights conventions despite their culpability. Much of their HRVs
resulted from lack of due process when trying members of the previous Somoza regime for past
crimes. Once Reagan took office in the United States, policy towards Nicaragua drastically
changed. In particular, Reagan created the Contras (counterrevolutionaries) in Nicaragua. The
Contras, funded and provided leadership by the United States, directly targeted the Sandinista
government and its sympathizers with repressive tactics. The Sandinista government responded
to this threat by engaging in HRVs themselves to defend the new government. The HRVs
committed by the Sandinista government may have warded off the threat of the Contras;
however, these violations ultimately delegitimized their authority and led to a major diminution
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in their popularity. In addition, most of the Sandinista government’s finances were allocated to
the war against the Contras that ultimately led to defunding their social programs, which proved
extremely unpopular, by the Nicaraguan people. With the Sandinista government’s actions
against the Contras losing favor, national elections were held in 1984 resulting in Daniel Ortega,
a FSLN leader, being elected president. Under Ortega and pressure from the international
community, Esquipulas II was ratified starting the peace process. In 1989, the Contras agreed to
demobilize. Contra rebels were asked to disarm, and in return they would receive some land and
food aid under the new Violeta Chamorro presidency. Once the Contra rebels settled on their
new land, old sparks reignited, but the situation later stabilized around 1994. Although
throughout the mid-1990s and early 2000s HRVs were relatively low and stable in Nicaragua,
social and economic conditions still remained grim, with the majority of citizens living in dire
poverty. Nicaragua during this time was one of the poorest countries in all the Western
Hemisphere.
In conclusion, the human rights situation in Nicaragua was inextricably tied to U.S.
intervention over the past century. The United States funded some of the worst perpetrators of
HRVs in Nicaragua during this time. For instance, Gómez fails to mention that the overthrow of
democratically-elected Nicaraguan president, Jacobo Árbenz, was orchestrated by the United
States in collaboration with Anastasio Somoza as part of Operation PBFORTUNE (Doyle and
Kornbluh 1997). Another interesting conclusion suggests that, despite the Sandinistas
continuing efforts to remain neutral politically and abide by international human rights standards,
they were still unable to avoid the politics of the Cold War. More specifically, they were
targeted by the United States because their policies threatened a global capitalist marketplace and
were not beneficial to capitalism. Although not examined by Gómez, the goal of establishing
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neoliberal economic policies in Nicaragua, like the other countries investigated, played a role in
U.S. intervention and HRVs. The Sandinistas were demonized for their HRVs that they
committed out of a need for political survival, but ultimately cost them their political livelihood.
The Contras, although they arguably did not succeed in overthrowing the Sandinistas, were able
to delegitimize their more socialist policies as ineffective given that the Sandinistas’ resources
were focused on fighting the Contras rather than their new social programs. Lastly, Gómez notes
that HRVs were low during the mid-1990s and early 2000s, but social and economic conditions
still left the majority living in poverty which marks where this dissertation diverges from Gómez.
While Gómez only focuses on physical integrity rights, she misses seeing that the dire poverty in
Nicaragua could and should be classified as a HRV. When the scope of HRVs is expanded in
this way, the situation in Nicaragua must be viewed differently. An alternative stance on human
rights would change Gómez’ conclusion that HRVs decreased in number and became stable, to
HRVs took yet another form. In other words, killings and disappearances decreased, but dire
poverty increased. Therefore, she may be right in saying that HRVs lessened, since poverty is
arguably less severe than death, but may be remiss in stating that HRVs have decreased. The
current dissertation explores these lesser HRVs that may spark more severe HRVs – as seen in
many of these Latin American cases studies where people rebel against perceived social,
political, and economic injustices – and may persist during times previously discussed as
peaceful with no or only a few HRVs.

Overarching Themes
Considering all nine cases studies, there are some patterns that illuminate how and why
HRVs are committed. First and foremost, these case studies clearly demonstrate that HRVs are
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often systematic and not accidental. Adding to Heinz and Fruhling’s (1999: 591) conclusions,
which primarily focused on military de facto governments, they make four hypotheses. First,
“the greater the level of political polarization and violence prior to the democratic breakdown,
the more likely it is that a government will resort to [physical integrity rights] to restore public
order and the greater the possibilities are that civilian supporters of the government will justify
these violations.” Second, the greater the perceived threat of any opposition by the military, the
more likely HRVs will be used to eliminate such a threat. This conclusion can be expanded to
include any opposition to the ruling party. Third, physical integrity rights violations occur
largely due to the intentional acts by leaders of state or state agencies. Isolated physical integrity
rights without support of state leaders are much less common. Fourth, the main determinants of
physical integrity rights violations are political polarization, breakdown of law and democracy,
exclusionary economic policies, strategic alliances to protect ruling class (and capitalist)
interests, and ideological justifications to protect against criticism of repressive tactics. These
determinants of physical integrity right violations are expected to also impact lesser HRVs in
Mexico.
Gómez (2003) expands on the causes of HRVs. However, due to her specific focus on
the international level, she listed several external factors that explain HRVs. First, geopolitical
shifts or events destabilizing the political or economic system negatively affected human rights.
Second, external (or international) support for HRVs, such as foreign aid, provided the
opportunity for HRVs, but the state receiving funds must also be willing to commit such crimes.
Third, external threats can influence internal threats thus leading to an increase in HRVs. For
instance, the successful communist revolution in Cuba was thought to spur the communist
movement in many Latin American countries, and these movements were perceived as a threat to
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power. Fourth, international peace initiatives and criticism can control, at least to some level,
against HRVs. However, an important finding was that these controls often did not eliminate
HRVs, rather just caused them to shift in form from overt to covert. Two internal factors were
also noted as causing HRVs: (1) internal threats such as protests and social movements increased
HRVs, and even more so if they were perceived as threatening the ruling classes’ power and
political interests and (2) sudden and undemocratic regime changes often are accompanied by
HRVs.
The current dissertation borrows much from these qualitative cases studies. Most
importantly, from Heinz and Fruhling (1999), I take how perpetrators of HRVs are able to
establish national security doctrines that provide justifications for pursuing internal political and
economic stability. Policy implementation in the name of political and economic stability has
created chaotic conditions under which HRVs have been committed. Populations in these
countries often rebelled against perceived unjust economic policies leading to violent conflict
between the state and its citizens. From Gómez, I adopt her focus on how international
relationships influence domestic human rights conditions. Furthermore, Gómez offers an
understanding that HRVs shift form and intensity due to their visibility and the public’s
disagreement with them. A major goal of the current dissertation is to explore the nature of this
shift in the modern neoliberal era. In the current era, human rights organizations have gained
more of a presence which could lead to less visible HRVs. Thus, HRVs may not appear in the
form of physical integrity rights violations as they did in all of the nine case studies reviewed in
this chapter. Instead, lesser forms of HRVs may appear such as increased poverty, increased
unemployment, deteriorating labor conditions, the dismantling of unions, widespread hunger,
and displacement. Since Gómez’s study can be viewed as the most recent and in-depth case
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study exploration of the causes of HRVs, it is a starting point for the current dissertation, but
several criticisms must be made to advance the study of HRVs in the neoliberal era.
With the introduction of comprehensive international human rights treaties (e.g.,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances), HRVs are now unequivocally criminal acts.
Research on HRVs may benefit by borrowing theoretically from criminology, particularly the
state crime literature, in explaining HRVs in the current era. The Kramer and Michalowski
(2006) model, further expanded by Rothe and Mullins (2009), can more appropriately theorize
HRVs as state crime and better guide an explanation of HRVs than Gómez’s theoretical
framework. In the Rothe and Mullins model, four catalysts for action are included: motivation,
opportunity, controls, and constraints which more comprehensively covers HRVs than Gómez’
use of a simplified variation of these catalysts for action using the concepts of “willingness” and
“opportunity.” Rothe and Mullins’ (2006) distinctions are an improvement over Gómez’s
theoretical framework. The opportunity category, of course, overlaps and is the same as
Gómez’s proposal, but “willingness” is split into motivation and constraints. States that are
“willing” to commit HRVs can be said to be motivated and not constrained. Yet, states may be
motivated and constrained which is not well explored using Gómez’s theoretical framework.
Gómez does use external/internal pressures and threats to account for constraints, but her
framework is scattered and not well conceptualized whereas Rothe and Mullins model is built
specifically to describe and explain the interrelations between these variables. Gómez even
specifically states that pressures and threats need more conceptualization. Lastly, controls from
the Rothe and Mullins model theorize the effects that international treaties and other binding
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laws may have on HRVs which is subsumed under external pressures in Gómez’s theoretical
framework.
I applaud Gómez’s (2003) focus on external pressures applied by core nations, such as
the United States, on peripheral nations. However, she gave little to no attention to the reasons
why the United States was consistently involved in contributing to HRVs. Of course, the
political environment of the Cold War was the major explanatory variable as to why the United
States was involved in these nations, which is better documented in Heinz and Fruhling’s (1999)
case studies. Now that the Cold War has ended, it is not likely that Gómez could explain why
the United States would involve itself in HRVs given her analysis and the time period she
stuided. When focusing on the relationship between the United States and these developing
nations, it is paramount to explore its impact on the economic environment in the United States,
in the peripheral country holding a relationship with the United States, and globally. The Cold
War ended with capitalism as the victor over socialism/communism, and much of the HRVs
during the Cold War were motivated by preserving the capitalist system which brought wealth to
the elites in the United States, the countries of intervention, and its allies internationally. Once
the Cold War ended and these countries were “stabilized,” Gómez argues along with many other
scholars (see Hafner-Burton 2014; Regilme 2014 for summaries of these scholars’ work) in the
human rights area that HRVs ended for the most part. This argument is surprising given that she
portrays HRVs as shifting in form. Since many of the studies reviewed in this chapter are
focused on physical integrity rights, this is a correct statement, but misleading if the study views
HRVs more broadly. The issue with concluding a study once physical integrity rights remain at
an acceptable level is that other HRVs may still exist in different forms. These studies have
neglected other rights such as civil rights and worker’s rights while also failing to explore the
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economic quality of life through measures such as inequality. If the population is still suffering
from a low quality of life after physical integrity rights are under control, admitted by Gómez in
the case of Nicaragua, then there is still much work to be done by human rights advocates.
Judging from these qualitative cases studies done in several Latin American country, physical
integrity rights are closely related to these other rights and measures of quality of life. Physical
integrity right violations have been used as a systematic repressive tool and are not necessary if
the population does not visibly oppose the social and economic conditions. However, absence of
opposition does not mean absence of HRVs.

Summary of Empirical Literature
While the research on genocide helps illuminate the intricacies of HRVs at the
interactional level in the state-corporate crime models (Kramer and Michalowski 2006; Rothe
and Mullins 2009), especially providing a more comprehensive understanding of the interactions
between individuals in policy creation and explicating what motivates and constrains agents of
the state in policy creation, the crimes of globalization literature provides an empirical
groundwork that supports the proposed analytical model from the previous chapter. Statecorporate criminologists demonstrated that IFIs and transnational corporations enact policies in
developing nations that sometimes result in violating a series of human rights of particular
populations. It has been discussed how this process can be explained by bilateral or multilateral
policy formation and that particular states should be of primary importance given their influence
over these IFIs and multinational corporations. The United States was particularly singled out
for its clout over IFIs. The IFIs become a powerful mechanism by which the United States or
other powerful nations can exert influence over development programs and policy creation that
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affect weaker, less developed nations. Understanding the ways a country can shape policy and in
turn establish conditions conducive to HRVs, regardless of explicit intent, is a key focus of the
current dissertation. Although policy formation is not a central concern for the crimes of
globalization literature, the effects of policy was highly regarded as a cause or contributor to
HRVs in the case studies reviewed. This dissertation will center around tracing policy from
formation to implementation to outcomes in an attempt to assess the role policy may play in
creating the conditions for HRVs. Thus, the proposed analytical model should help contribute to
the crimes of globalization literature by providing a systematic research tool when assessing
criminogenic policies.
In addition, the amount of detail provided by the qualitative case studies covering several
Latin American countries offers rich empirical evidence of states complicit in the commission of
HRVs. Although these case studies document states that were likely more directly committing
HRVs than the modern states that are the subject of this dissertation, much can be learned from
the methodological approaches and findings of these historical cases. The findings from the
Latin American case studies suggest that both political stability and economic growth are major
motivators for state action. Therefore, bilateral agreements will likely center around these goals.
The ideologies informing these goals led to HRVs in several of the cases explored. For instance,
several Latin American countries adopted some variation of a national security doctrine that
justified HRVs in the name of political stability. Thus, political movements or groups that
threatened political change were repressed, sometimes violently. Also, new economic policies
were formulated and informed by the logic of economic growth justifying the repression of labor
unions and worker strikes in the name of economic stability. Both of these goals and their
legitimating ideologies are crucial to the current dissertation. As for methodology, Gómez’s case
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narrative methodological approach is most appropriate for use in the current dissertation. When
studying a single case using the proposed analytical model from the previous chapter, events
leading up to HRVs can be effectively explored using historical narratives to establish
chronological order of events while investigating a key policy for its significance as a critical
turning point contributing to the HRVs. Given the popularity of the case study method in
exploring the causes of HRVs, the case study method is explored in detail in the following
chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
THE PRESENT STUDY

Chapter Overview
Most studies covering human rights violations (HRVs) use quantitative data and methods
of analysis. For this reason, this chapter begins by critiquing quantitative studies of human rights
violations (HRVs) to demonstrate the many complexities uncaptured by these approaches. Then,
I introduce case study methodology through three unique lenses and argue that it is the best
method for studying HRVs due to a number of advantages such as its high level of construct
validity, flexibility, and ability to incorporate a variety of data sources. Once I have established
case study method as an appropriate method for tracing HRVs in a particular country, I justify
case and time period selection. Then, I identify several of the key data sources I used to address
the research questions in my study and describe why they are important. Lastly, this chapter
concludes with a succinct overview of the entire project to be covered in detail in the remaining
chapters.

Criticisms of Quantitative Studies of HRVs
The human rights literature contains numerous quantitative studies of HRVs. However,
Goldstein (1986) has cautioned against using quantitative data when studying HRVs. He does
not argue that HRVs can only be understood using qualitative data, but does take the stance that
quantitative data on HRVs is often useless without providing context with qualitative research.
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Overall, Goldstein (1986) warns against an overreliance on statistical methods without the use of
supplementary qualitative data. Whenever possible, he argues, statistics should be made more
meaningful by being placed in their appropriate historical and political context. In other
situations, where quantitative data are unavailable, researchers should not avoid doing such
research because they feel quantitative measures are superior. Case studies can include both
quantitative and qualitative data together. However, before continuing to the advantages of case
studies, I will review several of Goldstein’s (1986) concerns with quantitative research on HRVs.
The first problem Goldstein (1986) addresses is the definitional problems which have
long plagued human rights research. In addition to HRVs not being defined the same in different
countries or different databases, countries have often differed on their views of which human
rights deserve more attention. For example, Western countries and human rights organizations
have focused mostly on political and civil rights (e.g., voting rights) and physical integrity rights
(e.g., freedom from torture), while non-Western countries have emphasized social and economic
rights (e.g., right to employment). In addition, Western/capitalist nations have stressed
individual rights within legally bound nation-states, while non-Western (often developing
nations) have argued for global rights of economic autonomy and freedom from racial
discrimination, often making direct criticisms of Western global hegemony. Pollis and Schwab
(1979) even go so far as to describe “human rights” as a Western construct used to maintain its
hegemony. One American delegate, Richard Schifter, at an international human rights
convention exemplified these differences by stating, “we talk about human rights and they [the
Soviets] talk about unemployment and racism” (Wren 1985: para. 1). Unemployment and
racism are arguably human rights concerns, but this quote suggests that this is by no means a
clear distinction. Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is often considered as the
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global definition of human rights, different nations tend to choose which rights they deem to be
important. Human rights are influenced by ideology, and thus unilateral actions taken by a state
may be considered repressive by some while others see them as heroic. In other words,
repressive state action is often justified making it even more difficult to separate between HRVs
and necessary repressive measures (Stohl and Lopez 1984).
The second problem involves the difficulty of obtaining reliable data on HRVs. This
problem stems from the first. Since states define or focus differently on various HRVs, any data
they collect likely reflects their position taken on human rights. Popular quantitative measures
must not be blindly used in human rights research. For example, the Physical Quality of Life
Index (PQLI) is a score based on three equally weighted indicators – infant mortality rate, life
expectancy, and literacy (see Morris 1979). Researchers often use the PQLI as a measure of
social and economic rights, but there are several problems with this measure. First, there is no
theoretical or methodological justification for the equal weighting, essentially treating each of
the three rights as equally important. Second, the literacy rate is measured quite differently
across countries, while the other two measures are more standardized, thus complicating crossnational comparisons. Third, the PQLI does not account for subnational differences such as
racial disparities in these human rights. For instance, in the United States, African Americans
have an infant mortality rate twice as high as Caucasian Americans (Mathews, MacDorman, and
Thoma 2015). Fourth, the PQLI provides little variability among developed nations since they
all tend to rank low on infant mortality and high on life expectancy and literacy despite major
differences in equality and social welfare expenditures. Lastly, critics have argued that the PQLI
signifies national wealth rather than government’s protection of economic and social rights,
which is a major validity issue (Heginbotham and Bite 1978).
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Obtaining any data on HRVs may be problematic; however, obtaining reliable data may
be even more challenging as countries, especially those with poor human rights records, tend to
avoid data collection on human rights. Even Heinz and Fruhling (1999) found it difficult to
locate military officials who wished to disclose HRVs that had been committed by their
government years after the events. Also, in the United States, the FBI (Theoharis 1978; Weiner
2012) and CIA (CIA 1973; Weiner 2007) have long been involved in HRVs and their cover-ups,
but these events have not been recorded.
In the 1970s, researchers used qualitative data to study human rights (Marie 1973), but a
decade later quantitative researchers became involved in the study of human rights using
sophisticated quantitative measures and multivariate analysis techniques. Despite some
improvements over time, it became troublesome that the number of HRVs widely varied across
sources. For instance, the U.S. State Department’s report on El Salvador that classified the
country as making progress was criticized by America’s Watch as being biased (America’s
Watch 1985). Overcoming bias is a major concern for any researcher dealing with human rights
data. Data are often self-reported by governments, such as those data coming from the United
Nations Human Rights Commission established in 1965. Furthermore, sources are often
motivated politically such as the U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights
Practices. Although, this source is considered quite comprehensive and consistent, it is reporting
human rights conditions from the position of the U.S. government, which, given the stance of
this dissertation, is likely not an unbiased source as the United States would be highly motivated
to downplay HRVs committed in another country where the United States may have been
involved. NGOs are likely the best sources for measuring human rights violations, but this does
not mean that they cannot have bias as well. Since there is no single definition or operational
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definition for measuring human rights, either theoretically or methodologically, a prudent
researcher must use caution when making cross-national comparisons.
The third, and arguably most important, problem with using quantitative data for studying
HRVs is the interpretation of data. Quantitative measures of HRVs must be interpreted by
experts who have intimate knowledge of the country or case where the HRVs have been
committed. In other words, a purely quantitative interpretation of HRVs is likely misguided.
The Political Terror Scale (see Gibney and Dalton 1996; Wood, Reed, and Gibney 2010) and the
Cingranelli and Richards (2010) Human Rights Data Project known as CIRI are two of the most
widely used quantitative measures in human rights research. They both represent a score given
to a country based on the human rights record and are heavily based on raw count data. Human
rights scores must weight several different types of HRVs to arrive at a final score. However,
these weighting procedures, or lack thereof, can be scrutinized for their seemingly arbitrary
conclusions. In other words, there are judgements made as to which HRVs are given more
weight, and oftentimes, all HRVs are given equal weight despite their difference in seriousness.
For example, when including cases of torture with cases of extrajudicial killings, one could argue
that killing people is worse than torturing them. Thus, equal weighting between the two abuses
would not provide a useful overall score of state repression or severity of HRVs in a country.
However, is it fair to assume that ten cases of torture equal one extrajudicial killing? What about
50 cases of torture? The point here is that serious consideration to weighting must be given to
any measure of overall human rights violations, and any such measure should be used with
extreme caution.
Another concern with interpreting data on human rights is that HRVs are connected to a
state’s legitimacy. In other words, a dissident populous will likely lead to more HRVs, all else
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being equal, given the importance of conflict as a cause of HRVs. Accordingly, HRVs such as
police violence should be considered in relation to protest activity. For example, if we compare
countries on police violence, one country may have 1,000 incidents of police violence, while the
other only has 100. Based on this quantitative information we may conclude that the first
country is more repressive. However, more contextual information may lead to a different
conclusion. The first country may have experienced 2,000 protests while only 100 protests
occurred in country two. Given this new information, country two is actually quite repressive
with one incident of police violence per protest, while the first country only had one incident of
police violence every two protests. Citizens of country two may actually be even more repressed
beyond this ratio, but they simply know how repressive the state is, and in turn obey authority
more than citizens of the first country. In other words, quantitative measures often fail to capture
the amount of coercion that does not make itself visible. Furthermore, it is difficult to measure
the effect HRVs have on producing fear and deterring people from acting the way they would
have without the presence of repressive tactics. Leo Tolstoy is quoted as stating, “what matters
is not what the censor does to what I have written, but to what I might have written” (Swift 2009:
280). Oftentimes, states may modify behavior through fear, but quantitative measures will not
reveal this effect.

Case Study Methods
Quantitatively-oriented critics often argue that case study methods do not have welldefined research procedures. Furthermore, researchers employ case study methods differently
depending on their epistemological stance. Yazan (2015) reviews Yin, Stake, and Merriam’s
views on case study methods.

Yin (2013) holds the positivistic view of research and views the
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objective of case study research designs as maximizing well-established criteria used in
quantitative research designs – construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and
reliability. Yin’s epistemology informs his systematic design of a case study consisting of five
components – research questions; hypotheses; unit(s) of analysis; connection between data and
hypotheses; and criteria used for interpretation. All three researchers suggest using multiple
sources of data when studying a case, but differ on the types of data sources. Yin (2013) lists six
sources – documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant
observation, and physical artifacts. He argues that a chain of evidence should be constructed that
links the research questions all the way to the conclusions of the study. Analyzing data, to Yin
(2013), is about cross-checking and testing the data gathered against the initial hypotheses of the
study in an attempt to uncover some objective truth. Lastly, Yin (2013) lays out how to achieve
the objective of case study research designs. Construct validity can be achieved by triangulating
multiple sources of data and outlining a chain of evidence, internal validity by pattern matching,
external validity by analytic generalizability, and reliability by using a systematic case study
protocol.
In contrast to Yin’s view, Stake (1995) views knowledge as constructed rather than as
some objective truth to be discovered. Thus, case study researchers are primarily constructing
knowledge through their new interpretations of the data rather than discovering some objective
truth. While Yin suggests a systematic plan to be in place at the onset of a case study, Stake
(1995) describes a flexible design that only requires the major research problem(s) and
question(s) to be defined at the study’s onset. Stake (1995) follows Parlett and Hamilton’s
(1972) concept of “progressive focusing,” which suggests that the trajectory of the study cannot
be known in advance, and the researcher must be allowed to follow the research rather than lead
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it. Stake (1995) suggests using observation techniques, interviews, and document review to
gather data. However, he does describe the data gathering process as more artistic than
systematic requiring skills of “sensitivity and skepticism” and having an expertise in “knowing
what leads to significant understanding, recognizing good sources of data, and consciously and
unconsciously testing out the veracity of their eyes and robustness of their interpretations” (Stake
1995: 50). Both Stake (1995) and Merriam (1998) disagree with Yin (2013) on using
quantitative sources of data and suggest solely using qualitative sources of data. Unlike Yin
(2013), Stake (1995) argues that researchers should simultaneously collect and analyze data.
Data analysis is viewed as an ongoing process of separating the researchers’ impressions from
their observations. For Stake (1995), data validation is a process that never ends, but is ongoing
throughout the research process. He argues that triangulation in multiple forms (i.e., data source
triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation, and methodological triangulation)
should be used to achieve data validation.
Lastly, Merriam (1998) also views knowledge as constructed. However, she emphasizes
studying how knowledge construction is a product of social interaction between people sharing
their interpretations. In Merriam’s (1998: 22) words,
The researcher brings a construction of reality to the research situation, which interacts
with other people’s constructions or interpretations of the phenomenon being studied.
The final product of this type of study is yet another interpretation by the researcher of
others’ views filtered through his or her own.
Merriam (1998), although coming from a constructivist perspective like Stake (1995), lays out a
systematic procedure for designing a case study. Somewhere between Yin (2013) and Stake
(1995), she suggests performing several tasks before beginning data collection, including
reviewing the literature, constructing a theoretical framework, identifying a research problem,
creating research questions, and selecting a sample. Merriam’s suggested data gathering
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techniques mirror those of Stake (1995) by focusing on interviews, observations, and document
review while ignoring quantitative data sources. Similar to Stake (1995), Merriam (1998) sees
data collection and analysis as simultaneous processes. Merriam (1998:178) views data analysis
as “making sense out of the data ... [which means] consolidating, reducing, and interpreting what
people have said and what the researcher has seen and read – it is the process of making
meaning.” Since she views reality as “holistic, multidimensional, and ever-changing,” case
study, research should strive to provide “the reader with a depiction in enough detail to show that
the author’s conclusion ‘makes sense’” (Merriam 1998: 202, 199).
I follow Bennett (2004) in using a combination of these three approaches in the current
dissertation. Bennett (2004) discusses the use of case study methods with a focus on single-case
research. Of particular importance to this approach is process tracing – a technique used to
investigate an observed phenomenon from hypothesized cause to its predicted outcomes (or
unpredicted effects). Bennett (2004) draws on similarities between process tracing and detective
work. Detectives test several possible explanations against the known evidence to search for the
most plausible chain of events explaining the outcome. Process tracing is most useful when
controlled experiments are impossible, such as when studying nonexperimental or quasiexperimental studies of historical cases. Instead of using a nomothetic approach, process tracing
focuses on providing an ideographic explanation of a particular case including extensive depth of
detail, and tracing a historical process while applying theory throughout explains a case in its
entirety (Roberts 1996). Each step in a historical process must be described and its connection to
a subsequent one can be explored for a possible explanation. Although historians may be
satisfied with explaining individual cases, sociologists strive to generalize to some group of

113
cases. Thus, another goal of this project is to conclude with testable propositions for future
research of similar cases.
Although many researchers criticize the value of single-case research (see King,
Keohane, and Verba 1994) since the results cannot be generalized beyond the single case, yet
single case studies can contribute to testing or generating theory. Eckstein (1975) distinguished
between “most likely” and “least likely” cases that are extremely useful for theory testing.
“Most likely” cases are those cases that are strongly predicted to fit a particular theory, thus if a
“most likely” case fails to fit, it provides strong evidence suggesting theory reconstruction. On
the other hand, “least likely” cases are cases that are expected to be most difficult for a theory to
explain. Thus, if a theory is able to explain a “least likely” case, this offers support for the
theory. Even in instances where a single case fits neither of these distinctions, a single-case
project can help generate hypotheses capable of systematic testing in future research.
Despite its critics, case study research offers several advantages over other methods for
use in the current study. Maybe the greatest strength of case study research is its ability to
achieve high levels of construct validity – the ability to measure theoretical concepts most
appropriate to a theoretical lens (Bennett 2004). Contrarily, when conducting secondary data
analysis, or even when limited to quantitative measures, difficulties arise when attempting to find
or design a measure that captures the theoretical concept of interest.
The ability to achieve strong construct validity, however, often is paired with the inability
to obtain high levels of external validity. Thus, findings from case study research tend to be
applicable to small specific subfields rather than large general populations. Empirical
generalizability is often a goal that is only important once empirically-grounded theory has been
established, and case studies often contribute to the construction and testing of these theories
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with no attempt at achieving empirical generalizability. However, one goal of this dissertation is
to strive for theoretical generalizability by offering a theoretical explanation based on the
proposed analytical model for one case providing the groundwork for future researchers.
Case studies are capable of employing several levels of analysis within a single study
allowing for micro-macro connections to be studied and theorized (Yin 2013). Case studies also
provide an opportunity to synthesize a wide body of empirical evidence such as ethnographies,
interviews, surveys, historical archive data, and statistical data. All the evidence in a particular
case can be evaluated as a whole and an evidence-based judgement can be made about the causal
mechanisms in the case. Multiple data collection methods lead to triangulation of more robust
theoretical constructs and propositions, or simply a more accurate descriptive narrative of the
case. Case studies are quite unique given that they can utilize both quantitative and qualitative
data sources and analysis methods. One common misconception is to consider case studies as
solely based on qualitative methods. The strongest case studies include empirical evidence that
is both qualitative and quantitative. For instance, if the quality of life of Nicaraguan farmers is
under study, the Physical Quality of Life Index that includes quantitative measures of infant
mortality rate, life expectancy, and literacy would be included along with other qualitative data
such as in-depth interviews with farmers about their lived experiences. Therefore, case studies
can provide an immense amount of detail, test theoretical propositions, or even create theory.
Another important advantage of case study research is its ability to address complex causal
relations such as equifiniality (several combinations of variables may result in the same
outcome), multiple interaction effects, and path dependency (Ragin 1987).
Case study research can also be the foundation of good theory building (Eisenhardt
1989). The empirical strength and flexibility of case studies influence this power. Case studies
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allow greater flexibility than other forms of data collection. Unlike other methods, case studies
provide the opportunity for a hypothesis to be derived during the study and subsequently tested
using the same case as well. New research questions may emerge during the research process
and case study methods allow for the alteration or addition of data during the research process.
However, several of the advantages of case study methodology contribute to a weakness of
having an overwhelming amount of data per case. Although researchers may be advised against
the use of boundaries and allowing for the research to lead the researcher in case study research,
the constant use of techniques to organize the data, thereby attempting to remove any extraneous
information in order to hone in on what is of causal importance, is a more effective strategy.
One technique is to compare the case against others, either in the literature or within the study if
multiple cases are used. This technique is particularly useful when attempting to build or test
theory. Given the length of an in-depth case study, most research will involve a limited number
of cases. Thus, it is essential for other researchers to build on the previous literature to increase
the number of cases for strengthening theory through theoretical saturation.
The perpetual oscillation between theory and data is a key component, and advantage of,
case study research (Eisenhardt 1989). Theory can constantly be compared to various cases to
check for a good fit. Modifications to the theory can be made where it is appropriate. Case
study research can actually be most fruitful when data does not fit theory because it forces the
researcher to critically think about a specific case, and through rigorous reanalyzing of the case,
the researcher can develop a significant theory modification. If a case supports theory as
expected, more bias is likely present since the researcher is never forced to rethink his or her
theoretical position. However, when discordant information is discovered, researchers must
regroup in order to explain the unexpected. Regardless of whether theory holds or not in a
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particular case, an in-depth case study can be useful in explaining why such a relationship holds
or not. Given the back and forth between data and theory, theory generated or tested using case
study methodology is likely to be valid empirically. Furthermore, theory generated or tested
through case study research should also lead to more clear and falsifiable hypotheses, since any
hypotheses will have already been empirically verified with some evidence during the case
study.
A few disadvantages to the intensive use of empirical data in case study methods exist.
The first has already been alluded to, which is the overwhelming amount of information. With
extensive empirical data on a particular case, any theory designed to explain that case and others
like it will likely result in an overly complex theory. State-corporate crime research has been
criticized for modifying theory every time a new case is added (Lynch, Long, and Stretesky
2013). Good theory is generally signified by parsimony, and theory created through case studies
struggles to remain parsimonious. Related to this shortcoming, theory generated from case study
research also tends to be idiosyncratic. Typically, theories strive to explain wide bodies of
phenomena, but theory generated through case studies can often only explain very specific
phenomena given the extensive detail of particular cases.
Case study research is also restricted by other limitations. The lack of generalizability
was one issue already mentioned. However, case studies are typically employed to uncover how
particular conditions lead to specific outcomes by tracing the mechanisms by which these
outcomes occur. Selection bias is another potential issue, which involves selecting a limited
number of cases that does not represent accurate variability of conditions and outcomes. Yet,
selection bias is more of a concern in statistical research when sophisticated sampling procedures
are used. Since case study research inherently deals with small samples and sometimes single
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cases, confirmation bias – selecting cases that are known to support the theory under
investigation – is more problematic. Including all suspected cases is important during the
selection process to allow the research hypotheses to be fully examined. Lastly, although case
studies are proficient at discovering the scope of conditions that lead to particular outcomes, they
fall short at determining the magnitude of effects for each condition (a task statistical methods
perform well).

Research Procedures
This dissertation uses case study methods with a single case to assess the role that
NAFTA played in creating conditions for HRVs in Mexico, primarily among the working class,
with a focus on the agricultural sector. From Bennett (2004), the process tracing technique is
borrowed which allows for an in-depth examination of NAFTA and its connection to the
probable existence of HRVs in Mexico. This process helps to enlighten what other unsuspected
conditions lead to HRVs as well. Thus, I act as a detective, as Bennett suggested, which is quite
suitable considering that HRVs are criminal acts. Once I reviewed all the available evidence, I
established who or what was responsible for these HRVs, whether it was NAFTA, something
else, or a combination of factors.
Given that NAFTA is a prime suspect related to the HRVs, events before NAFTA, after
NAFTA, and the negotiation process itself was historically reconstructed into a case narrative,
similar to Gómez’ (2003) work. Once the case narrative of the creation of NAFTA and its
aftereffects is outlined, NAFTA was assessed as a critical turning point leading to HRVs in
Mexico. The use of case narratives allows for a chronological ordering of historical events to
explore casual significance. Thus, one key aspect of this dissertation is assessing whether HRVs

118
changed in any manner during the course of NAFTA’s negotiations and its subsequent
implementation.
Theory building is another main goal of this dissertation. Since case study research is the
foundation of theory building due to its ability to amass and assess large amounts of both
quantitative and qualitative data, this dissertation builds on the proposed analytical model I
elaborated in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1). Following this model, this project provides some
insight into criminogenic policy formation and related human rights violation outcomes. With
only one case being explored, some critics might question the value of such a study, but Eckstein
(1975) demonstrated that “most likely” cases can be useful for theory construction. Given the
likelihood that NAFTA has contributed to some HRVs in Mexico, it can be classified as a “most
likely” case. Thus, rather than being a criticism of confirmation bias, it can be treated as a “most
likely” case based on the proposed analytical model.

Case Selection
NAFTA was selected as the subject for studying criminogenic policies for a number of
reasons. First, it is relatively recent and has occurred within the most recently identified
neoliberal social structure of accumulation (SSA) which allows for findings that may also be
applicable to other policies formulated in this SSA (Kotz 2015). Second, NAFTA has already
been the subject of a myriad of scientific research and popular commentary, providing a copious
amount of data for use by any researcher wishing to study NAFTA. Given the strength of case
study research to incorporate all these forms of data, a case study of NAFTA can greatly benefit
from all of the research already conducted. Third, NAFTA is a policy that is nearly bilateral
(actually trilateral) between two nations, one in the core, the other in the periphery, (the United
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States and Mexico, respectively) of the global economy (Wallerstein 1974; 2004). The United
States has a long history of policy creation and intervention in Latin America, and its relationship
with Mexico is of particular importance since they share a border (Galeano 1973). Fourth, in the
neoliberal era, free trade agreements between the United States and other countries have
abounded, but NAFTA has received as much, if not more, attention than any of them.
Consequently, findings on NAFTA may have some generalizability to other free trade
agreements.

Time Period Selection
The time period for this case study is based on the timing of the creation of NAFTA and
its outcomes. Accordingly, as previously emphasized, it is important to document events some
time before and after NAFTA. Although the official NAFTA negotiations began on December
17, 1992, unofficial negotiations began a few years earlier, and similar free trade agreements set
the stage for NAFTA. The focus of this study begins in 1982 during a major economic crisis in
Mexico and end with the present. Although NAFTA was implemented on January 1, 1994, it has
been augmented with several side and supplemental agreements, and the original policy did not
remove tariffs completely until January 1, 2008. In addition, many of the effects of NAFTA are
not likely to be seen in their entirety until several years have passed. Therefore, given the
delayed outcomes, series of changes, and multiple phases of implementation, a longitudinal case
study spanning from the 1982 economic crises\ to the present time is the best time frame for the
current study.
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Sources of Data
NAFTA, including its negotiation process, and its short- and long-term effects, has been
the subject of a sizable literature. To document both the outcomes and negotiation process, I use
several secondary documents as part of my analysis and to locate essential primary sources. The
sources for this project include scholarly journal articles, books, and dissertations, official reports
from both the U.S. and Mexican states as well as IFIs such as the World Bank, articles from the
popular press, government and private memoranda, and NGO reports from various human rights
organizations. Given the large body of literature on NAFTA, it is possible to engage in the
process of triangulation to approach empirical verification. Also, this wide array of sources
provides a nuanced understanding of NAFTA and its consequences.
I also use several primary sources of data, mostly to construct the U.S. account of
NAFTA as many of these sources are produced by U.S. departments or commissions designed
specifically for NAFTA. I use the text of NAFTA, along with its supplemental texts, to
determine the key elements of the original agreement and subsequent changes in it. Two
important supplemental agreements are the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAEEC) and North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).
NAFTA members’ state agencies have also established several commissions to provide some
oversight and ensure that NAFTA is implemented effectively. The Free Trade Commission,
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Commission for Labor Cooperation, Committee on
Trade in Goods, and Committee on Agricultural Trade all publish reports that are useful for
establishing the governments’ (both U.S. and Mexico) accounts of NAFTA. The Mexico
Agricultural Country Reports from the Office of Agricultural Affairs and Agricultural Trade
Office in Mexico City and Monterrey helps to round out the states’ accounts. Lastly, several
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reports by the World Bank investigated the impacts of NAFTA on agriculture and poverty in
Mexico.
Given the primary interest in how NAFTA affected the agricultural sector in Mexico,
published reports by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) were essential for this
dissertation. NAFTA’s effect on the rural economy and farmers in Mexico are the subject of
many of these reports including, Effects of North American Free Trade Agreement on
Agriculture and the Rural Economy (Zahniser and Link 2002) and NAFTA at 20: North
America’s Free-Trade Area and Its Impact on Agriculture (Zahniser, Angadjivand, Kuberka, and
Santos 2015). The knowledge held by the U.S. government when considering future action is
established by these reports.
While the reports published by the U.S. and Mexican governments tend to focus on the
benefits of NAFTA, NGO reports offer several publications that are more critical. One crucial
NGO is the non-profit organization, Public Citizen, which defines itself as protecting health,
safety, and democracy for the common global citizen. Public Citizen functions as a lobbyist for
all people of the world, but is headquartered in the United States as a counterbalance to corporate
lobbyists. Its main goal is to ensure democracy and hold government officials accountable to the
global population. Global Trade Watch is a division of Public Citizen that is most valuable for
this dissertation, as it particularly focuses on trade agreements with a self-proclaimed mission,
to ensure that in this era of globalization, a majority have the opportunity to enjoy
economic security, clean environment, safe food, medicines and products, access to
quality affordable services such as health care and the exercise of democratic decisionmaking about the matters that affect their lives (Public Citizen 2016: para. 1).
Human Rights Watch is another non-profit NGO that publishes reports on HRVS and pressures
governments for change. Specifically, it has investigated the effects of NAFTA on Mexican
agriculture and labor in two important reports, Mexico: Labor Rights and NAFTA: A Case Study
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(Human Rights Watch 1996), and Trading Away Rights: The Unfulfilled Promise of NAFTA’s
Labor Side Agreement (Human Rights Watch 2001). Other notable NGO sources include the
Center for Immigration Studies, the Global Development and Environment Institute at Tufts
University, which has done a lot of work on NAFTA, the Economic Policy Institute think tank
dedicated to securing social justice for middle- and low-income workers, and the Public Eye, a
quarterly publication by the Political Research Associates think tank devoted to holding the U.S.
right accountable.
I use the above sources among others to develop a valid picture of NAFTA’s effects.
However, the negotiation process is crucial to understanding the formation of the policy. I use
several academic books that outline these negotiations. Four books most extensively document
the NAFTA negotiations: (1) The Selling of “Free Trade”: NAFTA, Washington, and the
Subversion of American Democracy (MacArthur 2000); (2) Interpreting NAFTA: The Science
and Art of Political Analysis (Mayer 1998); (3) The Making of NAFTA: How the Deal was Done
(Cameron and Tomlin 2000); and (4) Negotiating NAFTA: A Mexican Envoy’s Account (von
Bertrab 1997). These books were instrumental in reconstructing the negotiation process. To
ensure validity, I reviewed the authors’ primary sources to establish a narrative of the negotiation
process, while also supplementing them with other primary source material.
Overall, these various sources are interwoven to achieve triangulation in establishing a
chronological narrative of the events leading up to the signing of NAFTA, its negotiation
process, and its effects, both positive and negative. However, the primary focus is the impacts of
NAFTA on Mexican indigenous populations, farmers, the rural economy, and other labor-related
effects. The reconstructed narrative is used to assess the responsibility of NAFTA and its
subsequent amendments for any HRVs experienced by Mexican workers and citizens.
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Although this study focuses on NAFTA’s negotiation, Canada is not a central focus of
the study. Canada is only mentioned to the extent that it relates to the shaping of the North
American economy. Canada was not a very active negotiator during the NAFTA negotiations,
thus it is only minimally covered in this dissertation.

Chapter Summary
This project utilizes case study method, particularly trace processing, and applies the
analytical framework detailed in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1) to the case of NAFTA with the
primary goal of analyzing NAFTA as a criminogenic policy. This study answers if NAFTA is a
criminogenic policy, and begins to answer the question of how criminogenic policies are
formulated. The following four chapters describe the findings of this study. Chapter 5 details
the events leading up to the unofficial and official NAFTA negotiations with a focus on Mexican
developments. This chapter begins with the 1982 economic crisis in Mexico. Chapter 6
describes how NAFTA was formulated by reconstructing the NAFTA negotiation process.
Then, the negotiation process and NAFTA are analyzed as criminogenic. Chapter 7 documents
the social harms (or HRVs) incurred by Mexicans, mainly farmers and indigenous, at least
partially, caused by NAFTA from its onset to present day. Each of these three chapters
concludes with an analytical summary that explicitly applies the analytical model from Chapter 2
(see Figure 2.1) to the findings. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation with a general
overview of findings and contributions followed by study limitations and direction for future
research.
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CHAPTER 5
LEAD UP TO NAFTA

Chapter Overview
A multitude of forces shaped Mexico’s path to embracing NAFTA, and neoliberal
economics more generally, including emerging factions in the government’s one true political
party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the rise of a technocratic ruling class, a
weakening economy, a modification of Mexican national identity, influences of powerful
corporate organizations, increasing debt and loan restrictions, and a quickly integrating global
economy. In order to understand the U.S.-Mexico relationship, and how that relationship
impacted primarily Mexican workers, peasants, and indigenous groups, NAFTA is an important
piece of policy to study. However, several of these other forces and the larger body of neoliberal
economic policies, of which NAFTA is a part, must be examined in connection with one another.
To accomplish this goal, this chapter focuses on identifying the various forces behind NAFTA’s
creation primarily from a Mexican perspective, although how both U.S. political and corporate
leaders influenced NAFTA will be detailed throughout the chapter as well. In this respect, this
analysis of the U.S.-Mexico relationship investigates the interactions between state, corporate,
and non-state/corporate actors in both countries. Canadian actors are only superficially
mentioned since most scholars agree that the key aspects of NAFTA stem from the relationship
between the United States and Mexico (an extremely wealthy country and a developing
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country).19 This chapter proceeds in chronological order beginning with events prior to the 1982
economic crisis and concluding with the beginning of the NAFTA negotiations, but many events
and forces affecting NAFTA happened simultaneously over extended periods of time. Chapter 6
will cover the NAFTA negotiations in detail, but events in this chapter also overlap with the
negotiation process. To clarify this progression, Figure 5.1 below provides a timeline that gives
the dates of important events leading up to the NAFTA agreement.

1910 – 1920 – Mexican Revolution
Oct. 2, 1968 – Tlatelolco Plaza massacre (decreased public confidence in PRI)
Aug. 13, 1982 – Mexican debt crisis
Sept. 19, 1985 – Mexico City earthquake
Aug. 24, 1986 – Mexico joined General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Dec. 1987 – Economic Solidarity Pact negotiations
Jan. 2, 1988 – Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) signed
July 6, 1988 – Carlos Salinas won fraudulent election
Feb. 1989 – Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL; first groups began signing)
Jan. 1990 – World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland (NAFTA discussion began)
Aug. 21, 1990 – Salinas sent letter to Bush asking to discuss free trade deal
Sept. 1990 – Unofficial NAFTA negotiations began
Mar. 1, 1991 – Bush sent NAFTA fast-track request to Congress
Mar. 1991 – Business joined the NAFTA battle
June 12, 1991 – Official NAFTA negotiations began

19

See Mayer (1998), Cameron and Tomlin (2000), and MacArthur (2000).
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Nov. 7, 1991 – Salinas proposed Amendment of Mexican Constitution Article 27
Feb. 17-21, 1992 – Dallas Jamboree (Mexico made major concessions during negotiations)
Aug. 12, 1992 – Original NAFTA text finalized
Oct. 9, 1992 – USA*NAFTA formed
Nov. 3, 1992 – Bill Clinton elected president
Mar. 17, 1993 – NAFTA supplemental agreement negotiations began
Sept. 14, 1993 – NAFTA supplemental agreements signed
Sept. 14, 1993 – Secret USA*NAFTA meeting at Allied Signal Corp.
Oct. 1993 – Salinas announced Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo (PROCAMPO)
Oct. 25, 1993 – Jean Chrétien elected prime minister of Canada
Nov. 20, 1993 –NAFTA ratified by Congress
Jan. 1, 1994 – NAFTA went into effect
Jan. 1, 1994 – Zapatista uprising
Jan. 1, 2009 – Final NAFTA tariffs eliminated
Figure 5.1 NAFTA Timeline

Mexico’s Unique Political Character
Mexican Democracy
Many commentators have labeled Mexico’s political system as authoritarian (Erfani
1992; Roett 1993; Grinspun and Cameron 1993; 1996; Heredia 1994) including NAFTA
proponents such as journalist William Orme Jr. Even with U.S. administrations defining Mexico
as a democracy, Orme (1996) suggests that it cannot be classified as such based on typical
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criteria. Orme criticizes Mexican democracy for its state repression of political dissidents,
biased media, electoral fraud, and political tactics of cooptation.
Despite the 70 years of nearly unchallenged political rule by the PRI, a couple
characteristics of Mexican politics allowed those in power to keep that power even after leaving
office. Camarillas are integral to the Mexican political system and operate as small political
blocs of power and influence. Camp (1990) argues that camarillas influence the Mexican
political system more than any other variable. According to Ángel Centeno (1994:146),
camarillas are based on quid pro quos oftentimes between unequals such as when a “patron
offers a job or increased influence, the client offers loyalty and trust. At some moments the
patron may help a client’s career, at others the junior partner might provide resources or
knowledge critical to the chief.”
Along with camarillas, el dedazo, known as the handpicking of future presidents, was
also a well-established component of Mexican politics (La Botz 1995). Since the PRI reigned as
a virtually unchallenged political party for 70 years, the selection of the PRI presidential
candidate was a powerful ability afforded to the current president (Dominguez 1995). Thus,
presidents could ensure their political power would expand beyond their six-year term (sexenio)
by effectively hand selecting the next president, and filling several political positions with
members of their own camarilla (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). The Mexican political system
throughout the 1980s in the lead up to NAFTA, and many years prior to then, was not
democratic (La Botz 1995). The PRI was a large corporatist party deeply embedded within the
state that bestowed monolithic power to the presidency and its subordinate governmental
branches of power allowing for the 70 years of political dominance. The Mexican government
emphasized cementing PRI rule rather than establishing free and fair elections.
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Throughout the 1980s, both the de la Madrid and Salinas administrations focused on
economic transition, but few steps were taken towards democracy (Roett 1993). Interestingly,
most Mexican citizens supported Salinas’s decision to address the economy before the political
system. According to the World Values Survey in 1990, 60 percent of Mexicans ranked
economic growth the most important issue to address in the 1990s, while only 25 percent ranked
political participation higher, although this was the second most important issue after the
economy.20 Seemingly, democracy could be ignored when the economy was suffering. Thus,
the poverty and social problems in Mexico provided a diversion for pursuing economic reform
without political changes. Other countries such as Chile (and maybe even the United States)
send the message that economic consensus is a precursor for stable multiparty democracy. In
other words, “multiparty democracy is tolerated to the extent that it is perceived as
nonthreatening to economic reform” (Baer 1993:63). The various case studies of Latin
American countries from Chapter 3 support this argument as well (Heinz and Furhling 1999;
Gomez 2003). The United States along with the domestic Latin American governments pushed
for economic change with an “any means necessary” approach with no attempt to democratize
those nations. Only once economic reforms were solidified, the United States began to critique
some of their political systems as a way to save face in the international arena.
Heath (1996) also found Mexicans to be more willing to accept a loss of sovereignty if
economic well-being could be improved. Heath argues that the political elite used the cover of
political sovereignty – the ability of Mexico to rule itself – to secure economic wealth, in turn,
threatening economic sovereignty – the ability of Mexicans to influence the economy. Salinas’s
ability to reverse Mexico’s skeptical view of U.S. intervention led to more integration and
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The raw data for the World Values Survey can be found here
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV2.jsp.
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thereby less economic sovereignty. According to Heath, laws regarding foreign direct
investment were purposely flexible to allow for control with little earnest concern for
sovereignty.
Mexico’s authoritarianism was a valuable tool for social control complementary to free
trade (Zinser 1993). In particular, Salinas abused his presidential power to remove more state
governors in his first two years than any other president since Miguel Alemán whose term ended
in 1952 (Camp 1993). The United States did not wish to see Mexico democratize since
Mexico’s authoritarian government was beneficial to transnational corporations (TNCs).
Historically, democracy has not been ideal for business in Latin America (Collier 1979).
Furthermore, Mexican business executives tended to place their firm before their country,
suggesting that economic reform is more important for the business community as well (Dull
1981). Authoritarianism offers a series of advantages to passing policy without popular
challenge, including corporatism, political centralization, and impunity (Zinser 1993). Without
democracy, neoliberal policies will strengthen the elite while deepening inequalities. All of
these issues in Mexican democracy exist without even mentioning Salinas’ rise to power through
electoral fraud, after which he claimed Mexico was moving towards democracy and a true twoparty political system largely in part because of the highly competitive election (Erfani 1992).

Unions and Labor
Another characteristic of Mexican politics related to its democracy is its treatment of
workers and unions. Salinas actively removed union leaders to weaken their ability to bargain
for better wages (Kim 1995), and agrarian reforms, to be discussed, reshaped the government’s
new position towards rural workers (Barry 1995). The Mexican authoritarian regime also has a
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track record of repressive action towards labor unions and the manipulation of union leaders
which threatens Mexican democracy (Middlebrook 1989). Although unions were not always
treated with repressive tactics, there is a long history of the PRI using corporatist methods to
coopt any push for workers’ rights. One example is the Kodak union that was actually created
by the Eastman Kodak Company along with the PRI (MacArthur 2000). In the lead up to
NAFTA, some companies were relocating to Mexico, but were concerned with the potential
strength of unions. Thus, in this case, Kay Whitmore, the CEO of Kodak, explained in an
interview with MacArthur (2000:140):
We worked with the government and created a union before we even had employees. So
it was almost a ruse. Because you applied to the government – really the PRI – and they
created a union for you, and when the employees came in they were just automatically
part of the union. In union terms, we never had any problems.
Such a strategy between business and the PRI demonstrates a common partnership with the
common goal of a cheap labor force in the neoliberal age.
The Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) was the largest aggregation of labor
unions in Mexico, but became very corrupt during the 1980s onward (La Botz 1992). Instead of
defending the workers’ rights and interests, the CTM often took sides with business by
promoting policy that increased worker productivity. Since most of the leadership was allied
with business, little criticism of free trade policies could be expected. The CTM had long been a
tool of the PRI and this continued under the Salinas administration. On February 24, 1992, 92year-old Fidel Velazquez, one of the original founders of the CTM, was reelected as secretary
general for another 6-year term. He headed the CTM from 1941 when he was first elected until
his death in 1997. Velazquez had strong ties with the PRI government, and effectively silenced
Mexican workers, keeping wages and benefits very low in return for political privileges and
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government largesse for over 50 years (Erfani 1992). The compromised composition of the
CTM played a role in the shape NAFTA took as well.
Worker social movements such as Solidarity are also vulnerable to presidential
cooptation. Salinas promoted Programa Nacional de la Solidaridad (PRONASOL) as a poverty
elimination program, while also naming it after the Solidary movement with the sole intention of
creating a strong political base for the PRI (Orme 1996). Even critics of Salinas saw this effort
as the most effective recruitment strategy ever in the PRI’s history. The poor in dire need of aid
were won over, undercutting the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) and leftist opposition
(Scott 1992). Whereas Salinas entered office with low approval ratings and amidst electoral
fraud, the engineered Solidarity program restored faith in the PRI to some extent. Interestingly,
Salinas’s Harvard dissertation investigated the correlation between public programs and support
for the PRI (Orme 1996). Ironically, in his analysis, he found that these programs often did not
help support the PRI.
The United States praised both workers’ rights and democracy in Mexico, facilitating a
smooth economic transition in Mexico at the behest of TNCs. One example is found in the Wall
Street Journal which praised the Solidarity program as “politically neutral” and an insurance
plan for the poor that would ensure they benefit from neoliberal policy (cited by Orme 1996).
The United States also praised Mexican labor laws due to their liberal legal code, but in practice,
enforcement is often left to unaccountable government officials who have more at stake in
securing their own political and economic interests (Heredia 1994). Since economic policy
trumps political equality, the United States pretended Mexico was a democracy without criticism
as long as U.S. economic interests were served.
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Prior to the 1982 Economic Crisis
Public confidence in the PRI was first severely shaken after the events at Tlatelolco Plaza
in 1968, when the Mexican military and police forces killed several hundred students and
onlookers, and arrested several thousand (Suchlicki 1996). The massacre invited criticism from
many previous supporters of the PRI and placed the Mexican political system under unwelcomed
international scrutiny. In response, President Luis Eschevería strengthened security forces while
attempting to coopt the left’s call for democratization. These types of political maneuvers, used
by Eschevería to coopt democracy in order to maintain power, are deeply embedded in the PRI’s
history. However, the increased state repression under Eschevería’s presidency raised levels of
public criticism and created friction in the PRI, resulting in a rift that would later leave an
opening for a new technocratic class with strong U.S. ties (Suchlicki 1996).
The PRI maintained power by running its campaign based on a cultural identity shaped
by the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920. At risk of oversimplification, this cultural identity arose
when the United States and business interests backed counterrevolutionary forces. Thus, the
Mexican identity became synonymous with cynicism toward the United States and TNCs.
Mexico’s cultural ethos was based on a long history of U.S. interventionism that led to the
characterization of the United States “as imperialistic, paternalistic, and racist” (Morris and
Passé-Smith 2001:126). The Mexican ruling elite, most commonly manifested in the PRI,
coopted the anti-American sentiment to solidify their stranglehold over government policy, while
subtly undermining the political left in favor of their own economic development programs
(Bartra 1989). The economic crisis in 1982 provided an opportunity for questioning this
traditional ideology.
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Mexican anti-Americanism influenced Mexican economic philosophy. Historically,
Mexico was opposed to opening its markets to the international community, and was specifically
skeptical of providing the United States access to its domestic markets (Mayer 1998). In contrast
to Mexico’s philosophical preference towards a closed-economy, a strong U.S. business coalition
sought economic integration and free trade. As early as the 1970s, U.S. corporate power –
consolidated in the form of the Business Roundtable – came to the conclusion that the
compromise and protections offered to organized labor under Keynesian economics in the postWorld War II era needed to be reversed, and radical free trade policy was the best option for
achieving that goal (Robinson 2015). President José López Portillo succeeded Eschevería in
1976, to the relief of U.S. business interests initially, but he soon used the newfound Mexican oil
wealth to finance some anti-American/Communist regimes (Suchlicki 1996). However, these
measures failed as the oil crisis in 1982 ruined the Mexican economy. Up until the 1982 debt
crisis, Mexico’s economy was based on the import substitution industrialization model. In line
with its anti-American cynicism, this model advocated replacing foreign imports with domestic
production, and relied on state intervention to avoid foreign influence in the domestic economy.

The 1982 Economic Crisis and 1985 Mexico City Earthquake
On August 13, 1982, a devastating economic collapse in Mexico – caused by plummeting
oil prices and rising external debt – forced the Mexican government’s hand into seeking aid from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF; Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Briefly, Mexico’s economy
was staying afloat in the years leading up the debt crisis due to its oil revenues. In 1979, oil
prices skyrocketed allowing Mexico to take out large loans backed by its oil reserves assuming
future revenues would be capable of loan repayment. However, the U.S. Federal Reserve
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increased its interest rates in an attempt to address oil inflation, the purported cause of the
ongoing global recession. Once oil prices began to fall, Mexico was faced with high-interest
loans, low revenues, and an overvalued peso exchange rate resulting in default on its massive
external debt.
Most scholars attribute the 1982 economic crisis as the starting point for a major
economic transition towards free trade, open-market capitalism in Mexico.21 Among these
scholars, Golob (2003) provides evidence that Mexico – a country long opposed to trade
liberalization with the United States – experienced an economic policy paradigm shift, totally
embracing neoliberal economic policies. The economic crisis of 1982 was an “exogenous
shock,” not simply a domestic issue, and its lingering effects created the opportunity for this
dramatic shift to take place by fostering insecurity and uncertainty over Mexico’s economic
future and national identity (Golob 2003:373). President Portillo, in fact, nationalized the banks
in response to the 1982 economic crisis (Mayer 1998), and continued his vocal opposition to
U.S. foreign policy (Suchlicki 1996). However, Mexico’s policy options were limited by its
relation with the IMF as an in-debted nation (Golob 2003), and the nationalization of banks
scared away foreign investors leading the succeeding president, Miguel de la Madrid, to pass a
series of reforms to open up the Mexican economy (Mayer 1998), which is the subject of the
following section. The de la Madrid and Salinas administrations provided the relief for business
interests that some originally thought would come from the Portillo presidency. Yet, de la
Madrid’s experimentation with neoliberal policies, and enforced austerity programs from the
IMF, did not win over citizens that resulted in an extremely narrow victory by Salinas in 1988.
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Nearly every cited author in this chapter who discusses the 1982 economic crisis makes this attribution.
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Shortly after the economic devastation in 1982, natural disaster struck. The Mexico City
earthquake of 1985 was probably the most significant event in catalyzing the mobilization of
Mexican civil society (Monsiváis 1987). When the earthquake hit, the PRI government told
Mexicans to stay in their homes. In one of the largest waves of civil disobedience in Mexican
history, thousands of Mexicans poured into the streets of Mexico City determined to rescue
victims of the catastrophe (La Botz 1995). Besides the strong will of Mexicans in ignoring their
government’s request, the earthquake also uncovered the structural weakness of buildings due to
corrupt contractor deals and the hidden torture chambers under the rubble that had been the
police headquarters. Democracy became the rallying cry that united Mexican citizens around
questioning the current social structure, and particularly the PRI government.

Restructuring of the Mexican Economy
Although many commentators have depicted Mexican economic restructuring after the
1982 collapse arising from endogenous political and economic conditions in Mexico, several
aspects of the transition were in response to external factors (Hogenboom 1998). Even though
Salinas approached the United States with the idea of free trade, this and the next chapter will
demonstrate that various factors led Mexico to such a choice, and ex-U.S. President Ronald
Reagan mentioned the idea of free trade much earlier than Salinas, informing Mexico, as well as
most of Latin America, that such a deal was on the table whenever the others wished to discuss it
(Orme 1996).
The economic crisis that hit Mexico in 1982 was part of a larger global economic crisis
involving world oil prices. The U.S. Federal Reserve raised interest rates in an attempt to address
the inflation crisis. The hike in interest rates severely crippled Mexico’s economy and posed
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severe risks for the established political order, providing a major impetus for comprehensive
economic reform. Accompanying Mexico’s foreign debt, investors began moving their money
from Mexico to more secure investments. Failing to restructure the debt or secure favorable
international loans, Mexico was forced to seek financial support from the IMF, receiving nearly
$4 billion in loans, which was to be distributed over a three year period, and the United States
provided over $1 billion in an advanced payment for oil reserves (Boughton 2001). In return for
the IMF loan, the Mexican state was required to cut public spending, raise taxes, and tighten its
monetary policy (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Miguel de la Madrid was inaugurated president
during this tumultuous economic time and the same month (December 1982) as receiving the
IMF loan. President de la Madrid quickly implemented a recovery plan in line with the IMF’s
demands by freezing wage increases, slashing government social expenditures, and reducing
major state consumption subsidies.
The IMF loan failed to stabilize the Mexican economy, and the United States then
proposed the Baker Plan, a relief package that required Mexico to intensify its market
liberalization process (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). James Baker, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury,
proposed the plan at the 1985 IMF/World Bank meeting in Seoul, South Korea. The policy
blocked bankruptcy and instead encouraged countries to grow their way out of debt which
required more trade liberalization, creating opportunities for foreign direct investment, and
privatizing state-run enterprises (Cline 1989). To fulfill its obligation, Mexico sought
membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986.
Prior to 1986, Mexico had turned down GATT membership primarily due to its belief in
the import substitution industrialization model supported by both the PRI and citizens despite
incessant efforts by the United States to urge Mexican membership in GATT (Story 1982).
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Thus, Mexican nationalism and anti-Americanism dominated Mexican domestic policy prior to
the 1982 economic crisis. However, the United States shifted strategies after Mexico declined to
join GATT by imposing higher countervailing duties against Mexican exports entering the
United States (Lara-Fernandez 1987). It was not until the economic crisis hit Mexico in 1982,
and IMF loans were unable to solve the problem, that Mexico capitulated in joining GATT.
Under such dire circumstances, the United States was able to use the crisis as leverage to
implement the Baker Plan, GATT membership, and in turn promote trade liberalization in
Mexico. The United States finally gained Mexico’s acquiescence to join GATT by allowing
Mexico to retain several exemptions including sectoral subsidies, an exclusion of agricultural
products, and import permits (Ortiz Mena 2005). The United States allowed Mexico these
exemptions under GATT in hopes of gaining full trade liberalization in the long-term (Davis and
Wilf 2011). The political elite sold GATT membership to the Mexican people as a way towards
economic recovery (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Although trade liberalization had reached
Mexico, free trade with the United States was not considered until a 1987 document, Framework
Understanding on Bilateral Trade and Investment (American Society of International Law
1988). The Mexican government had avoided any trade deal with the United States until it was
perceived as the last resort. Unfortunately, for Mexico, approaching the United States as a last
resort in dire economic times gave Mexico very little bargaining power. As we will see, Mexico
faced a similar scenario in the NAFTA negotiations.
Several special interest groups rejected the GATT text. In particular, the Cámara
Nacional de la Industria de la Transformación (CANACINTRA) – a coalition representing small
and medium-sized businesses – fervently opposed GATT membership, but their objections were
weakened by strong business support in both the United States and Mexico, even coalescing
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within the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). President de la Madrid
avoided public debate and discussion on GATT membership knowing that opposition would
arise, a pattern that would continue throughout the NAFTA negotiations. The denunciation of
GATT was not limited to Mexican groups. Twenty-five leading U.S. environmental, consumer,
and animal protection groups wrote a letter to the GATT director on January 8, 1992 rejecting
the final Uruguay Round GATT text (Nader et al. 1993). The Canadians had their concerns as
well. One of the major concerns for all parties involved was that protections for workers and the
environment were made more difficult under GATT, a topic taken up in more detail as it relates
to NAFTA negotiations in the next chapter.

Mexican Business and the State: A Powerful Friendship
Both the de la Madrid and Salinas administrations sought to form an alliance with big
business, operating throughout North America, to win support for economic restructuring from
groups represented by CANACINTRA and the general public. Expropriation fears resonated
among the international business class despite the efforts towards market liberalization since the
nationalization of Mexican banks in 1982 was still fresh in their minds (Hernández Rodríguez
1986). Thacker (1999) argues that a major policy needs a political sponsor and a coalition
mobilized with political support to gain acceptance and be further implemented. As Mexico
experienced economic crisis, TNCs became more involved in Mexican economic reform policy.
Then, the IMF and World Bank joined the sponsorship of free trade policies along with the Bank
of Mexico. Despite the support, the move toward free trade did not remove Mexico from crisis.
One of the pressing concerns in Mexico was the high inflation rates averaging around 88
percent a year during de la Madrid’s presidency, and eventually reaching 177 percent in January
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of 1988 (Cook, Middlebrook, and Horcasistas 1994). In response, the Mexican state engaged in
the Economic Solidarity Pact (PSE) negotiations which reinforced a trend toward including big
business and the private sector elite, while excluding small- and medium-sized firms, in free
trade talks (Hernández Rodríguez 1990). The Business Coordinating Council – an organization
that disproportionately represented large corporations – was involved in the negotiations
magnifying the interest of big business (Luna and Tirado 1992). The consensus of business
leaders was that neoliberal reforms were both in their own interests and the Mexican economy as
a whole, albeit they had concerns over increased competition (Kaufman, Bazdresch, and Heredia
1994). The PSE solidified the institutionalized collusion between economic state planning and
large firms that dominated the Mexican economy, and went a long way in building a strong
mutual trust between the Mexican state and private sector.
The primary goal of the PSE negotiations that began in late 1987 was to drastically
reduce inflation despite Mexico’s economy growing by less than 0.1 percent a year during the de
la Madrid administration (Lustig 1992). Yet, Ros (1994) argues that Mexico had several
advantages that allowed it to combat inflation more swiftly than other Latin American countries.
First, the authoritarian political structure allowed presidents and economic policy makers to
implement drastic changes with little backlash from an uninformed public. Second, a major
interest from the Reagan administration sought to test its new debt restructuring approach
embodied by the Baker Plan. Third, Mexico had extremely low indexation despite the high
degrees of inflation, thus wage increases did not keep pace with inflation, eroding purchasing
power. Fourth, the historical relationship between the Mexican state and labor allowed for
astonishing flexibility in setting wages. Given these advantages combined with the depth and
length of the economic crisis gave government officials wide latitude in reexamining the role of
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the public sector and the country's overall strategy for economic development. Beginning in
1985-1987, economic policy makers radically liberalized Mexico's trade and industrial policy
regime, rapidly privatized state-owned enterprises, and aggressively deregulated foreign
investment flows and domestic economic activities.
Since attracting foreign capital was vitally important to the Mexican elite, Mexican
decision makers had strong incentives to adopt market reforms. Indeed, the U.S. government's
Baker (in 1985) and Brady (in 1989) plans conditioned additional foreign lending on debtor
countries' willingness to adopt such measures (Lustig 1998). The result was a sharp shift toward
export-oriented economic development, greater scope for market forces, and a more prominent
role for the private sector in promoting economic growth. These policies were accompanied by
other measures (including the elimination of government budget deficits, more effective tax
collection, and greater institutional autonomy for the Banco de Mexico) designed to maintain
business confidence and place the Mexican economy on the path toward sustained long-term
growth.
While GATT membership, the PSE negotiations, and IMF loan restrictions were in place,
simultaneously, both the de la Madrid and Salinas administrations restructured the Mexican
economy (Moody 1995). One major aspect of the restructuring was the privatization of the
Mexican public sector. By 1991, Mexico privatized or liquidated nearly 75 percent of its stateowned firms, with several others likely to follow (Hufbauer and Schott 1993; Moody 1995). A
small wealthy elite rose to power alongside Salinas represented by the 37-member Mexican
Businessmen’s Council. The 37 members controlled the wealthiest 71 private companies in
Mexico, accounting for 22 percent of annual GDP by 1992 (Carlsen 1991). These 37 members
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also benefited from the five largest privatizations that occurred from 1982 to 1991, and
accounted for 80 percent of all value transferred via privatization of state-owned assets.
The economic restructuring was primarily geared towards shifting the Mexican economy
from an import-substitution model to a neoliberal export model. In order to achieve this shift,
several measures were taken:
…the official minimum wage … was frozen well behind inflation. Industrial wages were
also restrained, often by forceful strikebreaking. The buying power of the minimum
wage dropped 67 percent from 1982 to 1991, hitting a historical low point, while the real
wages of industrial workers in the same period fell by 48 percent (Moody 1995:102; see
La Jornada, December 26, 1991).

The amendment of Article 27 of the Mexican constitution was the most radical rewriting of law
that influenced the economic structure in Mexico by completely reforming agriculture, as will be
covered in detail in a later section. In addition, the Mexican state reduced social expenditures on
programs such as the social security. With the restructured economy, U.S. capitalists found
Mexico a lucrative option for investment due to its:
…literate, industrious workforce adaptable to high-tech labor with its wages disciplined
by a PRI-dominated Confederation of Mexican Workers, on the one hand, and a growing
army of unemployed and underemployed, on the other (Moody 1995:103).
Throughout the 1980s, Mexico found it difficult to economically recover due to
restrictions by the IMF, lack of external investment, and falling oil prices (Dominquez 1995).
However, GATT membership and export promotion was advantageous for large TNCs,
especially the automobile industry, and large agricultural businesses focused on fruit and
vegetable production for the U.S. market. In contrast, Mexican citizens primarily experienced
social and economic dislocation and increased penury throughout the 1980s and early 1990s due
to the economic restructuring. In light of the growing state-corporate allegiance, citizens
seriously questioned the PRI’s legitimacy throughout the 1980s. Economic restructuring and
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eventually NAFTA promoted the growth and strength of a transnational capitalist class (TCC),
primarily consisting of elite state officials and corporate leaders (Petras and Morley 1990).
Despite the burgeoning power of the TCC, the state-corporate allegiance needed to sell
neoliberal economics to the public.

Economic Restructuring Under Salinas
Since NAFTA was negotiated and signed during Carlos Salinas’s presidency, he deserves
more attention than the other presidents before him, and other key players in the NAFTA
negotiations. For seven decades, the PRI maintained political stability and peaceful transitions
across presidential administrations (Dominguez 1995). While effectively an authoritarian
government, the PRI maintained the political legitimacy necessary to block any desire for a
multi-party democracy. However, neoliberal policy reforms under de la Madrid created
discontent and suspicion towards the PRI.
Riding the momentum created by the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas along with Munoz Ledo established the Democratic Current a reformist wing of the
PRI (La Botz 1995). The PRI initially lashed out at the Democratic Current, then made some
superficial reforms to maintain an appearance of democracy. Due to the PRI’s unresponsiveness
to requests for Cárdenas as a presidential candidate, the FDN was formed garnering the support
of many leftist groups. Cárdenas campaigned primarily on bringing democracy to Mexico with
almost no appeal to citizens as workers.
Amidst widespread electoral fraud, the PRI won the 1988 election and Cárdenas was
defeated. During the vote counting process, political authorities claimed a computer breakdown
had occurred in order to halt the high vote count for the opposition (Dominquez 1995).
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Although electoral fraud was typical, the PRI needed to go beyond its typical fraudulent
practices. Even with electoral fraud, Salinas barely garnered 50 percent of the vote in what was
the lowest number of votes ever received by a PRI candidate in any election since 1929 (Kim
1995). The previous low for a PRI candidate was de la Madrid who received 72 percent in the
preceding election. The strange computer glitch incident led many to believe that Cardenas was
the real victor. In 2005, Salinas confirmed these suspicions by stating Cardenas did, in fact, win
the election, thus indirectly admitting electoral fraud (see Mora 2012).
With its defeat, the FDN became the PRD, but many of the political parties that joined
the FDN quickly left when it became clear that they were outsiders to Mexican politics and
returned to the PRI (La Botz 1995). The PRD gained legal status as a political party by taking
control of the already-established Mexican Socialist Party (PMS). However, the absorption of
the PMS put an end to the socialist movement in Mexico, virtually shifting Mexican politics to
the right. Despite its fairly moderate political form, the PRD faced severe forms of repression by
the PRI government. The fraudulent election of Salinas was essential for delivering a crippling
blow to the most radical democratic groups, allowing Salinas to utilize an essentially
authoritarian government to restructure the Mexican economy.
The economic crises of the 1980s undermined public confidence in the statist policy
paradigm, and created a vacuum for policy change exploitable by a new “cohesive generation of
young, foreign-educated economists” that “arose through the Mexican economic policy
bureaucracy together in the early 1980s” (Golob 2003:382; see also Ángel Centeno 1997). By
1988, these “policy entrepreneurs” reached the president’s cabinet, the nexus of policy creation
(Golob 2003:384). Simultaneously, Salinas “centralized presidential power to an extremely
noteworthy extent” (Golob 2003:384) by elevating the economic cabinet as primary advisors,
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thus allowing the team of ministers to greatly influence policy creation and implementation
(Reyes Heroles 1991). Such a development effectively marginalized the Foreign Ministry and
diminished its ability to counterbalance the neoliberal ideology espoused by the president’s
cabinet. At this point, normalization of neoliberal economic policies was well underway, with
Salinas’s team of bureaucrats ready to produce technical studies advocating neoliberalism, while
offering an escape route for Salinas to publicly reject it if necessary (Golob 2003).22 Big
business lined up to support Salinas once the decision to pursue free trade was made.
When President Salinas arrived in office in 1988, amidst both economic and political
uncertainty, he quickly accelerated trade liberalization by reducing tariffs and import restrictions
with the ideological justification of neoliberal economic philosophy. He prioritized economic
recovery believing that political support would follow. Just one year after he took office, almost
all (96 percent) Mexican imports were quota-free and the average weighted tariff was 6.2 percent
(Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Bilateral relations between state and corporate power in Mexico
and the United States were already strengthening. Mexico increased its intellectual property
protections for U.S. corporations and removed a 40 percent tax on exported capital, while the
United States opened more of the U.S. domestic market to Mexican steel and textile exports.
More importantly, Presidents Bush and Salinas engaged in economic discussions, and when
Mexico displayed interest in a free trade agreement, “the United States was careful not to push
too hard” (Cameron and Tomlin 2000:60).
Beyond his friendship with the Bush family, Salinas had several connections to the TCC
and easily fit into Ángel Centeno and Maxfield’s (1992) description of the new technocrats.
Although not a son of a president, Carlos Salinas was the son of a major Mexican politician,
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In private interviews conducted by Stephanie Golob, SECOFI officials confirmed that the studies were aimed at
advocating a bilateral free trade option.
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Raúl Salinas Lozano – an economist and technocrat himself. Carlos Salinas served as the
secretary of the Budget Secretariat before becoming president, and his father was the minister of
industry and commerce during the Adolfo López Mateos administration. Most importantly,
Carlos Salinas received a master’s degree in public administration and a doctoral degree in
political economy from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Although Salinas
has been portrayed as having a true belief in neoliberal economic ideology, it may have been
more his desire to gain the U.S. seal of approval than his neoliberal sympathies that motivated
his economic policies (Oppenheimer 1998). Regardless of his true intentions, his background, as
well as much of his administration’s similar educational and social backgrounds, likely
influenced both a belief in neoliberal economics and a desired partnership with the United States.
Furthermore, the new neoliberal political elites in Mexico have had a tendency to be educated in
elite U.S. schools with a neoliberal economic emphasis, which is a dramatic shift from the
educational and social backgrounds of most Mexican politicians born prior to 1950 who were
overwhelmingly educated in elite French and English institutions (Camp 1995).

Beginning of NAFTA Negotiations and Economic Restructuring
Although Salinas did not seek a deal with the United States initially, in 1990, at the
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, he felt he could attract foreign aid with the
enticement of “cheap labor and privileged access to the U.S. market” (Dillon and Preston
2004:196). Reportedly, while at this conference, President Salinas, still in his pajamas, woke up
his Trade Secretary, Jaime Serra Puche, at dawn asking what he thought of a trade deal with the
United States (von Bertrab 1997). Salinas quickly sought a deal with the United States after this
realization and fervently marketed NAFTA in Mexico and beyond its borders. Serra met the
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following day with U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills about a possible trade deal. She
responded by suggesting that they bring in President Bush to hear his thoughts which marked the
beginning of the NAFTA negotiations.
The trip to Davos was not planned to involve free trade with the United States. In fact,
Salinas, as Mexican presidents before him, seemed adverse to such an idea. As stated, Salinas
intended on diversifying Mexico’s foreign investments. Davos was his last visit in an attempt to
promote and secure foreign investment. However, in Davos, Salinas learned that European
nations were consolidating into their own economic bloc, and thus were mostly not interested in
providing aid to the struggling Mexican economy (Cameron and Tomlin 2000; MacArthur
2000). Instead, the major European powers were interested in transforming Eastern European
economies. With limited investment funds, Salinas and his team were unable to convince the
Europeans to invest in the Mexican economy. Mexico was faced with a constrained choice of
risking economic isolation or collaborating with the United States in order to compete within the
global economy. Only as a last-ditch effort, once Salinas’s attempts at diversification failed, did
he seek out a trade deal with the United States (Dominquez 1995). Thus, foreign direct
investment was the primary impetus for Mexico’s support for NAFTA.
Since Salinas sought out a free trade deal with the United States, Mexico is often
considered the initiator of NAFTA. However, faced with the economic difficulties, Mexico
resorted to loans from major Western powers, primarily through the IMF (Cockburn 1986;
Krooth 1995). Many of the “unilateral” actions taken by the Mexican government were made to
appease the moneylenders. Privatization of public enterprises, trade liberalization for market
imports, reduction of government expenditures, and underwriting of foreign direct investment
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were all required or encouraged by the IMF. Furthermore, once NAFTA was on the table,
Mexico faced pressure to continue its economic restructuring.
Although Mexico implemented several actions and policies in the years surrounding the
NAFTA negotiations and leading up to its implementation, they must be understood as
consequences of NAFTA since they were adopted to prepare the Mexican economy for the free
trade agreement. For example, in face of all the government expenditure cuts, Mexico increased
its anti-drug spending ninefold from 1987 into the 1990s (Andreas 1998a). At the end of de la
Madrid’s presidency, he announced drug trafficking as a threat to national security which is a
rare claim in Mexican society. Salinas continued pursuing drug traffickers primarily to appease
the United States and amp up the national security apparatus to mollify investor concerns. The
militarization of the police force and involvement of the Mexican military grew as a solution to
drug trafficking. Narco-corruption among state officials in Mexico remains an issue today, and
drug trafficking and enforcement issues will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 7.
By the end of Salinas’ term, a conservative estimate of around 86 percent of state
enterprises were privatized, most during his presidency (Moody 1995). Ironically, Oppenheimer
(1998) sardonically points out that Salinas opened the Mexican economy to such an extreme that
Mexicans were eating their own cultural foods ill-prepared by Taco Bell. Land reforms
characterized another major aspect of the Salinas restructuring that will be covered in a later
section. Due to the intensification of the privatizing efforts and other neoliberal modifications,
unions that had long been controlled with corporatist methods became problematic to the
Mexican state and potential U.S. investors. However, with Salinas’ bold economic and political
promises, the PRI rebounded in 1991 with PRI candidates winning 61 percent of the votes in the
elections for federal senators and state governors. With this political victory, Salinas was able to
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make law unilaterally without appeasing oppositional parties (Dillon and Preston 2004). Even
President Bill Clinton (Auerswald, Duttweiler, and Garofano 2003) and the U.S. press (Dillon
and Preston 2004) endorsed Salinas, thus furthering his political and economic legitimacy.
With Salinas’s image as an economic savior and lack of oversight, he was free to deal
with the unions. Salinas disregarded article 12323 of the constitution that protected workers’
rights, particularly their right to organize and strike, by cracking down on union workers in order
to subdue labor resistance to neoliberal policies. Since Salinas and his cabinet members saw
Mexico’s competitive advantage and their leverage at the bargaining table as cheap labor and lax
corporate regulations, unions only stood in the way of Mexico making its case as being a strong
free trade partner to the United States. In response, Salinas went after major union bosses and
declared a war against unions (Kim 1995). The Salinas government arrested and sentenced
Joaquin “La Quina” Hernández on charges of corruption and possession of firearms, and The Los
Angeles Times described this action as a power grab by Salinas (Miller 1989). Dillon and
Preston (2004) described the charges as legitimate, but realized the economic and political goal
Salinas pursued. Hernández was the PEMEX (Petróleos Mexicanos – the Mexican state-owned
petroleum company) union leader who was outspoken against the privatization of PEMEX and
Mexican oil. Thus, Salinas felt he must be dealt with because he stood in the way of the
privatization of the Mexican petroleum industry. The commander of the Federal Judicial Police
threatened Hernández’s family in order to get his acquiescence to a thirty-five year prison
sentence (Dillon and Preston 2004). Labor groups went on strike in opposition, but were
repressed by the federal government. Eventually, PEMEX was partially privatized by 1993
(Teichman 1995).
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The Mexican Constitution can be found here http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/mex/en_mex-int-text-const.pdf
Article 123 begins on page 47 of the PDF file.
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Salinas also successfully subdued another prominent union leader, Agapito González
Cavazo, the day before his dockworkers’ union staged a protest against the maquiladora plants
owned by U.S. investors (Meyer, Sherman, and Deeds 2003). The experience of the
maquiladora sector raised many concerns over the NAFTA negotiations among labor unions,
considering workers in these American-owned firms were suffering brutal working conditions
and environmental degradation plagued the host communities (Grunwald 1991). Once again, the
U.S. and other foreign media hailed Salinas as a national hero and competent leader maintaining
peace during a tumultuous time in Mexico (Grunwald 1991). The wave of privatization enticed
foreign investments along with empowering the PRI government’s control over the Mexican
people. Once union and labor opposition was quashed, the Salinas government was free to
privatize nearly any industry deemed necessary. Corporate constituents of the PRI government
benefited greatly from these tactics, particularly billionaire Carlos Slim Herú who made a
fortune. The amendment of article 27 of the constitution was just another step in this strategy of
privatization that moved land from the poor to the wealthy.

Agricultural Reform
Faced with pressure by the United States, IMF, and World Bank, the Mexican
government followed a path of austerity commonly paired with trade liberalization by further
reducing the social programs it had in place (Stanford 1994; Barry 1995). In the years leading up
to NAFTA, President Salinas reformed agrarian society by allowing an inflow of agricultural
imports, removing or reducing most agricultural subsidies, withdrawing or shrinking tariffs on
most products, and guaranteed prices were no longer given for any crops other than maize and
beans in 1990 (Foley 1995). For instance, Mexico dissolved ANAGSA, a public insurance
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agency that provided programs for crops to help with losses, BANRURAL – a rural development
bank – declared it would only loan to profitable peasant farmers (Foley 1995), and the state
ended a history of subsidizing affordable necessities for farmers such as water, electricity,
fertilizer, and pesticides (Hewitt de Alcántara 1976). When the Mexican government withdrew
their political and economic support for peasant organizations, U.S. companies ceased to offer
financial credits to these organizations as well (Stanford 1994).
In 1992, a constitutional amendment to article 27 ended 70 years of land reform and
established the groundwork for privatization of ejido lands (McGuire 2015). The ejido system
was established by the Mexican Constitution of 1917 after the Mexican Revolution. An ejido is
a large piece of communal land available to landless farmers for cultivation. Historically,
wealthy land owners would lease lands to these farmers. With the establishment of the ejido
system, peasants could petition their government to expropriate the land from wealthy
landowners which, if successful, would make the land publicly owned. Thus, ejidatarios,
members of an ejido, would retain land rights as long as they used the land for farming, however,
they did not own the land. Land redistribution under this article was a large part of Mexican
history (Sanderson 1984). After the Mexican government deemed the ejido a failed system in
the face of the 1982 debt crisis, advocates of neoliberalism pushed for full privatization of rural
lands and abolishment of the ejido.
The amendment to article 27 revoked peasants’ right to petition for land reducing the
fears of foreign investors (Foley 1995). Corporations, although previously banned from land
tenure, were now free to purchase agricultural land, and only 33 percent of the ejido plus one
member were needed to make changes in property relations. Proponents of privatization saw this
move as beneficial for ejidatarios because they now owned some piece of land, and could use or
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sell it for profit. Many producers experienced an increase in competition simultaneously as costs
were rising.
Salinas proposed and implemented these reforms swiftly and furtively with little outside
consultation (Foley 1995). Despite the Permanent Agrarian Council – an organization created to
represent an aggregate of various peasant and campesino (i.e., farm labor and tenant farmers)
groups – and other constituent organizations’ disapproval of the amendment and subsequent
drafts proposing alternatives to it, the Mexican government ignored their appeals. These peasant
organizations had no direct involvement in broad policy decisions such as NAFTA and the
reforms brought by the constitutional amendment. The Mexican government also successfully
filtered the interests of agriculture into compartmentalized interest groups based on crop and
service, effectively dispersing organized grievances and narrowing each of their foci. With
dissidence fragmented, the government and corporate capital were more powerful in quelling any
protest. The Salinas reforms ended the legal threat to property that corporations feared. Faced
with the major reforms, rural-dwelling Mexicans were expected to relocate, and many people
wondered where these individuals would migrate. The Mexican government in a 1992
agricultural program even acknowledged that about 75 percent of the nation’s corn farmers and a
majority of grain producers were expected to “have to search for alternatives in other crops,
reorganize their landholdings, associate with private capitalists, or become wage laborers” (Cited
in Barkin 1994:74). Government policies tended to favor urban areas drawing cheap laborers to
the cities (McGuire 2015).
Despite such expectations, proponents of the reforms did not commonly concern
themselves with this potentially major complication, and certainly little was done to address the
likely fallout. Although Solidarity (more on this policy in the following section) offered some
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credits to very marginal producers, the landless, constituting two-thirds of Mexico’s rural
population, received nothing. With the struggles faced by campesinos, Mexican administrations
opted more for minimal relief measures than any real plan for rural farming sector development
(Barry 1995). The government was much more willing to discuss the issues of transition with
agroexporters and productionists (those who emphasize and have high productivity) than any
peasant or indigenous organization. U.S companies worked primarily with wealthy commercial
producers leading to a decline in the agricultural industry and a more concentrated market from
1987-90 (Stanford 1994). The concentration of local agriculture led to few commercial investors
profiting from these gains, while the region’s economic growth decreased. Peasants lost
participation in the export system as producers and were expected to become “hired agricultural
laborers on their own land” (Stanford 1994:108).
Although the Salinas administration used the lack of productivity as the justification for
most of the policies leading to the displacement of campesinos, the government did little to help
foster their productivity (Barry 1995). Despite motivation by campesinos, the government
lacked support in its failure to provide needed loans, technical assistance, and general marketing
operations. The changes to article 27 did create circumstances more conducive to increasing
productivity but at the cost of deepening class divisions in rural Mexico. Several of the land
transfers occurring during agrarian reforms were never titled, and often overlapped, causing
several complications with land ownership disputes. The government also removed its
protection of ejidatarios unable to repay their loans which increased the likelihood of more land
seizures by banks and large land-owners. Effectively, the reform of article 27 emphasized the
individual over community making land more of a commodity than a resource with social
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productive capacity breaking with a long time Mexican tradition of supporting the peasantry
(Gates 1993).
The United States also played an integral role in influencing land reform policy in
Mexico prior to NAFTA. Hendrix (1995) states that, according to the Wall Street Journal, the
amendment to article 27 was enacted to directly allow the Mexican Department of Agriculture
and Water to “enlist the Chicago Board of Trade, Merrill Lynch, Spatts, and several other
brokerage houses and Mexican financial institutions as consultants to create a new agricultural
commodities market” modeled after the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. A primary goal was to
convert ejidos to private property, in turn creating international partnerships for foreign
investment. Thus, U.S. foreign investors were directly behind, or at least heavily supported,
major agrarian reforms in Mexico prior to NAFTA.

Reversing Mexico’s National Identity and Selling Neoliberal Restructuring
As noted earlier, anti-Americanism was central to the Mexican national identity since the
Mexican Revolution of 1910, and arguably much further back in the past. Due to this sentiment,
most Mexicans were wary of any international involvement with the United States (Morris and
Passé-Smith 2001; Golob 2003). Thus, any economic restructuring that involved economic
integration with the United States was tough to sell to the Mexican people. Salinas’s strategy to
sell neoliberalism to Mexico was paired with the redefinition of the Mexican national identity.
However, still suffering from a slow recovery from the 1982 crisis, Mexicans were more open to
radical economic proposals.
A “strength through integration” narrative was the cornerstone of shifting the national
identity (Golob 2003:389). Integration rhetoric grew popular throughout North American not
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just in Mexico. This narrative effectively redefined the national interest as outward-looking, and
economic and political sovereignty were no longer understood as major national goals. In the
past, reduced tariffs or unregulated foreign direct investment were seen as invasions of domestic
sovereignty, but now were portrayed as increasing internal strength via building international
relationships. Another major component of this narrative was an emphasis on the idea that
radical change was necessary to meet the rapidly changing global economy. Economic security
was described as achievable only through interdependence in an ever-changing world affected by
globalization. Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, in the Mulroney
government succinctly summarizes this narrative in a statement on October 4, 1985 in regards to
CUFTA:
The decision to open negotiations with the United States will not weaken our sovereignty.
It is an assertion of sovereignty in an increasingly interdependence [sic] world. It
demonstrates our confidence that we can be as productive, innovative, ingenious, and
efficient as our American partners. Sovereignty is a dynamic, not a static thing. It is
constantly changing. It is not an artifact to be kept under glass and protected from the
intrusion of change.24
Salinas and his administration artfully bridged historical imagery and ideology of revolutionary
Mexico with the new national project of Mexico to bolster national identity around the new
neoliberal economic policies (Golob 2003). The media also helped to bolster Salinas’s economic
initiatives and connected it to a rising international position of Mexican identity which was a
source of pride for many Mexicans. In other words, Knight (1994) might describe this process as
bridging political, cultural, and economic nationalism through a project of nation-building where
Mexicans were united around economic goals, and this, in turn, became an integral part of their
cultural identity.
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Statement by Joe Clark to the Canadian Institute for International Affairs, Toronto, October 4, 1985.
Statements/Discourse 85/58 as cited by Golob (2003:389).
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Another component of the neoliberal pitch to Mexican citizens involved the technocrats’
technical studies. Evidence suggests that it was not until after Salinas considered bilateral freetrade as a legitimate economic strategy that Jaime Serra Puche, Salina’s commerce minister, and
other members from Mexico’s trade ministry (SECOFI) began to produce these studies that
provided scientific evidence in favor of free trade (SECOFI 1990). Furthermore, in confidential
interviews conducted by Golob (2003) in Mexico City in August of 1994, SECOFI officials
confirmed that the Salinas administration commissioned these studies after February 1990 with
specific instructions to justify bilateral free trade.
With widespread concern about the woes of the economic restructuring, Salinas
implemented Programa Nacional de la Solidaridad (PRONASOL) immediately after coming to
office in 1988. The goal of the program was to placate the poor (Lustig 1995) and coopt the
solidarity movement in Mexico (La Botz 1995). The official goal, however, was to alleviate
some of the issues of poverty caused by the 1982 debt crisis. By naming the program after the
solidarity movement, Salinas effectively usurped its identity. The solidarity movement gained
steam after the 1985 earthquake and raised questions of the state’s ineffectiveness. With the
growing scrutiny of the PRI and Salinas slim (even fraudulent) electoral victory, PRONASOL
was a state concession that sought to rebuild loyalty to the PRI. Many of the components of
PRONASOL, such as cheap credit programs and food subsidies, did not reach the poor (Lustig
1995). Instead of helping the poor, PRONASOL funds flowed into politically strategic
neighborhoods, specifically neighborhoods where the PRI lost in the 1988 election. Essentially,
PRONASOL was a program to rebuild the PRI. The case of the Committee for Popular Defense
(CDP) offers one example of how the PRONASOL coopted critical groups of the PRI. The CDP
strongly backed the PRD candidate, Cárdenas, in the 1988 election and was a major critic of the
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PRI while representing a diverse group of citizens (La Botz 1995). However, quickly after he
won the election, Salinas reached an agreement with the CDP to work in PRONASOL. The
CDP publicly distanced itself from the PRD and stopped openly criticizing the PRI. In return,
the CDP received millions of pesos to support a myriad of social services. The PRONASOL
investments may have helped some, but they certainly did not address the inadequate income at
the root of the poverty problem (Lustig 1995). Although poverty persisted, PRONASOL
effectively helped Salinas rebuild public faith in the PRI.
Peasants in Mexico were particularly unenthusiastic and even incensed by the economic
changes, specifically the amendment to article 27 along with the other agrarian reforms (Barry
1995). As Mexican corn prices were brought in line with international prices, Mexican corn
farmers were expected to lose income, and the Mexican government knew it had to do something
to quiet the rural discontent with the new land reforms. The answer for Salinas’s administration
was Program of Direct Support Payments to the Countryside (PROCAMPO) which officially
intended to compensate farmers for their losses during the NAFTA adjustment period by making
direct payments according to Salinas’s announcement in October 1993.
The creation of PROCAMPO to offset some of the expected harms from NAFTA’s
implementation demonstrates that the Mexican state was aware that the middle and lower classes
of Mexico would experience some difficulty due to NAFTA’s policy changes (Lustig 1995).
The Mexican state did not attempt to sell agrarian reform to peasants. Instead, the state seemed
to engage more in damage control since PROCAMPO was largely criticized by peasant
organizations for not consulting them before announcing the program in October 1993
(CECCAM 1993). Even after the program was implemented, many peasants complained about
the meagerness of the payments (Barry 1995). Thus, PROCAMPO ostensibly was implemented
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to provide just enough aid to avoid any major social movement. Hogenboom (1998) describes
both PROCAMPO and PRONASOL as tools of social control used to assuage the lower classes
from protest or revolt. Similar to these programs, most of the Mexican social policies passed
during the early NAFTA years were more about quieting discontent than making structural
changes (Wise 1998).
Overall, the Salinas administration masterfully reversed Mexico’s anti-American national
identity and kept Mexicans ignorant when necessary. Due to the steps taken by Mexico leading
up to NAFTA, Helleiner (1993) accurately predicted that Mexico would likely receive few, if
any, major concessions by the United States. Unfortunately, Mexicans knew little about free
trade which was a purposeful goal of the Salinas administration.25 The Mexican government was
not alone in its efforts to sell the ideology of neoliberalism to Mexican citizens, peasants, and the
middle-class alike. Mexican business leaders, in particular, collaborated with the Mexican state
to promote neoliberal philosophy. A massive campaign to win support for NAFTA, in
particular, played a large role in convincing the Mexican people neoliberalism was a promising
philosophy. The state-business coalition that heavily influenced the shape of NAFTA will be
explored in more detail once the NAFTA negotiations are discussed in the following chapter.
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Hellman (1993) conducted several interviews of Mexican citizens to uncover their content knowledge on free
trade. He found four different types of individuals. The first type of individual was confused about free trade and
its possible outcomes. The second type of individual could discuss deep philosophical questions of free trade, but
had little specific data to support their claims. A third individual type was a zealous neoliberal supporter who knew
little about free trade but remained unrealistically optimistic. Finally, the last individual was the cynic who felt that
anything tied to the PRI or the Political Action Party (PAN) was unlikely to benefit lower or middle-class Mexicans.
The PAN was and still is the primary second party to the PRI which typically is to the right of the PRI on most
issues. Very few Mexicans had an extensive knowledge about the specifics of NAFTA.
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Analytical Summary
At this point of the analysis, it is important to establish the context under which NAFTA
was negotiated. Referring back to the analytical model in Figure 2.1, the essential contextual
pieces are the current social structure of accumulation (SSA), transnational capitalist class (TCC)
involved in the negotiations, and where the United States and Mexico fit in the world-system. A
portion of the TCC, operating in North America, was driven by a neoliberal economic
philosophy, dominant during the neoliberal SSA (Kotz 2015). The 1982 economic crisis shook
the social, political, and economic fabric of Mexico as a result of a failing Keynesian SSA. In
response, the Mexican state sought solutions to its economic woes. During this time of crisis, a
TCC emerged from the wreckage in the form of technocrats in Mexico, most of whom possessed
economic degrees from elite U.S. universities.
In response to the crisis of accumulation, a shift towards neoliberal globalization
occurred led by the newly emerged TCC in the form of technocrats in Mexico. With the
transnationalization of production and capital, a TCC formed to replace domestic capitalist
classes (Robinson 2004). Although Mexico tried to stay steadfast to an import substitution
model, industrial growth was too tightly correlated with advances in technology, energy, and raw
material extraction. The internationalization of markets led developing countries to rely heavily
on loans from IFIs, unable to repay those loans, new loans were needed leading to a cycle of debt
(Robinson 2008). Mexico’s foreign debt rose from $6.8 billion to $58 billion from 1972 to 1982,
nearly forcing the state’s hand in restructuring its economic policies to the liking of the TCC and
its global hegemony (Harvey 2005). Mexico’s loans came with strings attached – structural
adjustment policies specified by the World Bank and IMF – requesting budget austerity (e.g.,
slashing social expenditures), privatization of many state-run firms, tariff reductions or removals,
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and increases in labor market flexibility (e.g., lower minimum wage, restriction of unions;
Harvey 2005). According to world-systems analysis, Mexico remained a semi-peripheral nation
depending on the investment of wealthier nations. Arguably, the structural adjustment programs
attached to Mexico’s loans established the foundation for Mexico’s future economic
restructuring and represent neoliberal ideology. The IFIs, business elite, and state leaders all
allied in the new TCC that ultimately shaped Mexico’s neoliberal economic restructuring of the
SSA, including a direct influence on NAFTA’s formation. The creation of NAFTA is a political
artifact of a deliberate collaboration and consensual effort among the TCC, and a major piece in
the creation of a new neoliberal SSA.
The SSA plays an integral role in shaping the negotiation process between states. The
TCC actively propagated a neoliberal ideology that promoted such an SSA, during the neoliberal
age, under which NAFTA was formulated. Kotz (2015:42) lists several of the key ideas of
neoliberal capitalism: (1) removal of trade restrictions placed on capital internationally; (2)
deregulation of industry and financial sector; (3) the abandonment of aggregate demand
management policies; (3) lowering regulations on workers’ rights and environmental standards;
(4) less enforcement of anti-trust violations; (5) privatization of previously public industries; (6)
reduction in social welfare programs; (7) major tax cuts for corporations and the wealthy elite;
(8) shifting the capital-labor relation in favor of capital by increasing labor flexibility and
weakening unions; (9) encouraging unfettered competition; (10) financial institutions becoming
independent from the non-financial sector; (11) restrict inside promotions for CEOs of
corporations; and (12) these neoliberal principles become dominant within corporations
themselves and other major institutions in society. Several of these characteristics of
neoliberalism can be used to define many of the policies implemented in Mexico during the
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economic restructuring advocated by both state and corporate leaders. The ideological influence
of neoliberalism is largely attributed to the prominence of the TCC in Mexico.
The rise of the technocratic ruling elite in Mexico occurred most precipitously during the
economic crises of the 1980s and paralleled the formation of the TCC subset involved in
negotiating NAFTA (Ángel Centeno and Maxfield 1992; Ángel Centeno 1994).26 The new
technocrats gained power through political opportunism brought by economic crises and
developing deep ties to the private sector, unlike the politicians who came before them. The
cohesion among these technocrats developed through homogenous social backgrounds,
analogous ideological predilections, lack of experience with the traditional PRI institutions,
similar professional specializations such as economics, and often housed in only a select few of
the government’s departments. Specifically, Ángel Centeno and Maxfield (1992) defined the
new technocrats as technoburócratas characterized by their social origins being most likely from
urban areas, a middle- to upper-class background, and the sons of presidents. Furthermore, they
tended to receive their education in foreign universities, most often the United States, and
typically specialized in economics or a related field. Most likely, due to their similar education,
they commonly viewed free market capitalism, global economic integration, and foreign
investment as solutions to Mexico’s economic woes. The new technocratic elite also lacked the
experience in corporatist politics and more often resorted to repressive government tactics as
evinced by Salinas’ presidential tenure. With the saturation of technocrats, patronage politics of
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The technocrats differed from their counterparts the politicians. Vernon (1964) first discussed this division in
Mexican politics between the técnicos (who had advanced through the political ranks by first establishing some
technical expertise) and the politicos (who advanced politically by their life-long servitude to the PRI). At times,
these factions are at odds with one another, but frequently they complement one another. With more technocrats
gaining power in Mexico, many politicos saw them as a threat considering the dwindling political influence of
politicos compared to the técnicos. However, many political bureaucrats have effectively maintained order and
stability by exerting political control over the population in accordance with the ruling technocrats. The PRI
developed close ties to both the Secretariat of the Interior and the Secretariat of Programming and Budget where
many presidents began before becoming president.
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corporatist cooptation were supplemented with the reliance on technical expertise to assuage the
fears of the population. Most of the neoliberal policies were sold to the public through this
mechanism: a president educated in economics telling the public the moves necessary to salvage
the Mexican economy.
Accompanying, and partly due to, the rise of the technocrats, Mexico went through a
dramatic economic restructuring. Pastor and Wise (1994) explain this restructuring through a
series of factors. The exponential growth of intra-industry trade occurring between Mexico and
the United States helped create a free trade constituency among the technocrats, corporate elite,
and U.S. politicians. Pastor and Wise also argue that the policymakers engaged in a rational
calculus based on weighing three influential processes. First, the 1982 debt crisis forced a
reassessment of the current political and economic model based on state patronage and domestic
production. Simultaneously, the technocrats heavily influenced a reconstitution of the PRI.
Political leaders found corporatist strategies more difficult to employ with fewer resources and
weakened legitimacy due to the economic crisis. Technocrats rose to power filling the political
void and quickly found allies among the corporate elite. The second process involves the
perpetuation of asymmetric information on neoliberal economic policies. The ruling elite
maintained a strict circumscription of NAFTA information, disseminating only studies that
painted NAFTA in a positive light. The ongoing debates over these studies by state and business
leaders were concealed from the public. The PRI also attempted to silence critics by offering
more political or economic concessions such as PRONASOL or PROCAMPO. The public
information campaign for NAFTA will be explored in more detail in the following chapter.
The third process was the homogenization of ideological thought that led to a single
solution platform (Pastor and Wise 1994). As mentioned earlier, a new technocratic ruling class
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educated in U.S. universities brought a neoliberal economic ideology back with them
sympathetic to the Washington Consensus. Concurrently, the private sector grew jaded with the
state and their corporatist policies, and found neoliberal economics more appealing. These views
by both groups intensified when trade liberalization policies demonstrated a capability in
lowering inflation and stabilizing the economy. The results of economic studies demonstrating
these successes also fed into the second process of asymmetrical information further swaying
less eager groups towards a similar economic ideology. In other words, a TCC formed with a
homogenous group supportive of the economic restructuring in Mexico. Arguably, Carlos
Salinas was the most important Mexican member of the TCC who tremendously impacted the
shape and direction of the Mexican economy with NAFTA being one of the major tools of the
economic restructuring.
The homogenization of ideological thought manifested in a profound groupthink,
influencing much of the TCC’s actions throughout the NAFTA years. To say that the TCC
deliberately advocated policies beneficial to them while being harmful to the majority would be
shortsighted. Rather, many members of the TCC suffered from an overwhelming groupthink
that led them to ardently believe in neoliberal economic policies as being the saving grace for
much of the economic woes. Clarkson (1993) specifically investigates the influence of
neoclassical economic ideology on U.S. power relations, and argues that neoclassical economic
theory was a powerful tool for U.S. empire building. Once intellectual theory crosses a threshold
to becoming ideology, the resulting ideology provides a tool of major influence. In particular,
neoclassical economic ideology became a tool to legitimate U.S. hegemony through securing
market access in Latin America. To some degree, this legitimized Mexico’s position in the semiperiphery of the world-system. Clarkson criticized the social sciences, but economics in
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particular, for becoming abstracted from social reality to the point that the average citizen is lost
and formulas justify the actions of macro-institutions. When theoretical economists become
policymakers who fail to challenge their theoretical assumptions and examine the human
outcomes of their theories, ideology stands to justify potentially harmful policies. In the
neoliberal era, business leaders took the helm on policy creation rallying around an ideology that
demonized government intervention, allowing them to take more control. In addition, Drache
(1993) warned against ideologies that assume trade-center strategies are executed in a vacuum
devoid of micro consequences. For instance, macroeconomic restructuring must be passed with
the assumption that this restructuring will not cause a major disturbance for workers adjusting to
the new economic model.
The TCC groupthink in Mexico was attributable to Mexico’s dependence on camarillas
in the organization of its political structure. Salinas placed Herminio Blanco Mendoza, an
economist with a Ph.D. from Chicago, in charge of negotiations, and Blanco selected several
members of the negotiating team from his own camarilla (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Since
Blanco was one of Salinas’s protégés, Salinas had direct control over the negotiation process,
and Blanco provided a check on Serra who was becoming a popular presidential contender.27
Salinas furthered his control over NAFTA negotiations by forming an alliance among business,
government, and labor organizations. This alliance made the Economic Solidarity Pact possible
and led to the implementation of structural adjustment policies attached to the austerity program.
The government offered these leaders political office and public or corporate business deals in
return for their support (Heredia 1994).

Camp (1990) documents Salinas’s camarilla in great detail. Such an analysis gives an in-depth look into the
members of the transnational capitalist class operating with the Mexican political system heavily influential in
crafting the economic policies of the 1980s and 1990s.
27
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The Mexican TCC incorporated business interests through lucrative trade deals. During
Salinas’s wave of privatization, he sold several government companies at several times the going
rate to make the economic strategy look favorable (Oppenheimer 1998). What was unknown by
most of the public at the time was that he had to offer furtive deals to investors for their
overpayment. For instance, Telmex, purchased by Carlos Slim, was allowed to increase their
prices by nearly 250 percent while only increasing their workers’ wages by 18 percent (Meyer
1992). However, the exorbitant prices were met by widespread protests resulting in a
compromise of only a 170 percent increase in rates. These lucrative deals springboarded
ordinary businessmen like Carlos Slim into the ranks of the ultra-wealthy where he sits today as
Forbes 4th richest person in the world, worth an estimated $50 billion.28
In addition to privatization, another primary goal of the economic restructuring was
securing foreign investment, and Salinas pursued this goal with the help of the TCC. Salinas
sought to regain foreign direct investment by establishing an “‘external constituency’ of
international bankers, fund managers, and corporations” (Golob 2003:377). Initially, when
Salinas took office, he sought an amicable relationship with the United States, but not a major
trade deal. Instead, more resources went into diversifying Mexico’s foreign investment. Salinas
traveled to Europe and Japan, meeting with 29 heads of state attempting to reduce Mexico’s
dependence on the United States (Salinas de Gortari 1989). Eventually, his plans at
diversification failed, and he then switched strategies after visiting Davos, Switzerland for the
1990 World Economic Forum. Realizing Mexico’s dependence on the United States for foreign
investment in the current world-system, especially after Salinas was ignored by the rest of the
Western world, a trade deal with the United States was viewed as the last resort.

28

See Forbes billionaire list at http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/#/version:realtime.
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Mexico’s borrowing pattern reflects the ruling elites’ desire to consolidate power rather
than to use the funds to promote the welfare of the nation (Heath 1996). IMF loans, in particular,
boost personal wealth at the cost of sovereignty and do not impose accountability. Mexican
politicians accepted IMF loans as long as the political system was left intact. The PRI-led
economic changes in Mexico are more concerned with maintaining the political structure than
bringing economic prosperity to the entire nation. The limited Mexican focus on economic
change without accompanying political change is problematic because economic growth means
very little progress toward a more equitable distribution of wealth (Roett 1993).
Complicating this dangerous TCC groupthink further, Wilkinson (1993) demonstrated
that the experts in free trade rarely discussed the ideological, moral, and ethical implications of
NAFTA or free trade. He challenged these axiomatic outcomes that are traditionally ignored by
economists and other experts. After documenting the extensive collusion between the
government and business, he questioned several economic assumptions that were deeply
embedded within the TCC groupthink. First, corporate growth through mergers and acquisitions
were assumed to improve efficiency, but some studies suggested otherwise. Second, the idea
that free trade created jobs for third and second world countries was often assumed and verified,
but Wilkinson asks about the type of jobs being created. In many instances, TNCs were creating
only
…assembly operations involving little or no transmission of technology…In this
scenario, the bulk of benefits in the form of technology, advanced employment, and
profits are retained by the home countries of the firms (Wilkinson 1993:38).
Third, the ease of capital flow was often uncritically accepted as a beneficial characteristic for
economies, but increased capital mobility enhanced corporations’ ability to threaten relocation to
demand lower working and environmental standards. Furthermore, when capital mobility is
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high, economic recessions or depressions in one market were quickly transferred to another, and
the most dependent markets tended to suffer drastically. The dependency of nations’ economies
on foreign investment made the global marketplace extremely volatile. Fourth, the economic
incentive for many economies to destroy foreign competition left the losers of international
competition in dire conditions.
As the interstate connections deepened, NAFTA efforts intensified. NAFTA was the
icing on the cake that would seal neoliberal economic policy in Mexico, and was sought after by
both political and business elites as a way of solidifying a neoliberal SSA conducive for the TCC
to accumulate capital. The desperate economic situation faced by Mexico provided their elites
the opportunity to negotiate a policy mutually beneficial to members of the TCC. Mexico’s
position as a semi-peripheral nation justified NAFTA as a necessity. The next chapter traces the
NAFTA negotiation process documenting how NAFTA was formed, and then argues that
NAFTA and its formation process were criminal and criminogenic.
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CHAPTER 6
NAFTA NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CAMPAIGN TO SELL NAFTA

Chapter Overview
As the historical narrative in Chapter 5 shows, there were events and forces shaping
NAFTA prior to the negotiations that led up to its ratification by Mexico, the United States, and
Canada. This chapter traces the negotiation process, from the unofficial negotiations to the
ratification of the final NAFTA text, including its two supplemental agreements for labor and the
environment. The massive campaigns to sell NAFTA to U.S. and Mexican citizens will be
extensively documented to illustrate the amount of influence the transnational capitalist class
(TCC) had on shaping NAFTA. The key sources I used in developing the historical narrative of
the formation of NAFTA are discussed in the chapter appendix. Once the NAFTA negotiation
process is detailed, I argue that both the NAFTA negotiation process and the final agreement
were criminogenic, and beyond that criminal in and of themselves using international law as a
basis. The chapter concludes by applying the model presented in Chapter 2 (see figure 2.1) to
demonstrate the various characteristics of NAFTA that made it criminogenic.

NAFTA Negotiations
Key Players
Before returning to the 1990 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, it is
important to first introduce the key players in the formation of NAFTA, particularly those most
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extensively interviewed by Cameron and Tomlin (2000). The two key players behind NAFTA
were U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Mexican President Carlos Salinas, with Canadian
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney playing a more minor role throughout much of the negotiations.
Members of these leaders’ cabinets were delegated much of the responsibility of actually
negotiating the deal. The most important negotiator for Mexico was Commerce Secretary Jaime
Serra Puche. Serra had a similar background to that of Salinas – trained as an economist with a
Ph.D. from Yale University who directly entered government from academia – and two years
after entering government in 1988 Salinas named him secretary of trade and industrial
development. Although Serra was the leader of Salinas’s cabinet, Herminio Blanco Mendoza
was chief negotiator who was both a protégé of Salinas and member of his camarilla.
For the United States, Bush handed the negotiating reigns to U.S. Trade Representative
Carla Hills, an accomplished lawyer and Yale Law School graduate. Bush ostensibly sought her
service, not because of her trade experience which was limited at best, but rather for her
reputation as an intrepid negotiator described as “fearless, combative, and uncompromising”
(Dryden 1995:352) and “persistent, fiercely competitive, sometimes thin-skinned: (Uchitelle
1990).29 Hills was actually reluctant to serve as a negotiator on NAFTA because she was
intensely involved in the ongoing Uruguay Round negotiations of GATT (Uchitelle 1990). Once
committed, she named Julius Katz, deputy U.S. trade representative, as chief NAFTA negotiator.
Hills requested that Katz take on the job while also maintaining his negotiating duties in GATT.
Katz also was noted to be an aggressive negotiator described as “a fox” who “knows where all
the skeletons are buried” (Cameron and Tomlin 2000:9).30

Carla Hills is also described as a “shrewd layer and negotiator” in the New York Times at
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/25/opinion/looks-like-america.html.
30
Quoted in Cameron and Tomlin (2000) as coming from Globe and Mail, June 10, 1991, B1.
29
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Don Campbell, Canadian Deputy Minister of Trade, headed up the Canadian negotiation
team. Due to his involvement in the Uruguay Round negotiations, among many other
responsibilities, he delegated the duty of chief negotiator for NAFTA to John Weekes who also
was involved in the ongoing GATT negotiations. Weekes had 25 years experience in foreign
service, and Cameron and Tomlin (2000) ascribe Campbell’s decision to hire a chief negotiator
from the foreign service bureaucracy as evidence that Canada took the NAFTA negotiations less
seriously than both the United States and Mexico. Trade minister Michael Wilson, the most
powerful member of Mulroney’s cabinet, oversaw Weekes and the negotiation process. As a
major proponent of the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA), Wilson was a serious
force in advancing NAFTA from the Canadian side.

Unofficial Negotiations and Fast-Track Process
A nine-day trip to Europe in 1990 was likely the turning point that spurred Mexico more
aggressively to pursue free trade with the United States (Salinas de Gortari 1990; Mayer 1998;
Cameron and Tomlin 2000; MacArthur 2000). As noted earlier, Salinas and his cabinet sought
foreign investment to alleviate their debt problems at Davos, Switzerland. However, at that time,
many countries of Eastern Europe were reforming their economies and most of Western
Europe’s investments were preoccupied with these projects (Rohter 1990; Riding 1990). The
trip made it clear to Mexico that their country was not attractive enough for European
investment. A trade deal with the United States could provide the opportunity to make their
economy more attractive to international investors. Furthermore, negotiations with the United
States would strengthen relations between the Mexican government and business.31 Shortly after
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See del Castillo (1995) and Weisskopf (1993) for details on the support for NAFTA coming from business.
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arriving at this conclusion, Salinas and Serra pitched an idea for bilateral free trade to Carla Hills
(Mayer 1998; Cameron and Tomlin 2000). When others in Washington caught wind of the
proposal, it took off.
Despite the enthusiasm for a North American free trade deal by Mexico and the United
States, Canada was a reluctant participant in NAFTA since it had recently finished an internally
divisive free trade agreement with the United States, CUFTA, and free trade and investments
with Mexico were expected to be of little value (Cameron 1991; Goar 1992). Ultimately,
Canada joined to protect its interest in the North American market rather than any desire to trade
with Mexico (Eden and Molot 1992). Canada was not interested in NAFTA until it heard of
Salinas’s bilateral trade negotiations with the United States. Canadian economic analyses
conducted by the Department of External Affairs indicated that Mexican competition was not a
threat, but a bilateral U.S.-Mexico agreement could threaten Canada’s access to the U.S. market
(Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Mexico initially perceived Canada as a potential deal breaker and
opposed its involvement in the free trade negotiations (Drohan 1991; Long 2015). Yet, when
Bush vouched for Mulroney, Mexico capitulated with the stipulation that if Canada halted any
agreement it (Canada) should withdraw from negotiations.32
The United States was preoccupied with the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations, and many of the key negotiators from the United States wanted to place NAFTA
negotiations on the backburner.33 However, political support from the Southwest, particularly
Texas, wanted to seize the opportunity of NAFTA to consolidate the Mexican economic reforms
and secure a Mexican market for American exports (Sharp 1992; Bradsher 1993b). Shortly after

Mulroney’s support for war in the Persian Gulf gained Bush’s approval (See Drohan 1991).
Most negotiators did not want to give up the progress made on GATT (Marchick and Misra 1991). Some
members of Congress opposed to NAFTA, favored GATT (Zremski 1994). Once NAFTA negotiations were
underway, GATT took the backseat (Behr 1993a).
32
33

171
Davos, President Salinas sent a letter to President Bush on August 21, 1990, asking to open up
discussions on a free trade deal (von Bertrab 1997). Bush informed Congress of his intent to
negotiate and requested fast-track approval, leaving Congress 60 legislative days to vote on
negotiations. The vote was urgent given that the president’s fast-track authority would need an
extension by March 1991, because, without such an extension, the fast-track authority would
expire in June 1991.
Fast-tracking authority can only be issued by Congress, thus Bush needed its approval.34
Typically, the president requests fast-track authority on trade deals to speed up the negotiating
process and avoid long litigious negotiations over various sections of such a deal. By approving
fast-track, Congress delegates its authority to negotiate trade deals to the executive branch, and,
most principally the president. Once given fast-track authority, the president works with
advisory committees both private and public to “ensure that U.S. trade policy and trade
negotiating objectives adequately reflect U.S. public and private sector interests.”35 Congress
retains the right to vote on the final trade deal without any power to amend any of its provisions.
Fast-track authority is only granted for a limited period of time, thus, once it expires, the
president must solicit Congress again for its approval. In theory, fast-track is used to bypass the
need for Congress’s approval on every section of the trade deal. However, critics have raised
several concerns over fast-tracking (Brown 1993). Public Citizen describes fast-tracking as
“undemocratic” empowering the “executive branch officials” being “advised by large

34

See Holmer and Bello (1992) for a detailed discussion on fast-track authority and its use during NAFTA
negotiations.
35
Quote from Office of the U.S. Trade Representative’s website found at https://ustr.gov/about-us/advisorycommittees.
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corporations to skirt Congress and the public” to furtively and non-transparently pass trade
deals.36
In September 1990, unofficial negotiations began.37 Secretary of Commerce Robert
Mosbacher and Jaime Serra acted as traveling salesmen visiting U.S. businesses across the nation
giving their sales pitch for free trade with Mexico to the business community (Cameron and
Tomlin 2000). Early on, Mexico asserted that its national petroleum industry was off limits, but
Mexico offered U.S. oil drilling companies access to extraction a month later.38 The United
States made it clear free movement of labor would not be part of a trade agreement with
Mexico.39 When the Uruguay Round failed to reach a deal, NAFTA became a top U.S. priority
(Behr 1993a). On March 1, 1991, President Bush requested Congress to extend the fast-tracking
of NAFTA.40 The extension would generally extend the fast-track option for other trade deals
such as GATT negotiations. The Democratic majorities in both the Senate and House
immediately issued resolutions requesting that “the disparity between the two countries in the
adequacy and enforcement of environmental standards, health, and safety standards and worker
rights” be addressed.41 The Democrats were simply responding to their voters who were
concerned about the negative effects of free trade. While Republicans favored an extension,

Quote from Public Citizen’s website that specifically discusses their criticisms of fast-tracking at
http://www.citizen.org/fast-track.
37
See Bush’s statement at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=18862, and an earlier statement about
the early considerations of a U.S.-Mexico free trade agreement
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=18582.
38
Inside US Trade, November 2, 1990: 8 as cited in Cameron and Tomlin (2000). See also Oxford Analytical Daily
Brief, November 12, 1991: 2 and February 19, 1992: 1, Chemical Week July 29, 1992, 151(4): 8, and Morton (1992).
39
Bill Clinton even claimed NAFTA would reduce illegal immigration (Espenshade and Acevedo 1993).
Immigrants were also not viewed as an “economic drag” until NAFTA was nearly implemented (Reinhold 1993).
40
See Bush’s letter to Congress at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19354.
41
Cameron and Tomlin (2000:73) quote House Ways and Means Committee Chair Rostenkowski and Senate
Finance Chair Bentsen.
36
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Democrats remained split, due in part to the labor-environmental coalition that had been
lobbying against NAFTA since the fall of 1990.42
It was not until March of 1991 that business leaders were warned that they must do
something or the extension was in danger.43 First, the Coalition for Trade Expansion (CTE) was
created as a coalition group that represented business interests including the Business
Roundtable, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association of Manufacturers among
over 500 business and lobbying groups (Olson 2014). Then, they responded with fierce
lobbying, and Salinas met with American business leaders to sell free trade while alleviating
environmental and labor concerns (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Mexico also cornered members
of Congress with a staff of top Washington lobbyists from both major political parties (von
Bertrab 1997). On May 1, in a letter, President Bush announced a plan to address the
Democrats’ concerns including assisting displaced workers, retaining superiority of U.S. health
and safety standards, excluding any discussion of immigration, an environmental border plan,
enforcing environmental violations more regularly, allowing environmental representatives on
trade advisory boards, some protectionist policies against imports likely to see large increases in
the United States, and strict rules of origin.44 Majority Leader Richard Gephardt, one of the
major players in the opposition, showed weakness in his stance towards tougher regulations
likely due to the fear of being labeled a protectionist which could be damaging to his political
career (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). His faltering was a large blow to the opponents of the fast-
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A border cleanup plan for Mexico was necessary to get the fast track opposition on board (See The Economist,
February 29, 1992: 25).
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Rostenkowski warned business leaders that “if you want to win this thing, move your ass.” Quoted from the Wall
Street Journal in Cameron and Tomlin (2000).
44
See Bush’s letter at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19533, and his remarks at a White House
briefing that same day at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19535. See also McCarthy (1991) for
a short list of Bush’s promises.
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track extension. Ultimately, attempts at blocking the fast-track extension failed, setting the stage
for NAFTA negotiations.
The Bush administration, along with the business community and Mexican elites,
orchestrated a plan to achieve fast-tracking by reshaping the NAFTA and Mexican image among
the U.S. public, politicians, and business leaders (Mayer 1998). Along with erecting the CTE,
the Business Roundtable, with the encouragement of Jim Robinson, CEO of American Express,
orchestrated the founding of a new National Foreign Trade Council which was comprised of
many of the same groups represented in the CTE. This ad-hoc group executed a lobbying
campaign that promulgated various favorable letters from business leaders, pro-NAFTA
editorials, and endorsements from both political and business elites to create the impression that
the business world was universally in favor of NAFTA.45
The Mexican government spearheaded its own lobbying effort in Washington
(Gerstenzang 1993a). Von Bertrab (1997) was in charge of most of these efforts and spoke
candidly about the team’s frustration with, even disdain for, labor unions. This frustration was
mostly due to the difficulty of selling the idea of NAFTA to labor unions and their leaders, as he
states: “Fear and partisan political interest made them [labor unions] impervious to such
reasoning” (von Bertrab 1997:9). He continues to say, “We had very little sympathy for the
trade unions’ concerns, as we understood them, and I personally had to control my outrage at
their sanctimonious claims and gross exaggerations.” Although von Bertrab (1997:10) did not
completely dismiss the concerns over labor and the environment, he certainly felt that they could
be dealt with later, and even within the agreement, as he observed,
[b]ut the real issue at the time was simply the concept of a trade agreement. In my
opinion, the consistent position would have been to insist during the negotiations on
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conditions that would help clean up the environment without opposing the concept of the
agreement itself before it had any content.
Later on, however, von Bertrab (1997:11) seemed to desire putting off addressing these concerns
even further, removing them from the agreement entirely. He even stated that he thought the critics
should abandon their idealism and that “the Los Angeles Times had it right in its editorial of April
29, 1991” that stated “putting them [environmental issues] on the table during trade talks is a sure
way to slow the talks down and maybe even sabotage them.”46 He also expressed agitation over
considering human rights within NAFTA. For instance, he described one proposal by NAFTA
opposition groups as interested in expanding “the agenda of negotiations to include human rights,
debt, child labor, and many other impossible dreams” [emphasis added] (von Bertrab 1997:23). In
another example, he characterized Majority Leader Gephardt as having “labor and human rights
supremacist attitudes” invoking a negative connotation (von Bertrab 1997:23).

With such

categorizations, von Bertrab made the disdain and lack of empathy Mexican negotiators had for
the labor movement’s concerns quite apparent.
Using his friendship with Congressman Bill Richardson, von Bertrab (1997) focused his
team’s initial efforts more towards convincing members of Congress.47 To win them over, he
bolstered his team by building partnerships with the private sector (e.g., Business Roundtable),
establishing contacts with think tanks (e.g., The Heritage Foundation, Hudson Institution, and the
American Enterprise Institute), acquiring government relations advisors, and enlisting the help of
several law firms. The armada of experts was necessary to help von Bertrab’s team successfully
lobby as foreign agents in the U.S. political system. He described his experience lobbying for
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Von Bertrab (1997: 11) quotes an article in the Los Angeles Times April 29, 1991 found at
http://articles.latimes.com/1991-04-29/local/me-536_1_trade-pact.
47
See also Baldwin et al. (1993) and Long (2015) for more context on Mexico’s NAFTA lobbying campaign and
their connections to U.S. politicians and business leaders.
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fast-track as an invigorating, “democratic” experience (von Bertrab 1997:16). Relating lobbying
to democracy, and lobbying for fast-track at that, is a bit odd considering some of the criticisms
of fast-track as being undemocratic. He even described one congressman as looking like an
“aristocrat” while he was working on garnering more support (von Bertrab 1997:18). Despite his
praise of democracy at work, von Bertrab also recalled discovering the hidden mechanisms that
obfuscated the process and circumscribed democracy, such as the Rules Committee room. All
legislation in the House had to pass through the committee that meets in this very small room
guarded by Representative Joe Moakley, who von Bertrab described as a strapping bouncer
preventing outsiders from gaining access.
To better understand some of the elite connections and how deep they ran, consider New
Mexico representative and friend of von Bertrab, Bill Richardson. Richardson acted as a
gatekeeper for the von Bertrab lobbying team to establish various contacts in Washington (Von
Bertrab 1997). Richardson was a supporter of NAFTA, and free trade generally, who had elite
ties to both U.S. and Mexican business interests (MacArthur 2000). His father opened a Mexico
City branch of the National City Bank (now Citibank) in 1929. When the Mexican banks were
privatized in 1982, Citibank was left alone by the PRI.48 Later, in 1998, Citibank was the first
U.S. bank to acquire a large Mexican bank, Banco Confia, paying only $195 million for the
acquisition despite the Mexican government recapitalizing it for $1billion one year prior
(Friedland 1998). Not surprisingly, Richardson was a major proponent of Mexican privatization.
Interestingly, Raúl Salinas used Citibank to surreptitiously offload large sums of money into
foreign bank accounts.49
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Citibank was the only foreign bank at the time it was left untouched by the PRI (Marois 2008).
See the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s report at http://www.gao.gov/products/OSI-99-1.
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Aware of the opposition mounting against fast-tracking, von Bertrab (1997), with the
help of his team, devised a multifaceted campaign strategy to win support for NAFTA fast-track
that went beyond members of Congress. One component of their strategy was a massive media
campaign that stretched across 31 media markets to win undecided members of Congress.
Interestingly, von Bertrab (1997:26) both praised and criticized the U.S. media for presenting
both sides of the story, praising their “balanced treatment” while criticizing their “proclivity to
highlight strong news – which in our case was basically bad news.” Von Bertrab’s team also
tried to garner the Hispanic vote to create a Hispanic American constituency that could convince
others of the merits of NAFTA. By influencing the media towards presenting more pro-NAFTA
coverage, both citizens and their representatives were expected to come around. Ultimately, the
fast-track passed suggesting their campaign was a success, but not without concerns, particularly
raised by Gephardt (McCarthy 1991). His interest with including labor and environmental
accords worried the Mexican negotiating team among others (von Bertrab 1997).
The fast-track process exemplifies the importance of U.S. domestic politics in shaping
NAFTA. Since NAFTA was taking longer than expected, a fast-track extension was necessary
to keep it moving.50 The opposition to the fast-track of NAFTA included labor organizations and
environmental groups (Lee 1991; Smith 1993). Since these groups typically comprise a key part
of the Democratic constituency, many Democratic representatives felt pressured to oppose
NAFTA. However, key proponents of the fast-track process felt they could pass NAFTA
without the support of labor, but would need to neutralize the environmentalists’ threat (Mayer
1998). Josh Bolton, head of an interagency group to promote fast-tracking and general counsel
at the Office of United States Trade Representative, and Nick Calio, a member of Bolton’s fast
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track team and Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, pursued a way to
appease environmentalists’ concerns at least minimally (MacArthur 2000). With help from
members of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), they felt they needed to do this by
teasing out labor protectionism in the form of environmentalism, leaving only pure
environmental issues.51 To achieve this goal, NAFTA proponents successfully encouraged
major environmental organizations to submit their demands to the Bush administration.52 Bush’s
action plan was the answer to those most staunchly opposed to fast-track, such as Gephardt
(McCarthy 1991). The major opposition to fast-track was mainly labor and environmental
organizations and their sympathizers located in the United States. From the view of Mayer
(1998), the struggle over the fast-track process for NAFTA was primarily between three
competing groups: those in support, those opposed, and those who had little to gain or lose. The
third group consisted of the large national environmental organizations that could gain from
having some influence over the shape of NAFTA.53 For them, it seemed most advantageous to
gain some political power by going along with NAFTA while only receiving minimal
environmental concessions (Audley 1997).54

Official Negotiations
Nearly a year after the announcement of the NAFTA negotiations, fast-tracking passed
on May 24, 1991.55 With fast-track a reality, the various parties prepared for negotiations by
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assembling negotiating teams. Salinas opted for a highly centralized negotiation structure.
Mexico’s trade ministry (SECOFI), under Jaime Serra’s leadership, would run negotiations
(Torres 2010). Mexican chief negotiator, Herminio Blanco, was soon discovered as ill-prepared
for substantive discussions on NAFTA issues (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Von Bertrab (1997)
recalled selecting his negotiation team based on personal characteristics rather than professional
experience, electing to choose members from his camarilla – most of whom were U.S. educated.
There were also several who had connections to international financial institutions, with one
member from the IMF, Ildefonso Guajardo, who pursued graduate studies at Arizona State
University and the University of Pennsylvania. Two other members were from the World Bank
– Harvard-educated Eduardo Wallentin and Luis de la Calle who holds a Ph.D. in economics
from the University of Virginia. The U.S. team was more decentralized, including members from
several government departments handling their respective sections of the trade negotiations
(Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Canada, having used a centralized structure in the CUFTA
negotiations, switched to a strategy in between that of Mexico and the United States.56
For both Carla Hills and Jaime Serra, the goal was to reach a broad agreement quickly,
but Michael Wilson was more defensive and wished to maintain most of the earlier CUFTA
provisions (Rohter 1990; Magnusson et al. 1991).57 Michael Wilson stated that Canada’s
intentions were to prevent renegotiating bilateral trade agreements with the United States.58
NAFTA negotiations were held secretly and a high-security clearance was needed to even review
the notes of the meetings (Mayer 1998; MacArthur 2000). The secrecy was intended to keep the

56

The main change the Canadians made since CUFTA was to eliminate the position of an independent chief
negotiator who had a direct line to the prime minister’s office. Instead, more than simply one individual had
significant influence over the negotiations. See appendix B in Cameron and Tomlin (2000) for the structure and
members of each negotiating team.
57
See also Bloomberg, May 27, 1991 at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1991-05-26/the-mexico-pactworth-the-price.
58
Quoted from Financial Post, April 26, 1991, 1 by Cameron and Tomlin (2000).

180
negotiations out of the public eye. Despite the lack of transparency to the public, the business
community was able to work closely with negotiators and received frequent updates. In an
interview with Mayer (1998:116), an official of the Mexican Embassy expressed Mexico’s
concern over major concessions made to the United States:
This [nationalist backlash] was always on our minds. That we would be charged with
giving up the country. That’s why we had to do it with support of the business
community … It was essential to build political support to defuse fears that we were
giving up too much.
Official NAFTA negotiations began on June 12, 1991, during hard economic times for
both the United States and Canada, while the Mexican economy was experiencing economic
growth.59 Bush’s approval ratings dropped throughout the negotiations adding another obstacle
to the passing of NAFTA.60 With guidance from Salinas, Serra outlined Mexico’s initial
negotiation stance by listing five areas not up for negotiation: (1) reducing Mexican control over
the petroleum sector; (2) no guaranteeing of supplies to countries; (3) reducing state monopoly in
distribution; (4) no including of risk contracts; and (5) creating foreign retail outlets (Cameron
and Tomlin 2000). Negotiations began slowly, but the imminent U.S. presidential election
heightened the urgency of passage despite U.S. preoccupation with the Uruguay Round.61 The
three countries struggled to get close to a final agreement on agriculture, intellectual property
rights, financial services, accession, and investment.62 Since the United States and Canada
already had a free trade agreement, it was Mexico who wanted membership, and the United
States was in a position to obtain concessions from Mexico (Vaghefi 1993). The Mexicans
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began by seeking protections typically desired by developing countries, but the United Sates
would not budge for anything less than comprehensive liberalization, specifically it opposed
Mexico’s wish to leave energy and financial services out of the agreement (Fox 1991; Cameron
and Tomlin 2000). Since the Mexicans believed in the philosophy of neoliberal economics, they
quickly capitulated and abandoned their opening position on non-negotiable areas (Marois 2008).
The Dallas Jamboree, held from February 17 to 21, 1992, was a major round of
negotiations that led to significant concessions, primarily by the Mexican team (Robert 2000).
Erroneously, the Mexicans perceived the jamboree as the end game, but in retrospect, it was
quite early in negotiations. Mexican negotiator Blanco wrote a memorandum that instructed his
negotiators to “show your cards, get to the bottom, there is no tomorrow” (Cameron and Tomlin
2000:107). One of the most significant concessions was in agriculture that removed tariffs on
corn, ultimately affecting the lives of millions of Mexican peasants and consumers, while this
also came in the same year that Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution was amended (Long
2015). The United States argued that if Mexico did not endorse comprehensive free trade of all
agricultural products, access to the major U.S. consumer market would not be made available for
winter fruits and vegetables (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). The decision to put corn on the table
was unilaterally made by Salinas, as was the case for all major concessions, highlighting the
centralized, authoritarian nature of Mexico’s negotiation team. Only the small details of the
negotiations were left to the assigned negotiators. Canada was nonplussed by the concessions
and refused to liberalize across the board, desiring protections for their dairy and poultry
sectors.63 U.S. and Mexican negotiators used crafty language to allow Mexico to give

63

See White House memorandum of breakfast meeting with Carlos Salinas at
https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1992-02-27--Salinas.pdf.

182
concessions on investment that arguably did not violate the constitution.64 They avoided
violation of Mexico’s constitution by semantically rearranging the agreement rather than making
any substantial changes.65 The Mexican negotiators also abandoned permanent caps on foreign
investment in the banking sector, much to the dismay of the banking industry (Whyte 1992;
Cameron and Tomlin 2000).
The Mexican secretary of finance desired to quickly wrap the agreement up, yet these
concessions, rather than bringing the parties closer to an agreement, led to the U.S. team
demanding more (Cameron and Tomlin 2000).66 Mexico’s impatience resulted in many large
concessions made too early in the game. NAFTA was the goal with little emphasis on the terms
of the agreement. Some of Mexico’s impatience was due to the volatility of the peso, and its
strength appeared to be tied to the success of NAFTA, as it fluctuated with the negotiation
process.67 Mexico’s authoritarian political structure littered with its camarillas weakened
Mexico’s negotiating power rather than strengthening it.68 Mexican team members were heavily
committed to trade liberalization, likely due to their similar educational backgrounds, and,
according to one anonymous Mexican negotiating advisor, they had little understanding of the
advantages of protectionism for the Mexican economy (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). The fact
that Mexico needed NAFTA more than the United States, with arguably no other viable options,
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created the most important power imbalance between these two negotiating countries (Blears
1993).
After Dallas, Mexico reorganized its negotiation team given the performance at the
Dallas Jamboree. In interviews with Cameron and Tomlin (2000), several Mexican negotiators
expressed concern over the information flows among the various negotiators. Very few people
actually knew what was going on in every sector of the negotiations, and the hierarchical
structure of the Mexican team led to too many concessions early in the negotiations. Von
Bertrab (1997) describes the differences between the U.S. and Mexican negotiation structure.
For Mexico, its organization was very centralized where information was concentrated at the top
and the various task groups knew very little about what was going on in the other groups.
Furthermore, upper management kept most of the information about the negotiations concealed
from the public. For the United States, management was much more decentralized with various
experts responsible for different sectors of the trade deal. The United States was also much more
open with its information, at least among the negotiators in the trade deal. Mexico’s centralized
style allowed them to make much quicker decisions since there were fewer people to consult.
Although von Bertrab (1997) seemingly describes this as a strength, many of the Mexican
negotiators interviewed found it to be more of a weakness (Cameron and Tomlin 2000).
Mexico’s reorganization focused on bringing in more people to negotiate and relieving many of
the negotiators from handling large portions of the negotiations, rather than addressing the
problems with information flow.
In the time between the Dallas Jamboree and the meeting at Watergate in August 1992,
considered the tail end of the negotiations, several advances were made in the agreement.
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Mexico changed its stance on the Automotive Decrees.69 Traditionally, Mexico’s Automotive
Decrees placed an emphasis on protecting its domestic manufacturing capacity, but Mexico
shifted to a more open market approach during the NAFTA negotiations (Brid 1996). Mexico
argued, in textiles, that it was better for the United States to lose jobs to Mexico – a country that
imported various U.S. goods – than to Asia (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). The United States
acquiesced and agreed to drop quotas as long as products were 100 percent made in North
America. The Dunkel Text was imported from the Uruguay Round and constituted 95 percent of
the agreement reached on intellectual property rights, reflecting many similarities to the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights negotiated at the end of the
Uruguay Round.70 Transportation was the one section where Mexico received a major U.S.
concession – a generous phase-in schedule. The United States stopped pushing for bank
branching in Mexico’s financial sector, primarily because it seemed impossible considering the
safeguards in place against it.71 Mexico also agreed to extend Chapter Nineteen on dispute
settlement and anti-product dumping72 to cover Mexico. While Mexico and the United States
battled it out, Canada negotiators were able to remain relatively stubborn given their ability to
revert back to the CUFTA if NAFTA were to fail, whereas Mexico lacked a viable alternative
(Blears 1993).73
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On August 2, 1992, the three parties met at the Watergate complex for a seventh and
expected final round of negotiations (Bradsher 1992). By this time, the Americans were getting
anxious given the approaching U.S. presidential election, and this impatience would undermine
some of its bargaining power (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). However, the Mexicans did not want
to risk the possibility of no deal. For example, according to U.S. negotiators, the Mexicans gave
in drastically on liberalization of financial services, while the United States barely changed its
position. Canada, instead of Mexico, used the impending presidential election against the United
States, but Canada’s intransigence almost led to the end of NAFTA. The severity of this
stalemate was reflected in the fact that it was not made public in North America, fearing a major
loss in support for NAFTA.74 Eventually, the countries reached a compromise, and the
negotiations continued. In the end, Mexico opened up PEMEX for privatization but retained the
right to screen foreign investment, and Canada would win its stance on culture.75 On August 12,
1992, a final agreement was reached.76 Five days later, the legal text was completed. Once the
deal was finalized, a strong division was visible in the United States between business groups in
favor and unions opposing it (Mayer 1998).
With the U.S. presidential election approaching, support and opposition for NAFTA were
fairly evenly split (Molyneux 1994). The political polls were threatening the likelihood of
NAFTA’s success, with Bush well behind Clinton in the polls.77 Salinas’s endorsement of Bush
incensed many Democrats (Mayer 1998). Some Democrats, including presidential candidate Bill
Clinton, retaliated by criticizing NAFTA with a specific focus on labor and environmental issues
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which became a driving force in his campaign apparent in his speeches.78 However, Clinton did
not abandon NAFTA, rather he proposed a different kind of NAFTA (Lavin 1993). Clinton was
able to give an endorsement of NAFTA while suggesting amendments that would please his
working-class constituency, which helped strengthen his appeal in the polls. However, Clinton
had to resell NAFTA as a high wage policy rather than a low wage one (Mayer 1998).
After Clinton won the presidential election, relations between the three NAFTA parties
grew sour.79 The day after the election, Salinas called Clinton to urge him to ratify NAFTA
without any renegotiations (Cameron and Tomlin 2000).80 Salinas also wanted to assuage
investors’ fears of NAFTA coming to fruition.81 Later, Salinas informed Clinton that delays in
the ratification of NAFTA would likely weaken the Mexican economy, creating political
instability – something no U.S. president wanted.82 Salinas was clearly aware of the Chiapas
guerilla activities at this time and sought to maintain political stability by securing NAFTA.83
When it became clear that side agreements were inevitable, Mexico articulated its desire for the
weakest possible side-agreements (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). As side negotiations began,
Richard Gephardt publicly uncovered a fund called the AmeriMex Maquiladora Fund L.P. that
received funding from a Mexican development bank, Nafinsa, and was dedicated to luring U.S.
companies to relocate to Mexico (Bradsher 1993a). Of course, this confirmed the fears of labor
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groups in the United States opposed to NAFTA. Mexico quickly responded by removing
Nafinsa from the fund (Golden 1993a).

NAFTA Side Agreements on Labor and the Environment
All three NAFTA countries realized that Bill Clinton’s election consequently led to
inevitable NAFTA supplemental agreements, or risked not passing Congress (von Bertrab 1997;
Mayer 1998). As stated, Clinton campaigned on a platform that was appealing to both labor and
environmental groups, even claiming that NAFTA needed side agreements (Lavin 1993).
Although it proved to be an effective political strategy, it also made the passing of NAFTA more
difficult than it likely would have been if there was no election, or if Clinton campaigned
differently.84 Von Bertrab (1997) observed that the Mexican negotiating team feared a Clinton
presidency initially. However, to facilitate a swift ratification of NAFTA, von Bertrab’s
negotiation team made several connections with both political parties and was quite prepared to
work with the Democrats, even though most of the opposition was within that party. Although
Clinton supported NAFTA, he had to maintain an image that was critical to keep his working
class constituency who voted for him. Thus, a secret meeting was arranged for Salinas and
Clinton to discuss NAFTA prior to the inauguration where Clinton reassured the worried
Mexicans that NAFTA would be passed (Jouzaitis 1993).
The official NAFTA supplemental agreements negotiation process began on March 17,
1993 (Gerstenzang 1993b). Two supplemental agreements were under negotiation covering
labor and the environment: (1) the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)
and (2) the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC). Initially, the
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United States wanted authority to overrule domestic sovereignty in Mexico, but Mexico refused
to relinquish the power, knowing that it could damage its image in the eyes of foreign investors
who saw Mexico as appealing for its weaker enforcement of labor and environmental standards
(Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Delaying ratification was dangerous for Mexico that felt its
economy depended on the agreement,85 and holding up ratification meant more time for critics to
gather information against NAFTA. However, NAFTA supporters needed to placate both the
labor and environmental special interests to ensure that the supplemental agreements did not go
too far and thwart business interests.86

Labor Agreement (NAALC)
The Clinton administration doggedly sought the NAALC agreement in 1993 to appease
U.S.-based political pressure for extending labor rights (Dombois, Hornberger, and Winter
2003). Both side agreements were initially one-sided due to their origins in internal U.S.
politics. The Mexican and Canadian governments reluctantly accepted NAALC to save the
original NAFTA agreement. Mexico stubbornly tried to maintain sovereignty over labor
relations (Mayer 1998). Essentially, the NAALC upheld “labor principles” within extant
domestic labor laws with no intention of replacing them with supranational legal standards, and
there was no attempt at harmonizing labor standards. Other than appeasing critics, a main
objective of the NAALC was to allow U.S. monitoring and modifying of Mexican labor practices
(Dombois et al. 2003). Thus, conflict resolution was at the heart of this agreement. Complaint
procedures detailed measures to be taken against a government accused of failing to uphold the
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“labor principles.” Disappointing critics, sanctions for some of the most severe infringements of
fundamental labor rights such as collective rights (e.g., freedom of association and organization),
the right to collective bargaining, and the right to strike were oftentimes the weakest sanctions.
The harshest punishments for these violations would include bilateral ministerial consultations.
An Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) could be used for other violations such as forced
labor, discrimination, unequal pay between men and women, lack of protections for migrant
workers, and failure to compensate injured or sick workers. Yet, the ECE was built around the
concept of cooperation, and any resolution must satisfy all three countries. The NAALC only
maintained a strong commitment to the prohibition of child labor, protection of health and safety,
and minimum wage. Thus, violations of these principles were the only violations punishable by
fines and suspension of NAFTA trade advantages.87
Mexico was unwilling to harmonize its labor standards and thus agreed to labor standards
as suggestions rather than obligations (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Due to Mexico’s corporatist
history, Mexican unions were not in favor of workers’ rights as they thought it would
compromise their corporatist bargaining. A staunch anti-NAFTA stance taken by most U.S.
unions cost them the ability to negotiate better side deals, while Mexican unions were
considerably weaker given their position deeply embedded in the PRI and with the interests of
business elites (Mayer 1998). In the end, Mexico accepted trade sanctions, against their original
stance, as long as they did not cover industrial relations. Mexico realized that the United States
was facing more pressure to wrap the deal up and used this to its advantage. Mexicans were
happy with the weakness of the labor accord, but the environmental agreement was stronger than
they originally anticipated.
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Environmental Agreement (NAAEC)
Although environmentalist groups from the United States and Canada influenced NAFTA
to some degree, little momentum was gained by the grass-roots environmental movement in
Mexico (Hogenboom 1998). Interestingly, U.S. environmental NGOs (ENGO) barely ever
collaborated with Mexican ENGOs and established few contacts (Barkin and Mumme 1992), but
Mexican ENGOs were able to receive help from Canadian ENGOs somewhat indirectly. Two
major factions arose among the ENGOs (Hogenboom 1998; Hufbauer and Schott 2005). One
group consisted of the moderate ENGOs including the National Wildlife Federation and World
Wildlife Fund (WWF) that were most influential on altering the NAFTA deal.88 However, this
group accepted large sums of money from pro-NAFTA companies. For instance, Eastman
Kodak, an integral corporation to the pro-NAFTA business lobby (more on this in the following
section), donated $2.5 million to WWF.89 U.S. ENGOs also maintained positive relations with
Salinas and his cabinet and had provisional agreements to extend projects in Mexico
(Hogenboom 1998).90
On the other side, a group of critical ENGOs was primarily ostracized from the NAFTA
debates due to its questioning of basic free trade elements. Key among these critical ENGOs
was Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen, Friends of the Earth, and the Sierra Club who joined forces to
bring a case to the U.S. District Court which ruled that the Bush administration violated the
Administrators Procedures Act (Cameron and Tomlin 2000).91 This ruling raised the political
stakes of any Clinton decision on NAFTA, but still did not incorporate these groups in any
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meaningful way into the environmental side deal negotiation process. After a messy court battle,
the U.S. Supreme Court freed the government to pursue NAFTA escaping a potential end to the
negotiations.
Pro-NAFTA interests argued that NAFTA would bring prosperity and in turn improve the
environment (World Bank 1992; Hogenboom 1998). The United States even praised Mexico’s
environmental policy as on par with that in the United States (EPA 1991). Although true on
paper, this commendation neglects Mexico’s enforcement history (Hogenboom 1998). Mexico’s
Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology conducted an environmental impact study to assess
the likely effects of NAFTA, but it was never revised or released. In a confidential interview
with Hogenboom (1998), a Mexican insider in the environment debate stated that the evidence
was too damaging to a pro-NAFTA argument based on the results of the data collected.
Contrarily, NAFTA proponents consistently cited one study by Grossman and Krueger (1991) to
assuage environmental critics of NAFTA. Yet, many of these proponents cherry-picked the
same section of the report without mentioning its negative findings, and later studies came to
different conclusions (Molina 1993). The U.S.-Mexico border proved to be a difficult issue for
the pro-NAFTA side to address. They seemingly made a paradoxical argument, first admitting
that the environmental border situation was in part due to the rapid growth of the maquiladora
sector, and then suggesting the solution was more growth (Hogenboom 1998).
The office of the U.S. Trade Representative (1992) released the Environmental Review
that concluded NAFTA would not lead to more environmental degradation compared to a noNAFTA scenario. However, most environmental organizations dismissed this report as being
grossly inaccurate (Barry and Sims 1994; Hogenboom 1998). In response, environmentalists
listed minimal necessary safeguards that gained support by members of the U.S. Congress such
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as not treating environmental regulation as violations of trade barriers, ensuring future economic
development and growth was sustainable, and a review process should continue to monitor
NAFTA’s impact (Shrybman 1993), but these were not reflected in NAFTA’s provisions
(Houseman and Orbuch 1993; Hogenboom 1998).
When the environmental impact debate was rekindled during the side agreements,
environmental groups sought several concessions, but all were again not addressed in the final
side agreement.92 Hogenboom (1998) concludes that the transnational NAFTA environment
debate positively impacted Mexico’s environmental policy by bringing industrial compliance in
line with environmental legislation, but changed little in the way of Mexico’s enforcement, thus
serious issues persisted.93 Even with major increases in inspection staff, several companies were
left uninspected. The inspection staff was underpaid creating prime conditions for corruption.
On top of all this, most inspectors either had not received training or were ill-equipped to do their
jobs. Ultimately, the NAFTA process itself and the United States greatly influenced the focus of
the debates. The grass-roots environmental groups’ political clout was coopted by mainstream
environmental groups that successfully influenced the environmental discussion to address some
of their concerns, which provided political cover for the Bush and Clinton administrations
(Mayer 1998).94
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NAFTA Goals
With the final NAFTA text comprising around 2,000 pages including the side
agreements, appendices, and footnotes, the actual aim of NAFTA can be obfuscated and lost in a
sea of legal jargon. Thus, the major goals NAFTA was designed to achieve can be difficult to
ascertain. Beyond the obvious objective of reducing trade barriers and extending economic
markets, several other goals are most often attributed to NAFTA by its commentators, and have
been alluded to throughout this and the previous chapter. First, similar to extending markets,
NAFTA was designed to deeply integrate the North American economies. According to
Galbraith (1993), NAFTA deepened integration with the U.S. economy incentivizing the United
States to help with any future economic crisis experienced by Mexico (as was the case in 1995).
Such integration was also viewed as positive for Mexico since NAFTA allowed Mexico to
diversify its exports instead of relying on a few major products such as automobiles. The goal of
integration aligns well with the TCC’s desire to create a global economic marketplace.
Beyond integrating North American economies, the majority of NAFTA critics and
proponents listed two primary goals of NAFTA. One of the cornerstones of NAFTA was to
solidify the unilateral neoliberal economic restructuring already underway in Mexico (Shane
1992; Bognano and Ready 1993; Dent 1994; Grinspun and Cameron 1996). NAFTA made the
economic policies in Mexico much harder for future administrations to change since they would
have to go through an extensive process to remove themselves from NAFTA which was a
formalized treaty, not a less formal convention. However, using NAFTA to solidify neoliberal
economic changes in Mexico was a tactic often seen as a means of achieving what many experts
agreed was the most important premise of NAFTA. Most scholars of NAFTA, on both sides of
the debate, tend to agree that its central purpose was to secure foreign investment (Shane 1992;
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Galbraith 1993; Kim 1995; Young 1995; MacArthur 2000; Golob 2003; Fairbrother 2007).
From the Mexican perspective, NAFTA was an instrument to attract much needed investors for
its debt-ridden economy. Relatedly, from a U.S. perspective, NAFTA needed to also provide
secure investment opportunities by making the Mexican economy more attractive and reassuring
an open market for the future. Many investors grew more confident investing in Mexico because
NAFTA offered some assurances that Mexico was committed to neoliberal economic policies,
and government expropriation of private property was a thing of the past. According to
Galbraith (1993), for Mexico, NAFTA had very little to do with free trade and was more about
macroeconomic stabilization.
To reiterate the major forces behind NAFTA from Salinas’s perspective, Shane (1992)
argues that Salinas decided to reverse the traditional Mexican economic policies for several
reasons. First, the debt crisis in 1982 was caused by cheap credit throughout the 1960s and
1970s and the shocking fourfold increase in petroleum prices in 1973-1974. Mexico perceived
oil prices would continue to increase, and thus proceeded to borrow based these expectations, but
the future oil profits never materialized. Second, theoretically, economic policy reform predicted
improvements in efficiency and increases in economic growth rates. This ideology was heavily
influenced by the Mexican technocrats’ educational background in economics, thus neoliberal
economic philosophy dominated at the time within a TCC groupthink. Third, NAFTA did not
drastically change economic policy since many of the reforms were already in place. However,
it did attempt to increase investment flow into Mexico, specifically satisfying the United States
that was responsible for 65 percent of Mexican foreign direct investment. Mexico’s joining of
GATT set a maximum bond tariff limit of 50 percent, and began the elimination of all licenses
on imports (only 2 percent of imported items required licenses by 1990), and removed
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restrictions on foreign exchange. Raising direct investment became the favored form of
financing any deficits over government borrowing. Overall, the economic reforms gearing up for
NAFTA shifted the Mexican economy from state-controlled to competitive and privately
operated (including banks that were trending towards complete privatization), and drastically
decreased support for public enterprises. Fourth, the signing of NAFTA was a political strategy
to further solidify the neoliberal policy reforms sweeping Mexico making them more difficult for
future administrations to remove. Salinas understood that he could remain in office only 6 years,
but NAFTA could be used as a political maneuver to cement his economic ideology within the
Mexican state and private sector. In the following sections, the process by which members of the
TCC, primarily political elites and business leaders, created NAFTA with the purpose of
solidifying neoliberal economics and creating profitable opportunities for investment will be
detailed.

Selling NAFTA
Mexico’s Sales Job
Once the NAFTA supplemental agreements were signed on September 14, 1993, the only
step left was ratification which would require a majority vote from the U.S. Congress that would
simply be voting yes or no on the final text due to the fast-track process.95 After the U.S.
presidential election complicated negotiations, the Mexicans felt they had to hurry to ratify
NAFTA before the Mexican elections (von Bertrab 1997). Then, complicating NAFTA’s
success further, at the last minute, Gephardt, as suspected, opposed NAFTA even with the side
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agreements.96 Congressional, as well as public opposition, arose in response to the final NAFTA
text making the prospective job of selling NAFTA challenging. Since there were more members
of Congress against NAFTA than for it, according to von Bertrab’s team count, it was an uphill
battle to convince members to change their votes. Some members, like Representative Jim
Cooper, were quite easy to convince, only requiring keeping their votes a secret to protect them
from their constituencies. In cases such as these, members of Congress wanted to be able to
continue to speak against NAFTA to appeal to their constituencies if the ratification was
unsuccessful. To understand von Bertrab (1997:104) and the Mexican negotiators’ approach for
selling NAFTA surreptitiously, one must understand their lack of faith in the citizenry,
seemingly favoring a form of republic or aristocracy over democracy:
The welfare of the people is not always clear to the man in the street who cares about his
daily concerns without having to have an informed opinion about every happening in the
country. That is why professional politicians exist as managers for the public interest.
People are the stockholders, but stockholders cannot be asked about every detail in the
administration of a firm. Those decisions should be left to the managers, who will be
judged by their constituents – the stockholders – on the results of management’s
decisions. It thus seemed to me a perversion of democracy to have a government run by
opinion polls.
The subsequent Mexican lobbying campaign was run by Von Bertrab’s team to sell
NAFTA ratification to the U.S. Congress. It was an extraordinary lobbying campaign conducted
by a foreign government in the United States (Gerstenzang 1993a). A clear coalition formed
between the Mexican government and prominent businesses that together unprecedentedly spent
over $30 million lobbying in Washington to promote the enactment of NAFTA which, at the
time, was considered “the most expensive, elaborate campaign ever conducted in the United
States by a foreign government” (Baldwin et al. 1993:1).97 Salinas was personally involved in
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heavily influencing U.S. government officials and business leaders (Cameron and Tomlin 2000).
Opposition also arose and a war of information began. U.S. and Mexican citizens banded
together in response to organize a public forum comprised of both U.S. and Mexican elected
representatives. In response, Mexican government officials and the U.S. ambassador to Mexico,
John D. Negroponte, moved quickly to block the forum, understanding that such a forum would
bring widespread attention to NAFTA and the reality that support for NAFTA was less than
unanimous (Pei-Tsu 1991). Salinas contributed to the media campaigns by praising supporters
of NAFTA and vilifying the opponents. Herminio Blanco exerted great effort to thwart Mexican
Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC) trips to Washington for participation in NAFTA
congressional briefings (Heredia 1994).98 The RMALC was a citizen network organization that
was in favor of economic integration in North America, but wanted to see citizen networks also
integrated simultaneously to ensure democratic decision-making. They opposed NAFTA (in its
finalized form) viewing it as a neoliberal strategy to suppress wage and labor rights in order to
gain an international corporate advantage.

Mobilizing Business Support
A small number of large, international firms took over the Mexican economy in the
1980s and stood to benefit greatly from market liberalization (Dominquez 1995). Using the
precedent of the PSE, the Mexican government sought the help of the elite business
community—expected to gain the most from free trade—to sell NAFTA to the public and other
small- and medium-sized businesses. Salinas’s decision to negotiate free trade with the United
States was likely influenced by big business, but the Mexican business community did not really
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mobilize for free trade until after the decision for free trade had been made (del Castillo 1995;
Fairbrother 2007). Large Mexican businesses did not strongly support North American free
trade nor actively oppose it, but it was, for the most part, unified in support of the idea.
Although Mexico’s government was ostensibly autocratic, gaining the support of the business
world was essential for smoothly negotiating free trade. Large corporatist organizations coopted
the smaller independent unions and peasant groups critical of NAFTA, effectively silencing their
opposition. As noted earlier, Salinas and his administration also effectively quieted rural
opposition, by an antipoverty and community development program that provided benefits as a
quid pro quo for loyalty to the ruling party.
Fairbrother (2007) identifies three mechanisms by which the Mexican state mobilized
support from the private sector, despite the concerns over neoliberal policies. First, the state
effectively gave voice to only supporters of NAFTA while muting critics via senate hearings,
advisory councils, and the Business Coordinating Council for Foreign Trade (COECE).99 Such
influence over the NAFTA debate created an illusion where even small businesses, at least
publicly, appeared largely in favor of NAFTA. With Salinas controlling the PRI, and the PRI
controlling the senate, all official senate hearings not only voiced support, but provided a veneer
of openness and dialog that provided NAFTA with democratic legitimacy. The official Advisory
Council allowed the state to present NAFTA as the majority’s will. The council consisted of 24
members primarily comprised of nine private sector representatives with more than half from a
large exclusive business association known as the CEO’s Businessman’s Council. Jaime Serra
headed the council with Herminio Blanco serving on it as well. Another six members came from
leaders in academia (presidents or top administrators). Although three representatives from labor
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and agriculture served on the council, they all came from corporatist associations tied to the PRI,
one of which represented the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM).100
Second, the Mexican government gave concessions and incentives to the business
community for participation in working for the best possible terms as long as they did not oppose
NAFTA in general (Fairbrother 2007).101 Most parties involved often viewed NAFTA as an
unstoppable force, and thus it was better to jump on board rather than try to stop it (Armijo and
Faucher 2002). Third, the Mexican state also incessantly reinforced the logic that NAFTA was
good for all by emphasizing the positives and never mentioning the negatives, which was the
primary strategy used by lobbying campaigns in selling NAFTA.102 The lobbyists emphasized
NAFTA’s potential for increased exports ignoring the likely rise in imports that could be quite
harmful to some industries. Furthermore, they emphasized that Mexico’s “national economic
competitiveness” would strengthen via NAFTA (Fairbrother 2007:286). Overall, Fairbrother
demonstrates how the Mexican state created an ostensibly unanimous level of support for
NAFTA among the business community despite the vocal critics of NAFTA and the state’s own
awareness of possible flaws in the agreement.

“Unanimous” Business Support
The role of the COECE was essential for creating the illusionary consensus on free trade
(Alba and Vega 2002). Ironically, the CCE, an organization constructed to represent large
corporations, created COECE to represent the entire business community including medium and
small businesses (Thacker 1999). COECE assigned Juan Gallardo Thurlow, business leader of
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Grupo Guepec that was affiliated with PepsiCo, to head delegate. COECE’s main
representatives were actively involved in the NAFTA negotiations. However, its structure
further cemented the interests of major businesses such as Nestle, Volkswagen, Ford, and
Chrysler. COECE had six sectoral divisions—finance, insurance, commerce and services,
industry, agriculture, and banking—to represent a diversity of interests, but three of the six were
finance oriented. In addition, the head of each sector was appointed by COECE business
organization leaders.103
The sectoral arrangements shifted to a more thematic organization in 1991, leading the
COECE to mirror these divisions by creating 17 unique negotiation groups (Thacker 1999; Alba
and Vega 2002). This restructuring consolidated power further in favor of big business with
two-thirds of the negotiators being new, and almost exclusively from large companies. To
participate in the negotiations, COECE required that the businessperson read English and
comprehend sophisticated economic issues, but most importantly was that they had the time to
participate. Larger firms had departments dedicated to international economic trade issues, while
smaller business leaders were involved in day-to-day activities. Also, COECE representatives
were volunteers and needed to foot the entire bill during negotiations. Large businesses joined
COECE to lobby for their interests to be represented in NAFTA, traveling with state negotiators
during negotiations. Small businesses could not afford the travel expenses (Fairbrother 2007).
COECE provided skilled and knowledgeable negotiators, as they had a stake in the outcome of
the NAFTA negotiations, and were at the side of government negotiators throughout the process
(Thacker 1999). As expected, the predicted losers of NAFTA, such as small businesses, smallscale agricultural producers, and common workers, were not represented in the negotiation
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process.104 In interviews with Thacker, business leaders and individuals from business
organizations explained that if they did not accept the basic premise of NAFTA, they were not
allowed to participate in the negotiations.
CANACINTRA was virtually the only organization that represented small and medium
business interests. Initially, CANACINTRA vehemently opposed NAFTA, but later reversed its
opinions of NAFTA fearing too much to lose by taking on the state (Poitras and Robinson 1994;
Shadlen 2000). Critics of CANACINTRA viewed it as being a tool used by the government to
manipulate perceived acceptance of NAFTA by the business community (Thacker 1999). Small
business owners were probably only represented if they were in favor of accessing U.S. markets.
Fairbrother (2007) lists three reasons why CANACINTRA likely refrained from mounting
serious public criticism against NAFTA. First, CANACINTRA leaders were content with
maintaining their political influence in the PRI and did not desire to become confrontational with
its members. Second, many CANACINTRA members relied on some form of state aid, such as
economic protections and subsidies, and did not want to risk this support being discontinued.
Third, much of the CANACINTRA membership was determined by a compulsory membership
rule for small industry. Thus, any confrontation could result in a rewriting of the law weakening
CANACINTRA further. However, much of the advantages CANACINTRA did not want to lose
also reflect their corporatist composition and dependent relationship with the PRI-controlled
state. In turn, CANACINTRA’s dependence shaped its support for NAFTA rather than any
strong belief in free trade.
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Von Bertrab’s Negotiation Team’s Campaign and Deep Connections
Von Bertrab’s (1997) team was responsible for several strategies to sell NAFTA beyond
the massive media campaign that helped NAFTA fast-track to successfully pass. Early on, Von
Bertrab knew that Mexico needed Americans to sell NAFTA to U.S. citizens, and they hired a
minimum of 33 former U.S. state officials with wide-ranging ties to the federal government
including Congress, the White House, the State Department, and the Treasury to achieve this
goal (Baldwin et al. 1993). Mexican business, specifically COECE, was also heavily involved,
flying at least “three members of Congress, a governor, and 48 congressional staffers on a dozen
‘fact-finding’ trips to Mexico” for “educational” purposes (Baldwin et al. 1993:17, 26). The
U.S. Senate approved these trips without releasing participants’ names until a financial
disclosure was made available just before ratification.105 SECOFI provided most of the funding
for the NAFTA campaign, and had several resourceful firms on its payroll including Shearman
and Sterling, TKC International, Walker/Free Associates, Gold and Liebengood, BursonMarsteller, Manchester Trade, the Brock Group, Public Strategies, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen &
Hamilton, and Fleishman-Hillard, to name a few.
Von Bertrab’s (1997) team also felt that an initiative to garner U.S. business and citizen
support was the missing component to sell NAFTA, but again, the Mexicans thought that any
such initiative supported by a Mexican-affiliated group would be suspect. Thus, it sought the
help of corporate supporters of NAFTA to influence U.S. citizens. The USA*NAFTA coalition
(subject of the next section) spearheaded this endeavor with other corporations such as Dow
Chemical Company, Bechtel, and General Electric. Over the course of the NAFTA negotiations,
Von Bertrab met with nearly all chief lobbyists on Capitol Hill on a weekly basis, establishing
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deep connections with members of the TCC (Baldwin et al. 1993). Ildefonso Guajardo, a
member of Von Bertrab’s team, associated regularly with Gail Harrison of the Wexler Group,
who was a prominent executive in the USA*NAFTA coalition representing nearly all U.S.
corporate interests, and Sandra Masur, Director of International Trade Policy at Eastman Kodak.
Eastman Kodak, operating throughout North America, was a member of USA*NAFTA, and
contributed to the corporate movement promoting NAFTA. Other members of Von Bertrab’s
team had important tasks as well: Felix Agular regularly updated a database tracking individual
members of the U.S. Congress and where they stood on NAFTA; Luis de la Calle ran the
“Hispanic outreach” program and worked with Burson-Marsteller to organize meetings between
Mexican government officials and U.S. businessmen to discuss the economic changes in Mexico;
Raul Urteaga served as a liaison with U.S. environmental groups; and Rodolpho Balmaceda
helped facilitate the interactions between Mexican government officials and U.S business
interests (Baldwin et al. 1993:19).
Von Bertrab (1997) observed that his team was acting more fairly and democratically
than the opposition, while subsequently saying that they tried to avoid raising public interest in
NAFTA because they thought the public had no interest in the NAFTA debate, although he
admitted they were wrong about there being no citizen interest. Despite these claims, Von
Bertrab and his team went to great lengths to control the image of Mexico and NAFTA. Under
his direction, Burson-Marsteller was involved in “a speakers’ bureau, media monitoring,
grassroots outreach and public education, position papers, fact sheets, speeches and press
releases” all with the purpose of creating a positive outlook on NAFTA and Mexico among U.S.
citizens (Baldwin et al. 1993:21). For their efforts, Burson-Marsteller received $5.4 million from
SECOFI. The Brock Group provided strategic counseling to Burson-Marsteller, and Bill Brock

204
was personally involved in conversations with Mexican officials about a free trade agreement
since 1982. He actively pressured major NAFTA players to aggressively pursue a free trade
deal. Von Bertrab’s team also hired prominent lobbyists that extensively solicited all 115 new
members of Congress who were elected in 1992 to vote yes on NAFTA. Among these lobbyists
were Joe O’Neill, president of Public Strategies and former administrative assistant to Senator
and Treasury Executive Lloyd Bentsen,106 Charls Walker and Phil Potter from Walker/Free
Associates, both of whom formerly held principal positions in the Treasury Department, Howard
Liebengood, former Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, and Marin Gold, former U.S. government
official.107 Charls Walker, like many of those involved in the sale of NAFTA, was a wellknown lobbyist with major corporate clients such as Anheuser-Busch, AT&T, CBS Records,
Columbia Pictures, Mitsubishi, and CSX Corporation. With all the political power players on
Mexico’s payroll, critics argued that it looked like Mexico was “trying to buy the treaty.”108
As mentioned, von Bertrab (1997), through Salinas, had deep connections with Bush, but
they also hedged their bets by establishing relationships with Clinton prior to the 1992 election.
In addition, several of the lobbyists hired by the Mexicans were deeply embedded in the Clinton
administration (Baldwin et al. 1993). Joe O’Neill, for instance, worked for Lloyd Bensten who
served as Clinton’s Treasury Secretary. Gabriel Guerra-Mondragon was deeply entrenched in
both countries beginning as U.S. Ambassador to Mexico in the 1980s, and then working for the
Mexicans in his firm, Guerra and Associates, while also serving as an advisor to Clinton on
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national security issues. Charlene Barshefsky became Deputy U.S. Trade Representative despite
a history of representing transnational corporations (TNCs) throughout North America and
Japan, with some specific clients including COECE and the Canadian Wheat Board.
In addition to the Mexicans’ awareness that they needed Americans to help sell NAFTA,
they also realized that rallying the Hispanic vote in the United States would be helpful. The
strategy to build a constituency of Hispanic Americans mentioned earlier continued beyond the
fast-track stage, but generally failed to win the Hispanic vote in favor of NAFTA. Von Bertrab’s
(1997) team focused on members of Congress with large Hispanic constituencies, gave talks at
their meetings, and tried to connect with Hispanic community leaders. Despite various attempts
to capture the Hispanic vote, a majority of Hispanics did not view NAFTA favorably. Even a
“substantial minority” of Hispanic representatives voted against NAFTA (von Bertrab
1997:123). Von Bertrab mostly blames ignorance for why, not just Hispanics, but the opposition
in general did not support NAFTA. He is probably right about some U.S. stereotypes of
Mexicans as “bandidos,” but he clearly did not believe that NAFTA would have unequal effects.
For instance, he states, “[C]ertainly we were not fighting for an economic model that would
grant more opportunities to rich Mexicans at the expense of the underprivileged” (von Bertrab
1997:124).
Another strategy von Bertrab (1997) and his team used to galvanize support for NAFTA
was the recruitment of past presidents to endorse NAFTA. Former Presidents Gerald Ford,
Jimmy Carter, and George H.W. Bush came together to demonstrate bipartisan support for the
trade deal as Bill Clinton signed the side deals on Sept. 14, 1993 (Mayer 1998; Cameron and
Tomlin 2000).109 Each of them spoke in favor of NAFTA, while trying to placate the fears of the
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opposition. The Mexicans hoped such an event would demonstrate the overwhelming political
consensus surrounding NAFTA. Former presidents Carter and Bush went further to actively
campaign for NAFTA calling in favors from members of Congress (Mayer 1998).

USA*NAFTA Coalition and the U.S. Campaign
As mentioned, more than anything else, NAFTA was a policy sought by the Mexicans to
primarily secure foreign investment.110 U.S. corporations would be interested in Mexican
investment only if the Mexican government could guarantee likely returns and minimize risks.
Therefore, U.S. corporations were not completely satisfied with the Salinas/de la Madrid
neoliberal reforms because there was no guarantee that the next administration would not raise
tariffs, use expropriation strategies, create inflation, or engage in national populism. NAFTA
solidified the unilateral reforms taken by the Salinas/de la Madrid administrations making it
much more difficult for future administrations to overturn them, and fostering the confidence of
U.S. corporations in the process. The U.S. business community, and President Bush, an oil man
himself, had not forgotten President Lázaro Cárdenas expropriation of U.S. oil interests in 1938.
Jorge Castaneda accurately described NAFTA as an investment opportunity for U.S.
corporations that would lock in low wage rates, and establish cash flows for a “nervous
oligarchy” (MacArthur 2000:133).
Much like the Mexican government, corporations were sending large sums of money to
both the Republicans and Democrats during the 1992 U.S. presidential election.111
Unquestionably, NAFTA was important to them and they wanted to hedge their bets. Also, the
Democrats under Clinton were very capable of pitching to business interests while
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simultaneously upholding a pro-labor image. The Clinton administration went to great lengths to
establish relationships with Republicans and the Business Roundtable (MacArthur 2000). For
example, the White House gave its polling data on who would make the best spokesperson for
selling NAFTA directly to USA*NAFTA. Such an act is noteworthy since the Fortune 500 is a
staunch Republican entity and widely represented in the Business Roundtable, and thus
USA*NAFTA. In effect, the Democratic National Committee dedicated its funds to promoting
NAFTA which was largely opposed by labor organizations that are major contributors to the
Democratic Party.112
Although Mexican interests behind NAFTA were substantial, the largest player from the
corporate world during NAFTA was the massive business coalition, USA*NAFTA. Mexico,
and von Bertrab (1997) specifically, played an integral role in establishing the groundwork for
the U.S. business coalition. Bill Daley, head of Bill Clinton’s Illinois campaign, also worked to
achieve the support of the private sector (Behr 1993b). The USA*NAFTA coalition was formally
created in New York on October 9, 1992. Among the attendees of the meeting in which this
coalition was formed were President Salinas and staff members, the Business Roundtable, and
several business leaders from both the United States and Mexico, specifically key representatives
of USA*NAFTA, Kay R. Whitmore (chairman of Eastman Kodak and chair of the Business
Roundtable) and James D. Robinson of American Express and former chairman of the Business
Roundtable’s task force on trade (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). When crunch time approached at
the height of the NAFTA negotiations, the USA*NAFTA coalition represented a staggering
2,300 corporations and lobbies. U.S. TNCs operating in Mexico comprised a significant portion
of the USA*NAFTA coalition (Hogenboom 1998).
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Their lobbying campaign to sell NAFTA was a sophisticated multi-clustered approach
where groups of corporations were assigned specific states and jurisdictions (Levy and Bruhn
2006). These groups or corporations would then be responsible for convincing their local
citizens and representatives of the benefits of NAFTA. In Illinois, Daley’s state, for example,
Caterpillar, John Deere, the Illinois Farm Bureau, and the Illinois Retail Merchants Association
along with others formed an Illinois “NAFTA Coalition.”113 Several large corporations covered
multiple states–AT&T had seven, IBM had five, and General Electric dealt with the New
England states. Von Bertrab (1997) explained that 35 captains orchestrated these campaigns, of
which 34 came from Fortune 500 companies.

Secret Meeting at Allied Signal
On September 14, 1993, the very same day the NAFTA supplemental agreements were
signed, a secret meeting attended by both business and Washington lobbyists, along with three
officials from the Clinton administration, was held at the Allied Signal Corporation in
Washington, D.C. to discuss the bleak prospects of NAFTA ratification (MacArthur 2000;
Roman and Arregui 2015). In other words, the pro-NAFTA interests devised a plan to alter the
course of NAFTA through a major lobbying campaign headed by USA*NAFTA at this
meeting.114 Clinton’s staff in attendance included Mickey Kantor, Clinton’s presidential
campaign chair and later U.S. trade representative, Rahm Emanuel, Clinton White House aide
and later Barack Obama’s chief of staff, and William Daley, son of longtime mayor of Chicago,
Ricard Daley. Various members of USA*NAFTA or attendees at their meetings paralleled
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members of the TCC with widespread connections across North America in business and
politics, specifically a strong interweaving of U.S. and Mexican interests: President Salinas
himself; Jim Jones, chairman of the New York Stock Exchange at that time who later served as
U.S. Ambassador to Mexico from 1993 to 1997; Rodman Rockefeller, head of the Mexico-U.S.
Business Committee (MEXUS) which is the oldest binational private sector business
organization with a focus on economic, commercial, and political relations in North America;
Juan Gallardo Thurlow, mentioned earlier, head delegate of COECE, business leader of Grupo
Guepec, PepsiCo affiliate, and later Mexican co-chair of MEXUS from 1990 to 1993; and Jerry
Jaznowski, President of the National Association of Manufacturers in the United States to name
a few (Roman and Arregui 2015).
Before serious lobbying efforts could begin, the goal coming out of the meeting was to
assemble an elite lobbying team that would, in Nick Calio’s (Bush’s congressional liaison)
words:
[Bring] together a group of us who had been in the political process for a long time and
had various jobs who knew people very, very well on a personal level, and who could
talk on that level, and by happenstance, people who had probably raised an awful lot of
money for a lot of members and who were part of their political life-support system, so to
speak (MacArthur 2000:172).
Calio encouraged members of the Business Roundtable to get their best guys to the meeting at
Allied Signal Corporation.

USA*NAFTA Gets Serious
The pro-business lobbying campaign did not have many supporters or strength early on,
which was part of House Majority Whip and later Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich’s,
concern. He told business to get serious or risk losing NAFTA (Austen 1993; MacArthur 2000).
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Three reasons existed as to why NAFTA was in danger and needed the efforts of USA*NAFTA
to succeed. First, NAFTA was so obviously advantageous for business that no one really went to
them to ask for support, it was expected. The other two reasons involved the side agreements.
Much of the business community was waiting to see what came of the side agreements before
they moved one way or the other (Bradsher 1993c). If nothing serious was threatened, there
would be no reason for intervention. Lastly, and most importantly, no one really expected the
labor and environmental interest groups to gain as much momentum as they did to actually
challenge the Washington system (MacArthur 2000).
The business community waited on true commitment from the Clinton administration
before fully backing a campaign to save NAFTA (Mayer 1998).115 Through secret
correspondence, the conclusion was that domestic forces were constraining the administration’s
ability to move forward. The strategy was to sway undecided voters in the House and slow and
weaken the oppositional forces outside of Washington. Eventually, the Business Roundtable
committed $5 million for an advertising campaign.116 The media campaign painted NAFTA as
good for American jobs, a solution to environmental, immigration, and drug problems, and as a
choice between “competing or retreating,” “going forward or backward,” “hope and fear,” and
“embracing change” or shying away (Mayer 1998:284). Election-like television campaign
commercials aired, and business reached out to the public through talk shows and newspaper
editorials (Austen 1993). Mainstream environmental groups publicly voiced their support, and
lobbied undecided members of Congress explaining to them the environmental advantages
(Mayer 1998). Above all, the primary goal of the campaign was to create an image that there
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was universal consensus behind NAFTA by amplifying the positives and eliding the negatives.117
Beyond the facts, the story of NAFTA was most important to voters, and the administration’s
campaign was able to alter that story from one of tragedy to national pride.

U.S. NAFTA Advertising Campaign and More “Unanimous” Support
Faced with a vehement opposition, USA*NAFTA knew it needed a campaign for
NAFTA, and it needed a spokesperson for its advertising campaign. Using the polling data
received from the White House, three possible spokespersons arose as top candidates: Bill
Cosby, Lee Iacocca, and Arnold Palmer (MacArthur 2000).118 According to Ken Cole, Allied
Signal’s chief lobbyist who was largely responsible for the USA*NAFTA secret meeting, Lee
Iacocca was the perfect fit for all the right reasons:
He had just done the funding for the Statue of Liberty, a lot of money had been pumped
into his image at Chrysler, he knew international business, he had done business in
Mexico, he was selling cars (MacArthur 2000:202).
Leo Kelmenson, advertiser extraordinaire and chairman of Bozell, Jacobs, Kenyon, & Eckhardt,
also explained to MacArthur (2000:202) that Iacocca represented the perfect balance between
business and labor interests, recalling one time when a couple of workers praised him:
I’ll never forget, after the loan guarantee [for Chrysler] was approved, we were doing a
photo shoot of Iacocca walking out of the plant, and these two big burly guys, one black
guy and one white guy, come running out with tears in their eyes. ‘Mr. Iacocca, I can’t
tell you how much we love you. You saved our lives, our careers, everything we’ve ever
done, by saving this company.’
Interestingly, von Bertrab (1997) actually credits himself with the idea to recruit Lee Iacocca to
sell NAFTA because he thought Iacocca would offset the damage Ross Perot was doing. Either
way, USA*NAFTA solicited Iacocca to be their spokesperson, and the White House
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simultaneously sought him to be both the national NAFTA spokesperson for business and the
Clinton administration.119 Iacocca refused to join until the President contacted him directly, and
assured him that he would not back away from NAFTA if it lost popularity (MacArthur 2000).
When Iacocca was in Italy, Clinton called him at three in the morning, catching him when he
least expected it, and secured Iacocca for the job. Ironically, Iacocca was not a major enthusiast
of free trade, but became the poster boy of NAFTA. In his eponymous best-selling
autobiography, Iacocca (1984) criticized free trade:
When people ask me whether I’m in favor of free trade or protectionism, my response is:
None of the above. I’m opposed to protectionism. I’m opposed to local content
legislation. But the United States is just about the only industrial country left in the
world that doesn’t have an enlightened, modern day trade policy. We’re the only country
in the world that comes close to practicing free trade – and we’re getting
clobbered…Let’s look at what is really going on here. We ship them [Japan] wheat,
corn, soybeans, coal, and timber. And what do they ship us? Cars, trucks, motorcycles,
oil well equipment, and electronics. Question: What do you call a country that exports
raw materials and imports finished goods? Answer: A colony.
Four other major problems still troubled the Allied Signal Corporation in meeting its
goals. First, at that time, few major Democratic players were overly interested in passing
NAFTA (Gephardt and Wessel 1999). Second, and relatedly, Richard Gephardt and his longtime
adviser on trade issues, Michael Wessel, were making a serious effort to derail NAFTA.
Gephardt was holding true to his caveat during NAFTA fast-tracking. Both were not pleased by
the NAFTA side agreements, viewing them as essentially toothless, even weaker than Bush’s
Action Plan. Third, House Republicans, although supportive of NAFTA, did not want to give a
victory to Clinton, but more importantly, they were hesitant because the Business Roundtable
was largely uninvolved, to that point, in promoting NAFTA (MacArthur 2000). Newt Gingrich
gave private lessons on political organizing to the lobbyist team which woke them up to the
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arduous path of passing NAFTA that lay ahead. Fourth, billionaire businessman Ross Perot had
a wide body of supporters who were putting out anti-NAFTA publications.120 Perot’s most
famous contribution was his co-authored book with Pat Choate entitled, Save your Job, Save our
Country (Perot and Choate 1993).
At the outset, USA*NAFTA hired both Democratic and Republican political organizing
firms to create the illusion of widespread political support (MacArthur 2000). The Republican
firm hired a telemarketing company to generate pro-NAFTA letters to be sent to members of
Congress. The Democratic firm ran a “grass tops” campaign that organized high standing
individuals in several voting districts to tell real stories about business (MacArthur 2000:217). A
“grass tops” campaign was all about recruiting people with close relationships with
congressional members to consolidate as much political clout as possible.121 USA*NAFTA used
its enormous wealth to purchase the best advertisers and public relations firms money could
buy.122 Iacocca, as lead salesman, spewed unsubstantiated claims about NAFTA in nationally
aired commercials mostly revolving around its likelihood of creating high-paying jobs.123
Although it is difficult to measure each strategy’s impact on the NAFTA vote, the public
debate between Vice President Al Gore and Ross Perot may have been the major momentum
shifter for the NAFTA proponents.124 Von Bertrab (1997) was well aware of the threat Perot
posed to getting NAFTA through, and was largely in favor of a debate to discredit him. Von
Bertrab’s team handled scheduling the national debate between Al Gore and Ross Perot. Both
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von Bertrab and Luis Donaldo Colosio, the PRI presidential candidate in the upcoming Mexican
election, helped prepare Gore’s notes for the debate. During the live debate, Perot stumbled and
failed to rebut many of Gore’s fallacious points, resulting in a resounding victory for NAFTA
supporters (MacArthur 2000).125
As time edged closer to the ratification vote, Clinton, himself, played a major role in
getting NAFTA through down the stretch. Ken Cole told MacArthur (2000:253) that “Bill did
something I’ve never seen before or since. He brought the private-sector people into his whip
meetings every week and sometimes two times a week.” Clinton also directed the USA*NAFTA
team to find out each congress member’s needs to get his or her vote.126 The creation of the
North American Development (NAD) Bank was one such deal that secured Esteban Torres’s
vote, which was symbolic in swaying labor-sympathetic voters. The NAD Bank ideally was a
binational bank designed to fund environmental projects, but never delivered on its promise,
suggesting that this move was only to secure votes for NAFTA (Public Citizen 1999). Clinton’s
furtive deal with Oklahoma Representative Bill Brewster demonstrates how fickle some of these
decision makers were despite the potentially widespread effects of NAFTA on the populous.
Clinton secured Bill Brewster’s vote with the promise of a golf trip to which Clinton held true to
the deal (MacArthur 2000). Phillips and the Haliburton Corporation, along with the Business
Roundtable, strategically placed op-ed pieces glorifying NAFTA in Brewster’s local district to
also help persuade him by swaying the voters. Other voters wanted more, for example, the
Florida delegation required protection and cash, mostly for the Florida Fruit and Vegetable
Association.127 These deals ranged from promises of investigating certain imports, to guaranteed
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The New York Times reported on USA*NAFTA meeting members of Congress on August 22, 1993 (Bradsher
1993d).
127
See Boyer, Wallach, and Watzman (1993) for a list of these deals, and Austen (1993).
125
126

215
protections for particular industries, to extraditing a Mexican citizen accused of raping the niece
of Florida Representative Clay Shaw’s secretary. Other players in the NAFTA game were later
rewarded directly for their involvement in getting NAFTA through Congress, like Bill Daley
who landed a job at the Department of Commerce.
Clinton, with the encouragement of Anne Wexler, the public relations executive partially
responsible for the secret meeting at Allied Signal Corporation, held a dinner for several CEOs
soliciting them for money to finance a pro-NAFTA campaign (Snow 2010). The White House
even created a special office that vetted companies and people who might cause public relations
problems (MacArthur 2000). For instance, corporations that were promoting an environmentally
green approach were weeded out. Alternatively, pro-NAFTA businesses were using the White
House property to further their cause. Von Bertrab (1997) attests to Clinton’s side deals, private
sector invitations, and personal phone calls. According to him, when it approached time to vote,
over 20 amendments to NAFTA were proposed. Clinton’s last-minute concession deals, in large
part, appeased these concerns, and von Bertrab (1997:133) even classifies some of the deals as
“democratic bribery.” Although he defines the deals as legal, he sees it as an abuse of power to
receive benefits oftentimes unrelated to NAFTA. Both the sugar and citrus industries received
last minute deals which, according to von Bertrab (1997:137) “reflected the political clout of the
groups involved far more than the importance of the issues to the United States as a whole.”
The Canadian election was one of the last scares for NAFTA promoters. When Jean
Chrétien, the anti-NAFTA Liberal Party candidate, won the election for Prime Minister of
Canada, uncertainty struck the NAFTA crowd.128 USA*NAFTA immediately leaked a story on
health care to sidetrack the media away from the election (MacArthur 2000). Despite the
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worries, Chrétien was on board, but he needed political cover against the anti-NAFTA members
of his party. For that, a symbolic NAFTA renegotiation on sensitive issues fit the bill (Bradsher
1993b). In the end, not a single word of the entire NAFTA document was changed, and Chrétien
continued to give his support behind the scenes (MacArthur 2000). As a seemingly last ditch
effort, David Bonior, ostensibly the last Congressman vocally opposed to NAFTA, appeared on
Meet the Press to debate Bill Bradley and Mickey Kantor.129 In pro-NAFTA thematic fashion,
Bradley and Kantor offered the public some well-versed talking points silencing the critics
(MacArthur 2000).
The day of the NAFTA ratification vote, the NAFTA lobbying team was instructed to
follow ambivalent members of Congress around to influence them before the vote, but it turned
out the anti-NAFTA coalition was not there as expected (MacArthur 2000). They had already
considered the vote lost, and they proved to be correct when the vote was cast.

Although the

vote was lost, the public tuned in to the vote as if it were a major sporting event. The public was
interested in a congressional vote unlike any before. The massive U.S. and Mexican NAFTA
campaigns proved successful when the Senate passed NAFTA on November 20, 1993.130 In
addition, major surveys revealed that citizens of both the United States and Mexico generally
expressed positive views of NAFTA, and believed the policy would bring socioeconomic growth
and a higher quality of life (Davis 1998; Nicholson et al. 1994).131
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NAFTA as a Violation of International Law
Building on the information discussed thus far, this section argues that NAFTA was
criminal and criminogenic on two counts. First, the negotiation process, responsible for creating
the type of NAFTA contained in the final text, was criminal and criminogenic. The negotiation
process was criminal and criminogenic for three interrelated and overlapping reasons: (1) a TCC
heavily influenced the outcome; (2) it was undemocratic; and (3) the opposition was often
repressed. And secondly, the NAFTA policy itself was criminal and criminogenic. This
argument is comprised of two major components. First, NAFTA as a policy encapsulates only
state and corporate interests while neglecting average citizens and the various intellectual voices
that criticized NAFTA by predicting negative social outcomes. In short, the final policy does not
reflect the multitude of risks highlighted by NAFTA critics. Second, the written text of NAFTA
is criminal for failing to include protections of human rights for average citizens, and instead,
providing business interests with a litany of rights to protect their investments.

NAFTA Negotiation Process as Criminal
TCC Heavily Influenced NAFTA Negotiations
The TCC had a massive influence on the progression of NAFTA as seen in the massive
campaigns to sell NAFTA executed in the United States and Mexico.132 Corporate interests
influenced NAFTA negotiations directly (Pastor and Wise 1994). For instance, General Motors,
Chrysler, and Ford had establishments and interests in all three countries. Much of the auto
industry agreements correlated with the interests of these mega corporations (Mayer 1998). In
some instances, the Mexican business elite was reported as running the negotiations (Morris
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1995). Pro-NAFTA business leaders had access and relationships with Bush, Clinton, Salinas,
and their respective administrations (Hogenboom 1998). And, even the supposedly “neutral”
international financial institution, the World Bank, actively supported NAFTA. In Mexico,
SECOFI established the NAFTA Advisory Council which played an integral role in creating an
image of unanimous support for NAFTA (Heredia 1994). The council consisted of trade union
bosses, leaders of small farmers’ leagues, and leading academics who were all tied to the PRI in
some way. Despite the existence of substantial criticism of NAFTA, the government and the
COECE (large Mexican conglomerates who were already involved in international trade and
export markets) pushed for its ratification (Thacker 1999; Alba and Vega 2002). These
mechanisms allowed the key players in the NAFTA negotiations to ignore the concerns of those
most likely to be negatively affected by NAFTA – indigenous groups, small subsistence farmers,
and small and medium-sized businesses. The potential and likely costs and harms of NAFTA
were never addressed by Salinas and his constituents, or their U.S. counterparts. No democratic
debate was held. Mexican television – where most Mexicans received their information –
overwhelmingly disseminated pro-NAFTA propaganda and excluded critical analysis of it
(Heredia 1994). Radio commentators and journalists who aired material that questioned the
benefits of NAFTA faced extreme repercussions.133 NAFTA supporters from both the United
States and Mexico publically insisted that Mexican citizens expressed widespread support for the
agreement, despite clear evidence to the contrary (Banamex 1993). The side agreements to
NAFTA demonstrate the small concessions made by the initial authors of NAFTA to some of its
so-called “nonexistent” critics. The business community never wanted to discuss the side
agreements, as even the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was against bringing these issues to the
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table (MacArthur 2000). In fact, the Chamber of Commerce was more direct and clear about its
disapproval.
To understand the position of the TCC on NAFTA, consider the case of Collectron, a
company that taught business managers and leaders the tactics and advantages of outsourcing to
Mexico. Collectron held a seminar in Tuscon, Arizona, which MacArthur (2000) secretly
attended. The seminar encouraged outsourcing to Mexico by describing it as a very secure
opportunity for major profits. The Mexican workforce was described as extremely exploitable
with wages essentially locked in place with a low ceiling. The instructors of the seminar
informally taught NAFTA loopholes such as circumventing rules of origin. Instructors at
Collectron described the restricted salaries and lack of unions, with one Collectron employee
even observing that Nogales, the city in Mexico they advocated as a relocation site, was
“virtually union free” (MacArthur 2000:340).134 Companies avoided bidding wars over keeping
good employees to secure low wages. Another internet brochure also advertised relocating to
Nogales (MacArthur 2000:344).
Consider also the common theme of secret meetings, such as the one at the mansion of
Ortiz Mena, a Mexican economist who previously served as President of the Inter-American
Development Bank and as Mexico’s Secretary of Finance. This meeting, as described by
Oppenheimer (1998), demonstrates the massive amount of wealth influencing macro-level
structural changes.135 On February 23, 1993, thirty of the wealthiest men in Mexico, who had
acquired their wealth in the recent privatization, met with President Salinas to discuss the
upcoming Mexican election. Since the fate of NAFTA could continue into a presidency after
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Salinas, the election was paramount. The primary goal on the agenda was to secure funding for
the PRI without relying on government finances. Those at the meeting agreed with this proposal
unanimously. Carlos Slim was among those who agreed with the proposal, but wished that these
discussions were done more privately without public exposure that could “turn into a political
scandal” (Oppenheimer 1998:86). His fears were quickly realized when the press caught wind of
the surreptitious meeting (Golden 1993b; Oppenheimer 1993). A $25 million dollar contribution
was requested from each meeting attendee, and the Mexican public was at a loss trying to figure
out how these seemingly middle-class businessmen could afford such large contributions. Some
of the attendees expressed their concern over coming up with the $25 million, but Don Emilio
stood up and urged all of them to contribute by saying, “I, and all of you, have earned so much
money over the past six years that I think we have a big debt of gratitude to this government”
(Oppenheimer 1998:87). Emilio more or less openly admitted to ongoing state-corporate
collusion. By the end of the meeting, $750 million was raised, and the men swore each other to
secrecy and left in their limousines. To put the $750 million contributions into context, that
figure was more than five times the total Democratic Party expenditure for Bill Clinton’s
successful campaign in 1992 (Alexander 1996). Keep in mind that this is at a time Mexico’s
GDP was only ten percent of that of the U.S. economy.136 With the amount of money flowing
back and forth between the state and business, one should not be surprised that the final NAFTA
heavily favored business, and the TCC more generally. For instance, although NAFTA was built
around the premise that government protectionism would be removed, the Mexican government
offered its big business friends a head start in the game by keeping protections for 12 to 15 years
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after NAFTA. The major influence of corporate money largely contributed to an undemocratic
negotiation process.

NAFTA Negotiations were Undemocratic
NAFTA’s negotiation process was a violation of international law, specifically a
violation of the United Nations (UN) International Bill of Human Rights including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), due to its
negotiation process being undemocratic and repressing the opposition.137 First, the negotiation
process was undemocratic for a variety of reasons including its secrecy, lack of oversight,
screening of popular involvement, restraints on future governments, and quid pro quo political
deals.138 The first article of the ICCPR and ICESCR state:
All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
Although NAFTA negotiation secrecy and lack of transparency have been extensively discussed,
the NAFTA text was not made available to the public until after Clinton was inaugurated. Even
at that time, the NAFTA text came with a hefty price tag, $42 despite it likely costing about $5 to
print with a commercial printer (Nader et al. 1993). If a concerned citizen successfully navigated
all of these obstacles, there was still the uphill battle of deciphering the purposely recondite
1,000+ page document. In Mexico, the public never endorsed the neoliberal policies of the
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1980s (Dent 1994). Instead, an illegitimate, authoritarian government furtively negotiated the
agreement while circumventing national debate and prohibited the involvement of the Mexican
Chamber of Deputies (Grinspun and Kreklewich 1994). Meanwhile, no independent body
provided oversight to ensure that the negotiations were democratic. The TCC led the efforts to
shape a policy that would be most beneficial to it.
Considering that one of NAFTA’s aims was to cement the neoliberal policies of the
1980s making them more difficult to remove for future administrations, many of the steps taken
to achieve such a goal restricted democracy. Largely related to NAFTA’s lack of transparency
and secrecy, popular involvement was restricted through various mechanisms. Corporate leaders
were connected to many of the negotiators, and consistently received weekly briefings on what
was happening during the negotiations (MacArthur 2000). While business elites effectively had
seats at the table, the opposition lacked the resources and cohesiveness to fight back effectively
(Mayer 1998). Furthermore, anyone who was opposed to a free trade deal was screened out of
participating in the negotiations. Thus, everyone involved agreed on a free trade deal, and
merely the details were up for negotiation. Whereas the state inhibited the public from joining
the negotiations, political elites received furtive deals to secure their votes.

Repression of Opposition
The second major reason why the NAFTA negotiations violated international law was the
repression of the opposition that accompanied these negotiations, such as in Salinas’s efforts to
arrest major union leaders. Dent (1994) argues that NAFTA did not necessarily violate civil and
political rights per se, but oftentimes opposition arose due to the poverty and inequality that
stemmed from neoliberal policies. The state then, at times, responded to the opposition with
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repressive measures. Several physical integrity rights violations have been documented in
Mexico since the late 1980s following this pattern (Acosta 1993). Most commonly, the victims
of these violations were political opponents and union members. Oftentimes, Mexican unions
are forced to be affiliated with the PRI, and many union leaders are bribed to keep their members
in line (Bacon 2004). A labor protest at the Ford Motor Company in Cuautitlán offers one
example of CTM strikebreakers attacking workers, leading to the death of one worker
(America’s Watch 1990). The Mexican state also gave near immunity to the military after the
atrocities committed in the Chiapas region before and after the Zapatista uprising (America’s
Watch 1994). In Mexico, repression took the form of violence, while in the United States,
repression of the opposition resulted more in the form of withholding information, as in the
NAFTA campaigns that focused on highlighting its benefits and neglecting or even hiding its
potential costs.
Although NAFTA opposition arose in all three countries, the Mexican coalition held the
least power and influence over changing the course of neoliberal policies. Organized labor was
particularly weak in Mexico because the national labor organizations were predominantly
affiliated with the PRI, and thus capitulated to the business elite (Massicotte 2009). The PRI also
actively worked to disrupt and dissolve social movement organizations to weaken the possibility
of a threat to PRI’s political stranglehold (Cadena-Roa 2009). The opposition in all three
countries banded together, striking common ground on appeals to democracy, human rights,
economic justice, and environmental sustainability, yet their strength through integration did not
really solidify until after NAFTA was ratified (Ayres and Macdonald 2009). While the
opposition in Canada and the United States successfully mobilized a large segment of their
populations and drastically shifted public opinion on NAFTA to slightly favor a rejection of the
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treaty, NAFTA still was signed and implemented. In both countries, the possibility of rejecting
NAFTA through a popular referendum was blocked (Dent 1994). The U.S. success of altering
public opinion is owed to opposition on both sides of the political spectrum with key figures such
as Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan (Scott 1998). As for Mexico, the authoritarian governmental
structure was too much to overcome for these social movement organizations to alter public
opinion on NAFTA. However, these groups likely constructed a new identity and solidarity for
North Americans that strengthened future social movements’ ability to shape major policy
decisions (Robinson 2015).
The PRI Mexican government was masterful at quieting public discontent through
service projects that would distract the poor from their troubles and causes of them. In addition
to PRONASOL and PROCAMPO, other concessions included numerous basketball courts that
the state provided in nearly every Indian community (Oppenheimer 1998). Oppenheimer
observed that most of the people in these communities had no idea how to even play the sport.
Another example was the ostentatious $11 million opera house built in the jungle. Arguably, the
enormous amount of money spent on projects like these may have provided more benefits if
spent on real infrastructural improvements such as water filtration plants, power plants, or
garbage disposal facilities.

NAFTA Policy as Criminal
NAFTA, as a policy, was criminal on two counts. First, the NAFTA policy was criminal
because it ignored or failed to address the numerous studies and predictions that suggested
potential negative effects of implementing NAFTA. The expediency of passing NAFTA, and the
lack of caution, contributed to the criminal and criminogenic nature of the policy. Second, the
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NAFTA text itself is criminal for its failure to include protection of human rights, the passages
that criminalize state-corporate crime controls, and the bias toward business interests.

People’s Voices Unrepresented
NAFTA was partly criminal because it did not consider the voices of the people which
relates directly to the undemocratic negotiation process and repressive measures taken against
the opposition (Brown 1993). NAFTA negotiations did not include the opposition or many
citizen groups, thus, the final NAFTA policy did not address ordinary people’s concerns.
Kingsolver (2001) explores the various stories of NAFTA by conducting interviews and doing
ethnographic work with a widely diverse set of people, both for and against NAFTA.139
People’s social interactions and social positioning fed into a struggle over the symbolic
representation of NAFTA, where a more positive image of NAFTA dominated the major public
coverage, particularly in Mexico. The amount of power possessed by the differing groups and
individuals reflected their influence over the public discussion on NAFTA. Most of the
differences between Kingsolver’s NAFTA stories rested in the answer to the question “who did
NAFTA benefit?” The two answers to this question are best summarized as a neoliberal NAFTA
story and a counterstory that fits well with the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.
The conflicted NAFTA story, pieced together by Kingsolver’s (2001) interviewees, was
one of a TCC that was portrayed as benefiting all of society despite only really being beneficial
to a select few. For instance, the Canadian government seemed to promote NAFTA, while the
public did not support it (Daly 1990). While members of the TCC touted the marvels of
NAFTA, workers questioned the benefits of NAFTA they would likely experience (Kingsolver
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2001). With such a large number of Salinas’s administration’s cabinet members having a U.S.
education from elite schools, their stories reflected an agreement on the fruitfulness of free trade
and market liberalization. Similarly, members of the Clinton and Bush administrations and
corporate executives viewed NAFTA as a remarkable opportunity for economic progress
(Chavolla Nava 1993). In response to farmers’ concerns, President Salinas’ rhetoric attempted to
comfort campesinos. However, he also used the military to remove indigenous activists from the
central town square where he gave this “comforting” speech (Kingsolver 2001). Salinas and the
Mexican state used tactics of exclusion to create an image of support for his policies, and even
took repressive measures to discourage worker organization. Many workers’ stories displayed
trepidation for leaving their futures to an unregulated free market. The RMALC drafted an
alternative to NAFTA that took into consideration the possible negative outcomes of NAFTA for
workers with 52 NGOs as signatories.140 Yet, their suggestions were never addressed in the
NAFTA text. Various stories of farmers expressed even more fear than other laborers. Most of
the farmers expressed concern for economic survival. Many of them articulated a willingness to
surrender their land if a factory was built on it and jobs were guaranteed for them and their
children.

Critical Intellectual Voices Unrepresented
Citizens were not alone in expressing their concerns, as many academic scholars and
policy analysts raised serious issues surrounding NAFTA. Although both positive and negative
outcomes of NAFTA were acknowledged, some potential costs and harms of NAFTA should
have been cause for concern. For instance, in response to Kehoe’s (1994) conclusions that
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Mexico had much to gain from NAFTA, Grinspun and Cameron (1996:170) demonstrate that
classic neoliberal assumptions built into many of the economic models assessing NAFTA lack
the inclusion of a series of complicating factors such as:
political instability, structural unemployment and other institutional characteristics of the
labor market, eroding educational and health-care systems, societal tensions, rural
impoverishment, financial speculation, environmental degradation, and a chronic lack of
investment in research and technology, particularly by subsidiaries of transnational
corporations.
Despite such complicating factors, nearly all economists early on believed NAFTA to be a
positive development-enhancing policy (Nasar 1993), although some economists did provide
economic analyses that predicted negative effects on labor (Cypher 1993). Faux and Lee (1993)
criticize the ongoing groupthink of economists as evidenced by the use of general equilibrium
models in most economic studies. They demonstrate that these models make the dubious
assumption of full employment and do not assume a shift in productive investment from the
United States to Mexico despite there being overwhelming evidence that the latter would occur.
Of course, NAFTA was primarily crafted for that specific purpose.
Another major argument perpetuated by NAFTA proponents was that neoliberal
economic policies would improve productivity and increase wages (Orme 1996). Thus, Mexican
wages were assumed to be low because of low productivity. Through fieldwork research,
Shaiken (1990) demonstrated the fallacy of high productivity’s link to higher wages. Shaiken
demonstrates that productivity gains did not bring wage increases to Mexico, despite claims to
the contrary. Instead, he provides more evidence for social dumping, or the use of cheap labor,
occurring in Mexico. Rendón and Salas (1993) offered some reasons why the focus on increased
wages and job creation was problematic. First, they predicted NAFTA to inspire the acquisition
of existing plants more so than the creation of new ones. Even if new plants could be expected,
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they would need to create a large number of jobs to offset the losses expected from technology
and plant closings. Second, technological advancement was expected to increase productivity
levels while decreasing the demand for workers. Third, some existing firms were expected to
close due to increased competition. Fourth, the suffering manufacturing sector struggled
throughout the 1980s and the mean size of those sectors shrunk dramatically leading to more
instability. Small firms with few personnel were not very profitable and had high rates of failure
(Salas 1992).
During the time of NAFTA negotiations, official unemployment appeared low, but this
was illusory. The International Labour Organization (1988) considered people employed if they
worked just one hour a week, and unpaid work was considered employment. In addition, anyone
who spent more than two months looking for work was considered no longer unemployed, but
“economically [in]active” (Rendón and Salas 1993:114). No unemployment insurance was
offered in Mexico, and likely coerced people to take menial employment over nothing. Lastly, if
people were not working, but did not look for work during the reference period, they were not
considered unemployed. Little pre-NAFTA attention was paid to the massive un- and
underemployment in Mexico—largely due to these miscategorizations—amounting to
somewhere between 30 and 70 percent of the labor force leading up to 1992 (Rothstein 1992).
With the proposed NAFTA, Mexico expected increases in capital concentration and the
inequality gap, and conducted virtually no research on how NAFTA might impact employment
(Hogenboom 1998). Overall, the NAFTA policy does not consider the asymmetries of social
welfare between the three countries in the agreement, and was not expected to positively impact
workers in Mexico. Spain’s similar position in the European Union provided evidence that when
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foreign investment flowed in after 1986, extant firms were purchased, new plants were not
established, and virtually no job creation occurred in the export sector (Serrano 1993).
Downward harmonization of wages was another fear expressed by critics of NAFTA, this
meant that the higher wages of U.S. and Canadian workers would likely decrease to come in line
with lower Mexican wages rather than the other way around. The fear of downward
harmonization is not unfounded, as this phenomenon was present in the earlier maquiladora
program (Bognanno and Ready 1993) between the United States and Mexico, and in the years
following the CUFTA agreement (Campbell 1993). In the maquiladora sector, Mexico’s strong
labor standards rarely were enforced, keeping wages low and inviting foreign investment
(Heredia 1994).141 Yet, the United States was able to praise Mexico for its progressive labor
laws, but in practice, enforcement is often left to unaccountable government officials who have
more at stake in securing their own political and economic interests.142 U.S. political leaders
have failed to criticize the authoritarian regime in Mexico as long as U.S. economic interests are
being met. U.S. corporations engaged in union busting tactics in Mexico to thwart organization
of workers. They also kept wages low by the weakening unions through corrupt relationships
between the PRI and national union organizations. For example, the CTM is the official PRI
government national labor union association where its secretary general, Fidel Velazquez, has
controlled the CTM since the 1940s, and has actively subverted union wage and benefit demands
in exchange for public office access and political favors. Compounding the corruption, only 35
percent of Mexican workers are unionized, and of those that are, about 75 percent are

141

NAFTA perpetuates the use of the U.S.-Mexico border as a tool for maintaining the access of cheap, complacent
labor for exploitation by U.S. manufacturers. The maquiladora industry demonstrates how this tool was effective
for corporations before the signing of NAFTA (Erfani 1992). The maquila program was implemented under a
partnership between wealthy corporate investors and an authoritarian Mexican government.
142
Von Bertrab (1997) similarly praised Mexico’s labor law as more progressive than the equivalent U.S. labor law
without recognizing how poorly those laws are upheld in practice.

230
represented by the CTM. Similarly, after CUFTA, downward harmonization occurred, but it was
not U.S. workers, but rather Canadian workers who saw their wages and benefits erode as
manufacturing jobs were outsourced to the U.S. Sun Belt states or the maquiladora sector
(Campbell 1993). Canadians had enjoyed better wages, benefits, and stronger unions than U.S.
workers, but in the immediate years after CUFTA these conditions deteriorated (Nichols 1993).
The Business Council on National Issues (BCNI), the major business lobbying group in Canada,
actually promised to leave social spending untouched, but reneged on that promise after CUFTA
passed (Campbell 1993). The Canadian government was swayed by the BCNI’s lobbying efforts
to cut social programs and began its austerity approach after CUFTA. More corporations in
Canada were foreign owned after CUFTA. Similarly to CUFTA, NAFTA was predicted to shift
power away from the Canadian government towards multinational corporations, primarily those
that were U.S. owned.
Most early analyses also demonstrated the likely dire outcomes for both grain and maize
producers in Mexico (Robinson et al. 1991), and even the World Bank came to a similar
conclusion (Levy and van Wijnbergen 1992). Differences in labor productivity were used as a
justification in the agricultural sector as well, since U.S. productivity was higher for nearly every
crop, but this ignores the fact that less than 50 percent of ejidatarios have access to resistant
seeds, advanced fertilizers, or mechanical tractors (Cornelius 1992). Peasants were not the
expected benefactors of increases in foreign investment, and changing intellectual property rights
were thought to be a major obstacle to farmers.143 Foreign investors were much more likely to
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invest in large-scale production outfits. Young (1995) noted the difficulty for farmers in
switching their current crops or traveling long distances to change work. Furthermore, since
U.S. agricultural workers were paid as much as six times more than their Mexican counterparts,
more workers were expected to “compete for these jobs, working under worse conditions and
earning less for it” in Mexico after NAFTA (Young 1995:55). Alain de Janvry and de Anda
(1995) argued that smaller maize producers would be affected very differently by NAFTA. The
most at risk were nondiversified maize sellers heavily dependent on the price of maize (39.8% of
maize producers in Michoacán, 27.8% in Sinaloa, and 42.9% in Veracruz). Although this
constituted a minority of maize producers, it was significant for the welfare of the rural
population. NAFTA did not establish institutions to help ease transitions by providing local
buyers (for diversification) and technical assistance to increase yields (for modernization). Barry
(1995) emphasizes that even when neoliberal economic policies brought some general benefits to
Mexico, indigenous communities did not reap those benefits. Instead of protecting the
indigenous, NAFTA favored investors collaborating with large-scale agribusiness. Overall,
maize-dependent producers were placed at the mercy of institutions capable of providing skills,
resources, and relief. NAFTA and the Mexican government neglected family farms. 144
As with labor, the environment was another major concern prior to NAFTA, specifically
numerous studies highlighted the environmental pollution and degradation on the U.S.-Mexico
border (Hogenboom 1998; Simon 2014). Much like with wage harmonization, critics of NAFTA
feared U.S. downward harmonization of environmental policy or enforcement (Hogenboom
1998). Unlike the strong written labor laws in Mexico, Mexican environmental laws were lax
and in their infancy. During the NAFTA debates, Mexico created policies mostly as window-
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dressing to save face, but they were largely ineffective. Simultaneously, Mexico slashed
expenditures for environmental programs. Furthermore, the issues related to the deteriorating
condition of workers under NAFTA were linked to environmental problems. For instance,
industrial development and poverty contributed most significantly to environmental degradation,
and neoliberal policies increased both. Agricultural industrialization in Mexico particularly
created several environmental problems including soil erosion, water scarcity, and deforestation.
Salinization contributed to enormous crop reductions, and a dwindling water supply complicated
irrigation and agricultural growth (Barry 1995).
Issues of oil drilling, sprawling urbanization, and uncontrollable urbanization added to
the precarious environmental situation in Mexico (Hogenboom 1998). The United States has
strategically engaged in policy to control the North American oil supply, and NAFTA was a
mechanism partially built to secure control of major oil reserves (Morton 1992; Dillon 1993).
Since Mexico’s constitution was written in such a way to keep oil publicly owned, U.S. oil
interests crafted the NAFTA text to “respect” the Mexican Constitution while maintaining
purposely vague passages that could be interpreted in favor of their interests (Cameron and
Tomlin 2000).
While criticism of the potential negative environmental impact of NAFTA mounted,
NAFTA proponents relied on untested arguments. For example, the aforementioned work by
Grossman and Krueger (1991) was probably most cited to support the notion that environmental
harm caused by NAFTA was unlikely. However, as with other classical neoliberal economists,
complex phenomena were ignored including “transformations in agriculture, the regime of
exploitation of natural resources, the role of the state in enforcing environmental standards, [and]
the power relations that affect those standards” (Grinspun and Cameron 1996:176). In one
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interesting economic analysis, Shrybman (1993) investigated the potential impacts of NAFTA on
the environment. He argued that reducing export controls, import controls, and the use of nontariff trade barriers – all of which are included in NAFTA – have negative effects on the
environment. Despite these environmental costs, the initial NAFTA text dealt very little with
protecting the environment.
The hasty and haphazard push for NAFTA led it to fall short in protecting the
environment (Barry 1995). Natural resource extraction was left unregulated by NAFTA.
NAFTA offered no protections for sustainable agriculture. Even mainstream U.S. ENGOs
supported unsustainable patterns of economic growth and reduced communal capacity for future
development. Massive government subsidies fueled the capitalist penetration of the agricultural
sector producing crises of sustainability. Lax regulations allowed for extreme pesticide use
resulting in Mexicans having one of the highest levels of toxins in their bloodstreams in the
world in 1993 (CNDH 1993). In addition, U.S. corporations operating in Mexico before NAFTA
contributed greatly to the toxicity levels in the waterways and sewers without any government
sanctions (Bognano and Ready 1993). Governmental hydroelectric dam projects did not
consider the effects of inhabitants in the area contributing to the displacement of poor
campesinos (Barry 1995).
To summarize this half of the argument, NAFTA was criminal because it embodied and
symbolized neoliberal economics, and research on neoliberal economic policies provided
evidence of widespread harmful effects (Galbraith 1993; Nader et al. 1993; Roett 1993; Grinspun
and Cameron 1993; Bognanno and Ready 1993; Betts and Slotje 1994). Despite the existence of
such evidence, the NAFTA policy addressed very few of the concerns raised about its potentially
harmful outcomes. The overwhelming neglect of these legitimate concerns makes the policy

234
criminal considering that many of the likely outcomes, as listed, were violations of the UN
Declaration of Human Rights. The NAFTA text itself helps support this argument.

The Criminal Text of NAFTA
Bognano and Ready’s (1993) edited volume is a collection of essays by a myriad of
experts, community leaders, and government officials who engaged in a debate over NAFTA on
November 19-20, 1991, at a conference held at the Minneapolis Convention Center. Although
the arguments throughout the book range from highly favorable to highly critical of NAFTA, a
middle ground appears quite frequently among many of the contributors: NAFTA, in its
proposed form, needed to include some more protections, most importantly a social charter of
some sort. A majority of the authors saw NAFTA as potentially dangerous if there was to be no
inclusion of a social charter that could address the large differences between the U.S., Canadian,
and Mexican populations, primarily standards needed to be universally stated and enforced to
ensure that wages, labor standards, and environmental conditions would harmonize upward
towards the United States and Canada rather than downwards towards Mexico. The European
Union’s social charter offered both free mobility of labor and a common external tariff to ensure
the harmonization upwards and to avoid pressures toward the gutting of worker protections such
as retirement, proper work breaks, unemployment, and paid leave. Furthermore, the European
Union’s social charter includes social assistance, collective bargaining, vocational training, and
health and safety standards.
Despite the extensiveness of NAFTA, it never mentions human rights — albeit twice to
name the Canadian and Mexican human rights commissions — even though linking human
rights with international trade has been a strategy implemented by the United States since World
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War II (Smith 1994). The United States and most of the developed world have ideologically
linked market economies with democratic values, and economic trade policies have been the
primary instrument for manifesting this ideological linkage. However, the United States has
historically relied more on unilateral action than multilateral agreements to uphold human rights
(Abbott 1981; Smith 1994). In particular, the United States has used economic sanctions to
enforce human right standards in other countries, more so than any other country.145 More often
than not, the United States has used measures such as export and import restrictions, military and
economic aid removal or reductions, and restrictive votes in IFIs over loan issues to address its
security interests (Malloy 1990).146 In addition, the United States has not granted trade
preferences in response to a country’s HRVs which typically stops tariff reductions that other
countries receive.147 Although U.S. support for the human rights regime has wavered at times, it
has remained consistently subservient to security concerns (Cohen 1982).
The United States is the most unique of the NAFTA countries with its avoidance of
multilateral agreements and resistance to ratification of several major UN human rights
conventions. At the time of the NAFTA negotiations, the United States was a signatory to three
of the seven major UN human rights conventions: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention Against Torture, and
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Smith 1994). In fact,
the United States has still, to this day, not ratified the UN International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, despite the ratification by every other developed nation. Even when
treaties are signed, the U.S. Constitution may allow federal legislation to override any
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international agreement when discrepancies arise. Smith (1994:812) argues that the
Organization of American States (OAS) provides an opportunity to establish the much needed
linkage between human rights and trade policy, but notes that the United States has “been hostile
to the OAS human rights regime.” NAFTA appeared to be the perfect opportunity to establish
this link since HRVs were without question occurring (America’s Watch 1990; 1992; Shepack
1991). Congress and the public recognized that human rights were a concern given that little
discussion over NAFTA covered workers’ rights and social dumping was a major issue. Yet, the
United States continued its unilateral approach at addressing human rights in face of various
violations. On a larger scale, the unilateral pursuit of improving human rights distanced Mexico
from a future possibility of a multilateral agreement.
Even with an overwhelming recommendation to link NAFTA to human rights coming
from various NGOs, the United States sided with NAFTA proponents who touted that the
agreement was “only a trade deal” and it did not need to include human rights (Dent 1994:69).
In response, Dent (1994) demonstrates not only the need, but the human rights failures of
NAFTA. Neoliberal globalization eased the move of capital without changing labor’s mobility,
which freed the way for exploitation of third world nations’ cheaper labor in producing goods
with the intent of selling them in first world markets. Therefore, Dent (1994) argues that human
rights provisions are a necessity in major trade agreements, especially NAFTA because of its
inclusion of a peripheral nation — Mexico.
Considering the overwhelming neglect of human rights in NAFTA, the text of the
agreement can be viewed as criminal and criminogenic primarily for what it lacks. However,
aspects of the text also violate human rights. Economic rights are only superficially mentioned
in NAFTA and Grinspun and Kreklewich (1994) argue that NAFTA’s policies are more in line
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with the opposite of its promises. For instance, Dent (1994:79) summarizes the NAFTA text and
its likely economic outcomes, while also grouping it with the CUFTA and its actual outcomes:
[D]ue to their recessionary biases, their monetarist policies which drive interest rates and
exchange rates higher, their reduction of fiscal expenditures, the negative impact of
lowered protection on weaker sectors, privatization layoffs, and labor market
segmentation, neoliberal economic agreements have the opposite result of instead
increasing unemployment and inequality and lowering incomes.
Article 1106 in Chapter Eleven of NAFTA sets performance requirements that restrict the nation
receiving foreign investment from gaining full benefits. Furthermore, policies are in place to
disallow governments from creating jobs in high technological industries. More generally,
NAFTA regulations reduced any government’s ability to grow the public sector in providing
secure employment.
Various other rights never made it into NAFTA. Despite the UN International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights guaranteeing all state parties the right to social security
and social assistance to all people, social programs are not guaranteed and no standard for social
security is set in NAFTA (Dent 1994). The Mexican social security system has drastically
changed under IMF structural adjustment programs resulting in it shrinking by 40 percent from
1981 to 1991 (Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice 1991). Thus, NAFTA did not change
the Mexican social security system, rather it allowed for the trend towards reducing social
security to continue and further cemented the changes. Article 12 of the ICESCR also covers the
right to health, holding all state parties responsible for assuring medical service and attention to
all in need. Yet, no basic rights to health care were ensured by NAFTA, and the trade policy
incentives further cuts of the public health system in Mexico (Dent 1994). The intellectual
property provisions in Chapter Seventeen of NAFTA greatly benefited multinational
pharmaceutical companies by establishing a 20-year monopoly on drug patents, while offering
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nothing for the common citizen. Similar to social security, the IMF policies reduced the public
health sector, shrinking the per person budget of the Ministry of Health by 50 percent from 1983
to 1990 (Laurell and Elena Ortega 1992). These cuts led to decreased access and quality of care,
depressed salaries, and deskilled workers.
NAFTA also either failed to include or obfuscated many environmental rights. The right
to a clean environment is subsumed within the right to health in the ICESCR. Not only is it
unaddressed, NAFTA provisions are conducive to environmental degradation (Dent 1994).
NAFTA did not provide protection for people who have had their environmental rights violated,
and it offered them no recourse or method to make a claim. Since each country maintains its
own right to enforce its own environmental standards, no minimum environmental standards
were set. NAFTA also did not attempt to address the problem of competitive advantage that
allowed companies to relocate from a country with high environment standards to one with low
standards. In regards to subsidies, NAFTA clearly favored gas and oil companies by permitting
subsidies while prohibiting similar subsidies for alternative, cleaner energy sources. NAFTA
Article 607 specifically states the preference given to “oil and gas exploration.”148 Sanchez
(2002) further noted the limits of environmental enforcement provisions in NAFTA. First, the
demands of environmental groups and the public were not incorporated into the agreement.
Second, the Secretariat of the North American Commission on the Environment has limited
power of investigation and enforcement under NAFTA. Daly (1992:129) also argued that
NAFTA might negatively impact the environment by simply solidifying the neoliberal ideology
that assumes “the whole world and all future generations can consume resources at the levels
current in today’s high-wage countries without inducing ecological collapse.” Lastly, although

See also The Economist, February 29, 1992: 25 for details on Texas’ oil and gas constituency’s interest in free
trade.
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NAFTA side agreements allowed for one or both countries to impose economic sanctions on a
country that fails to uphold its own national laws, sanctions were never used (Simon 2014).
Unsurprisingly, side agreements were not effective in accomplishing stated goals. Although this
could not have been known at the time, much of this chapter should serve to illustrate the
warning signs.
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) hardly
alleviated any of these issues. No commitment to increase environmental enforcement budgets
was included in the NAAEC. Environmental law does not include laws that primarily focus on
natural resource extraction, and accordingly, there is no clarity as to whether the NAAEC covers
“strip mining, soil conservation, energy extraction, coastal fishing, and sustainable timber
harvesting” (Charnovitz 1994:7). The NAAEC circumscribes the environment to include only
the territories of the nation under investigation. Thus, if Mexico imposed a law affecting the
Gulf of Mexico it would not be subject to NAAEC reporting or dispute settlement because it is
not restricted to only Mexican territory. In the case of embargos on particular products for
environmental reasons, if the United States placed an embargo on Mexican corn, for instance,
Mexico could challenge the embargo with the United States bearing the burden of proof under
the NAFTA dispute settlement laws according to Chapter Nineteen. In other words, trade is
placed before the environment. In addition, a large amount of uncertainty surrounds how an
NAAEC dispute panel is to deal with enforcement failure.
Labor rights received more attention than many of the other human rights resulting in the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), but some critics have argued it is
“toothless” since it does not require compliance with international labor standards (Dent 1994).
Instead, the NAALC allows states to meet only their own national labor standards which can be
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much worse. Therefore, the NAALC allows a country to gain a competitive advantage by not
recognizing international labor standards, such as the right to form a union, and worker
protections were limited. Trade unions, in particular, experienced high rates of repression by the
Mexican government, and the Mexican workplace was at least twice as dangerous as those in
Canada and the United States (Velasco Arregui 1992). Yet, the NAALC offered no protections
for the heavily exploited Mexican workforce. Furthermore, despite a widespread consensus that
unskilled workers were the most likely group to suffer from NAFTA, programs to help these
workers adjust to the economic changes, such as unemployment payments, job training, or job
dislocation programs designed to help workers find new gainful employment, were all missing
from NAFTA (Bognano and Ready 1993). Labor organizations actually sought this help by
urging Congress to pass the Save American Jobs Act in 1992, but this bill did not show up in
Congress until 2012 under Barack Obama. If countries wished to dispute labor practices, they
would be limited to cases involving child labor, the minimum wage, or occupational safety
violations.
Although NAALC may have been the most ambitious agreement to link labor rights with
trade, Human Rights Watch (2001) argued it is remarkable for its deficiencies. Both
international and national institutions were erected to deal with complaints and cooperation.
Unfortunately, key labor rights are not the primary focus of the agreement, including freedom of
association and the right to collective bargaining. Four structural problems were apparent in the
side agreement according to Dombois, Hornberger, and Winter (2003). First, national
sovereignty was emphasized over supranational legal standards, and thus external bodies had
little jurisdiction over enforcing HRVs. As mentioned, the United States is notorious for
disregarding international bodies of law. Second, limitations are placed on regulatory agencies’
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ability to redistribute resources or compensate complainants for their conflicts. Conflict
resolution was heavily influenced by U.S. industrial relations. Third, the political and economic
dominance of the United States led to unequal policy agreements. Fourth, there is a lack of
mechanisms to include public participation in conflict resolution and regulation. Independent
unions had an uphill battle to stake claims and receive compensation as they typically faced a
cooperative force of corporatist unions and state officials. Paradoxically, these public bodies
were responsible for making claims while being excluded from the complainant’s process.
Although NAALC offered regulations for a minimum wage, child labor, and health and safety in
the workplace, Heredia (1994) considered these regulations empty since there was no guarantee
for rights to collective bargaining, union formation, union strikes, and freedom from interference
from the government in the unionization process. He also criticized mechanisms for filing
complaints and punishing corporate infractors. The government was to be held responsible for
paying corporate penalties, thus taxpayers would be experiencing double victimization.
Consistent with NAFTA’s shortcomings, all labor complaints in the first nine years
following NAFTA, even those regarding the “more serious” breaches of labor law, resulted in
ministerial consultations with no substantial changes in legal practices in any of the countries
(Dombois et al. 2003). Furthermore, conflict resolution has consistently been delayed,
sometimes lasting over two years. The bilateral ministerial consultations create a circumstance
in which both countries benefit from few complaints, and resolutions of conflict that do not
create labor conflicts. Since governments emphasize their sovereignty over labor laws, these
complaints likely have little influence over labor practices. In addition, the emphasis on
cooperation obfuscates the complaint by providing only limited publicity resulting in little
pressure for change. Dombois et al. (2003) argued that more severe sanctions would not have
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improved the NAALC. Its failure lies in the structure of interactions among the parties involved.
For one, international or trilateral institutions play a marginal role in labor law creation or
enforcement. Also, actors of civil society had next to no involvement in NAALC practices.
Lastly, the need for conflict resolution was inhibited by distrust among participating
governments.

NAFTA’s Bill of Business Rights
Although the average citizen’s rights were not respected by NAFTA, several articles
covered rights for businesses and investors. As stated, investors had protections such as Article
1105 that provides an exit plan for investors. More or less, the article states that investors can
revert to international law protections on investment if the environment in Mexico goes awry.
Furthermore, Article 1108(7) (b) offers more protections to investors specifically in times of
“armed conflict and civil strife.” In other words, if unions or other members of political
opposition protest, investors have an exit strategy. One of the major fears, that business elites
had was expropriation of private property by future governments since Mexico had a history of
nationalizing U.S. and other foreign-owned businesses. Article 1110 appeased these fears:
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an
investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or
expropriation of such an investment (“expropriation”), except: (a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and Article
1105(1); and (d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.
Although a few exemptions existed, expropriation must be accompanied with compensation:
Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment
immediately before the expropriation took place ("date of expropriation"), and shall not
reflect any change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become
known earlier. Valuation criteria shall include going concern value, asset value including
declared tax value of tangible property, and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine
fair market value. 3. Compensation shall be paid without delay and fully realizable.
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Also, to protect against the Mexicans paying in pesos, the NAFTA stipulated that this
compensation must be paid back in a G7 currency or by a means of compensation commensurate
with currency fluctuations and accrued interest. Confidence in the peso was clearly questioned
considering this NAFTA article.
One of the most important protections of business interests was in response to an aversion
to protectionist policies.149 The view of regulatory policy as threating to free trade was not new
with NAFTA and still exists today. In a recent policy analysis, Watson and James (2013:1)
articulate the major problem threatening free trade as “the practice of using domestic
environmental or consumer safety regulation as a way to disguise protectionist policy.” Such a
fear was obvious in NAFTA by its removal of the common subsidies code, an agreement
originating in the CUFTA, allowing the United States to interpret policies supportive of farmers,
health, safety, labor rights, social equity, and regional development as unfair trade subsidies
(Dent 1994). NAFTA Article 1907 2(b) states that a new system to deal with “government
subsidization” should be created, but it is left open to accepting the current standards
indefinitely.
NAFTA went a step further than simply removing a subsidies code to criminalize
regulatory policies. In other words, NAFTA, far from protecting human rights, actually
criminalizes policies that may further human rights such as regulatory policies protecting the
environment or workers. Section C in Chapter Three of NAFTA provides businesses security
from non-tariff trade barriers—restrictions, prohibitions, policies, stipulations, or other
mechanisms, typically implemented by a government, that make the importation or exportation
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of a product more difficult and/or expensive. Thus, any environmental and/or worker protection
policy that increases the difficulty or price of goods production could be classified as a non-tariff
trade barrier and disputed under NAFTA. For instance, a U.S. company could challenge the
Mexican government if it implemented a policy to protect the environment by reducing the
amount of oil to be extracted, under the assumption that this policy would increase the price of
oil. Natural resource preservation strategies, in general, are viewed as violations under NAFTA
(Barry 1995). Furthermore, the burden of proof would be on Mexico to prove that its policy is in
accordance with Article 712. Such a dispute would then be settled by an appointed panel of
representatives according to Chapter Twenty of NAFTA. The power held by these dispute
settlement panels is another undemocratic element of NAFTA (Brown 1993). In all elements,
NAFTA restricts a state’s ability to regulate social harms such as worker rights violations and
environmental degradation (Hogenboom 1998).
One major case that illustrated the likely scenario of dispute settlement under non-tariff
trade barrier provisions during NAFTA negotiations was the well-known Tuna Dolphin Case.150
U.S. ENGOs boycotted Mexican tuna because Mexican tuna fisheries used driftnets to catch
their tuna leading to a rise in the number of dolphins accidentally killed, exceeding the
restrictions in place by the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act. Mexico disputed this
restriction as a violation of GATT (viewed as a non-tariff trade barrier). A GATT dispute panel,
much like the way NAFTA envisioned, ruled in favor of Mexico stating that an environment
outside U.S. borders was beyond its jurisdiction. Even efforts to label tuna “dolphin free” was
viewed as a violation of GATT as this likely would increase the difficulty for Mexico to sell its
tuna. Cases such as this one offered insight into how protective policies, even if they were for
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the good of the environment, workers, or even consumers, would ultimately be determined under
NAFTA by businesses and governments more concerned about profit than the environment,
workers, or consumers.151
Overall, NAFTA refers to human rights only superficially, while missing the opportunity
for advancing human rights more substantially, yet seizes the opportunity to provide rights and
protections for the financial and corporate elite. Dent (1994:93) points out that instead of the
NAFTA making true on its promises to workers and the environment:
Rather, the NAFTA is remarkable for its omission of minimum civil rights, labor
standards, wage standards, health standards, environmental standards, and social policy
standards which could have been employed to advance, or at least protect, human rights
in NAFTA-participating countries. Yet while silent on human rights, the NAFTA text is
explicit concerning the rights of State Parties, financial institutions, intellectual property
holders, other corporate actors.
The existence of the European Union’s social charter provided a noteworthy example of member
states creating a binding human rights agreement linked to economic and trade policy (Smith
1994).152 In other words, another multilateral economic policy that protected human rights
already existed for NAFTA use as a model, yet its negotiators opted for an agreement void of
human right protections. To top it off, some NAFTA proponents such as Galbraith (1993)
admitted to a high probability of socially harmful outcomes resulting from NAFTA, like the
destruction of the agricultural sector. In particular, he predicted local farmers would be
displaced and environmental degradation would worsen. The worst part, however, is that,
despite these insights, he did not criticize negotiators for ignoring these issues when they were
aware of them. Shockingly, one reason Galbraith (1993:32) argued for others to support NAFTA
is “if NAFTA fails, Mexican elites are more likely to step up repression, and less likely to play
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fair, than if it succeeds.” In other words, critics should accept and support NAFTA because, if it
fails, many people will be violently oppressed. He even admits that NAFTA is part of a
corporate and elite agenda, but weakly suggests that the lower-classes should support it or
potentially face the arguably worse consequences for not doing so. With Galbraith’s warning
and ultimatum in mind, the next chapter investigates the socially harmful outcomes of NAFTA.

Analytical Summary
The last chapter demonstrated the context under which NAFTA was negotiated. Most
importantly, NAFTA was negotiated among members of the TCC from the three North
American countries. Although Mexico was at a disadvantage due to its position in the worldsystem, the TCC was overwhelmingly influenced by neoliberal ideology which motivated their
pursuit of a neoliberal SSA, strengthened by NAFTA. This chapter focused more on the actual
negotiations and their result. Using the analytical model from Figure 2.1, NAFTA negotiations
can be investigated from a state-corporate crime framework. Following the state corporate-crime
framework (Kramer and Michalowski 2006; Rothe and Mullins 2009), Figure 6.1 was
constructed to demonstrate the various catalysts influencing the NAFTA negotiations at the
different levels of analysis.
First, consider the motivations for NAFTA, at the state level, Mexico desired NAFTA
because of its compromised position from the economic crisis in 1982 (Golob 2003) and sought
foreign investment and debt restructuring to address its failing economy (Cameron and Tomlin
2000; Fairbrother 2007). The United States desired NAFTA to solidify the unilateral moves
towards trade liberalization already taken by Mexico (Grinspun and Cameron 1996). Canada
joined negotiations more reluctantly to protect its interests previously established in CUFTA

Table 6.1 State-Corporate Crime Catalysts for Action Influencing NAFTA Negotiations
Catalysts for Action
Levels of Analysis
International Level

Motivations
TCC
Neoliberal global market
Compete with other trade
blocs
Investors’ rights

Opportunities
TCC
Massive collusion of
power/wealth
Media control
Information campaign
IFIs commitment
Classified negotiations

Constraints
Environmental and labor
groups
NAFTA side agreements
Popular opposition
Public Opinion
NGO criticisms

Controls
International Bill of
Human Rights

Macro Level
(State/Structural)

Solidify Mexico’s trade
liberalization (US)
Economic crisis 1982
(US/Mexico)
Foreign investment
(Mexico)
Protect CUFTA (Canada)

Desperate Mexico (US)
US domestic market (US)
Undemocratic (Mexico)
Repressive techniques
(Mexico)
Proximity to US

Canadian election
U.S. election
U.S. congressional
opposition (e.g.,
Gephardt)

US Fast-track approval
US Ratification process

Meso Level
(Organizational)

Neoliberal ideology
Investment opportunity
US domestic market

Financial resources
Business coalition with
state
Access to negotiations

CANACINTRA

Micro Level
(Interactional)

Advance individual career
Belief in neoliberal
policies
Similar social and
economic backgrounds
Maintain power

Connected in a powerful
web (TCC)
TCC groupthink

Morality of human rights
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(Cameron 1991; Goar 1992). According to world-system theory, Mexico was desperate to
secure investment due to its position as a peripheral nation and dependence on core nations,
while the United States and Canada pushed to maintain the current world-system to which they
were beneficiaries.
Although there were differences among the three countries in motivations at the state
level, internationally, there was much more overlap. The overlap is best explained by the TCC,
consisting of political elites, business leaders, leading intellectuals, and members of the IFIs
among others (Faux 2005). Members of the TCC sought a neoliberal global market exemplified
by deregulation and trade liberalization.153 Furthermore, investors’ rights, a major piece of
NAFTA, was a goal of the TCC, designed to shift power away from the state, which could be
held in check by the people, and give it to corporations.154 NAFTA also created a North
American trade bloc that could rival the European Union, and gain leverage in the GATT
negotiations (Baggaley 1998). This motivation was likely held by the North American segment
of the TCC (Robinson and Harris 2000).
At the organizational level, many of the corporations pushing for NAFTA were informed
by a neoliberal ideology that saw NAFTA as an investment opportunity to expand their scope of
influence (Chavolla Nava 1993; MacArthur 2000). For Canadian- and Mexican-based TNCs, the
massive U.S. domestic market was also on the table (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Individuals
involved in the NAFTA negotiations, primarily members of the TCC, held a common belief in
neoliberal policies as a panacea for the economic woes in North America. Many of them had
similar social upbringings with similar educations, and likely viewed NAFTA as a way to either
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advance their careers or maintain power (Petras and Morley 1990; Ángel Centeno and Mexfield
1992). For example, many of the U.S. politicians simply advanced NAFTA to appease their
donors and political partners, and Salinas and his administration tried to push NAFTA through
while simultaneously securing the PRI’s dominance (Oppenheimer 1998; MacArthur 2000;
Dombois, Hornberger, and Winter 2003).
Second, the opportunities for getting NAFTA through were nearly limitless for those in
favor, while those opposed faced extreme odds. At the state level, Mexico was able to use its
undemocratic structure to advocate for NAFTA (von Bertrab 1997). The Mexican state
benefited from its single-party dominance, corporatist mechanisms to control union opposition,
and hierarchical structure and informal camarilla networks (Cameron and Tomlin 2000).
Mexico also was able to violently oppress the opposition if necessary (America’s Watch 1994;
Orme 1996). On the other hand, the United States benefited most from Mexico’s desperation
and its control over information (Fairbrother 2007). The United States was able to get more
concessions from Mexico because of its dire need for investment (Mayer 1998). Canada mostly
stayed under the radar during the NAFTA negotiations which likely helped, given the
unpopularity of the recent CUFTA (Rohter 1990; Magnusson et al. 1991). The proximity
between the three countries also provided an opportunity to hasten negotiations.
The opportunities at the international level revolved largely around the massive collusion
of wealth and power concentrated in the TCC. With these resources, segments of the TCC
including von Bertrab’s (1997) team and USA*NAFTA were able to control the media and
dominate the information disseminated on NAFTA (Baldwin et al. 1993; Heredia 1994). The
TCC exposed the public to overwhelming favorable information on NAFTA. The negotiation
meetings were secret and classified, blocking the public from having any meaningful
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involvement in the negotiations (Mayer 1998; MacArthur 2000). These moves by the TCC
further evince their motivations listed in Figure 6.1. Similarly, at the organizational level, nearly
all of the largest corporations coalesced their boundless resources in USA*NAFTA (Baldwin et
al. 1993). Furthermore, these corporate leaders had access to the negotiations, while the public
did not (Hogenboom 1998).
At the interactional level, the bonds formed between members of the TCC created an
opportunity for them to work together to influence passage of a favorable policy (Pastor and
Wise 1994). The last chapter also discussed at length the groupthink that persisted among the
TCC (Clarkson 1993). The TCC groupthink likely existed for two reasons. First, members of
the TCC involved in the NAFTA negotiations likely sought to gain what they could rather than
question NAFTA which would have compromised their own position by creating conflict
(Heredia 1994). Second, neoliberal economic philosophy was heavily influential in harmonizing
many of the members in favor of NAFTA (Golob 2003). Otherwise, critics of neoliberalism
likely took a back seat to what appeared to be a consensus in favor of neoliberalism.
Third, since NAFTA was an international policy, most of the constraints were at the
international level. The largest opposition to NAFTA was environmental and labor groups
which, of course, led to the signing of the NAFTA supplemental agreements (Mayer 1998).
Without this opposition, NAFTA would likely have passed without the side agreements, thus
resulting in fewer protections to workers and the environment. Popular opposition rallied behind
politically diverse intellectuals who posed major threats to NAFTA, including Ross Perot, Pat
Buchanan, and Ralph Nader (Scott 1998). These anti-NAFTA leaders fostered a large segment
of the North American population to oppose NAFTA. Despite their efforts, however, public
opinion was at best only slightly unfavorable to NAFTA, and more often remained split
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(Molyneux 1994; Ayres and Macdonald 2009). The resources possessed by the TCC seemingly
were too much to overcome (Mayer 1998). NGOs also played a role in constraining NAFTA
through their criticism of the policy and the players involved (Human Rights Watch 2001). Most
notably, they pointed to the abysmal environmental and human rights record in Mexico
(America’s Watch 1990; 1992; 1994; Hogenboom 1998).
At the state level, both the Canadian and U.S. elections threatened NAFTA (Bryden
1992; Cameron and Tomlin 2000). In both cases, NAFTA proponents overcame a brief scare
when liberal candidates won in each election. Although NAFTA may have passed without its
side agreements with a Bush win, Clinton’s presidency did not kill NAFTA, and may have
actually helped to get it through by quieting some of the opposition since both environmental and
labor groups were long time members of the Democratic constituency (Cameron and Tomlin
2000). In the case of the Canadian election, Chrétien’s win did little to slow down NAFTA
(MacArthur 2000). Maybe most problematic at the state level was the opposition to NAFTA
found in the U.S. Congress, most principally, Gephardt (Bradsher 1993b). Again, this constraint
on NAFTA from members of U.S. Congress, at best, led to the NAFTA supplemental
agreements. In the end, the congressional opposition was offered political cover from its voting
constituency via the side agreements, and that was good enough for them (Mayer 1998).
Few, if any, constraints existed at the organizational and interactional level. In fact, there
was little resistance to NAFTA among large businesses. CANACINTRA was the major
opposition in Mexico representing small- and medium-sized business, but eventually shifted its
view to favor NAFTA (Poitras and Robinson 1994; Shadlen 2000). Since members of the TCC
experienced similar socialization, there was little constraint offered by its members (Ángel
Centeno and Maxfield 1992; Camp 1995). The public also likely trusted the members of the
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TCC such as political elites, business leaders, and the media, and had little reason to question
them based on limited knowledge.
Finally, more formal controls were also limited. The most important were likely the need
for fast-track approval and ratification of NAFTA by the U.S. Congress which were the major
battles ultimately won by the TCC through their vigorous information campaigns (Cameron and
Tomlin 2000; MacArtur 2000). Although this existed at the state level for the United States, the
U.S. Congress was the safeguard to potentially stop NAFTA from happening for all three
countries (Mayer 1998). Other than the U.S. Congress, there was virtually nothing that could
stop NAFTA. As discussed in this chapter, the body of law known as the International Bill of
Human Rights can be applied to NAFTA to make an argument that NAFTA was crimanl and a
criminogenic policy and therefore should not have been passed. However, this was not a
common argument made, and only Dent (1994) made a similar argument, albeit after NAFTA
was implemented. During the NAFTA negotiations, the arguments against NAFTA did not
discuss NAFTA or its probable outcomes as human rights violations or criminal. Thus, this
control virtually did not exist, even though the argument was there to be made. Lastly, at the
interactional level, a morality of human rights appeared to exist among the opposition, but
seemingly did not influence members of the TCC evinced by the near complete remission of
human rights language in the final NAFTA text.
Overall, the TCC actively pursued a NAFTA that was sympathetic to business interests
while neglecting the concerns of the people. Connections within the TCC ran deep with
seemingly boundless resources utilized to win public and political support for NAFTA.
Although the opposition was successful in winning supplemental agreements, these side
agreements arguably fell well short of the opposition’s desires. Thus, the constraints on NAFTA
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were relatively weak, and the controls were virtually non-existent. Ultimately, NAFTA was
largely shaped by the TCC who saw NAFTA as an opportunity to further its goal of achieving a
neoliberal global market that favored investors. The resultant NAFTA reflective of these
interests should then, unsurprisingly, bring outcomes favorable to those who played a role in
creating it and campaigning for it. It would also not be surprising if the reckless neglect of
legitimate concerns over NAFTA led to the negative social outcomes predicted by its critics. In
other words, this particular NAFTA was criminogenic. However, in addition to being
criminogenic – creating conditions conducive for crimainl outcomes – NAFTA was also
demonstrated as being criminal for its negotiation process and policy itself. For many of the
same reasons, NAFTA was both criminal and criminogenic. For example, the undemocratic
nature of NAFTA was criminal for its violation of international law as explained, and the
undemocratic formation of NAFTA also increased the likelihood that criminal outcomes such as
poverty may occur for those groups unrepresented in NAFTA negotiations such as Mexican corn
farmers. The next chapter looks at the last 22 years since NAFTA was ratified to highlight its
negative social and economic consequences. By highlighting these negative social and
eeconomic outcomes, NAFTA can be argued a criminogenic policy giving rise to multiple
criminal outcomes or HRVs. The focus will be on the social harms (crimes/HRVs) primarily
experienced by indigenous farmers in Mexico.
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Chapter 6 Appendix: NAFTA Sources
This chapter pieces together a wide variety of sources to retell the story of the NAFTA
negotiations. However, four particular sources were invaluable to reconstructing the negotiation
process, while others simply filled in minor gaps or reconfirmed the information in the primary
sources. Two of these sources are books written by people who actively participated in the
negotiations from opposite sides. Frederick W. Mayer (1998), a political scientist, took a leave
of absence from Duke University to eventually be offered a position handling foreign matters for
U.S. Senator Bill Bradley. When NAFTA hit Capitol Hill, Mayer became a participant in the
NAFTA negotiations, writing presidential memos, talking with a wide variety of NAFTA agents
including officials at the Office of United States Trade Representative, Mexican and Canadian
leaders, and lobbyists for business, labor, and the environment. He spent most of his time
tracking the public politics of NAFTA and informing Bill Bradley on strategies for intervention.
His book attempts to write “NAFTA’s story, not [his]” (Mayer 1998:xii) by placing its story in
the larger context. He included a myriad of newspaper articles, transcripts, press releases,
reports, advertisements, and other documents on NAFTA in his analysis, while he also
interviewed around two hundred people involved in the NAFTA negotiations from both Mexico
and the United States.
On the other side of the NAFTA negotiations, Hermann von Bertrab provides a memoir
of his account working on a NAFTA team to negotiate the trade deal. He was recruited by the
Mexican private sector to organize a negotiating team for Mexico. After Herminio Blanco was
named chief negotiator for NAFTA in October 1990, he asked his long-time friend von Bertrab
to head up a negotiating team for Mexico. Blanco was an old student of von Bertrab’s at
Mexico’s Monterrey Institute of Technology who remained friends with him well after
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graduation. Both von Bertrab and Blanco were U.S. educated obtaining PhDs in economics from
the University of Texas at Austin and the University of Chicago respectively. Von Bertrab was
in Blanco’s camarilla, thus by association in Salinas’s camarilla. Von Bertrab’s book is more of
a personal account than Mayer’s, although he does state that he tried to present an account
closest to the truth.
The most valuable source of all was a study by Maxwell A. Cameron, a political scientist
and Brian W. Tomlin (2000), a professor of international affairs, that strived to conduct a
balanced and behind the scenes account of the negotiations including all three countries
perspectives and major players. Through the use of an informant in the Canadian government,
they were privy to crucial insider information and established various contacts. This relationship
led to extensive interviews with the key players in the NAFTA negotiations as well as other
tangential negotiators. With the privileged information they accessed, they were able to probe
their participants further than otherwise would have been possible.
Lastly, John R. McArthur provides an investigative journalistic account of the NAFTA
deal and how politicians and business elites worked together to subvert public opposition on
NAFTA. His book is told in a narrative format, but still, offers some powerful stories of his
personal experience and interviews with those involved and affected by NAFTA. The overall
story begins and ends with a Swingline plant that relocates from Long Island to Nogales, Mexico
since one of his primary interests was how NAFTA was affecting workers in the United States.
Ironically, President Zedillo was at the ribbon-cutting event for its grand opening in Mexico.
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CHAPTER 7
THE CRIMINOGENIC EFFECTS OF NAFTA ON MEXICO’S POPULATION

Overview of NAFTA Effects
NAFTA immediately impacted Mexico leading to a repressive effort to quell the
Zapatistas who declared war against the Mexican state on January 1, 1994, the day NAFTA went
into effect (La Botz 1995; Rochlin 1997; Cuninghame and Corona 1998), a peso devaluation
near the end of NAFTA’s first year of implementation (Peach 1995; Lee 1995; Thacker 1999;
Wise 1998), and a subsequent economic crisis beginning in 1995 (Cameron and Tomlin 2000;
Morris and Passé-Smith 2001). Given that NAFTA was an economic policy, some Mexicans felt
its economic effects soon after its implementation. Although NAFTA’s economic impact was
devastating, dissidents who adamantly opposed the neoliberal economic model culminated by
NAFTA faced a worse fate. One such example is the Acteal Massacre.
On December 22, 1997, heavily armed paramilitary soldiers surrounded a chapel in
Acteal where several pro-Zapatista civilians were gathered.155 The paramilitary opened fire on
the villagers and pursued all those who fled, killing 45 Tzotzils, an indigenous group, including
36 women and children. Despite knowledge of the onslaught, government security forces failed
to intervene. Some of the victims were mutilated by machetes, and in at least one instance, a
pregnant woman’s belly was cut open and her baby ripped from her womb. The paramilitary
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See Stahler-Sholk (1998) for more details. The story that they were praying while being attacked has been
disputed.

257
was linked to the PRI and tasked with targeting those opposed to NAFTA (Human Rights Watch
1997).156
Although the Acteal Massacre was not the only attack of its kind, the majority of
NAFTA’s victims did not experience violent repression. Rather, they felt the wide-ranging
negative economic impact of NAFTA. While most pro-NAFTA studies praised the success of
NAFTA by pointing to the increased foreign direct investment flowing into Mexico, expanding
exports to the massive U.S. market, rising productivity in Mexico, and/or increasing
macroeconomic stability (Fitzgerald 2001; Weintraub 2004; Hufbauer and Schott 2005; 2007;
2008; USTR 2008; Villarreal and Fergusson 2015; McBride 2017), these studies neglect the
crippling effects of NAFTA experienced primarily by the rural indigenous farmers of Mexico,
and the Mexican population more generally. Studies show that Mexico has experienced little or
no job growth, and often a net loss of jobs (Zepeda, Wise, and Gallagher 2009; Cypher and Wise
2010). While job growth did occur in the maquiladora sector, the over 2.3 million jobs lost in
agriculture (over a quarter of the total jobs) offset these gains (Zepeda et al. 2009), resulting in a
high level of un- and underemployment.157
Farmers throughout Mexico were the hardest hit by job loss with about 20 percent of
agricultural jobs disappearing from 1991 to 2007 (Weisbrot, Lefebvre, and Sammut 2014),
forcing many to find work in the maquiladoras or the United States (Kim 2013). Even more
troubling, of the over 8 million workers left in agriculture, nearly 55 percent were
underemployed, working seasonally or less than six months a year (Weisbrot et al. 2014).158
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See also articles written by Jesús Cuevas Ramírez in La Jornada, January 2 and 3, 1998.
Mexico has no unemployment insurance or any social safety net for the unemployed. Scholars suggest that the
official unemployment rate is superficially low, failing to take into account high levels of underemployment (Laurell
2015). According to the CIA (See CIA World Factbook), Mexico’s unemployment rate in 2016 was 4.4 percent, but
they estimated the underemployment rate as high as 25 percent.
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Seasonal agricultural workers increased 151 percent over the same time period of 1991 to 2007 (Weisbrot et al.
2014).
157
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Those lucky enough to secure a job after NAFTA found their wages stagnated (Zárate-Hoyos
and Spencer 2003; Rello 2008; Zepeda et al. 2009; CONEVAL 2013; Laurell 2015), their job
was unlikely to offer basic benefits (Zepeda et al. 2009), and their working conditions probably
were abysmal.159 The PRI and transnational corporations (TNCs) undermined unions, further
exacerbating the poor working conditions (La Botz 1995; Wise, Salazar, and Carlsen 2003;
Bacon 2004; Bacon 2014b).160 Instead of causing U.S. and Mexican wages to converge, NAFTA
widened the gap (Jus Semper Global Alliance 2016) and sustained high levels of economic
inequality in Mexico (Esquivel and Rodríguez-López 2003; Airola and Juhn 2005; Esquivel
2015).161 The southern states saw few benefits from NAFTA, and the rural peasants were left to
fend for themselves in a harshly competitive global economy (Robertson 2000; Esquivel et al.
2002; Chiquiar 2008; Baylis, Garduno-Rivera, and Piras 2012). Poverty skyrocketed after the
Mexican peso devaluation in 1994, subjecting 69 percent of Mexicans to poverty in 1996 with
37.4 percent living in extreme poverty (Laurell 2015).162 Since then, poverty has returned to preNAFTA levels.163 Rural poverty has followed a similar trend, but has been more pronounced
than overall poverty, with 55 percent of the population experiencing rural poverty and 25 percent
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In interviews, several workers have discussed conditions such as improper ventilation of toxic chemicals,
inoperable exhaust systems, faulty equipment, high levels of dangerous chemical exposure, long hours, missed
payments, and no vacation time (MacArthur 2000; Simon 2014). Workers experienced a series of chronic physical
conditions including carpal tunnel syndrome, weakened or injured shoulders, glue addiction, incessant sinusitis, and
other musculoskeletal injuries (Simon 2014). Workers who experienced these types of crippling chronic conditions
were referred to as jonkeados, meaning junked workers, and treated as such.
160
Fake unions – those created by the firm itself – commonly existed with no knowledge of them held by workers
(Bacon 2004). Previous studies have shown that 90-95 percent of labor contracts are signed without the knowledge
of the union in order to prevent real organizing (Bacon 2014b). The PRI held several voters/workers “hostage” by
offering them aid for party loyalty as noted earlier (Bacon 2004).
161
Although NAFTA did not ostensibly increase the GINI coefficient for households, Mexico’s GINI remained high
in comparison to other countries in the Western Hemisphere (Zepeda et al. 2009). See also Galbraith (2014) for a
sophisticated look at inequality in Mexico.
162
Poverty is defined as “income less than needed to cover food, clothing, housing, health, public transportation, and
education,” while extreme poverty is defined as “income less than needed to cover the basic food basket defined by
INEGI and CEPAL” (translation by Zepeda et al. 2009:21).
163
See the World Bank’s poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) at
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=MX.
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living in extreme poverty in the countryside during 2006 at a time when overall poverty was
relatively low (Zepeda et al. 2009).
At a NAFTA conference in November 1991, Stephen Schlossberg (1993:219), Director
of Washington Branch International Labor Organization raised the following question about
NAFTA’s future:
NAFTA gives this nation, Canada, and Mexico the opportunity to demonstrate that they
are worthwhile societies that recognize people as social as well as economic beings.
Shall we have a fair and compassionate society – in essence, a decent society – or shall
we opt for greed and the law of the jungle?
His question seems best answered by the latter. The devastating economic effects have forced
Mexicans to adjust their agricultural strategies, migrate to northern Mexico or the United States,
or seek work in the informal economy. Those who challenged the Mexican government over the
harsh conditions brought by NAFTA and other neoliberal policies often faced a fate similar to
the Tzotzils in Acteal. This chapter attempts to further answer Schlossberg’s question by
examining several deleterious outcomes influenced by NAFTA, and argues that NAFTA largely
contributed to their severity due to the type of NAFTA described in Chapter 6.164 These NAFTA
outcomes consist of four overlapping types: (1) agriculture; (2) environment; (3) migration; and
(4) the drug war. Although these are not all of the negative effects influenced by NAFTA, they
are some of the most important and impactful ones. Each type will be discussed in turn.
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However, the multitude of policies passed during the neoliberal age, such as those discussed in the previous
chapters, make it nearly impossible to isolate NAFTA as a sole cause of these negative outcomes. Thus, the effects
presented here are due partially to NAFTA, while also influenced by the other neoliberal polices as well. However,
this chapter will attempt to argue that NAFTA greatly exacerbated these social harms.
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Agriculture
The agricultural section of NAFTA was particularly interesting in that it was the only part
of the agreement that was bilateral rather than trilateral. The U.S.-Mexico agreement actually
had fewer protections than the U.S.-Canadian agreement despite Mexico’s status as a developing
nation. Many of the major changes to agriculture were also done as part of the NAFTA sales
package, primarily the amendment to Article 27 which put an end to the ejido system and
effectively privatized the countryside. Furthermore, the poor economic performance after
implementation of NAFTA translated into serious harms for many small farmers, probably more
so than any other group in Mexico. Together, these policies created a neoliberal agricultural
model that displaced and impoverished peasants while enriching TNCs. The struggles of the
rural poor were further complicated by poor nutrition, induced by the changes to food
production. Lastly, Mexico’s new focus on importing many staple foods left it helpless to feed its
own population when global food prices increased.

Neoliberal Agricultural Model
NAFTA and the other neoliberal policies brought a new agricultural economic strategy to
Mexico, shifting the focus to crop specialization and global exportation. Yet, production
specialization degraded natural and human resources, subordinated local producers to the whim
of foreign-based TNCs and governments, impinged on the food security of Mexico’s poorest
populations, threatened Mexico’s food sovereignty, and sacrificed domestic consumers’
nutritional diets (González 2014). NAFTA envisioned a particular strategy for agricultural
production in North America based on comparative advantage. Most capital- and land-intensive
production was expected to shift to the United States, due to its superiority in high-yield,
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mechanized agricultural production, while labor-intensive production was expected to shift to
Mexico. Thus, crops such as fruits, vegetables, nuts, and coffee were expected to expand in
Mexico where cheap labor could be exploited. Since NAFTA, seasonal fruits and vegetables
have been grown in Mexico, while staple crops, such as corn and soybeans, have been largely
produced in the United States, and, to a lesser extent, Canada.
The neoliberal corn regime created under NAFTA promotes food quantity over all else
(Fitting 2011). Thus, TNCs are typically favored over small-scale farmers since they produce
corn in massive quantities. In Defense of Maize, a grassroots peasant organization, critiqued the
new agricultural approach, arguing that food sovereignty and quality should be the primary goals
of corn production, not to mention that this agricultural model was costing millions of Mexicans
their livelihoods. NAFTA simply continues a long Mexican history of maize struggles.165 Both
pre-and post-revolution, corn was targeted to either displace or modernize indigenous peoples, a
trend that has accelerated under NAFTA (Fitting 2011). NAFTA has continued the legacy of the
Green Revolution by benefitting major agricultural producers while having devastating effects
on smaller-scale farmers.166
Another major strategy in the neoliberal food regime is monoculture or monocropping–
the agricultural practice of cultivating a single crop every growing season within the same land
area (Pechlaner and Otero 2010). Corn, particularly, became heavily concentrated in Sinaloa.
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Part of the struggle is racial and cultural, beyond simply being about corn. The history of corn production is tied
to natives, and more recently, mestizo history, while wheat is linked with whiteness (Pilcher 1998). Throughout
Spanish colonization, the ruling elite viewed corn production with a paternalistic and condescending attitude. At
one point, tortilla consumption was an official measure of poverty.
166
The Green Revolution, often viewed as an equally enjoyed historical achievement, actually benefited primarily
large-scale farmers in the North. Although the Green Revolution was touted for its ability to alleviate hunger in
poor societies, a major meta-analysis concluded that inequality actually intensified after the Green Revolution (See
Boletim da Commissao Pastoral da Terra-CPT as cited by Lappé, Collins, and Rosset (1998:65). TNCs that fueled
the Green Revolution, funded by the U.S. government, were primarily motivated by profits and not humanitarian
reasons or environmental sustainability (Kloppenburg 1988).
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The use of genetically modified (GM) corn also threatened biodiversity by growing one or
limited species of corn. Given the focus on production specialization, production of specific
fruits and vegetables also increased while other crops were abandoned. Emphasis on
monocropping was paired with forced urbanization of rural peasants to sustain a cheap labor
force necessary to attract foreign investment (Bartra 2004). These changes were justified by
increased productivity.
Overall, the neoliberal agricultural strategy to focus on high-value exports has resulted in
three major outcomes. First, regional concentration of specific crop cultivation subordinated
itself to foreign priorities of governments and TNCs, primarily by the changes to tariffs and
subsidies. Second, Mexico’s integration into the North American agromarket increased food
vulnerability by prioritizing external demands rather than domestic needs, and destroyed the
traditional Mexican diet. Third, monocropping degraded the land, thus depriving Mexicans of
natural resources and damaging the health of workers.

Struggling Peasants and Thriving TNCs
The typical NAFTA story concerning agriculture is one of struggling small- to mediumscale farmers and prospering agricultural producers tied to TNCs.167 Effectively, NAFTA
removed Mexican tariffs on a variety of crops, most importantly corn, eliminated most supports
for small farmers, and allowed the United States to subsidize its agricultural sector without
penalty. The amendment of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, combined with other
changes in the agricultural sector, were also made in the lead up to NAFTA. All of these policies
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Nearly 66 percent of corn producers are considered small farmers defined as those with less than five hectares of
land, using 57 percent of their harvest for self-consumption (Rivera 2009). Contrarily, large agricultural producers
have more than five hectares of land and only consume 13.6 percent of their own harvest.
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came together to create the perfect storm crippling smaller scale corn farmers. NAFTA
impacted corn more than any crop (Rivera, Whiteford, and Chávez 2009). In 1990, corn
accounted for a third of Mexico’s agricultural production. In comparison, the United States
produced 14 times more corn than Mexico. After implementation of NAFTA, cheap U.S. corn
flooded the Mexican market and decreased farmers’ income from corn by 66 percent (Wise
2009). From 1994 to 2008, Mexican corn imports from the United States more than tripled,
according to the USDA, and more than quadrupled, according to the Mexican Agricultural
Secretariat (Browning 2013). Many farmers found growing corn no longer sustainable (Public
Citizen 2001) with entire towns being abandoned as their farmers could not compete with
heavily-subsidized U.S. corn production (Clark 2006).
Exporting products to a country below their production value is referred to as product
dumping. NAFTA did not impose penalties for subsidies, unlike the World Trade Organization,
and thus provided the opportunity for U.S. product dumping in Mexico. For example, Wise
(2009) examined the production of eight agricultural exports—corn, soybeans, wheat, rice,
cotton, beef, pork, and poultry–subsidized by the U.S. government. Overall, Wise finds that both
U.S. policies and subsidies affected the competitiveness of U.S. exports. The United States
exported many crops at dumping-level prices (or below production costs). The cost to Mexican
producers was monumental for corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, and rice, resulting in a combined
loss of $9.7 billion from 1997 to 2005, with corn accounting for around 66 percent of the total
loss. Since livestock producers used cheap corn and soybeans as feed, Mexican livestock
producers lost an estimated $3.2 billion over the same period. When all eight products are
combined, the losses account for 10 percent of all Mexican agricultural exports and are greater
than all Mexican tomato exports, one of the primary crops designated to replace corn. Dumping
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margins increased significantly after 1996, with all eight products having positive dumping
margins (higher for crops than livestock), and product prices fell. Ironically, corn production in
Mexico increased, while the other crops all showed a decline in production.168
NAFTA was not the only reason for the U.S. product dumping. Mexico’s major farm
subsidy program, PROCAMPO, was actually found to contribute to U.S. product dumping,
rather than helping rural Mexican farmers, since the PROCAMPO support payments were less
than the losses from U.S. product dumping (Wise 2009). Wise argued that compensatory tariffs
would be more likely to be effective in reducing U.S. product dumping than Mexico matching
U.S. subsidies, but NAFTA blocks such efforts. In addition, NAFTA eliminated tariffs while
ignoring subsidies, which actually incentivized agricultural subsidies. Before NAFTA, the
United States shifted agricultural strategies towards overproduction. However, the 1996
Freedom to Farm Act changed the game by abandoning a strategy of managing supply. 169
Almost immediately, a crisis ensued where millions of acres of land were brought back into
production leading to overproduction and low prices (Ray, Ugarte, and Tiller 2003; Wise 2009).
The burden of price failures was shifted from consumers to taxpayers, and government payments
flowed to farmers as compensation. Although product dumping was punishable under NAFTA,
the Mexican state never pursued this line of adjudication. Instead, Mexico chose not to impose
tariffs, accelerating the effects of NAFTA. For example, corn tariffs were not set to be
completely eliminated until January 1, 2008, under NAFTA, but Mexico allowed corn to be
imported over quota immediately after NAFTA was implemented. The 15-year transition period
was actually compressed into only 30 months (Nadal 2000; Rivera, Whiteford, and Chávez
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Relinger (2010) finds similar results.
See The New York Times, April 5, 1996 at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/05/us/clinton-signs-farm-billending-subsidies.html.
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2009). U.S. subsidies were much higher than Mexican subsidies for all crops except wheat and
soybeans (Wise 2009; Rivera, Whiteford, and Chávez 2009). The United States also gained
some advantage through export credits, although it was quite small (Wise 2009). Subsidizing
agriculture has not been limited to the United States. Massive subsidies by OECD countries do
not tend to offer any help to small-scale agricultural production (Lazio 2003).
Surprisingly, gross production of and total surface area used for corn cultivation
increased (Browning 2013). Such an outcome flies in the face of the overall NAFTA agricultural
strategy, yet reflects how the average Mexican small farmer responded to NAFTA. Mexican
peasants likely continued to grow corn despite a major decline in its price for a variety of
reasons. First, horticultural crops suffer from fewer commercial applications, a shorter shelf life,
and tend to use more destructive production practices that are harsher on the land. Second, the
neoliberal agricultural strategy severely underestimated the cultural importance of maize
production and consumption. Mexico is the cradle of maize cultivation where it has been grown
since as early as 5000 BC and throughout the Mayan and Incan empires (MacNeish 1972). Corn
is used for ancient religious practices, the main staple of the Mexican diet, the major crop grown
by peasants, and even used as a social safety net (Bellon and Hellin 2010; Fitting 2011; Lewis
2011). In rural areas, corn is treated as a secondary currency for trade and survival. Around 40
different maize varieties are grown in Mexico dating back thousands of years (Audley et al.
2004). Thus, maize is more than just a crop, it is a cultural identity for many Mexicans.
Third, small farmers lacked adequate support to allow for a switch to alternative crops
(Avalos and Graillet 2013). These farmers often lacked credit, technology, quality land, and
infrastructure needed to cultivate alternative horticultural crops. Instead of switching crops,
those farmers unable to survive with corn cultivation commonly migrated north to urban centers.
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In addition, the lower price of corn was accompanied by large increases in tortilla prices,
ultimately allowing the two largest Mexican corn flour mills, Gruma and Grupo Minsa, to
control 90 percent of the domestic corn flour production, pocketing most of the gains (Zahniser
and Coyle 2004). While corn prices plummeted, tortilla prices skyrocketed 279 percent by 2004,
but medium and small farmers did not reap the benefits (Henriques and Patel 2004). The
Mexican government abandoned tortilla price controls and subsidies in 1999 after 25 years of
support, further inflating the tortilla oligarchy’s power (Avalos and Graillet 2013). The preferred
alternative crops, fruit and other horticultural products, provided few employment opportunities
since most of the production increases were due to technological improvements, and these subsectors constitute only 3 percent of total exports.
Using municipal data from 1991 and 2001, Alvarez et al. (2011) found that producers
with larger farms and greater access to insurance and information were more likely to abandon
corn production for alternatives by 2001. Smaller producers knew very little about potential new
markets for agricultural products available from NAFTA (Chávez 2009), while large-scale
agribusinesses had access to pertinent information to transform their firms into profitable
enterprises. For small-scale producers, the government never intervened to offer help or an
alternative. For some states, farmers increased corn acreage in congruence with other
horticultural crops, while other states increased corn replacing other less lucrative staple crops
(Alvarez et al. 2011). Some factors such as literacy, irrigation, and access to credit led to a
diversification in crops, while other factors such as a lack of pesticides and fertilizers led
subsistence farmers to continue growing their traditional crops. Thus, policies with cash
payouts, credit access, or support for chemical inputs likely would not help farmers switch their
crops. Alvarez et al. (2011) concluded that small farmers are unable to transition their crop

267
production without government support, but subsistence farmers react very differently to
governmental programs and may not benefit the same as commercial farmers from the same
policies.
Groenewald and Van Den Berg (2012) used fieldwork, household surveys, focus groups,
and key informant interviews to explore what adaptive strategies farmers employed to survive
the neoliberal agricultural model. Although informants considered cattle more lucrative than
corn, most farmers did not make that switch. Peasants receiving PROCAMPO funds indicated
that they spent most of these funds on production costs for corn, suggesting that PROCAMPO
was enabling corn production rather than encouraging farmers to switch crops. Evidence from
one government program developed to subsidize livestock production, Caja por Caja, suggests
that the program only helped those farmers who had at least some money to invest in the
program rather than the most impoverished (Browning 2013). The program was also extremely
complicated to follow and navigate with the proper documentation, often creating more costs
than benefits.
Groenwald and Van Den Berg (2012) found struggling Mexican farmers used three
primary coping strategies. First, the overwhelming response from small-scale farmers (67%)
was to continue producing maize. Nearly all of their time and land was dedicated to maize
production. Second, 16 percent of households supplemented their corn cultivation with cattle
grazing. They used PROCAMPO funds to invest in cattle-breeding. Third, a diversified income
approach was adopted by 16 percent of households. These households used all of their land for
corn cultivation, but supplemented their wages by spending most of their time not working the
fields. Instead, they found temporary work on plantations or in the non-farm sector. The
peasants gave several reasons for continuing maize production in the face of dwindling prices.
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The most prominent response (24.5%) was the lack of knowledge on how to grow other crops.
Many responses suggested that maize was of significant cultural importance, describing maize
cultivation as a family tradition (18.5%) or a village tradition (6.0%). Several respondents also
mentioned maize’s importance to the local diet (20.5%), suggesting concern over food security.
If government support did exist, the programs were often not understood, and many people did
not know how to apply for them (Browning 2013).
Transitional support for small farmers has either been nonexistent, severely lacking, or
misguided. In addition to the large dumping margins, access to credit decreased for rural
peasants with only 4 percent of rural farmers having access to credit by 2007, inhibiting them
from competing (Fernández, Wise, and Garvey 2012). According to surveys conducted with
poor rural farmers in Alamso, PROCAMPO payments were more likely allocated to purchasing
basic necessities rather than improving farmers’ competitiveness (Keleman 2010). In another
survey in Chiapas, PROCAMPO funds were reportedly used mostly to pay off debts, invest in
non-livestock agricultural goods, and purchase household supplies (Bellon and Hellin 2011).
Larger-scale farmers, however, received over-allotments of these funds (Palmer-Rubin 2012).
About a quarter of the respondents reported that PROCAMPO payments accounted for half of
their agricultural income (Keleman 2010). A large portion of participants (42%) applied their
funds to necessities such as food, transportation, clothing, and medicines, while agricultural land
preparation was secondary with only a quarter of respondents claiming it was their first choice.
Only around a quarter of respondents actually changed their crops, and even fewer, only 6
percent, said that PROCAMPO improved their access to agricultural technology. Unfortunately,
local maize did not fit well into NAFTA’s scheme for short-term profitability and required more
long-term support. Keleman (2010) qualitatively assessed several institutions and programs with
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the majority of findings suggesting negative effects for rural farmers often due to exclusion. He
concluded that the neoliberal agricultural policies actually made conditions more difficult for
small-scale farmers. He suggested government support for maize diversity conservation is
necessary given the lack of collective cohesion among small farmers.170 In other words, the lack
of transitional support left farmers to fend for themselves in a viciously competitive postNAFTA economy flooded with cheap U.S.-subsidized corn.
Although neoliberalism revolved around a rhetoric of removing governmental
intervention, the government simply changed its intervention methods establishing connections
with the private sector (Radcliffe 2005). Instead, a few large firms remained after massive
consolidation and raked in enormous profits with virtual monopolies, while corn farmers
suffered (Public Citizen 2014). TNCs such as Cargill, Maseca, and Minsa were favored under
these policies, and particularly by NAFTA (Liverman and Vilas 2006; Aguilar Soto 2007;
Appendini 2014). In addition to transnational food producers, transnational food retailers
benefitted from NAFTA by seizing control of 75 percent of the market by 2001 (Chávez 2009).
Mexico’s northwest region was particularly favored for post-NAFTA agricultural growth given
its rare irrigated lands produced higher and more stable yields (Scott 2010), while the nonirrigated sector is more erratic since it experiences more climate-induced crop failures (Sweeney
et al. 2013). Poor rural farmers were overwhelmingly located on rain-fed land, while the
Northwest continued to experience growth in market share. Thus, the NAFTA strategy left the
small farmers further behind.
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Groenewald and Niehof (2015) conducted surveys and focus groups with farmers in Morales and found that
farmers do not benefit from farmer groups – formal networks that provide members with services to help increase
profitability – because group members rarely help each other or share information. Only households actually
display high levels of cohesion. Furthermore, poverty exacerbates the issues complicating what would likely help
these farmers escape poverty. One example of this is the loss of credit among rural farmers. Consequently, the
exhibited individualistic behavior weakens the community resources. The end result of all these various
complications is unsustainable farmer groups.
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In particular, the Free and Sovereign State of Sinaloa disproportionately received much
of the government funding for farm subsidies (Scott 2010; Eakin, Buasch, and Sweeney 2014).
According to one Trust Funds for Rural Development (FIRA) informant, Sinaloa subsidies
accounted for 16 percent of national agricultural finances. FIRA (2006) officially claimed that
possibly over a quarter of the corn production cost in Sinaloa was subsidized by farm subsidies.
In another analysis, Sinaloa was found to be the main beneficiary of federal policies, receiving
more than 12 percent while only 4 percent went to the nation’s agricultural workers (Scott 2010).
Some programs contributed extremely large portions of their funds to Sinaloa. For example, the
Ingreso Objective program allocated 68 percent of its budget to Sinaloa subsidies (Appendini
2014). These subsidies created a Sinaloa monoculture that often flooded the market with corn.
NAFTA preparations led to the dismantling of CONASUPO (Compañia Nacional de
Subsistencias Populares) beginning in 1991 and a full liquidation by 1999, removing most crop
subsidies, and then replaced the program with ASERCA171 in 1991, which preserved crop
subsidies for corn during times when corn prices drop below production costs (Yunez-Naude
2003; Rivera, Whiteford, and Chávez 2009). However, ASERCA price supports directed aid at
large-scale commercial maize growers (Fox and Haight 2010; Appendini 2014). Salinas wanted
to focus on helping commercial farmers demonstrate to the world that Mexico had a modern
agricultural sector (Smith 1992). Part of this strategy was to make Mexico more attractive for
NAFTA as well. The government made several efforts to disseminate information on maize
cultivation and the available subsidies to attract more growers in Sinaloa (Eakin et al. 2014).
Technological innovation was important to Sinaloa’s success in maize cultivation. Seed
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See the ASERCA (Agencia de Servicios a la Comercialización y Desarrollo de Mercados Agropecuarios)
webpage at Mexico’s government website for more information on ASERCA at
http://www.sagarpa.gob.mx/quienesomos/datosabiertos/aserca/Paginas/default.aspx.
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innovation was particularly important, allowing Pioneer and Monsanto to dominate the market.
In interviews, several members of private organizations and public officials in Sinaloa expressed
concerns such as new “super pests” resistant to pesticides, excessive use of synthetic nitrogen,
the overproduction of maize (the largest concern), and transportation costs (Eakin et al. 2014).
The concentration of maize production in Sinaloa also left Mexico vulnerable to any disaster that
threatens maize production in that region such as drought, low reservoir levels, and the frost of
2011. The state-engineered maize boom in Sinaloa may have created an artificial food security
and potentially led to a major food crisis to be discussed in the next section.
In a key analysis of farm subsidies, Fox and Haight (2010) drew four major conclusions.
First, the loss of rural employment was not due to a lack of government funding, which had
increased significantly during the 2000s, rather government aid has targeted large-scale
commercial farmers while not prioritizing support for subsistence farmers. Second, the lack of
transparency in Mexican subsidy programs has limited attempts to hold them accountable.
Third, although PROCAMPO was the only program officially designed to compensate peasants
for their losses after NAFTA, it more often excluded these individuals from receiving such aid
while disproportionately benefiting large commercial agricultural producers. In addition, seed
subsidy programs were reduced to virtually nothing by 2006, and fertilizer subsidies were
removed, alongside rising prices in fertilizers resulting in few gains for small growers (Bellon
and Hellin 2011). Fourth, other non-PROCAMPO subsidies were even more skewed towards
benefitting larger farmers. Taken as a whole, the Mexican farm subsidy strategy exacerbated the
negative effects of NAFTA on small agricultural producers thus intensifying inequality in
Mexico (Fox and Haight 2010).
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Food
Although NAFTA affected food production and consumption in various ways, this
section focuses on two particular deleterious effects. First, Mexico was hit by a national health
crisis after NAFTA. Poor nutrition in Mexico is primarily attributed to what some scholars have
called the “neoliberal diet” (Otero, Pechlaner, and Gurcan 2015: 1). Second, and arguably one of
the most devastating impacts of NAFTA, Mexico lost its ability to produce enough food for its
population, thus becoming dependent on food imports.

Neoliberal Diet
The neoliberal diet is defined as a diet that is “largely composed of ‘energy-dense’ foods
with high contents of fat and empty calories with low nutritional value” (Otero, Pechlaner, and
Gurcan 2015: 1). This diet is a direct result of the changes to agriculture in the neoliberal age.
Before NAFTA, Mexico removed its guaranteed floor prices for crops, thus favoring imports
(Clark et al. 2012). With nearly 40 million Mexicans living on less than five U.S. dollars a day,
major nutritional problems have arisen because Mexicans are spending exorbitant amounts of
money on tortillas, which constitute a large part of their diets (USDA 2010; Levitt 2011). If
current trends continue, this diet could be responsible for the younger generation having a lower
life expectancy than its elders. The change in diets has more to do with agrarian restructuring
(Otero et al .2015) than the poor’s lack of education (Guthman 2011). For instance, the change
in caloric contribution of cereals has risen since NAFTA, while cereal consumption itself
remained relatively stable. Preliminary analyses show a rising junk-food-risk index (measure
that considers the food-import dependency, GINI coefficient, food-uniformity index, rate of
urbanization, and economic-globalization rates of change) during the neoliberal age increasing
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from 36 to 40 from 1985 to 2007.172 This increase suggests that the neoliberal diet
disproportionately affects the poor.
The changes due to NAFTA have largely impacted the Mexican diet by shifting power
from the Mexican state to TNCs. For example, protections for soybeans under NAFTA were
removed in 2003, and soybean trade intensified thereafter. The United States since then has had
a virtual monopoly on soybean production, and Mexican soybean producers have been nearly all
displaced (Clark et al. 2012). Livestock and meat imports from the United States also increased
after NAFTA, and this was particularly the case in the fast food industry (Zahniser and Crago
2009; Clark et al. 2012).173 U.S. investors found the Mexican pork and poultry industry
especially lucrative. Transnational firms control a significant portion (35%) of the pork industry
in Mexico (Wise and Rakocy 2010). When Mexico imposed a sales tax on soda to combat the
obesity epidemic, investors challenged it, and eventually high fructose corn syrup rapidly poured
into Mexico (Clark et al. 2012).174 Ready-to-eat meals and snack foods also began flowing into
Mexico in larger numbers (Clark et al. 2012).
Both the United States and Mexico face serious obesity epidemics, while NAFTA, and
more generally trade policy, has played a major role in this crisis spreading to Mexico (Clark et
al 2012). Public policy changes intended to increase crop yields and productivity, along with
other programs designed to manage supply and production, have led to an abundance of highcaloric foods. By the end of the 2000s, Mexico and the United States ranked number one and
two in percentage of overweight and obese citizens among OECD countries (OECD 2010). As
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See a radio interview with Gerardo Otero for more details on the junk-food-risk index at
http://www.rabble.ca/podcasts/shows/redeye/2013/02/quantifying-junk-food-risk.
173
See also the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service for statistics on Mexico’s agricultural imports and exports with
the United States at https://www.fas.usda.gov/regions/mexico.
174
See the WTO dispute on this measure at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds308_e.htm.
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many as 39 percent of children in Mexico are classified as obese, and Mexico ranks first in child
obesity in the world according to Mexico’s ministry of health.175 Child obesity is on the rise, and
obesity is occurring more rapidly in children than in the past (Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública
2012). Mexico is in the midst of a health crisis brought on by increased consumption of
processed foods – full of sugar and refined carbohydrates – and soda, and a lack of physical
activity (Wilhelm 2016) which has given rise to not just obesity, but increasing mortality rates,
diabetes, and heart attacks as well (Rivera et al. 2002).
The high consumption of these processed foods is directly related to changes in foreign
investment. Mexico is one of the leading recipients of U.S. foreign direct investment in the food
and beverage industry (USDA 2009). Around 75% of this investment is in highly processed
foods, such as snack foods, meat, and ready-to-eat packaged foods (Bolling, Elizalde, and Handy
1999). For example, Yum! Brand Inc. –owner of KFC, Pizza Hut, Taco Bell, and Long John
Silver’s–profits more from Mexico than any other regional market (Hawkes 2002). Although
Mexico began its processed food frontier in the 1980s, it accelerated during the 1990s under
NAFTA (Chavez 2002; Schwentesius and Ángel Gómez 2002). NAFTA contributed to
increasing consumption of soda, snack foods, meat, and dairy products (Clark et al. 2012). For
instance, the number of Wal-Mart stores grew rapidly from 1993 to 2001, along with other major
chain food retailers (Chavez 2002). Such changes have led to a major shift in Mexican diets
which now consist of processed foods high in fats and sugar (Barquera et al. 2006; Rivera,
Irizarry, and González-de Cossio 2009). The average total food energy from fat found in foods
actually increased most dramatically during the NAFTA years (Rivera et al. 2004). As of 2006,
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See Mexico’s Gobierno de la República website at http://www.imss.gob.mx/salud-en-linea/obesidad-menoredad.
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34.8 percent of Mexicans were at risk for excessive carbohydrate intake, and 12.7 percent had a
similar risk for fats (Barquera et al. 2009).
In response to the health crisis, the Mexican state issued a national soda tax in 2014.176
This move is significant given that Mexico is the world’s greatest soda consumer (Kilpatrick
2015). The politics of soda are even more interesting in Mexico considering their president from
2000 to 2006, Vicente Fox, was also the president of Coca Cola Mexico. The World Health
Organization (WHO) has been one of the major NGOs tasked with protecting consumer health,
but it has been infiltrated by corporate influence through large contributions. For example, in
2012, several donations were made to the WHO including $50,000 from Coca Cola, Co.,
$150,000 from Nestle, and $150,000 from Unilever (Wilson and Kerlin 2012).
Personal choice does not appear to be to blame for the obesity epidemic. The
overwhelming number of children (30%) and adults (70%) who are obese or overweight speak
against the idea of individual agency.177 Furthermore, aggressive advertisement campaigns are
run to sell the foods high in sugar, fat, salt, and calories (Gallo 2012). In particular, children are
subjected to over 5,500 food advertisements a year, with 95 percent of them dedicated to these
types of junk foods (Novak and Brownell 2012). NAFTA has uniquely contributed to the rapid
increase in processed foods (Hing 2010). The influx of junk food was compounded from 2008 to
2010 due to the soaring prices of food and rampant food poverty (Carlsen 2011). Healthy food
prices increased in price at twice the rate of cheaper processed foods during the neoliberal era
from 1985 to 2000 (Novak and Brownell 2012).

See PRI’s The World news story at https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-12-02/mexicos-soda-tax-starting-changesome-habits-say-health-advocates.
177
See PRI’s The World news story at https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-12-02/mexicos-soda-tax-starting-changesome-habits-say-health-advocates.
176
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Loss of Food Sovereignty
The loss of food sovereignty may have been the most devastating effect NAFTA had on
Mexico. Before continuing, three important terms need to be defined. First, the WHO defines
food security as “when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to
maintain a healthy and active lifestyle.”178 Food security is often used by NAFTA proponents
because it does not require Mexico to produce its own food, thus allowing major importation of
food products. Second, food self-sufficiency is defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the UN (FAO; 2003) as the ability of a country to produce enough food to feed its domestic
population. Lastly, food sovereignty goes even further and is defined by Via Campesina, a social
justice organization, as “the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced
through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and
agriculture systems.”179 Although Mexico had been losing its food sovereignty since 1970,
NAFTA exacerbated this precipitous drop and made any recovery of food self-sufficiency
difficult (Rivera, Whiteford, and Chávez 2009).
Since NAFTA, Mexican agricultural and food exports grew fivefold, but imports grew
even more rapidly (FAO 2013). Mexico went from being food sovereign before NAFTA to 42
percent food dependent in 2008, with an overwhelming dependence on foreign imports of staple
grains (Suárez 2008). The primary reason for the increased dependence was the flooding of the
market with U.S.-subsidized corn after NAFTA. With major subsidies, U.S. farmers were able
to sell their crops, particularly corn, under the actual cost of its production, which devastated the
Mexican competition (Clark et al. 2012). Most corn is actually exported for cattle feed rather
than for feeding humans. The flooding of the market with cheap subsidized crops paradoxically
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As cited by Couch (2013).
See Nyéléni, Declaration of Nyéléni at https://nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290.
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led to widespread hunger and put many rural farmers out of business. All the while, elites
argued against food sovereignty suggesting that it is an “old-fashioned concept” (RodriguezGomez 2013:6). Instead of supporting “inefficient” peasant farmers, elites felt Mexico only
needed the resources to buy food from the global market, in other words, food security.
Meanwhile, private sector agricultural oligarchies have been on the rise with two TNCs—Cargill
and Archer Daniels—along with two national corporations—Maseca and Minsa—controlling 66
percent of Mexico’s maize market (Rubio 2013).
The policies enacted by the Mexican government and NAFTA have transformed most
Mexicans from food producers to food consumers, thus making them more vulnerable to global
and domestic food price volatility than ever before (Rodriguez-Gomez 2013). For example, the
price of tortillas skyrocketed since NAFTA, increasing 733 percent from 1993 to 2006, while
inflation remained 376 percent higher in rural areas compared to urban (González and Macías
2007). This trend has coincided with the rapidly rising corn imports to Mexico, multiplying
sixfold since the implementation of NAFTA (Rodriguez-Gomez 2013). The rise in corn prices
defeats the logic of NAFTA based on comparative advantage. NAFTA was advertised as good
for consumers due to lowering prices through productivity gains, thus legitimizing the
elimination of the peasant maize producer. Since food prices initially decreased after NAFTA,
Mexico continued to shift farmers away from many staple crops, but once the food prices
skyrocketed, Mexico’s lack of food sovereignty and self-sufficiency was exposed (Sanchez and
Moreno 2013). Due to these changes, Maseca and Minsa have enjoyed virtual monopolies on
corn and corn flour since 2008, making most Mexicans dependent on a handful of large
corporations for their food (Appendini 2008).
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As global food prices began rising in 2007, the tortilla crisis in Mexico further exposed
its hidden problem of food sovereignty. The tortilla crisis brought an unprecedented 75.5 percent
increase in corn prices internationally, as well as increases domestically as high as 67 percent
(Rodríguez-Gómez 2007; 2008; Lustig 2008; Appendini 2008). NAFTA, combined with the
removal of Mexico’s state subsidy that held the tortilla price stable, allowed for these conditions.
Under NAFTA, Mexico was converted into the world’s number one importer of maize, sorghum,
and milk powder (Sanchez and Moreno 2013). Ironically, Mexico’s National Development Plan
2007-2012, designed to soften the blow of high food prices, attempted to help increase farmers’
incomes through more exports. Food sovereignty was not the main goal of the agricultural
developmental programs despite the negative outcomes of their export-oriented strategy.
Unfortunately, food prices soared to their highest level in 2008 causing catastrophe in Mexico
(Sanchez and Moreno 2013). After these prices skyrocketed in 2008, eventually a fixed price
was agreed upon among the elite, but the price was still more than twice the average (RodriguezGomez 2013). Only weeks later, supermarket chains, Soriana and Wal-Mart, undercut the
market to establish their control over the vulnerable populations. Such unexpected volatility in
the corn market sparked outrage among the public engendering popular movements, such as Sin
Maíz no hay País y sin Frijol Tampoco, raising the issue of food sovereignty. By emphasizing
agroexporting, Mexico eventually faced the reality of its decreased food sovereignty and food
security (Sanchez and Moreno 2013). Mexico has not even attempted to offset these issues by
improving grain storage programs. The increasing investment and interest in the biofuels sector,
specifically the U.S. ethanol biofuel initiative, compounded the issues of corn prices (Wise
2012). Furthermore, large flows of speculative finance inflated the price of corn (Vidal 2011),
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severely threatening people’s food security since food costs did not decrease alongside cheaper
corn production (Public Citizen 2004).
While consumption of maize, soybeans, and major meats increased generally, wheat,
maize, and soybean consumption decreased during the food price hikes of 2008-2009 (YunezNaude 2013). Expenditures for food after NAFTA most pronouncedly increased for the poorest
30 percent of Mexicans. Data on the proportion of household expenditures spent on food
suggests that Oportunidades (poverty alleviation program) contributed to increased expenditures.
Although some may tout the program as a success, increased expenditures on food do not
necessarily signify more food is purchased considering the soaring prices. Rather, more money
was spent on food. More troubling is that expenditures on high-nutrition food declined, while
purchases of processed foods increased. This trend is of concern beyond the obesity implications
discussed earlier and suggests high levels of food poverty.
Mexico also experienced price increases in wheat, and many wheat farmers abandoned
wheat production for more lucrative crops, thus making them more vulnerable to global price
increases (Otero 2011). The food vulnerability experienced by Mexico was not unique; it
occurred worldwide giving rise to around 40 popular food-related uprisings. The strategy to
focus on exports has enriched a small portion of food industry firms, and only consumers in the
wealthier nations like the United States and Canada benefited from cheaper prices. While 32,000
firms still exist in the food industry, only a small fraction (1,692) engage in exports and 300
firms account for 80 percent of all exports (González and Macías 2007). Most Mexicans did not
achieve increased living standards after implementation of NAFTA, rather they have fallen
victim to Mexico’s increased food vulnerability and dependency (Otero 2011).
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The direct result of Mexico’s loss of food sovereignty and food price increases was food
poverty and widespread hunger. After the food price hikes in 2008, over 18 percent of the entire
Mexican population lived in food poverty—the inability to purchase nutritious food – and poorer
rural areas such as Chiapas saw food poverty rise as high as 47 percent (USDA 2010). Nearly
half of the country’s population experienced some form of food insecurity (CONEVAL 2008),
and over one in every three indigenous children suffered from malnutrition (USDA 2010). A
majority of rural families in the states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, Tlaxcala, and Puebla reported
trouble obtaining sufficient amounts of food (INEGI 2008). From the years 2001 to 2010,
Mexican data suggest that more deaths have occurred as a result of malnutrition, including
starvation, than due to the drug cartels.180
Food sovereignty is directly related to another major problem, labor sovereignty. Otero
(2011:385) argues that food self-sufficiency is a prerequisite for labor sovereignty, or the “ability
of a nation to generate employment with livable wages for the vast majority of the population.”
When these forms of sovereignty are lost, countries experience high levels of emigration, and
more migration to richer countries deteriorates workers’ rights. When comparing the NAFTA
countries, only Mexico experienced significant food price increases during the global food crisis.
High food prices are even more troubling when comparing the average percentage of income
spent on food among the three NAFTA countries. Mexican families spend on average 35 percent
on food, while the United States and Canada spend 12 and 11 percent respectively. Some of the
impacts of losing labor sovereignty will be discussed in a later section on immigration.
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According to CEIDAS (Centro de Estudios e Investigación en Desarrollo y Asistencia Social) and INEGI
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía) data, 85,343 people died from malnutrition over these years, while
49,804 died from organized crime.
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Environment
Many of the negative environmental effects arising from NAFTA are due to changes in
agricultural cultivation. Thus, this section begins with various agricultural environmental harms
before moving on to other environmental harms less connected to agriculture, such as air and
water pollution and deforestation. These harms are more linked to the poverty and inequality
perpetuated by NAFTA. Several forms of corporate environmental harms are also discussed in
relation to NAFTA, such as biopiracy, bioprospecting, and ecotourism. Finally, this section ends
by demonstrating the enrichment of TNCs via NAFTA investor rights and their contribution to
environmental degradation.

Agriculture and the Environment
Agricultural changes have led to some devastating impacts on the environment. As small
and medium farms were put out of business, large factory farms took their place, contributing to
water shortages, increased levels of nitrogen and other agrochemicals, a loss of maize diversity,
and deforestation. In relation to the environment, the changes in agriculture, more than anything
else, threatened biodiversity, the variety of flora and fauna in the environment. Threats to
biodiversity are particularly troubling in Mexico considering its tremendous amount of
biodiversity, accounting for nearly 10 percent of the entire Earth’s biological diversity, while
only occupying 0.51 percent of its land mass (CONABIO 1998; Carlsen 2004). Around the time
of implementation of NAFTA, Mexico ranked in the top ten for diversity of most life forms,
second for reptiles, third for mammals, fifth for amphibians and vascular plants, and eighth for
birds (CONABIO 1998).
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The new NAFTA agricultural strategy replaced traditional crop diversity and
sustainability with monocropping and tied agricultural exports to Wall Street speculation
(Mendieta 2006). Venture capitalists began investing enormous amounts of money in
biotechnology, which has typically taken the form of genetically modified (GM) crops or seeds
(Dibner, Trull, and Howell 2003). The United States strongly supported intellectual property
rights domestically, and efforts to homogenize these rights globally (Pechlaner and Otero 2010).
NAFTA effectively furthered this goal. TNCs began their quest to patent various genetically
modified organisms (GMOs). Although GMOs have been met with criticism, the United States
has pushed for deregulation of biotechnologies and sided with industry against GMO critics. In
addition to blocking regulations on transgenic crops, such as the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety, the United States, joined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, has
praised transgenic crops as a panacea for world hunger (Gillis 2004). President Bush charged
African governments and members of the European Union for causing starvation by not allowing
U.S. imports of GM high-yield crops (Fleischer 2003).
One of the most pressing concerns about using GM crops is that they cross-pollinate with
landraces (naturally evolved seeds/crops), thus destroying biodiversity by creating a single
species. Some scientists were predicting that even if farmers only planted a single row dedicated
to GM corn, a large majority of corn would turn GM within seven years (Mendieta 2006). Some
researchers even experienced backlash when studying GMOs. When one researcher, Ignacio
Chapela, attempted to publish his findings with David Quist on GMOs that showed GM corn
contamination happening in Mexico, his article was accepted, but later unprecedentedly rejected
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by Nature (Ross 2004).181 The North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation
(CEC; 2004a) found, much to U.S. chagrin, that transgenics contaminated some Mexican
landraces, and will likely be irremovable from Mexico’s ecosystem.182
Most scientists weighing in on the GM corn debate are opposed to GM corn because of
the threat to biodiversity.183 Yet, these scientists did not oppose biotechnology, rather they
rejected weak regulation and industry priorities. Industry sought control over seed by passing a
new law in 2007 that required all seed, even native seed, to be registered in a national seed
catalogue before they could be sold. Paired with intellectual property rights, peasants’ ability to
plant seed was restricted, especially considering the cross-pollination of GM crops. Seed
producers charged farmers for using their seed even if it was saved or exchanged. With the
influx of primarily U.S. GM corn under NAFTA, farmers lost control and access to seeds
fundamentally important to their survival (Harvey 2003). GMOs could be banned in Mexico, but
required a scientific basis under Article 26 of the Secretariat of the Convention on Biodiversity.
Yet, this evidence was particularly hard to come by because no evidence really existed for or
against GM corn and its health impacts (Fitting 2011), not to mention the harsh ridicule
experienced by some scientist studying GMOs.
On another side of the GMO debate, Mexican citizens have fought back against GMOs
by filing a major lawsuit in 2013. The lawsuit has been challenged an astonishing 93 times in 17
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Eventually, he lost his tenure at Berkley by trying to take on the seed industry. It was later revealed that Bivings
Group – an internet advocacy group with Monsanto as a client – was responsible for smearing Chapela and Quist
(Worthy et al. 2005). By 2004, the scientific community agreed with Chapela (Mendieta 2006).
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In this report, the CEC went as far as to suggest the United States sell only milled corn to Mexico. The CEC
report expressed concern for the cultural contribution of corn in Mexico, and also recognized the importance of
small-scale farmers to maintaining biodiversity in Mexico. In response, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
and EPA have challenged the findings of the CEC as “unscientific” (See the USTR press release at
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/archives/2004/november/us-calls-naftaenvironmental-report-8220).
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See Fitting (2011) for interviews with scientists on the GM corn debate.
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different federal courts.184 The outcome of such lawsuits is pertinent to the overall health of corn
diversity, which is of paramount importance given that corn is ranked as the second most
important crop globally (Cummings 2002). Although peasants have been disparaged for
continuing to use “lower-yielding” traditional seed, at least four reasons exist as to why they
would continue this practice despite its appearance as inefficient (Fitting 2011). First, traditional
seeds can be reused every growing cycle, while GM corn seed would need to be repurchased
from seed sellers. Thus, the seed patents have prevented poorer farmers from growing traditional
crops. When their traditional seed is cross-pollinated by the GM seed, they are required to pay
user fees to the seed owners. Second, smallholders trust particular traditional seed variants that
have proven to grow well in particular climates and conditions. Third, many traditional seed
variants grow without the use of pesticides and fertilizers, while GM corn seed requires these for
optimal results, leading to soil degradation. Fourth, peasants prefer the taste and texture of their
traditional corn varieties.
TNCs, allied with the United States, have been invested in the sale of GM crops in other
countries which has been quite successful considering the United States leads the world in GM
crop exports (McAfee 2008). Although this alliance argues for the superiority of GM crops, their
claims are not supported by the empirical evidence.185 In spite of the empirical evidence, the
World Bank still pursues a GM crop strategy, and the corporate-driven biotechnology strategy
has appeared to work (Otero 2008). By 2008, Mexico ranked 13th in the world in total transgenic
acreage.186 Mexico’s food consumption overall remained relatively similar after NAFTA (Otero
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See Organic Consumers Association article at https://www.organicconsumers.org/news/mexico%E2%80%99sgmo-corn-ban-and-glyphosate-cancer-findings.
185
GM crops have not been found to regularly produce higher yields (Carpenter 2001; Elmore et al. 2001; Benbrook
2003) or require less pesticides (Benbrook 2004).
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See the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applicatinos Brief at
http://isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/39/pptslides/default.html.
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and Pechlaner 2009). However, once food consumption is broken down by protein, vegetables,
and fats, it is apparent that protein came to replace some of the vegetable consumption in
Mexico. Ironically, NAFTA allowed fruit and vegetable exports to increase in Mexico, but this
apparently signifies that average Mexican consumers were not benefiting from this with their
dwindling purchasing power, rather large agroexporters were pocketing these profits. Although
transgenics are praised by proponents as the panacea for world hunger, as noted earlier, cheap
imports did little to help Mexico protect itself against the exorbitant increases in corn prices
during 2008. By the late 2000s, several studies concluded that major problems are associated
with corporate-driven biotechnology including rises in pesticide use, extreme bias towards
TNCs, and few benefits experienced by small farmers or those who are hungry (McAfee 2008;
Otero and Pechlaner 2009). Since most of the GM crops are engineered to be pesticide resistant,
they often are paired with pesticides to get the highest yields. However, pesticide use has
increased to a dangerously high level that is harmful to both humans and the environment
(Thrupp 1998).

Environmental Harms of NAFTA Agricultural Strategy
Water usage is heavily concentrated on commercial farms. In a country where 82 percent
of the land depends on rainfall, irrigated areas are crucial resources because they offer higher
crop yields (CONAGUA 2008). The majority of water (77 percent) is used for agriculture. Land
surface area is also heavily concentrated in nine states, accounting for 59 of planted vegetables
and 89 of fruits, which is a result of the NAFTA-driven export strategy (González 2014). Due to
crop specialization, only a handful of fruits and vegetables are widely produced. Seven of 114
fruits and seven of 88 vegetables account for the majority of production. The large commercial
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farms producing most of these crops are heavily dependent on imported technology from TNCs
(Massieu 2004). Such intensive cultivation methods have contributed to serious human and
environmental issues of soil erosion, depletion of external inputs, air, water, and soil
contamination, and major illnesses (Alieri and Nicholls 2004; Gliessman 2007). Monocropping
techniques also tend to render future cultivation unfeasible because of their vulnerability to
plagues and plant disease, and overexploitation of subterranean water sources (González 2012).
Renting and buying of water shares has become commonplace, thus exacerbating the concerns
over water (Barkin 2006). With the privatization of water, most peasants cannot afford irrigated
land, and thus rely on rainfall. Also, the focus on horticultural crops has led to depletion of
underground aquifers in those regions (Maisterrena and Mora 2000; Moreno 2006).
After the water is tapped out and the land is assumed to be infertile, the agricultural
TNCs tend to simply move to untapped fecund lands. Critical resources are depleted by the
TNCs. For instance, enormous amounts of water are used in tomato cultivation and most of
those tomatoes are exported, thus water is exported (Allan 2003). Studies that have quantified
this “virtual water” use have found that it has risen among Mexico’s export sector (ArreguínCortés and López-Pérez 2007). The concentration at the domestic level has also taken place
globally, with much of the fruit and vegetable production originating in Mexico. This
concentration increases the vulnerability of both the country and agroexporters who are affected
by international changes impacting the price of crops. Furthermore, major weather calamities
create severe scarcities primarily affecting the poorest consumers in Mexico (Thompson and
Wilson 1997). Although the average price of fruits and vegetables in Mexico increased
drastically since NAFTA, average to poor workers have not seen increases in their wages
(González and Macías 2007). Agricultural workers and local citizens are the ones who bear the
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major burden of this unsustainable production strategy by sacrificing their water and precious
natural resources, enjoying no real economic improvements, and suffering from exposure to
noxious pesticides (Arellano et al. 2009). Regions high in pesticide use have also been found to
have higher incidences of cancer among other diseases (Acedo 2011).

Biopiracy and the Enola Bean
NAFTA’s revision of intellectual property rights gave rise to biopiracy, the exploitation
of fauna and flora by claiming ownership via patents. In ethnocentric fashion, the United States
patented old knowledge long held by indigenous farmers in a form of biopiracy (Shiva 2000). In
addition to the new GM crop innovations, TNCs have taken out patents on seed used for
centuries (Press and Washburn 2000). The “Enola” bean is probably the best-known case of
biopiracy. The case of the “Enola” bean demonstrates how these new intellectual property laws
have been detrimental to indigenous and peasant groups (Carlsen 2003). Larry Proctor
purchased bean seed in Mexico and harvested a common yellow bean endemic to Sinaloa,
Mexico. Later, he acquired a patent from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on the yellow
bean, naming it “Enola” after his wife. Bean farmers in Mexico increased exportation of the
beans to the United States after NAFTA and this exportation was shaping into one of the few
Mexican farmer success stories. Then, Proctor demanded six cents on every pound to be paid to
his company, Pod-Ners, for use of the patented bean. In response, Rio Fuerte farmers abandoned
the profitable bean as they saw no other choice. Such patents have been predominantly held by
wealthy nations much to the detriment of developing country farmers. OECD nations accounted
for 97 percent of all patents (Mexico only nominally a part of this), and patented production
contributed about half of these countries’ GDPs (RAFI 2000; UN Development Programme
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2000). Furthermore, TNCs hold over 90 percent of all technology and product patents.
Although the patent on the “Enola” bean was later ruled invalid by the U.S. Court of Appeals, it
was allowed to stand for an entire decade, about half the life of the patent.187

Corporate Conservationism
With the rise of the influence of TNCs in the neoliberal age, a trend of corporate
conservationism has appeared in the post-NAFTA era. In the name of environmental
conservation, many corporations have enacted policies that effectively secure long-term,
unrestricted access to natural resources for the purpose of production, not conservation (Carlsen
2004). There is a fundamental contradiction with corporate-driven consumerism in the name of
environmental conservation. Due to the lush biodiversity in Mexico and other parts of Latin
America, three major business opportunities arose within the context of corporate
conservationism: (1) environmental services, (2) bioprospecting, and (3) ecotourism. The
corporation offers its resources and ability to protect the environment as part of environmental
services. However, while the corporation offers to conserve rich natural areas, it buys the rights
to raise its pollution cap, thereby negating its environmental stance. Bioprospecting provides an
opportunity to patent and privatize the building blocks of life, such as plant and animal species’
genomes, allowing them to be marketed as pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and food products. The
“Enola” bean and biopiracy are examples of bioprospecting. The indigenous peoples who
inhabit the lands that are bioprospected have been displaced and often left uncompensated for
their land’s exploitation (Barreda 2003). Many of them remain opposed to the process but are
simply not consulted about the excavations. Companies also privatize indigenous lands to allow

See the ETC group’s news release at
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/etcnr_enola_14july09.pdf.
187
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for beautiful nature retreats for tourists (Carlsen 2004). The tourist workers often experience
deplorable living conditions while the ecotourism industry flourishes. As a result of such
projects, Mexico has experienced a wave of extinctions and biodiversity loss.

Pollution
Air pollution in Mexico, primarily Mexico City, is serious and responsible for increases
in the mortality rate, chronic bronchitis, and other respiratory problems (Molina and Molina
2002). Although an upsurge in automobiles is one noted cause, Gallagher (2004) demonstrated
that industrial production is a significant source of many air pollutants such as particulate matter,
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, and carbon oxides. Although there appeared to be
some decreases in pollution due to changes in production, NAFTA increased the scale of
industry in Mexico. The increase in scale far exceeded the contributions of compositional
changes, resulting in an accelerating increase in pollution in Mexico. Overall, Mexican industry
is 14 times more pollution intensive than U.S. industry, albeit some industries are actually
cleaner in Mexico, and most of Mexico’s pollution is driven by the paper and pulp industry. For
the most part, Mexican industries are dirtier because they are either more energy intensive or use
dirtier fuels, and for industries that produce high levels of byproduct waste, Mexico lacks
requirements for end-of-pipe technologies.
Several other studies reach similar conclusions. One study found evidence suggesting
that trade openness between the United States and Mexico has contributed to the majority of
increases in greenhouse gas emissions in Mexico since 1994 (Yu, Kim, and Cho 2011). Similar
to Gallagher (2004), Stern (2007) investigated the technique, scale, and composition effects of
NAFTA on Mexico’s environment, and found that most of the pre-NAFTA pollution trends
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continued after NAFTA, albeit in some cases improved. Energy use and carbon emissions
trended upwards, but the other pollutants (nitrous oxide and sulfur dioxide) converged at lower
levels than the United States and Canada. NAFTA was found to have no effect on technology
diffusion, and the technology gap between Mexico and its northern neighbors has widened,
likely contributing to environmental problems. Lipford and Yandle (2010) found NAFTA to
have mixed effects on Mexico’s air quality. Particulate matter emissions were decreasing before
NAFTA and continued to decline after NAFTA. Most positively, NAFTA appears to have
reduced the rate of growth in per capita carbon dioxide emissions in Mexico, albeit carbon
dioxide emissions are still increasing. Most troubling, nitrogen oxide emissions were declining
prior to NAFTA, and reversed direction and began increasing after NAFTA. Some
environmentalists have warned that the changes in trucking brought by NAFTA could lead to
increases in child asthma (Rosenberg 2004). A CEC (2002) report also found air pollution
increasing since NAFTA, caused particularly from the increases in freight. Generally, the CEC
(2002; 2004b) has only reported minimal environmental degradation caused by NAFTA.
Evidence of NAFTA’s effect on water pollution has also not been completely
straightforward. Hufbauer and Schott (2005) found pronounced water pollution around the U.S.Mexico border along with inadequate sewer systems, and hazardous wastes. In addition, several
studies have noted a chronic drought plaguing the Rio Grande region during the ten years after
NAFTA (see Mumme 2016). Lipford and Yandle (2010), similar to their results on air pollution,
found mixed results for water pollution. NAFTA was associated with greater access to improved
water sources and better sanitation treatment. However, organic water pollution emissions in
terms of biochemical oxygen demands (BODs) have risen significantly as a result of NAFTA. In
fact, from 1980 to 1993 BODs were declining in Mexico. Then, once NAFTA was
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implemented, BODs stabilized then began rising. Lipford and Yandle (2010) conclude that
NAFTA did not produce the economic growth necessary to reduce pollutants in Mexico.
Conducting fieldwork, Simon (2014) discovered that maquiladoras commonly
contributed to a stream of waste that contaminated nearby neighborhoods and the environment,
and children living in the contaminated areas had noticeable spotty and discolored skin. Most
notorious of these waste areas was the Dren Cinco de Marzo that originally was a mechanism for
flushing city water as a flood prevention method, but became a cesspool for sludge and maquila
waste. Many children living near the Dren were covered in rat bites with blotchy skin and
missing patches of hair. Areas exposed to this waste also had high rates of tuberculosis,
hepatitis, and dengue fever. Several migrants told Simon a similar story about moving from
rural ejidos northward to the border in search of employment. They often reminisced about life
on the farm conveying a sense of nostalgia while detailing a process of forced urbanization.

Poverty and Deforestation/Soil Degradation
The lack of economic gains along with the poverty and inequality after NAFTA also is
related to another form of environmental degradation (Esquivel and Rodríguez-López 2003;
Baylis, Garduno-Rivera, and Piras 2012; Galbraith 2014; Laurell 2015). Considering agriculture
is the most destructive force of biodiversity, and poverty is a major cause of environmental
degradation, Soto (2012) studied the impact of NAFTA on agriculture and poverty, and thereby
the environment. He found NAFTA contributed to substantial percentages of deforestation in
several states: 24 percent of jungle and forest lost in Chiapas; 37.3 percent in San Luis Potosí;
31.5 percent in Tabasco; 17.3 percent in Oaxaca; and 10.4 percent in Campeche. This
deforestation is most attributable to peasants in these states increasing their cultivation of corn to
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compensate for economic losses. Since corn prices decreased, they simply cultivated more corn
to compensate. Unfortunately, these states also had the highest levels of endangered species and
likely experienced other biological diversity losses. Despite protections on the trade of
endangered species, profitable black markets still exist and will likely continue if inequality and
poverty are not addressed (Rosenberg 2004). Although deforestation is correlated with poverty,
Pascual and Barbier (2007) argue that the causal link is rooted in the macroeconomic policy
underlying NAFTA. They find support for Soto’s logical conclusion that as farmers’ household
incomes dip, they make shifts in cultivation. Interestingly, the costs of soil degradation appear
highest among the non-poor and poorest households. Thus, two trends contributing to
deforestation and soil degradation occurred after NAFTA. Peasants increased their land
cultivation to compensate for economic losses, and wealthier farmers, often connected to TNCs,
increased their scale of cultivation and used massive quantities of water, fertilizers, and
pesticides. Both trends caused environmental degradation.

TNCs and the Environment
TNCs Empowered by Lax Enforcement
Although some cases exist where U.S. firms relocated to Mexico for its lax pollution caps
(Gallagher 2004), most of the environmental degradation is due to the restructuring of Mexico’s
agricultural sector (Zepeda et al. 2009) and the Mexican government’s lack of commitment to
environmental protection (Carrillo and Schatan 2006). Little funding went to important aspects
of protecting the environment, such as inspection of manufacturing firms (Carrillo and Schatan
2006), despite the rhetoric surrounding NAFTA’s environmental side agreement.188 The

See Behr (1993a) and Farnsworth (1993) for some examples of news coverage on the praise over NAFTA’s
environmental friendly proposals.
188
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Mexican state has done very little in the way of comprehensive environmental policy reform, and
the CEC has been underfunded (Zepeda et al. 2009).
Interestingly, just prior to NAFTA, Mexico’s environmental enforcement and regulation
was at an all-time high. From 1990 to 1993, Mexico strengthened its environmental regulatory
and enforcement capability, during a time environmental concerns were raised around the
NAFTA negotiations (Logsdon and Husted 1997). In 1993, there were over 30,000 inspections
of firms, dozens of plants were closed daily, and there were 1,500 partial or complete plant
closures (Harvie 1998). After 1994, Mexico continued to strengthen its policies (See Logsdon
and Husted 2000 for specific examples), but these changes seemed to be only window-dressing.
Enforcement never really increased after NAFTA despite the pre-NAFTA preparation.
Compliance began to drop in 1998, although participation in a voluntary audit program
supervised by the Mexican government increased. A large majority (86%) of TNCs made
environmental investments and began voluntarily setting environmental standards (Husted and
Rodríguez 1998).
Despite some of these changes, environmental outcomes did not significantly improve in
the years immediately following NAFTA. Very little (14%) wastewater was treated (OECD
2000), air quality declined overall despite improving in some years after NAFTA, and Tijuana
initially improved its air quality only to later see deterioration (Logsdon and Husted 1997). Per
capita solid waste generation increased, and there was little engagement in recycling outside of
plastics. Hazardous waste generation also increased (SEMARNAP 1997). Although grants for
environmental programs were expected, most financing was in the form of loans, and World
Bank loans applied user fees to repay loans (Logsdon and Husted 2000). Few loans were ever
requested considering the rising interest rates due to the way the North American Development
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Bank was functioning (Browne 1996). Generally, Mexico strengthened its environmental
policies and the mechanisms for regulation and increased its environmental budget. However,
Mexico has done little in the way of improving enforcement measures, and despite TNCs’
environmental investments and voluntary participation in self-regulatory programs, compliance
rates have decreased. The wave of environmentalism displayed by the Mexican government and
TNCs may be more window-dressing than any real effort to protect the environment. These preNAFTA environmental moves ostensibly were made simply to sell NAFTA considering the lack
of enforcement after NAFTA was passed.

NAFTA Favored Investors over Environment
The case of Metalclad, a U.S. waste removal company, provides an example of how
NAFTA protects investors over the environment, to the detriment of the environment. Riding
the wave of environmentalism surrounding the NAFTA negotiations, Metalclad made promises
to clean up Mexico. Against the recommendation of the Mexican government, Metalclad
purchased a piece of land from Coterin, a Mexican company that was contaminated with more
than 20,000 tons of toxic waste residue (González 2003). Metalclad took control of the toxic
waste dump with only two of the three necessary operating permits and without cleanup.
Metalclad promised to clean up the dump if it was given authorization to reopen it. An audit was
pushed through rapidly that granted authorization despite finding 18 violations. The wife of a
federal environmental official was given $100,000 by Metalclad, ostensibly to foster the
expedited review (Perezcano Díaz et al. 2001). However, shortly after its reopening, local
citizens protested due to birth defects recorded among local residents (González 2003).
Metalclad responded by backing a local politician who sided with its interests, and using its
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stockholders to influence U.S. senators towards efforts to reopen the site. Facing intense
political pressure, Mexican authorities halted their investigation into the harms caused by the
site.
Nearly two years later in January of 1997, with falling stock prices, Metalclad filed a
lawsuit against the Mexican government under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, claiming a violation of
Article 1105 (González 2003). Metalclad claimed it had not been treated fairly since the local
San Luís Potosí government denied it the operation permit. Metalclad sued for $130 million in
lost profits, despite its original investment of only $20 to $25 million.189 In 2000, a NAFTA
tribunal ruled in favor of Metalclad, ordering the Mexican government to pay Metalclad over
$16 million. Mexico appealed the ruling, but a Canadian judge upheld the decision despite his
disagreement with it, basically stating that no court had any authority to overturn the original
ruling (González 2003). Ultimately, Mexican taxpayers, many of whom already paid a price due
to the toxic contamination, were ordered to pay just over $16 million to Metalclad. Metalclad
was also absolved of any responsibility for cleanup, and the taxpayers were left with the
estimated $8 million bill. Despite the apparent victory for Metalclad, its president expressed his
contempt for the ruling, arguing that at least $90 million in losses were not compensated, and the
U.S. International Business Council also sided with Metalclad, claiming the ruling was a
violation of investors’ rights.
Although Metalclad is only one example, this case set a dangerous precedent for
corporations suing sovereign governments, and many other TNCs followed suit (González
2003). This case also demonstrated that investors would not be assigned any responsibility, and

See Metalclad’s court proceedings at http://www.economia.gob.mx/files/Metalclad_v2.pdf and
http://www.italaw.com/cases/671, and also news coverage at http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jun/14/business/fi10239.
189
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NAFTA tribunals’ rulings could not be appealed. The power of these tribunals is even more
troubling when considering their secrecy and public exclusion. Lawsuits such as Metalclad’s are
settled behind closed doors with no public scrutiny (Calton 2014). Furthermore, industry
spokespersons often serve as the expert witnesses providing industry-friendly testimony while
any real oversight is circumvented by eschewing it or simply disallowing it through holding
closed-door trials. Even threats of a lawsuit have led to powerful victories for TNCs.190
Inspection and regulation between the different NAFTA parties often vary significantly, but
NAFTA allows such variability through its “equivalent” standards provision. The future is also
bleak since NAFTA’s Chapter 11 has been described as the “investors’ bill of rights.” However,
this case demonstrates that Chapter 11 places the rights of corporations above citizens and the
environment.
In general, when evaluating NAFTA on its environmental achievements, the most
important gains have been procedural, not real improved conditions (Torres 2009). Ironically,
environmental transnational actors have achieved less since the signing of NAFTA, and the U.S.
government has been less willing to help with the environmental situation. Despite the
development of new laws, the environment has received little attention after NAFTA. Thus, the
environment was only a concern during the NAFTA negotiations. Yet, once the policy passed,
the environment took a back seat. NAFTA’s inability to produce sufficient economic growth in
Mexico may have allowed for the ensuing environmental deterioration (Laurell 2015). The
decreased environmental spending may be attributable to the economic struggles in Mexico.
Nonetheless, Mexico has experienced great economic costs for the losses to its environment.
Official Mexican government sources estimate about $50 billion dollars in damages a year from
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environmental destruction (Gallagher 2006), or an estimated 10 percent of GDP per year (Zepeda
et al. 2009). For every dollar generated, 10 cents are lost from environmental degradation
(Gallagher 2006). As a result, soil erosion, solid waste, and air and water pollution have
increased faster than GDP and population growth.

Migration
NAFTA influenced several negative outcomes related to migration through its lack of
addressing labor flows in its text. Furthermore, considering the poor post-NAFTA economic
outcomes in Mexico discussed earlier, NAFTA forced many Mexicans to migrate north to the
United States in search of improving their economic condition, while not offering these migrants
the possibility to migrate or any protections. In contrast, aggressive anti-immigration laws and
actions have been taken by the United States. Consequently, the undocumented Mexican
population has grown in the United States, an informal economy for smuggling and false
documentation grew in Mexico, and immigrants have been criminalized negatively affecting
workers’ rights.
Economic development and migration are often linked. When traditional economic
structures are disrupted by new policies, large shifts can occur in migration. When considering
that nearly 20 percent of Mexicans depended on the corn industry, it is no surprise that around
two million agricultural jobs were lost as a result of NAFTA (Healey 2013). After the
agricultural restructuring and signing of NAFTA, campesinos, unable to provide food or a
sufficient income, traveled north either to Mexico City, the border region, or the United States in
search of employment. After NAFTA undermined Mexican corn production, Mexico’s economy
became subservient to U.S. agricultural policies (Bacon 2014a). Partially due to the more

298
substantial U.S. farm subsidies, about 75 percent of the U.S. farm workforce is comprised of
undocumented immigrants, largely from Mexico (Luckstead 2012). Although the Bracero
program may have set the precedent for hiring migrant workers, Luckstead (2012) found that
free trade and increased farm supports led to more trade which magnified undocumented migrant
labor flows. In addition, a simulation analysis confirmed this result for NAFTA. Even if
subsidies are completely removed, NAFTA alone would account for significant labor migration.
Additionally, an Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) commission conducted a study
that found poverty to be the main impetus for Mexican migration to the United States, and
surprisingly, recommended that the United States promote more free trade without a focus on
free movement of labor (Bacon 2013). However, the report did encouraged the use of
transitional support. Considering that rural poverty increased after NAFTA (Zepeda et al. 2009;
Gonzalez 2011), the IRCA commission report’s conclusions, extended into the years after
NAFTA, seem to suggest that NAFTA played a large role in migration via increases in poverty.
Many Mexicans migrated to the northern border regions first before eventually crossing
the border into the United States in search of work. Maquiladora plants increased 17 percent
from 1993 to 1996 (Santillán 1997), and 10 percent of the formal labor force was employed by
maquiladoras by 1997 (Kopinak 1998). Yet, maquiladoras were primarily hiring women,
forcing men to look for work in the United States. Since most of the labor was simple assembly,
job creation lagged dramatically behind demand, and maquiladora wages were often too low to
keep workers from moving on to the United States. Mexicans reported that they did not intend to
move to the United States, they only moved there when it was clear there was no work for them
at home (Anguiano 1996). These decisions are supported by the fact that the number of deported
Mexicans in 1996 equaled the number of workers in the entire maquiladora sector (Gatsiopoulos
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1997). As noted earlier, the NAFTA-driven Mexican economic growth and job creation were
not enough to absorb the displaced rural population (Cypher and Wise 2010; Blecker 2014;
Laurell 2015).
Continuing a trend from the NAFTA negotiations, an increasing number of immigrants
from Mexico entered the United States. Annual immigration from Mexico to the United States
soared from 370,000 in 1991 to 770,000 in 2000 (Passel, Cohn, and González-Barrera 2012).
After 2000, immigration continued, but at a slower pace. The Mexican-born population in the
United States increased most drastically in the 1990s. Unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the
United States increased from 2 to 2.9 million from 1990 to 1995, but then increased more
rapidly, increasing to 4.5 and 6.9 million in 2000 and 2007, respectively (Passel and Cohn 2016).
Since 2007, unauthorized immigration has declined in the United States. The mass exodus of
Mexicans to the United States has largely impacted indigenous Mexican communities. Around
half a million indigenous people from Oaxaca alone live in the United States (Hershberg and
Rosen 2006). Indigenous people constituted only 7 percent of Mexican migrants in the United
States just before NAFTA, but by 2008, they made up 29 percent (Mines, Nichols, and Runsten
2010). Unfortunately, these workers are largely underpaid, which depresses wages in the U.S.
agricultural labor market.

Criminalization of Labor Migration
Since NAFTA contributed more to expanding intrafirm trade, consisting mostly of trade
between parent and subsidiary companies, rather than bringing wealth to Mexico, some scholars
have described Mexico’s leading export as its labor force (Tello 1996). One of the major reasons
why Mexico has relied on labor as their primary export is a direct result of NAFTA and the
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agreement’s neglect of migration policy (Wise 2004). While the free movement of goods and
services received major attention during the NAFTA negotiations, the free movement of labor
was left off the table with virtually no mention. Moreover, legislation was passed in the United
States that criminalized labor migration. Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) and the 1990 Immigration Act, U.S. immigration policy shifted from tolerance to
repression and criminalized hiring unauthorized workers in the United States. Major increases in
funding went to militarize the border. Just as NAFTA was being implemented, Operation
Blockade, and Operation Gatekeeper a year later, were launched resulting in spending massive
amounts of taxpayer money on detaining illegal immigrants at the two busiest border entry points
(Nevins 2002). Although IRCA may have set the precedent of criminalizing labor migration, the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 created a hostile approach
towards labor migration. This legislation was passed to address the uptick in Mexican
immigration to the United States after NAFTA.
Over the past two decades, the United States has pushed for integration in nearly every
market, except the labor market, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks strengthened the anti-labor market
liberalization sentiment. The Department of Homeland Security was established in response to
terrorism, but effectively “terrorized” Mexican and Central American migrant workers
(Fernández-Kelly and Massey 2007:108). The strict immigration policies have not been
effective in deterring illegal immigration (Massey 2005). Instead, they have led to increases in
the growth of undocumented people in the United States. Since reentry to Mexico is more
dangerous than ever, Mexicans, in more numbers, are electing to stay in the United States rather
than risk traveling back home. The number of Mexicans dying at the border skyrocketed after
the new immigration policies (Eschbach, Hagan, and Rodriguez 1999). Ironically, the likelihood
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of being caught and arrested at the border actually decreased since the changes took place
(Massey 2005), falling to as low as 5 percent in 2002 (Fernández-Kelly and Massey 2007).
The militarization of the border seemingly has only accomplished one thing—it made the
costs and risks of crossing the border extremely high, tripling the rate of death along the border
(Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). The increased costs gave rise to unintended consequences
such as the expansion of the border smuggling market. The cost of hiring a coyote to help cross
the border has increased drastically, from about $400 in 1993, to around $1,200 in 1999 (Massey
2005), and closer to $2,800 more recently (Fernández-Kelly and Massey 2007). Since these
costs have also kept Mexicans from returning home, the population of Mexicans living in the
United States has increased without accelerated migration. Despite numerous Mexican deaths
along the border, little has been done to address the migration issue. The United States has
resorted to violence along the border to secure its interests in locking out labor while freeing
mobility of capital, and Mexico has remained subordinate to U.S. interests (Wise 2004). For
example, the United States has delegated the task of securing Mexico’s southern border from
immigration and the Mexican presidency has reaffirmed this position. Interestingly, one analysis
suggests that blocking labor mobility may have prevented potential NAFTA gains (Robertson
2005).

Forced Displacement and Union Busting
Many Mexicans migrated to the United States due to poverty and lack of work, but this
was not the only cause of migration. Many Mexicans faced extreme political violence which
later gave birth to armed opposition, further perpetuating the cycle (Bacon 2013). Political
repression often took place during worker protests and strikes, exacerbating the poor working
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conditions in Mexico, especially after the NAFTA negotiations started. Since Mexico’s major
selling point for NAFTA was its cheap labor, it took extreme measures to keep wages down.
Many indigenous groups, such as the Triquis, are excluded from any autonomous decision
making about their own communities, and have to fight nearly everyone for any autonomy.
Miner unions are another example of groups that experienced severe repression (see Fischel and
Nelson 2010). When repression did not manifest, the firms often used mass firings to control
worker unrest (Bacon 2006; 2013). In the years following NAFTA, Mexican officials actively
decimated unions.191 U.S. officials even authored some of the deregulation policy in Mexico in
order to secure cheap labor.
These harsh anti-union tactics also increased in the United States, victimizing many
Mexican immigrants. The criminalization of immigrants commonly manifested itself in
immigration raids where the primary goal was union busting (Bacon 2008). Since 2008, the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency has been heavily involved in arresting
immigrants.192 Unfortunately, criminalizing immigrants fails to take into account the various
factors influencing their decisions (or lack thereof) to relocate in the first place. Most
immigrants who are criminalized in the United States come from regions of the world that are
poverty stricken (Bacon 2008). When considering Mexican immigrants, NAFTA played an
integral role in creating the conditions of poverty and unemployment (Zepedea et al. 2009;
Gonzalez 2011; Weisbrot et al. 2014; Laurell 2015). Most notably, NAFTA reduced the price of
corn in Mexico rendering many corn farmers without their livelihoods and desperate (Browning
2013). Pair these circumstances with the widespread civil unrest and repressive state tactics to
control opposition groups, many Mexicans had little choice but to seek both physical and
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economic security elsewhere (Blecker 2003; Lacey 2007; Petras 2010). For those Mexicans who
still had work, the repression led to lower wages and weaker unions, and for many occupations,
the workplace conditions were abysmal and life-threatening (Bacon 2008; 2013). Mexicans
faced a conundrum: Should they stay in Mexico with no work or, at best, precarious
employment, or should they seek work in the United States where they would be considered
criminals? Many Mexicans chose the latter, or had no choice, but to migrate.
Another cause of migration was abrupt and cruel forced dislocation (Bacon 2013). One
example where this happened was on mineral-rich lands. Salinas changed the Mexican mining
laws in preparation for NAFTA, another often overlooked policy change designed to attract
foreign investment and support for NAFTA. The new law stated that resources must be utilized,
and thus mandated exploitation of resources. Consequently, resource extraction firms were
granted the authority to demand that entire towns be vacated for extraction. Later
administrations such as Calderón’s made several concessions to mining companies in exchange
for financial reimbursement (Bacon 2012). The same story repeated itself throughout Mexico
where mining companies promised jobs and economic development only to bring displacement,
environmental degradation, and mistreatment of workers (Bacon 2013).
Mexicans who entered the United States faced a series of new problems. NAFTA
functioned as “an instrument of displacement,” producing “a huge labor reserve in Mexico,” and
providing Mexicans with “no alternative but to migrate” (Bacon 2013;19, 59). Many of the
displaced campesinos found work in the meatpacking industry with some of the most dangerous
working conditions imaginable (see Bacon 2008; 2013). The border region was a popular place
to settle because it was still close to home and populated mainly by Mexicans (Garcia 2006).
These Mexicans suffered from poor health care since they could not afford U.S. health care
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insurance, and reentering Mexico to obtain affordable health care was perilous. Many of the
families were able to build their own homes through the colonia housing project, but these
houses were often small with several problems such as uneven and unpaved streets, high flood
risks when it rained, and dangerous neighborhoods ridden with drug trafficking.193 In addition,
families who wished to move were often unable to sell their homes. Some men commuted to
work as far away as Detroit and Chicago and were gone for weeks or months at a time, leaving
the women to care for their children, the household, and continue to work their own full-time
jobs. Racism and anti-Mexican rhetoric is another problem. Proposition 187 demonstrated
strong U.S. racism towards Mexicans that would not even grant some basic human rights, such
as the right to health care and education, and U.S. legislation passed in 1997 intensified the
deportation efforts in the United States (Kopinak 1998). Despite the xenophobic rhetoric that
suggested undocumented workers were a drain on the economy, studies actually showed that
they provided economic benefits (Brown 1997; National Immigration Forum 1997).

TNCs Favor Guest Worker Exploitation
In response to the massive influx of migrant workers, rather than offer permanent
residency, U.S. employers advocated for guest worker policies. Yet, the history of guest workers
is quite dark and ridden with exploitation. Gonzalez (2006) describes this history in relation to
the trends after NAFTA. He challenges the common argument in the literature that Mexican
migration shares several similarities with European migration. Instead, he argues that Mexican
migration is much more explicable using a comparison to colonized labor in Britain and France.
The key to understanding Mexican migration is U.S. capitalist expansion. Furthermore, the
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Bracero program, as well as other “guest worker” programs between the United States and
Mexico, are run unilaterally by the United States and are not interdependent.194 The only
interdependence is between elites in the TCC where Mexican elites agree to the terms and
conditions of TNCs demanding cheap labor.
Looking at more recent NAFTA-era migration, employers have used a strategy of
employing contractors to employ workers to shield themselves from any scrutiny over worker
rights violations (Bacon 2008). Employers have also continually declared labor shortages to
keep a large labor pool and wages down. Since guest workers are subject to deportation when
they do not have a job, it is most troubling that several guest workers have been fired for very
fickle reasons, such as “mother sick,” “death in the family,” “work hours too long,” and “slowing
down other workers,” likely to keep them from gaining any power, and often a guise for union
busting (Bacon 2008:94). These reasons were often mentioned by workers themselves, and they
were fired by employers for complaining.
Although NAFTA attempted to integrate the economies of the United States, Mexico, and
Canada, no political integration was sought, and labor integration was actively avoided. In sum,
the creation of NAFTA with no discussion of labor flows has brought at least five problematic
outcomes. This lack of discussion is reflective of the criminogenic nature of NAFTA,
particularly the lack of worker representation in negotiations and its allegiance to the TCC
motivated by a neoliberalism ideology that favored cheap labor. First, many Mexicans were
displaced by NAFTA and other agrarian policies. Second, in response, there has been
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intensified, often violent, attempts at curtailing migration. Third, the informal sector dedicated
to providing smuggling services and false documentation grew. Fourth, there has been
unprecedented growth in the undocumented Mexican population in the United States. Fifth, the
criminalization of immigrants and classification of immigrants as guest workers has had
detrimental effects on workers’ rights.

Drug Trade
The changes brought by the neoliberal policies, including NAFTA, encouraged Mexicans
to migrate north in search of work or secure employment in the informal economy in Mexico.
Some displaced Mexicans turned to the drug trade (Dube, García Ponce, and Thom 2014; Arizpe
2014). In response, U.S. federal spending on drug control has increased, and the drug problem
has been reshaped as an international problem (Andreas 1998b). Although drug concerns have
multiplied since NAFTA, the NAFTA negotiations themselves never mentioned drug control.
Mexico’s desperate search for foreign investment has led to little scrutiny over the source of
various funds (Mayer 1998; Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Also, the restructuring of the
agricultural sector has encouraged the production of marijuana and other more profitable illicit
crops, while also contributing to the rising number of migrant workers (Dube, García Ponce, and
Thom 2014; Arizpe 2014). The slashing of government funding for electricity, fertilizer, water,
and other necessities for farmers has resulted in a mass exodus from rural lands (Rivera,
Whiteford, and Chávez 2009; Bellon and Hellin 2011; Fernandez, Wise, and Garvey 2012;
Browning 2013). Due to the immigration activity along the U.S.-Mexican border, Border Patrol
agents have proliferated, and several military-esque operations, such as Operation Hardline,
Operation Gatekeeper, and Operation Blockade, have been carried out (Andreas 1998b). In other
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words, many of the forces giving rise to Mexican emigration have also contributed to a growing
informal economy centered around drugs and migration. By 2004, informal employment
accounted for 57 percent of the actively employed population in Mexico (Zepeda et al. 2007),
and has continued to remain steady at high levels (Laurell 2015). In addition, the acceleration of
the drug trade and migration have been impetuses for increased military and security spending
(Rochlin 1997).

Turning to the Drug Trade
After NAFTA furthered the trend of reducing government supports for the development
of agriculture, and the availability of loans also declined, Arizpe (2014) contends that individuals
in the countryside who were faced with bankruptcy had four choices: work as wage laborers in
agriculture, obtain a higher education to attempt to climb the socio-economic ladder, migrate to
the United States, or enter the drug trade. Agricultural laborers experienced some of the worst
working conditions in the world facing deterioration of health, poverty, and repressive treatment
(Bernet, Francis, and Lara Flores 2008). When rural families are able to send their children
away to universities, it often results in high-skilled, unemployed workers who seek work in the
United States and Canada (Arizpe 2006). If they are unable to escape their hometown, they often
have nothing to do and suffer from many problems (Arizpe 2014). For those who seek migration
to the United States, the new policies have made the passage much more dangerous. For many
rural Mexicans, the drug trade was the only real alternative because when government funding
was lost, drug traffickers invested in the abandoned countryside. Although the drug trade may
have been a safety valve at first, some peasants began to collaborate with the traffickers who
were funding social welfare programs and financing schools and hospitals (Rochlin 1997).
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NAFTA made unique contributions to the drug war and escalation of violence that
followed in Mexico. First, NAFTA destroyed corn peasants’ ability to grow for subsistence,
forcing them to find new livelihoods (Rivera, Whiteford, and Chávez 2009). Some turned to
illicit crop growing and other illegal activities (Dube, García Ponce, and Thom 2014). Many
traditional peasants were attracted to growing illicit crops considering the decline in prices of
licit crops (Watt and Zepeda 2012). Second, large-scale displacement and widespread poverty
created major waves of civil protest and acts of dissidence by the opposition to the new
neoliberal economic model culminating in NAFTA (Rochlin 1997; Cuninghame and Corona
1998; Bacon 2004). NAFTA ineffectively addressed the poverty and unemployment in Mexico
while unintentionally making the black market attractive (Zepeda et al. 2009; Weisbort et al
2014; Laurell 2015). Third, NAFTA linked the U.S.-Mexican highway system together and
increased the flow of goods across the border, providing the infrastructure for the drug trade
(Andreas 2001; Paley 2014). The opening of the borders provided the opportunity for the
insatiable demand for drugs in the neighboring United States to spark a brutal turf war over
supply (Watt and Zepeda 2012). Without U.S. demand, the drug war would not be lucrative
considering how extremely low Mexico’s domestic demand for drugs was prior to NAFTA.
Fourth, long-standing political and military corruption in Mexico involving the drug trade was
further integrated with U.S. government and business elites who had profitable connections to
the drug trade (Reyes 2011; Paley 2012). Lastly, the neoliberal economic model culminating in
NAFTA, needed defending which was done under the guise of the war on drugs (Watt and
Zepeda 2012; Paley 2014).

309
Calderón and the War on Drugs
Although NAFTA created conditions conducive for the drug trade, it was not until Felipe
Calderón won the Mexican presidency in 2006 that the drug trade turned extremely violent. A
few days after his inauguration, Calderón—who won the election with widespread accusations of
electoral fraud (Gibler 2011a)—declared a war on drugs, and immediately deployed more than
20,000 troops (Gibler 2009). Despite the massive campaign against drugs, violence in Mexico
actually increased rather than decreased (Human Rights Watch 2011), and the Mexican
government officially claimed that 47,515 were killed in drug-related violence between 2006 and
2011 (Cave 2012). Calderón steadily increased the number of deployed troops involved in the
counter-narcotics effort, and the number of deaths quickly dwarfed those that occurred during the
previous administration (Schneck 2012). The Mexican military engaged in brutal repression
techniques including “beatings, asphyxiation with plastic bags, electric shocks, sexual torture,
death threats, and mock executions” which were supposedly used to gain “information about
organized crime” (Human Rights Watch 2011; Schneck 2012:930). Maybe most troubling are
the tens of thousands of Mexicans who disappeared, at least 20,000 of whom were acknowledged
by the military (Human Rights Watch 2011). Evidence surfaced that suggests the Mexican
military and police force were involved in these disappearances despite their claims that drug
cartels were behind them. However, the drug cartels have used the same repressive techniques
of torture as well, contributing to the violent atmosphere in Mexico.

Corn’s Connection to Violence
Since NAFTA’s implementation, marijuana and other illicit drug crop cultivation have
increased (USDS 2000; 2011). Over 600,000 agricultural workers had participated in illicit drug
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cultivation by 2010 (Ronquillo 2011). Previous journalists and researchers have noted the
connection between maize prices and activity in the drug sector (Bucardo et al. 2005; Ronquillo
2011; Castillo García 2012), but Dube et al. (2014) provide the most compelling argument. In
their study, they found that the precipitous decline in maize prices in the 1990s was linked to
both marijuana and opium cultivation in areas suited for growing maize, many of the same areas
devastated by NAFTA. Drug seizures and criminal detentions for drugs also were connected to
the price of maize. Most troubling, maize prices were associated with large increases in drugrelated homicides. They estimated for every 10 percent increase in maize prices, drug war
killings could be reduced 8 percent. All of these findings suggest that a rise in maize prices
lowers the opportunity costs involved with the drug trade. NAFTA quotas and Chinese exports
explained the majority of the variation in corn prices (84%). Thus, by reducing corn prices,
NAFTA had a significant impact on the rise of illicit drug activity in Mexico. These effects of
maize prices span the entire narco-trafficking chain from increasing cultivation of illicit crops to
fatal violence over the drug trade. NAFTA proponents must ask themselves if such violence
mitigates any of the potential gains from free trade.

Unemployment’s Connection to Violence
The job creation by NAFTA was outpaced by unemployment, particularly in rural areas
of Mexico (Cypher and Wise 2010; Blecker 2014). The lack of economic opportunities led
many Mexicans into the informal drug economy and increased the lethal violence in Mexico.
Arizpe (2014:142) discusses the “violence of joblessness” as the correlation between
unemployment and violence. During the war on drugs in Mexico, unemployment increased to
5.17 percent and wages lost 51 percent of their purchasing power (Murayama 2010). The
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joblessness of Mexican military soldiers was particularly troubling. After NAFTA took effect,
around 250,000 soldiers deserted the Mexican army due to low wages (Morton 2012).
Unfortunately, drug cartels were hiring, offering much more enticing salaries and their military
skills were transferable. In particular, women have been encouraged to stay out of the workplace
to provide more work for men. The PAN has instructed women to have more children, and even
rewarded them with scholarships for having children as teenagers to address the high
unemployment rate (Arizpe 2014). Violence against women also intensified alongside the
counter drug trade efforts (Gutiérrez Guerrero 2010). Arizpe (2014:145) classifies Mexico’s
current poverty as a new form of poverty that is “now deeply tinged with blood, rage and social
disorganization.”

Police, Military, and Political Corruption
The ineffectiveness of the war on drugs in reducing the drug trade and violence likely has
much to do with the corruption of the police, military, and political officials who are tasked with
addressing the problem. The military and drug traffickers are often discussed as a binary of good
versus evil, but more commonly, there is a deep overlapping, even cooperative, relationship
between the two (Poppa 2010; Hernández 2013). This cooperative relationship tends to hold
regardless of the political party in power (PRI or PAN). Police officers commonly work for drug
traffickers (Reyes 2011). The Zetas are just one example of the intricate ties of a drug cartel to
various government structures. The Zetas largely consist of ex-military officials, many of whom
were U.S. trained (Paley 2012). They also have various police officers on their payroll. Some
estimates suggest more than 60 percent of police officers received some kind of compensation
for their work in the drug trade, and nearly 50 percent of drug cartel members had either a police
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or military background (Oppenheimer 1998). To complicate matters, several police factions
exist, all notorious for their own crime specialization. Some of the most egregious acts were
carried out by madrinas, or secret agents, paid discretely to perform the police’s dirty work
(Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000). Police officers who speak out against
corruption, such as Juan Carlos Valerio Roldan,195 typically do not make much progress and may
face a similar fate of demotion or worse (Oppenheimer 1998).
Despite the escalating violence, funds kept flowing, seemingly backing the violence. On
average, the budgets for the four institutions196 dedicated to confronting drug trafficking grew by
77 percent from 2007 to 2011 at the height of the drug war (Watt and Zepeda 2012). Yet, a
positive correlation exists over these years between funding and violence. More specifically, a
positive correlation has been recorded between military occupation/presence and violence
(Human Rights Watch 2009). Funding for police training also benefited drug traffickers, since
about 25 percent of those trained left to join drug cartels (Watt and Zepeda 2012). The violence
committed by authorities, in the name of the drug war, was given near immunity. The Mexican
government investigated less than 5 percent of drug-related murders, and not even 1 percent of
criminal investigations involved the drug trade (Gibler 2011b). Only around 1 in 100 crimes
actually result in punishment of offenders in Mexico (CNDH 2009). Since Article 57 of
Mexico’s military code stipulates that military human rights abuses are to be investigated by the
military itself, it is not surprising that only one military official was convicted during the entire
Calderón presidency (Amnesty International 2011). Moreover, the political corruption behind
the drug war has been difficult to expose due to the harsh retaliation against those writing the
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exposés. Several individuals in high profile positions who investigated the politics of the drug
trade were assassinated.197

Increased Security…for Capital
Rochlin (1997) traces the Mexican security paradigm shift to the neoliberal age.
NAFTA, in particular, brought about regional integration that effectively shifted Mexican
national security to focus on security for transnational capital and TNCs. Unfortunately,
Mexico’s military was arguably the most closed military in all of Latin American, severely
inhibiting academic investigation, media coverage, or public scrutiny (Human Right Watch
2015). Migration issues were also seen as security concerns after NAFTA (Rochlin 1997).
However, most importantly, Rochlin argues that the U.S.-led drug war (well before Calderón’s
declared war on drugs) in Mexico offered a cover for targeting subversive groups, particularly
the political opposition to the neoliberal economic model. HRVs in Mexico were widely present
in the years following NAFTA (Monroy 1994; Human Right Watch 1994; 2001; La Botz 1995;
International Federation for Human Rights 2006; Bacon 2013). Mexico controlled its population
in several instances with repression, while being cautious about its public image. Many
dissidents suffered physical integrity rights violations at the hands of the government, as they
were often tortured or executed as “suspected” drug traffickers while being blocked from having
legal representation (La Botz 1995; Rochlin 1997; Vonow 2016). Wealthy ranchers hired hitmen
(called guardias blancas) to remove campesino squatters attempting to regain land in rural
Mexico, and Zapatistas were tortured to gain false confessions of weapons trafficking in 1994
during the Chiapas uprising (Amnesty International 1996; Rochlin 1997). Conflicts also
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occurred in Tabasco, Guerrero, and elsewhere.198 Mexico constructed a major military base on
the Guatemalan border to serve multiple security functions, most principally quieting
Zapatistas/indigenous groups and halting Guatemalan immigrants, and Mexico’s harsh antiimmigration stance has led to several harms for Central Americans (Isacson, Meyer, and Smith
2015).
A new security law passed in 1995 – Ley del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública –
made the repression of citizens even more justifiable as it identified all citizens as possible
enemies (Rochlin 1997). In the face of this repression and fraud, the United States remained
mostly silent. This silence may be less bizarre when considering the amount of U.S. funds and
resources sent to the Mexican military for training and equipment.199 NAFTA brought security
integration, and now, maybe more than ever, the United States influences Mexico’s military.
The suppression of the Chiapas conflict, for example, was performed using U.S.-provided
helicopters (Harvey 1994; 1998).
Although the relationship between the United States and Mexican military strengthened
after NAFTA through a series of bilateral agreements, the Security and Prosperity Partnership
(SPP) solidified the North American military regime designed to protect the NAFTA neoliberal
economic model. In March 2005, the SSP was signed between the NAFTA countries as a way
to improve “security cooperation” as described three years later by Thomas Shannon, the U.S.
assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs, and more bluntly when he stated,
“we’re armoring NAFTA.”200 In other words, the regional security regime shifted its focus on
protecting people from harm to securing the regional economic model. The SPP became a third
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“side deal” of NAFTA built to protect against security issues and appease investors. SPP was
later supplanted by the Mérida Initiative. Language about protecting economic interests was
replaced with rhetoric about combatting drug trafficking (Watt and Zepeda 2012).

Mérida Initiative and U.S. Influence on Mexican Drug Policy
On June 30, 2008, the United States, Mexico, and the countries of Central America
signed the Mérida Initiative (also known as Plan Mexico). Three components were officially
laid out by the Mérida Initiative as described by Paley (2014). The first component encouraged
privatization and foreign investment as a way to strengthen communities. Second, police and
military power was enhanced and the borders were militarized. The last component created the
emergence of new forms of social control, such as paramilitary forces used to address the drug
problem. Due to this agreement, U.S. security spending in Mexico in 2010 (over $500 million)
actually surpassed that of what was spent in Colombia ($434 million; Paley 2014). U.S.
involvement has been associated with higher murder rates and violence (OAS 2011; Paley 2014).
In particular, areas with U.S. military bases have higher rates of violence (Dube and Naidu
2015). The United States has trained Mexican police, but this strategy has been ineffective in
reducing crime (Huggins 1998), and more likely leads to HRVs (Amnesty International 2002).
Yet, massive police training efforts have continued (Thompson 2011). The failures of the
Mérida Initiative to treat the drug problem have led scholars to argue that the Mérida Initiative
was designed to protect the neoliberal economic model rather than any true effort towards drug
eradication (Carlsen 2008a; Watt and Zepeda 2012; Paley 2014). Instead, Carlsen (2008a)
argued that Plan Mexico was geared to repress grassroots protests or challenges to the economic
model. Such a strategy “blocks avenues for development of civil society institutions,
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criminalizes opposition, justifies repression, and curtails civil liberties” (Carlsen 2008a:18).
NAFTA created a Mexican economic and political dependency that rivaled that of Spanish
colonialism with the United States accounting for the majority of imports and 85 percent of
exports. If not its goal, Plan Mexico helps fund the repression of political opposition such as
autonomous Zapatista communities, the women’s movement, and Chihuahua grassroots leaders,
among others (Cruz 2006).

Drugs Downplayed Before NAFTA
The United States largely downplayed the drug violence along the border to avoid further
criticism of NAFTA (Payan 2006; Zarriello and Grey 2014). Mexican officials also omitted
important developments such as the increased trade in methamphetamines, state corruption
undermining antidrug measures, and increasing drug violence from their yearly reports. The
massive $30 billion revenue stream from the drug trade was ignored, along with the over $460
million spent on bribes (Lindau 2011). Instead, only $10 million was reported by Mexico to
Congress, while the approximately 75 percent of the police force involved in corruption went
unreported (Andreas 2001). Although intelligence agencies have proliferated, there is an
enormous amount of faulty intelligence, and the intelligence is often purposely inaccurate. For
example, both Presidents Bush Sr. and Clinton presented information to show that the Mexican
drug trade was trending downward to further economic goals such as NAFTA by deflecting
attention from the concerns of opening the border. When video and audio proof of corruption of
the Mexican Secretary of Defense and among other officials surfaced, Operation Casablanca—a
plan to arrest corrupt officials and intercept laundered money—was later mysteriously called off
despite being nearly fully executed (Zarriello and Grey 2014).
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Beyond simply selling NAFTA, the United States likely downplayed the drug war to hide
its own involvement. Mexico’s Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS), founded in 1947, was
tasked with national security and dealing with drug trafficking. The United States suggested the
creation of the DFS, thus it took the form of the FBI and CIA in the United States, and even
shared information with the CIA on subversives during the Communist scare (Watt and Zepeda
2012). At its inception, Colonel Carlos Serrano was made director of the organization despite
implications of involvement in the drug trade himself. Even during this time, anti-narcotic
missions were used as a cover for removing political opposition (Scott 2009). Cocaine
trafficking even subsidized some of these so-called anti-narcotic missions, but in reality
supported right-wing death squads. Evidence suggests that the DFS was directly involved in
drug trafficking even while supported by the CIA (Buendía 1988). The CIA did not wish to
interfere because the DFS was highly effective at removing left-wing political opposition. The
Mexican army filled a contradictory role, officially being dedicated to combating drug traffickers
while directly profiting from the drug trade (Aguayo 2001).

U.S. and TNC Involvement
The United States has mostly been indirectly involved in the drug war, primarily via
providing Mexico with funding of over a billion dollars worth of equipment for inspection and
surveillance, helicopters, military training, and technology, all of which helped the Mexican
security forces carry out their repressive tactics (Schneck 2012). Evidence also shows that the
United States trained Mexican police in torture techniques.201 President Calderón continued to
acknowledge the state-sanctioned killings, while dismissing the deceased as criminals without

201

See Democracy Now! Interview with Lauren Carlsen and John Gibler at
https://www.democracynow.org/2008/7/31/plan_mexico.

318
any evidence (Sackur 2010). As noted earlier, around 95 percent of these deaths went
uninvestigated (Gibler 2011b). The International Civil Commission on Human Rights
documented a multitude of HRVs by Mexican security forces, with nearly all these atrocities
being committed under the pretext that the victim was involved in the drug trade (Carlsen
2008b).202
Several groups raised threats to the new Calderón government in 2006. The Zapatistas
responded to a Calderón presidency by launching the Other Campaign, while teachers went on
strike and a rebellion broke out in Oaxaca (Mora 2007; Gibler 2011b). When San Juan Copala,
supported by the Zapatistas, announced itself as an autonomous municipality in 2007, a statesupported paramilitary slaughtered several civilians.203 Kristin Bricker argued in an interview
with Amy Goodman from Democracy Now! That, “the US-funded war on drugs certainly creates
a cover for these kinds of politically motivated attacks.”204 After NAFTA’s implementation, the
Mexican military went to war with the Zapatistas, displacing around 15,000 people (Stephen
2002). The people left behind lived under a military occupation of around 65,000 troops (Speed
2003). Zapatista women were subjected to rape and torture by the military, police, and
paramilitary (Stephen 2002). Once the drug war escalated, the Zapatistas were terrorized again
despite no evidence connecting them to the drug trade (Morales and Watt 2010). Considering
that the grudge between the Zapatistas and the Mexican government revolved around the
neoliberal economic model, much of these efforts have been political smokescreens providing
the opportunity to suppress major opposition to NAFTA (Carlsen 2008a). In other words, a
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“neoliberal security state” operates without concern for human rights or the non-market costs
while enforcing the neoliberal economic model via legitimate, state-sponsored violence (Reddy
2011), similar to what was documented in the other Latin American case studies in Chapter 3
(Hey 1995; Heinz and Fruhling 1999; Gómez 2003).205
In order to address the drug trafficking issue in Mexico, the lucrative nature of the
industry must be considered. The drug trafficking industry generates an approximated $45
billion annually (Gibler 2011a). As mentioned earlier, many peasants sought roles in drug
cartels, cultivating poppies and marijuana when the price of legal crops collapsed, and as much
as 78 percent of the Mexican economy currently is thought to be infiltrated by cartels (Garduno
2013). The insatiable U.S. demand for drugs kept the Mexican economy afloat. Around 80
percent of cocaine entering the United States was coming from Mexico, and Mexico was the
largest foreign supplier to the United States of marijuana and methamphetamines (Gibler 2009).
During the first four years of Calderón’s presidency, drug traffickers made an estimated $132
billion—more than oil during the same time period. Put another way, if drugs were eradicated,
the Mexican economy would shrink by 63 percent, and it is unlikely that both the U.S. and
Mexican governments would want to destroy Mexico’s economy.

Even those at the bottom of

the drug hierarchy could not ignore the economic opportunity. U.S. customs officials earned on
average around $40,000 a year which offered a strong incentive to accept the $10,000 to $20,000
payments per shipment offered by drug cartels to allow them to move drugs freely across the
border (Payan 2006). The newly integrated trucking industry also offered a lucrative form of
moving large loads of drugs across the border, since only a fraction of trucks are inspected
(Andreas 2001). Thus, the war on drugs has been considered a “war for drugs” that includes
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several beneficiaries including politicians, the police, and military, all looking for a cut (Gantz
2010: 27).
Aggressive extractivism also increased rapidly throughout the 2000s. Indigenous groups
and peasants were often targeted with repression in an effort to remove them from resource rich
land using the drug war as a guise (Paley 2014). In instances where communities have fought
back out of self-defense to protect their land and resources, the Mexican military, police, or
paramilitary groups were able to justify their repression as subduing a violent group.206 Mining
activity has proliferated since the drug war and is now mostly foreign-owned (Dhillon 2007;
Deloitte 2012). Despite oil being a major revenue stream for the Mexican government, the oil
and electricity sectors were reformed to benefit TNCs (Seelke et al. 2015; Malkin and Krauss
2016). Extraction industries have funded the paramilitarization movement in Mexico, mostly to
develop security forces to plunder and protect resource-rich lands (Servico Geológico Mexicano
2011; Ocampo and Briseno 2013; Esteban 2013).207 Instead of waiting for disaster, many of
these companies, with support from both the U.S. and Mexican governments, execute strategies
of displacement and destruction, and then, investment flows in to rebuild an economy where
TNCs reap the rewards (See Paley 2014). Carlos Slim was one of the Mexicans who profited
from this type of economic rebuilding (Meyer 1992; Freeland 2013).
While Mexico ships drugs to the United States, the United States exports guns to Mexico.
Strict Mexican gun laws are a major reason Mexican drug traffickers purchase arms from U.S.
sellers.208 Both the drug cartels and Mexican security forces are primarily armed with U.S.
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weapons (Morales and Watt 2010). Approximately, 90 percent of the 15 million illegal firearms
in Mexico come from the United States. The Mérida Initiative appears to be a formalized way
for arms and defense companies to cash in on the profits of a drug war. These firms receive over
40 percent of the funding behind the initiative (Carlsen 2008a).
The U.S. involvement in the Mexican drug war was likely profit-driven, with around 85
percent of the drug war proceeds going to the United States, compared to the 13 percent that
went to traffickers moving the product to the United States and 1 percent to the drug producers
(UNODC 2010). In addition to profiting from the drug trade itself, the U.S. Agency for
International Development issued extremely lucrative contracts to U.S. contractors for their part
in the drug war, with some involved in the destruction through military services and others in
helping with rebuilding through construction contracts (see Paley 2014).
U.S. banks were the largest beneficiaries of the drug war seeing as most of the drug
money flowed through their institutions (Murphy 2013; Paley 2014). Since U.S. banks profited
mostly from money laundering, their gains are not typically calculated in the drug trafficking
estimates. Money laundering became an extremely lucrative business for banks that could profit
immensely from the drug trade without direct involvement. Antonio Maria Costa, head of the
UN Office on Drugs and Crime, told the press that a majority of drug profits have flowed into
banks, arguably saving many of them with no other lifeline during the global economic crisis of
2009 (Syal 2009). The weak punishments meted out to the banks involved raised serious
questions about the purpose of the drug trade.209
Wachovia Bank, now owned by Wells Fargo, paid a paltry $160 million in fines,
resolving a criminal investigation into its money laundering practices (Morton 2012). The $160
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million was a small price to pay when considering over $378.3 billion of suspicious activity was
unmonitored. Wachovia Bank admitted to only $100 million of cartel funds moving through
exchange houses, while it is likely that more of the $378.3 billion in similar transactions were
involved in money laundering. It would only take a small fraction of that sum to make money
laundering exponentially more lucrative than the rest of the drug trafficking industry, and this is
only one bank’s activity. Peter and Watt (2012) estimated that U.S. banks made on average $250
billion a year from their indirect involvement in the drug trade starting in the 1990s—over half of
Mexico’s total GDP throughout the 1990s.210 More recently, HSBC bank laundered $7 billion in
drug money at minimum from Mexico via U.S. banks (Morton 2012). They were also fined a
much smaller amount of $27.5 million with potential fines approaching a billion, but still only a
fraction of the total seven billion dollars.211 In another record lawsuit, HSBC was fined $1.9
billion for its “blatant failure” to implement controls to prevent money-laundering.212 Yet, the
bank never faced prosecution because it was considered too vital to the U.S. economy (Rushe
and Treanor 2012). The fine was also considered paltry because it only accounted for five weeks
of income for the bank.213 Among the seemingly countless scandals, Raul Salinas was also
found to be involved in money laundering tied to the drug trade, with an estimated $300 million
in offshore accounts, including Citibank New York which was one of the banks he used to
launder the money (Watt and Zepeda 2012). Interestingly, Vulliamy (2011) draws attention to
the positive correlation between money laundered by banks and people killed in Mexico.
Morton (2012:1642) concludes that “the drug war is a horrid success of state violence and
capitalist accumulation.”
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Other TNCs profit from various aspects of the drug war. Many groups have profited
from the extortion of entire industries such as cultivation of avocados and limes (Wilkinson
2012; See Paley 2014). In this case, small- and medium-sized farmers were charged fees by
organized crime groups to avoid violence. When these farmers refused to pay the extortion tolls,
they were often killed. In one case when they were killed, the government accused the peasants
of involvement in drug trafficking.214 Rather than defending them, they invaded the town of
Buenavista Tomatlán and more blood was shed. Extortion is an added difficulty for small and
medium businesses as it undercuts their ability to effectively compete with larger TNCs, since
TNCs have the funds to hire security forces (Paley 2014). Extortion, then, is just an added
expense for these already struggling farmers and entrepreneurs. Many businesses had to close
due to security concerns. Drug cartels have also entered the business of kidnapping.
Kidnappings have recently been on the rise, leading some Mexicans to form self-defense militias
to protect themselves (Grillo 2014). The United States has also pushed for legal reforms in
Mexico because a common legal system allows U.S. law companies to profit from their services
in Mexico (Paley 2011). Furthermore, these “positive” legal reforms—some of which would
certainly benefit Mexico—have led to a potential U.S. military immunity in Mexico (see
Huggins 1991).

Extending the Neoliberal Economic Model
The drug war appears to be an extension of NAFTA and neoliberal policies. Paley
(2014) calls it “drug war capitalism” after the title of her book. From her work on Mexico as
well as Colombia, Guatemala, and Honduras, Paley (2014) found three commonalities among the
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drug wars in all four countries. First, the victims of the drug war are disproportionately poor,
working class, and migrants. These victims also typically have no connection to the drug trade,
although they are commonly portrayed as being criminal. Second, the most obvious widespread
effect felt by the majority of the population is a restriction of mobility, either around their own
city or migrating across borders. Third, violence related to the drug war is commonly paired
with decreased freedom of expression via individual, collective, media, or otherwise.
Journalists, in particular, have been targeted and silenced. In other words, the antidrug war
tactics act as a legitimized form of social control. Although Paley (2014) covers only four
countries, these patterns are part of a larger global war on drugs involving upwards of 65
countries with future plans of expanding into Africa.215 Physical integrity rights violations
increased in all four of the countries alongside the escalation of the respective drug wars, and
U.S. military bases have been established throughout Mexico and Central America. The military
takeover appears to have been primarily for corporate profit, specifically by extraction and arms
companies. TNCs are the one group that has gone largely unaffected by the violence which
ultimately is a benefit regardless of other factors. The drug war simply strengthened investor
protections in Mexico. Now, violence can be used to protect their financial investments.
Watt and Zepeda (2012) also see an undeniable correlation between neoliberalism and
narcotrafficking. Increases in drug trafficking did not catch the United States off guard since
both Presidents Bush Sr. and Clinton forbade the DEA and U.S. Custom Services from
mentioning drug trafficking as an outcome of NAFTA (Cockburn and St. Clair 1998). Despite
Mexico’s lower rates of crime and murder compared to other Latina American countries, the
United States promoted a narrative of Mexico as a failing state (Carlos 2013). The United States
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legitimized its economic and military expansion in Mexico through a civilizing narrative. In
addition, the United States perpetuated Mexico’s depiction as a chaotic failed state to further
protect its militarized attempts at reinforcing the economic model. Despite such a stance, the
United States is tied to both the drug and arms trade.
The evidence presented here suggests that the drug war was a cover for protecting the
economic model imposed by NAFTA and other neoliberal policies. With the rising outcry
against the drug problem, U.S. funds flowed into Mexico to equip and train Mexican troops
which actually correlated with increased repression rather than less drug activity (Watt and
Zepeda 2012). Groups posing unique threats to both NAFTA and the neoliberal economic
model, such as the Zapatistas, were targets of this repression. Yet, this political opposition
presented itself after the Berlin Wall had fallen and the Communist threat was no longer a
legitimate reason for repression. Instead, the drug war filled the void to serve as a pretext for
violent repression despite the fact that the Zapatistas had no affiliation with the drug trade. If
drugs are the real problem, government officials may want to look at NAFTA, which was
responsible for creating the infrastructure and labor pool for drug trafficking. NAFTA and the
militarization of antidrug measures led to a skyrocketing in the street prices of illicit drugs, thus
encouraging their cultivation by peasants. After the shift to neoliberalism, few jobs were created
and the majority of Mexicans found work in the informal sector. Drug cartels diversified into
new profitable areas of kidnapping and extortion, which became extremely profitable as several
vulnerable Mexicans sought to migrate either cross country or into the United States (Semple
2016). The drug industry as a whole was one of, if not the most, profitable business in Mexico.
Lastly, the Mérida Initiative and other antidrug programs provided over a billion dollars in U.S.
aid that funded the repression (Morton 2012). With U.S. funds, the Mexican military and police
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force, along with paramilitary groups, killed, displaced, and intimidated mostly poor and rural
Mexicans. The fear and displacement opened up land for investment and privatization and
weakened the power of labor and unions. As with the other Latin American case studies from
Chapter 3, the violence only subsided when Mexicans accepted the economic model as
unavoidable (Hey 1995; Heinz and Fruhling 1999; Gómez 2003).

Analytical Summary
The last two chapters dealt with the context under which NAFTA was negotiated, the
actual negotiations, and the details and criminogenic nature of the resulting agreement.
Referring to the analytical model in Figure 2.1, this chapter focused on the link between NAFTA
(policy) and its subsequent social harms, categorized as those generally found in agriculture, the
environment, migration, and the drug trade. The major piece needed at this point in the analysis
is establishing this link, most importantly, isolating NAFTA from other potential contributors to
these social harms. Most commonly, other researchers have attributed the poor economic
performance in Mexico to the peso devaluation and subsequent economic crisis in 1994 and 1995
(Galbraith 2014) and Mexican mismanagement (Wise 1998; Audley et al. 2004), rather than
NAFTA. However, both of these potential factors are related to NAFTA and the other neoliberal
policies put in place prior to NAFTA by the Mexican government.
The peso crisis had a major effect on Mexico, but it is difficult to disentangle it from
NAFTA. Since most NAFTA proponents blame the Mexican economic woes following NAFTA
on the economic crisis rather than NAFTA or the larger body of neoliberal reforms of which it is
the culmination, the 1994 peso devaluation and subsequent economic crisis must be examined
closely (Orme 1996; Wise 1998; Audley et al. 2004; Scott 2011; Galbraith 2014). If NAFTA
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played a role in the peso devaluation, then any subsequent economic crisis would, at least to
some degree, be attributable to NAFTA. Take Wise’s (1998) edited volume, for instance, where
most authors argue that NAFTA improved the Mexican economy—supported mainly by
focusing on increases in trade and foreign investment—and that the issues with Mexico after
NAFTA are due more to Mexican mismanagement than NAFTA. However, these authors tend
to neglect the U.S. role in that mismanagement. Specifically, the United States praised Mexican
leadership during and after the NAFTA negotiations to keep a positive image of NAFTA and its
interests in securing the trade deal. Wise (1998) even notes the importance of intra-industry
trade in securing NAFTA, and Maxfield and Shapiro (1998), authors in Wise’s edited volume,
argue that the United States was the winner in the NAFTA negotiations despite some
concessions to Mexico. Given that some of the NAFTA provisions severely limit the ability of
governments to pass regulations that cut into corporate profits, how can NAFTA be ignored as a
potential or partial cause of the economic crisis?
Wise (1998) seemingly ignores the likely scenario that Mexican mismanagement was not
necessarily due to incompetence, rather it was part of a strategy to inflate the peso to gain
support for NAFTA. In such a scenario, it would be hard to place the blame solely on
mismanagement and not hold NAFTA somewhat accountable. Another author in Wise’s edited
volume, Pastor (1998:121), outlines a plausible alternative to handling the peso crisis that would
have involved “tinkering with the exchange rate,” but would have “alienate[d] portfolio
investors” and “perhaps jeopardize[d] Mexico’s chances at entering NAFTA.” One could also
argue that NAFTA lacked transitional support for workers facing tough economic times.
Instead, Wise (1998) argues that transitional programs helped cushion many U.S. and Mexican
groups from the disadvantages of NAFTA, albeit those groups had to push for those concessions
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and these programs often served simply as window-dressing. Wise (1998) tends to focus on
Mexico’s failure to provide transitional aid, rather than NAFTA’s failure to include it. Take
Mexican agricultural workers for instance. Despite nearly 26 percent of the workforce in
agriculture, Pastor and Wise (1998), in their co-authored chapter, argue that the Mexican
government did next to nothing to help these workers through an adjustment period that brought
several changes to the agricultural sector. Many of those changes, of course, were brought on by
NAFTA and neoliberal policies adopted by Mexico in preparation for NAFTA. These authors
also ignore U.S. and Mexican TNCs as beneficiaries of the “Mexican mismanagement.” The
U.S.-Mexican ties during the early NAFTA years demonstrate the instrumental importance of
NAFTA to foster increased U.S. influence in Mexico as documented by Dresser (1998), another
author in Wise’s book, thus suggesting that NAFTA may have been more important in the
Mexican outcomes than initially suggested by Wise (1998).
Some scholars discuss the U.S. involvement in the Mexican peso devaluation without
placing blame on NAFTA. For example, Weisbrot, Lefebvre, and Sammut (2014) argue that the
U.S. Federal Reserve’s decision to increase U.S. short-term interest rates led to the 1994 peso
crisis. Since NAFTA created a deeper economic integration between the United States and
Mexico, Mexico was more at the mercy of Federal Reserve Policy. Weisbrot et al. (2014:18)
concluded that several policy decisions that troubled the peso “were not all written into
NAFTA,” but “were closely related in that they were part of a strategy of guaranteeing foreign
investors the kinds of capital mobility that they wanted, in order to attract foreign investment
(both portfolio and foreign direct investment).”
Audley et al. (2004) helped put the Federal Reserve’s actions in context. NAFTA
negotiations boosted investor confidence that investments in Mexico would be protected by the
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new agreement and would benefit from a newly available U.S. market economy. When
developed countries’ economies slowed in the early 1990s, Western banks cut interest rates to
help their struggling economies, but this also made investment in countries like Mexico more
attractive. Mexico also utilized a fixed exchange rate, pegging the peso to the U.S. dollar,
creating predictability in the exchange rate and appeasing investors. The massive inflows of
investment were primarily portfolio capital in the form of government bonds and corporate stock,
which is much more mobile than direct investment in actual facilities or equipment. When the
U.S. Federal Reserve raised their low-interest rates in early 1994, portfolio investment flowing
into Mexico slowed. However, Audley et al. (2004) like Wise (1998) points to Mexican
mismanagement as the cause of the peso devaluation for two reasons. First, the Mexican
government transferred its public debt from pesos to dollar-based securities (tesobonos),
assuming the exchange rate risk previously borne by investors. Second, it elected to keep the
incoming funds out of the public money supply which allowed the Bank of Mexico to intervene,
protecting the peso. However, both decisions were major appeasements for investors, holding
true to NAFTA’s promise. To suggest there were no other forces at play beyond the Mexican
government denies much of the evidence laid out in Chapter 6.
Although less common, other researchers hold NAFTA more accountable for the peso
crisis. Lee (1995) argues that the campaign to sell NAFTA created a major enthusiasm among
investors that led to unsustainable speculative capital flowing into the Mexican stock exchange,
creating a bubble of inflated Mexican assets and the peso.216 The subsequent mismanagement of
the Mexican government to correct the overvaluation was a deliberate strategy to keep NAFTA
attractive and reestablish PRI credibility, both of which were in the interest of the TCC. A high

216

Blecker (1997) makes a similar argument.

330
peso protected NAFTA from many of its critics since it made Mexican labor more expensive,
and increased Mexicans’ purchasing power. The former provided evidence against U.S. business
relocations, and the latter was appealing to Mexican workers. Thacker (1999) emphasizes the
government-business coalition (or TCC), which he claims destabilized the economy by
increasing dependence on portfolio investment capital. He described NAFTA as a policy
designed to attract greater levels of investment by bolstering investor confidence and cementing
Mexico’s reforms, providing preferential access to the U.S. consumer market for exploitation
and building trust with the business community by giving voice to the large firms during
negotiations. In turn, he attributes the peso crisis to the TCC which was also responsible for
NAFTA as documented in Chapter 6.
Although several negative outcomes have been documented as happening after NAFTA
was implemented throughout this chapter, it is reasonable to question if NAFTA actually
influenced them. It is often quite difficult to parse out the effects of NAFTA specifically from
the other neoliberal policies implemented around the same time. For the most part, this chapter
lumped the economic policies together while looking at trends pre- and post-NAFTA. However,
in a recent unique analysis of NAFTA, Weisbrot, Lefebvre, and Sammut (2014) attempted to
isolate the effects of NAFTA on Mexico by comparing Mexico’s socio-economic outcomes after
NAFTA with other Latin American countries. Ultimately, they found that, regardless of how
you measure economic success in Mexico, the story almost invariably describes NAFTA’s effect
on Mexico as an economic failure. Even when using popular macro-level economic indicators,
those most often used by the World Bank and IMF, they still find negative economic outcomes.
Compared to Latin America, Mexico’s growth rate ranks 18th out of 20 total countries,
and Mexico’s total growth is half that of the average Latin American country’s growth rate over
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the same time period (Weisbrot et al. 2014). While Mexico’s poverty remained at similar levels
after NAFTA, the rest of Latin America’s poverty levels fell 150 percent more than Mexico’s.
Real wages barely moved from 1994–2012 increasing only 2.3 percent, and the minimum wage
adjusted for inflation plummeted 26.3 percent over the same time period despite it being one of
the few protections for labor actually written into NAFTA. Although there are observable spikes
in the unemployment rate, the long-term trend from 1994 to 2013 was slowly upward with a
similar trend for underemployment as well. About 20 percent of all agricultural jobs were lost
from 1991 to 2007, while a large number of jobs transitioned from full-time family employment
to seasonal (lasting less than six months). In fact, over that same time frame, seasonal
employment increased by 151 percent while more than half of the family employment jobs were
lost. Many of the jobs lost in corn production were replaced by vegetable and fruit production,
but this industry was largely seasonal resulting in widespread underemployment in the
agricultural sector. Considering the miserable performance of the Mexican economy in
comparison to most of the rest of Latin America, Weisbrot et al. (2014) conclude that NAFTA
had a significant impact on driving these negative economic outcomes.
Additional evidence that NAFTA contributed to poor economic conditions in Mexico
shows low domestic investment (Zepeda et al. 2009), slow economic growth (Laurell 2015), few
jobs (Cypher and Wise 2010), stagnant wages (CONEVAL 2013), high under- and
unemployment (Laurell 2015), wide inequality (Galbraith 2014), poverty (Laurell 2015), rural
poverty (Gonzalez 2011), abysmal working conditions (Simon 2014), and weak unions (Bacon
2004). NAFTA also contributed to the four major categories of social harms discussed in this
chapter. NAFTA and the neoliberal policies altered the agricultural model in North America
resulting in Mexico’s reliance on U.S. food imports, ultimately destroying Mexico’s food
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sovereignty (Suárez 2008). In addition, the newly imported foods were high in sugar and fats
transitioning many Mexicans to an unhealthy diet, resulting in a major health and obesity
epidemic (Otero et al. 2015). The neoliberal policies also favored TNCs producing agricultural
goods on a massive scale, while forcing most small-scale farmers out of business and/or off their
land (Public Citizen 2014). Revisions of intellectual property rights under NAFTA created a
structure for TNCs to keep a stranglehold on patents and further unemployment among farmers
(Shiva 2000). Most of the new jobs that replaced those lost were often seasonal and/or had
poorer working conditions (Weisbrot et al. 2014). Little help was offered to these struggling
farmers, and no transitional support was built into NAFTA (Keleman 2010: Fernández et al.
2012).
The agricultural model embedded in NAFTA, and the neoliberal policies preceding it,
also contributed to the degradation of the environment. The rapid increase in the use of GM
crops threatened biodiversity, specifically corn landraces (Mendieta 2006). A new focus on
monocropping and concentrated mass agricultural production on irrigated land led to soil
erosion, depletion of external inputs, air, water, and soil contamination, and major illnesses
(Alieri and Nicholls 2004; Gliessman 2007). Under the guise of environmental conservatism,
TNCs removed the indigenous from their land (Barreda 2003) and exploited the environment for
profit through environmental services, bioprospecting, and ecotourism (Carlsen 2004). The new
neoliberal production model which provided TNCs with lax environmental enforcement (Carrillo
and Schatan 2006) also added to the air and water pollution in Mexico (Gallagher 2004; Lipford
and Yandle 2010), and toxic waste often collected in poor maquiladora communities (Simon
2014). Deforestation was a result of poor farmers attempting to cultivate more land to
compensate for their losses (Soto 2012), and others engaged in the trade of endangered animals
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in the black market (Rosenberg 2004). NAFTA even provided TNCs with the ability to sue
sovereign governments when the people stood up for themselves.217
Faced with the poor economic and environmental outcomes of NAFTA and other
neoliberal policies, average Mexican citizens often chose to immigrate to the United States
(Bacon 2013) or joined the drug trade (Dube et al. 2014). Both choices were quite dangerous,
often resulting in death. After NAFTA, the United States heavily militarized its southern border
(Nevins 2002), and death among Mexican immigrants traversing the border tripled (Massey et al.
2002). In the United Sates, ICE agents executed immigration raids which effectively suppressed
both immigrants and unions (Bacon 2008). While immigrants were exploited, TNCs prospered
from guest worker programs (Gonzalez 2008). For those who elected to enter the drug trade,
commonly to make ends meet (Dube et al. 2014), many died after Calderón militarized the
government’s efforts against the drug trade (Cave 2012). While Mexico’s government put on a
pretense of combatting drugs, they frequently profited from their partnership with drug cartels
(Paley 2012) and offered near immunity to its military to quell any opposition, tying them to
drugs without trial (Gibler 2011b). The later policies of the SSP and the Mérida Initiative
appeared to be ways of protecting the neoliberal economic model solidified by NAFTA (Watt
and Zepeda 2012). The increased military power brought by these policies provided Mexico the
ability to violently repress any threat to the economic model using the guise of drug trafficking.
This chapter has now established the link between NAFTA and its subsequent social
harms to which it played a varying degree of importance. Most of the social harms documented
in this chapter can be classified as human rights violations (HRVs) by simply using the UN
Universal Declaration of Huma Rights as a guideline. Conservatively, an argument can be made
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that Articles 11, 13, 17, 23, 25, and 27 were violated.218 Thus, these HRVs are considered
criminal outcomes resulting from the specific nature of NAFTA described in Chapter 6 that
being undemocratic, heavily influenced by a TCC, and incorporating repression of any
opposition. Given that NAFTA contributed to these outcomes, it is concluded that NAFTA is a
criminogenic policy not just for its formation which made criminal outcomes likely, but also due
to the realized adverse outcomes that actually came to fruition documented in this chapter. The
next chapter will conclude this dissertation by summarizing the main argument, discussing its
limitations, and suggesting directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

General Summary of Findings and Contributions
This dissertation began with the 1982 Mexican economic crisis, and then traced the
events before, during, and after the NAFTA negotiations, focusing on Mexico’s perspective.
The results of this study suggest that members of a transnational capitalist class (TCC), operating
internationally in all three North American countries, including political leaders, business elites,
prominent intellectuals, and members of international financial institutions, constructed a
criminogenic NAFTA. Operating during a crisis of accumulation in the early 1980s, a new
social structure of accumulation (SSA) was necessary to continue a capitalist economic system
capable of capital accumulation (see Kotz 2015). This new SSA was based on neoliberal
ideology embraced by those within the TCC. A neoliberal SSA, defined by an emphasis on
deregulation, privatization, and inflation control, crystallized in a collection of free trade policies
of which NAFTA was a part.
NAFTA was of particular interest because it involved a non-core nation.219 Mexico’s
economic woes and position in the semi-periphery, according to world-systems analysis,
provided the opportunity for the United States to extract several concessions from a Mexico
desperate for foreign investment. Specifically, Mexico made several concessions that removed
aid and protections for its rural peasants who were primarily poor subsistence farmers largely
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located in southern Mexico. During NAFTA negotiations, members of the TCC from Canada,
Mexico, and the United States worked in concert to craft a policy conducive to their interests,
which largely consisted of advancing and protecting investors’ rights, often to the detriment of
the average worker (see Table 6.1). Facing opposition from its onset, the TCC made efforts to
conceal much of the negotiations from the public by holding private meetings, classifying
information, and withholding drafts of the negotiated text from the public. In addition, they
launched a widespread media campaign that focused primarily on promulgating information
favorable to NAFTA, while eschewing any criticism of NAFTA, regardless of its veracity.
These media efforts helped to, not only change public opinion, but also offered political
protection for politicians to vote in favor of NAFTA without threatening a loss of their
constituencies. In the end, NAFTA was passed despite citizen opposition present in all three
countries.
Within the first year of NAFTA’s implementation, a serious peso crisis ensued. Mexican
leaders had continually increased the value of the peso during the NAFTA negotiations to keep
NAFTA attractive for investors. However, at the end of 1994, the peso had to be devalued,
giving rise to a major economic recession in the following year. The economic crisis led to high
poverty, inequality, and unemployment. Such a crisis, paired with the removal of aid and
protection for Mexican farmers, led to the devastation of the countryside, especially when corn
tariffs were removed ahead of schedule. Since most rural Mexican peasants were subsistence
farmers heavily reliant on corn production, many were forced to relocate to survive in the new
economy when corn prices plummeted. Their situation was compounded by the Mexican
government’s recommendation for replacement crops. In place of corn, these farmers were
expected to grow other horticultural crops such as fruits and vegetables. Without governmental
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guidance or aid, many expanded their land area, continuing the cultivation of corn. The changes
in agricultural methods led to environmental concerns such as lack of water, soil erosion, and
deforestation. Many of the farmers elected to either leave their land behind, or grow much more
profitable illicit crops such as marijuana. Both of these choices only complicated the dire
situation of farmers, and Mexican citizens overall. For those who migrated, many faced serious
danger if they attempted to cross the northern border into the United States. Due to these
dangers, most had to pay a coyote their life savings to arrive safely. Those who grew illicit crops
also faced perilous interactions with drug cartel members who often extorted money from these
growers, and, at times, killed those who were recalcitrant. Instead of offering aid and protections
to these vulnerable people, the U.S. and Mexican governments responded by militarizing both
the border, and the efforts against the drug trade, ultimately increasing the violence.
Overall, these various social harms that took place in the years following NAFTA’s
implementation have been connected to the policy itself. Members of the TCC actively pursued
a NAFTA that would meet their interests, while largely ignoring the evidence that suggested
these harms as possible outcomes. Partially blinded by a neoliberal groupthink, the TCC never
relented in promoting a neoliberal global capitalism as a panacea for major economic crises. The
TCC’s zealous, undemocratic pursuit and negotiation of NAFTA led to NAFTA being a
criminogenic policy.
This dissertation developed a unique analytical model for studying criminogenic policies
that incorporates a diverse theoretical literature including state-corporate crime research, worldsystems analysis, SSA theory, and neo-Gramscian work on the TCC (see Figure 2.1). Applying
this framework to NAFTA, the current dissertation concluded that NAFTA was criminal and/or
criminogenic on at least three counts as it violated the UN International Bill of Human Rights.
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First, the NAFTA negotiation process was both criminal and criminogenic due to three
interrelated reasons: (1) the heavy influence of the TCC that often pumped large sums of money
and resources into influencing its provisions; (2) the undemocratic structure that disallowed
various groups from participation, and (3) NAFTA opposition commonly faced repression, either
physically in Mexico, or informationally in the United States. Second, the written text of
NAFTA was criminal and criminogenic for its failure to include human rights protections for
average citizens, while offering several investor rights that were directly contradictory to the
rights of citizens.
Third, NAFTA was criminogenic for several of the social harms affecting much of the
Mexican population, at least partially related to the implementation of NAFTA. Chapter 7 is
dedicated to detailing many of these harms such as poverty, inequality, un- and
underemployment, harsh working conditions, lax workers’ rights and protections, displacement,
product-dumping, improper removal of toxic wastes, deforestation, water shortages, soil erosion,
air and water pollution, exploitation of guest workers, and drug-, border-, and immigrationrelated violence. All of these social harms are common targets of study for criminologists
operating within a state-corporate crime framework. Yet, this dissertation, instead of focusing on
one or two of these social harms individually, argues that NAFTA as a policy played an
important role in creating these conditions, and thus is a criminogenic policy outcome. In other
words, the concept of a criminogenic policy can help criminologists place these harms within a
larger context to analyze the people and forces behind these social harms.
In addition, the concept of criminogenic policy allows the study of multiple states
committing crime collectively. This dissertation expanded the traditional state-corporate crime
frameworks (Kramer and Michalowski 2006; Rothe and Mullins 2009) to better address crimes
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of globalization where not just one state should be held criminally liable. Instead, more
commonly, multiple states interact and commit crimes in collusion. Studying criminogenic
policies is one avenue for analyzing large-scale crimes in which multiple states, corporations,
and/or other institutions and the key players from these organizations (e.g., members of the TCC)
act together to commit crime. Although this dissertation focused on a criminogenic policy, it
also shed light on the importance of studying crimes that are committed by multiple states in
collusion. This may happen when collusive action by states results in social harm where no
policy is involved. In either case, examining multiple states in the production of social harm
should be important for criminologists interested in crimes of the powerful.
Lastly, more than simply looking at multiple states colluding to commit crime, this
dissertation offers a way to investigate the widespread intersection of powerful individuals and
organizational members of the TCC. For instance, when investigating an international statecorporate crime, multiple states may be liable, but likely there are also multiple corporations
liable along with other influential figures such as intellectuals, religious leaders, and media
pundits who are not necessarily members of the state or a corporation. In this dissertation, for
example, key players shaping NAFTA were not limited to political officials in all three countries,
rather business leaders, members of international financial institutions, intellectuals, and media
experts all played a crucial role in NAFTA’s formation. The TCC literature offers a way to
understand the overlapping interests among powerful members of multiple nations and bridges a
gap in the state-corporate crime literature by providing a vehicle to analyze and explain how
multiple states, corporations, and other powerful entities collude in crime commission. Tracing
the connections of the TCC should provide important insights into the motivations of crimes
committed by the powerful.
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Limitations
A few limitations exist in this dissertation due to the case study method employed. First,
an overwhelming amount of data makes theorizing difficult. However, this is not really a
problem of case study method, rather it is reflective of the complex reality of the phenomenon
studied. Since theory should accurately explain and predict reality, intricate phenomena such as
members of a TCC colluding to influence multinational policy necessitates a more complex
theory. Second, related to this issue of specificity, case study research lacks generalizability.
This dissertation focused on NAFTA, and its conclusions cannot be generalized to other
potentially criminogenic policies. However, case study research, and this study in particular,
commonly traces particular conditions to specific outcomes. In this case, the current study
demonstrated how social, political, and economic conditions influence the policy negotiation
process, and how those negotiations create a unique policy that is potentially criminogenic.
Although the results are not generalizable, other policies can be explored using the analytical
framework laid out in this study to analyze similarities and differences between policies and their
effects.
Third, there is an inherent selection bias in case study research. One major problem is the
lack of cases and variability of conditions and/or outcomes. For this dissertation, there was only
one of each, but future research can rectify this limitation by studying other criminogenic
policies. Another related problem is confirmation bias. In many respects, NAFTA was chosen
as a case to demonstrate the concept of criminogenic policies. In other words, NAFTA was
chosen to confirm the proposed analytical model of criminogenic policies (see Figure 2.1).
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However, as mentioned in Chapter 4, since there was a high likelihood of NAFTA being
criminogenic, it was treated as a “most likely” case testing the proposed analytical model.220
Fourth, the most problematic shortcoming of using case study research in this study was
its inability to uncover the magnitude of the effect for each condition. Although this study has
demonstrated several of the conditions that can influence a policy to be criminogenic, it struggles
at deciphering which conditions play the largest role in producing a criminogenic policy
outcome. Again, future research could help to weigh the various conditions and their level of
impact, as will be discussed below. However, more research is needed to clarify the conditions
that lead to a criminogenic policy outcome before moving on to uncovering their magnitude.
Beyond these methodological limitations, there are at least two additional limitations in
the current research. First, since the NAFTA negotiation process was secretive, there is a
heightened concern about the validity of the materials that are available. When documenting the
negotiations, there was, at times, a reliance on limited and secondary sources to fill in the gaps.
The Chapter 6 appendix discusses these sources in detail to ensure transparency. Despite the
obvious limitations of limited and secondary sources, several other sources such as newspaper
accounts, meeting memoranda, and presidential speeches and phone conversations were used to
triangulate the events that occurred during the NAFTA negotiations. Nevertheless, as with any
secretive or classified subject matter, the depiction of events should be taken with caution.
Second, one of the goals of this dissertation was to demonstrate NAFTA’s effects on
Mexican indigenous people and farmers. Although Chapter 7 attempted to disentangle, to some
degree, NAFTA from other variables, such as other neoliberal policies, the 1994 peso
devaluation, the 1995 economic crisis, Mexican mismanagement, and China becoming a
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competitor in the global marketplace, the complexity of Mexico’s social history make it nearly, if
not entirely, impossible to completely isolate NAFTA from other contributing factors to the
subsequent social harms. Thus, the strongest possible conclusion is that NAFTA played an
important role in contributing to the negative outcomes in Mexico, as documented in Chapter 7.
Time is another related issue. It is unclear as to the amount of time one should wait to evaluate a
policy. For instance, did the effects of NAFTA occur immediately, or after 20 to 30 years? The
other variables listed above further complicate this question. One must also be concerned with
the parameters of a study. Since any given historical event is likely influenced by other events
that come before it, one must reason how far to go back in history. Chapter 4 described why the
beginning of the neoliberal era seemed most appropriate.

Future Research
One of the most promising avenues for future research is further exploring criminogenic
policies. Although this study traced the formation and effects of one criminogenic policy, it did
little to assess what conditions and combinations of conditions lead to a criminogenic policy
outcome or a non-criminogenic policy outcome. Future researchers could borrow from Table
6.1, which documents some of the motivations, opportunities, controls, and constraints at various
levels of analysis influencing the formation of a criminogenic policy, to create a study that
further attempts to pinpoint which of these conditions may be necessary and/or sufficient,
making progress towards theory building. Quantitative analyses could help determine the
strongest predictors of criminogenic policy outcome. They may be able to decipher the
importance of motivations, opportunities, controls, and constraints more generally. Historical
comparative analyses could be designed to examine the differences between policies that
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produce social harms and those that do not in an attempt to search for these necessary and
sufficient causes of a criminogenic policy outcome.
Specifically, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) would help in such an effort to
assess the multiple pathways to a criminogenic policy outcome and the multiple pathways to a
non-criminogenic policy outcome.221 QCA is more promising for studying criminogenic policies
than quantitative analyses because it allows exploration of causation that is complex by
searching for pathways of combinations of conditions to a particular outcome rather than the net
effects of particular variables on a dependent variable. A future QCA could analyze multiple
economic policies, some that include a social charter with human rights protections such as in the
European Union, and some where there is no inclusion of human rights protections such as
NAFTA. Taking the lessons of this dissertation, several suspected conditions influencing a
criminogenic policy outcome could be used including the presence or absence of the policy’s
transparency, popular involvement in its formation, repression of opposition to the policy,
corporate involvement in negotiations, independent oversight of the negotiation, and furtive
political deals. A QCA would then look for the possible combinations of these conditions that
lead to a social charter, and those that do not lead to a social charter.
Of particular importance for future research is the inclusion of core nations other than the
United States. Studies that include policies where China, Russia, Japan, or some Western
European nations are the most powerful countries in the agreement would be useful for
comparison with those where the United States is the core-state negotiator. These policies could
also be included in a QCA. The findings of this study and such future studies should help to
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inform international lawmakers in drafting protections for global citizens from the potentially
harmful effects of transnational policies, particularly those that restructure the economy.
Since NAFTA, there have been several proposed free trade policies, most of which have
been implemented. None may be more important than the recent controversial Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP). U.S. President Donald Trump was elected partly running on a campaign
promise to withdraw the United States from the TPP which he fulfilled by signing an executive
order in his first week of presidency.222 The TPP should be of particular interest to future
researchers because it has been characterized as “NAFTA on steroids,” and, based on the current
study, likely to be criminogenic.223 The TPP is a NAFTA-like trade deal that includes 12 nations
covering around 40 percent of the world’s economy with strong support from business and
former U.S. President, Barack Obama.224 The TPP is an interesting case to apply the analytical
framework from Chapter 2, since an incoming president signed an executive order to withdraw
the United States from the agreement despite strong support from several members of the TCC.
What conditions lead to a reversal of a criminogenic policy? Although an executive order does
not mark the end of the U.S. role in major trade deals, future researchers should explore how
Donald Trump fits into the TCC and the likelihood of rivalry factions in the TCC.
Although there is ample ground for studying other criminogenic policies, the study of
NAFTA as a criminogenic policy should not end with this dissertation. As with the TPP,
President Trump campaigned on a promise to withdraw the United States from NAFTA, but later
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reneged on that promise and agreed to renegotiate NAFTA instead.225 Yet, the details of such a
renegotiation are unknown and a future date for renegotiation is not set. A comparison of
NAFTA and the TPP should be of interest to future researchers. Why did Trump withdraw from
the TPP, but only agree to renegotiate NAFTA? What are some of the conditions leading to
these differing outcomes? However, it is still early in the NAFTA renegotiation story. Future
researchers should continue following NAFTA to see if and how this renegotiation takes shape.
Another line of research related to the current dissertation involves domestic policy.
Although policy is operationalized in this study as, at least, bilateral, the concept of a
criminogenic policy should be useful to researchers studying domestic policy. For instance, with
news pages filling with debates over Trumpcare and Obamacare brands of healthcare, and
differing political alliances deeming each harmful to particular groups of people, future
researchers should study domestic policy as potentially criminogenic, and, in the same manner
used in this study, look for conditions leading to criminogenic domestic policies. Close attention
should also be paid to the interaction between domestic and global policy. For instance, in this
study, Mexican domestic policy was found to be influenced by Mexican elites’ relationships with
U.S. elites, and the NAFTA policy in particular.
Lastly, future researchers, especially criminologists, should focus more attention on the
“lesser” human rights violations (HRVs) such as economic inequality, lack of political
involvement in policy formation, poor working conditions, and unclean water and air. The
current dissertation demonstrated, not only the harmful nature of these violations, but the
compounding effect of these violations that gave way to more serious HRVs such as the torture,
disappearances, and extrajudicial killings seen in the Mexican drug war and the militarized
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southern U.S. border. Human rights organizations should track these “lesser” HRVs while also
searching for connections between them and the more serious HRVs.
There is certainly no global criminal justice organization dedicated to curbing such
elaborate crimes as creating a criminogenic policy through legal mechanisms. Even for illegal
crimes committed by powerful states or corporate actors, there is little, weak, or no infrastructure
to control those crimes. With the recognition that such crimes may be committed without
justice, the onus falls on the citizens of the world to restore justice, most promisingly through
transnational grassroots movements. Academia can play a vital role in this pursuit. Using
Bennet’s (2004) description of a case study researcher as a detective, academics, particularly
criminologists, should act as investigators documenting the transgressions of powerful actors,
like this dissertation has done. It is often not as simple as noting the crimes of particular
individuals, but rather highlighting criminal forces and institutions. Nonetheless, the role of
academics is essentially the same as a police detective who must piece the evidence together to
determine who or what committed a crime. On the other end of this envisioned global criminal
justice system are the citizens who shall play the role of prosecution, judge, and jury. Using the
evidence provided by academic researchers, the public should move to prosecute state-corporate
criminals, and push for social change to restore justice to the victims of criminogenic policies.
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